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ABSTRACT 
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis asks how a school which was established to help a group of children 
consistently identified with disparities in education achieve equality—and which 
has actually done so—could be sued for discrimination because it prefers those 
children in admissions.   
In search of answers, this thesis critically analyzes the narratives of equality evident 
in the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Doe v 
Kamehameha Schools, arguing that the dissent, majority and concurrence opinions 
suggest three conflicting narratives of equality—what the thesis calls the adamant 
everyone/no-one, weak someone and limited indigenous learner narratives.  It 
demonstrates how these narratives reflect an identity-specific, racialized history of 
slavery and segregation but fail to account entirely for either the unique historico-
legal history of the Native Hawaiian people or the huge gap between formal 
constitutional guarantees of equality and everyday realities of complex 
discrimination and disparities almost unrelentingly attracted to Native Hawaiian 
identity.  It recommends an expansion of these narratives within federal law 
consistent with liberal theory, international law and the legal experience of a sister 
settler jurisdiction—Aotearoa New Zealand.  More importantly, it demonstrates 
that such expansion is consistent with substantial equality, non-discrimination and 
rights of self-determination that may have the greatest capacity for reconciling the 
guarantee/reality gap.  Finally, specific good, better and best recommendations are 
made including philosophical consistency with the expanded multi-narrative, and 
the intentional importation of the human right to education and Article 14 of the 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2007 into federal law.   
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NOTES ON LANGUAGE 
NOTE ON USE OF TE REO 
MĀORI AND ŌLELO HAWAI‘I 
 
Consistent with the Geoff McLay, Christopher Murray and Jonathan Orpin’s New 
Zealand Law Style Guide1, words in te reo Māori (the Māori language) have not 
been italicized although translations of the words have been provided in the text or 
footnotes.  While the New Zealand Law Style Guide would require languages which 
are foreign to Aotearoa New Zealand to be italicized continuously, I have chosen 
to italicize words in ōlelo Hawai‘i (the Hawaiian language) only the first time they 
are used, at which time I will also provide a translation of the word or phrase in the 
text or footnotes.  Given their historical status as the indigenous languages of their 
respective countries and historically discriminatory attitudes towards ōlelo Hawai‘i 
and te reo Māori, the author is uncomfortable with treating either as a foreign or 
alien language.  To quote the 2010 doctoral thesis of Dr Nālani Wilson-Hokowhitu: 
I have chosen not to italicize Hawaiian words.  I understand that for some 
Indigenous researchers it is important to italicise Indigenous words that appear in 
English texts, so that the Native language does not become subsumed within 
English.  However, italicization can also serve to de-normalise language.  That is, 
italicization can make Native languages appear as foreign to the normal text.  While 
both arguments have merit, I believe it is more important that Indigenous languages 
appear standard, not as ‘Other’.2 
 
 
  
                                                          
1 Geoff McLay, Christopher Murray and Jonathan Orpin New Zealand Law Style Guide (2d ed, 
NZ Law Foundation, 2011), at 1.1.1. 
2 Kathryn Louise Nālani Wilson, Nā Mo‘okū‘auhau Holowa‘a: Native Hawaiian Women’s Stories 
of the Voyaging Canoe Hōkūle‘a (2010), a thesis submitted for the degree of doctor of Philosophy 
at the University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand, footnote 1 at 1. 
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GLOSSARY 
GLOSSARY OF EQUALITY 
NARRATIVES 
 
The following equality narratives are my own creation and will be explained and 
developed further throughout the thesis.  They are provided here for ease of 
reference. 
Everyone 
A formalized equality narrative which recognizes universal, broadly expressly 
equal protection guarantees distributed or recognized on the basis of homogeneity.  
That is, everyone and anyone is a rightsholder.  The equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution is expressed in this language. 
No-one 
Another formalized narrative often characterized by prohibitive anti-discrimination 
guarantees or rights belonging to the intentionally anonymous, negatively identified 
individual including no-one.  The Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the US 
Constitution are examples of this narrative. 
An adamant combination of everyone/no-one is characterized by a highly 
formalized version of equality and non-discrimination which ignores historico-legal 
context and substantive considerations, even guarantee/reality gaps.  Reverse 
discrimination is one expression of this narrative.  However, a substantive version 
of everyone/no-one is evident in international law’s recognition of rightsholder 
identity where doing so narrows guarantee/reality gaps in real-time. 
Someone 
A narrative which is aimed at substantive equality and exemplified by affirmative 
action and other temporary, positive measures designed to assist members of a 
semi-identified minority group member whose group identity has attracted 
discrimination.  The goal is to achieve parity with majority group members.  The 
slim or weak version is evident in the demise of affirmative action in US federal 
  xxxvii 
 
courts in recent decades.  The strong or expanded version accounts for complex 
minority-, child- and disability-specific education, language and culture rights in 
international law.  
Indigenous learner 
A politically-based, Mancari-like right to a preference in admission belonging to 
members of Native American tribes and nations who retain limited self-
determination and other rights consistent with the special trust relationship between 
the tribes and the US federal government.  The goal is the fulfilment of fiduciary 
duties associated with the trust relationship, tribal self-determination and self-
governance associated with substantive equality. 
The limited or arbitrary version is treated as an exception to the general rule of 
equality and is subject to congressional/parliamentary will and judicial activism. 
This version has been at the heart of the erosion of self-determination in federal 
courts in recent decades.  The fuller or more rational and remedial version 
recognizes specifically indigenous, historically continuous rights to education 
which precede any trust relationship.  Importantly, the expanded narrative 
recognizes the right of indigenous ‘peoples’ to a self-determination which is 
consistent with substantive equality and non-discrimination. 
Complex  
Combinations of strong and fuller versions of multiple narratives which are driven 
by substantive equality and non-discrimination and may create a toolbox of rights 
options, or a complex multi-narrative of equality.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
NARRATIVES OF EQUALITY 
 
1 CHAPTER ONE: NARRATIVES OF EQUALITY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis fundamentally asks how a school established to help a group of children 
consistently identified with disparities in education achieve equality—one that has 
actually done so—can be sued for discrimination because it prefers those children 
in admissions.   
The Kamehameha Schools (‘the Schools’), a private school system, were 
established in 1887 by Native Hawaiian Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop for the 
express purpose of helping “indigent” Native Hawaiian children overcome socio-
economic disparities that were, even then, alarming.  The modern Schools are a 
bastion of Native Hawaiian identity and culture but also of substantial equality as, 
without public funding, the Native Hawaiian-run Schools produce students who 
most often defy the terrible numbers frequently associated with Native Hawaiians 
in education.  However, when a non-Hawaiian boy was denied admission to the 
Schools, his lawyers alleged racial discrimination.  Three federal courts wrestled 
with whether the admissions policy that had produced measurable de facto equality 
was discriminatory.  Ultimately, it was identified as a racially justified affirmative 
action policy, a category seemingly inconsistent with both the unique historico-
legal and socio-economic context of the policy. 
This thesis critically analyses the narratives of equality evident in that case, Doe v 
Kamehameha Schools. 1   It demonstrates how current federal narratives fail to 
account for constitutional guarantee/reality gaps or the unique historico-legal 
context of the policy.  It recommends an expansion of these narratives within 
                                                          
1 Doe v Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate 295 F Supp 2d 1141 (D Haw 2003), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 416 F3d 1025 (9th Cir 2005), reh’g en banc granted, 441 F3d 1029 (9th 
Cir 2006) 470 F3d 827 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).   
2   
 
federal law consistent with liberal theory, international law and the legal experience 
of New Zealand—but, more importantly, with substantial equality, non-
discrimination and rights of self-determination which may have the greatest 
capacity for reconciling complex guarantee/reality gaps.  Recommendations 
include philosophical consistency with, and intentional importation of, the human 
right to education, including Article 14 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples 2007 into federal law.  
 
1.2 DISBELIEF AND DISCRIMINATION 
In 2005, I took my children back to Hawaiʻi for a family reunion on the North Shore 
of Oʻahu.  Halfway through the week, I found myself sitting in a wood-panelled 
room of relations, watching my mother and my aunties weep as a lady from the 
Native Hawaiian organization Kau Inoa spoke.  She had come to gather names for 
a Hawaiian nation but instead the conversation turned to current events.  With one 
phrase, the ceiling fan seemed to flutter in slow motion.  Someone actually uttered 
“Auwe!” as if it were a funeral.  My grandmother, the last of her generation, sat 
small and silent. 
What was the cause of such disbelief?  Death?  Sickness?  No, it was law.  On that 
day, my mother and the aunties cried because of Doe v Kamehameha Schools,2 an 
American federal court decision.  
The tragedy began when a non-Native Hawaiian boy was denied admission to the 
Kamehameha Schools (‘the Schools’), a private school system first established in 
1883 by Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop (‘Pauahi’) specifically to help “indigent” 
Native Hawaiian children overcome socio-economic disparities which were, even 
then, alarming. In her lifetime, Pauahi had witnessed disease, population 
decimation, landlessness, poverty, and other ills coinciding with Westernization, 
impact her people.3  She almost seemed to predict the long-term effects of the later 
overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom by Westerners supported by the American 
                                                          
2 Doe v Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate 295 F Supp 2d 1141 (D Haw 2003), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 416 F3d 1025 (9th Cir 2005). 
3 See discussion in Chapter Two 3.2.2. 
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government—the assimilation, discrimination and resulting socio-economic 
disparities which would be multiplied over generations.  Her hope was that the 
school would allow Native Hawaiian learners to “compete” with other groups on 
an equal footing.4  Unsurprisingly given its purpose, the private school system has 
prioritized Native Hawaiians in admission for generations.  The preference has no 
blood-quantum requirement and someone with one per cent Native Hawaiian 
genealogy has as much right to it as someone who is full Native Hawaiian.  
Consequently, the school’s population is actually quite ethnically diverse.5 
The identity-aware policy seems to be highly successful. The private school has 
become not only a bastion of Native Hawaiian identity and culture but also of 
substantial equality as, without government funding, the Native Hawaiian-run 
Schools produce students who most often defy the terrible numbers frequently 
associated with Native Hawaiians in virtually every area of human well-being.6  
Generally, Native Hawaiian learners are depicted in various studies and reports as 
“severely disadvantaged” in education and “significantly lag[ging] behind” all other 
groups in the State of Hawai‘i , our own country.   We often appear to be the extreme: 
the most likely to be absent, in special education and below average in all subjects, 
the least likely to attend school, graduate and continue to higher education.7  At the 
Kamehameha Schools, however, 99 per cent graduate and 92.6 per cent go on to 
higher education. 8   
The policy might be too successful, admission being “highly coveted”.9  Financed 
by colorblindness campaigns devoted to eradicating affirmative action,10 the slight 
teenager who had always possessed a name and identity voluntarily became ‘John 
                                                          
4 Charles Bishop, Founder’s Day Speech, Kamehameha Schools Bishop Estate archives (19 August 
2015) <http://kapalama.ksbe.edu>. 
5 Doe v Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate 470 F 3d 827 (9th Cir 2006) (en banc) 
at 832. 
6 See discussion in Chapter 3 at 3.2.2. 
7 Ibid. 
8  Linda Serra Hagedorn and others "The Academic and Occupational Outcomes of Private 
Residential High School Student Instruction" (2005) 13(1) Pac Ed Res J 21 at 33-34. 
9  Kay Young “Kamehameha’s Hawaiians-Only Admissions Policy Under 42 U.S.C §1981: A 
Permissible Pursuit of Practical Freedom” (2003) 26 U Haw L Rev 309.  
10 See description of the groups, their agenda and membership in Eric K Yamamoto and Catherine 
Corpus Betts “Disfiguring Civil Rights to Deny Indigenous Hawaiian Self-Determination: The Story 
of Rice v. Cayetano” in Rachel E. Moran & Devon Wayne Carbado (eds) Race Law Stories, 
Foundation Press (New York, Foundation Press, 2008) 541. 
4   
 
Doe’ when he sued the Schools under name suppression.  He was not the first Doe11 
nor the last12 but represented by the same lawyers.  In dogmatic language, they 
alleged the admissions policy violated section 1981 of Title 42 of the United States 
Code13—legislation which, like the admissions policy, was designed to overcome 
de facto discrimination and disparities.  Despite the Schools’ proven track record in 
helping an extremely disadvantaged group of learners to overcome discrimination 
and disparities—to actually level the proverbial playing field of liberal 
democracy—three panels of judges struggled to decide if the admissions policy was 
discriminatory or a measure of equality.   
Noting both the unique historico-legal context of the policy and resulting disparities 
of the history, Judge Kay in the United States District Court for the District of 
Hawaiʻi held that a ‘manifest imbalance’ in education between Native Hawaiians 
and other children justified the policy as a legitimate remedial measure also 
consistent with the special trust relationship between Native Hawaiians and the 
federal government.  Judge Kay also emphasized the “exceptionally unique 
historical circumstances” of the policy and opined that “context matters”.14  In 2005, 
on appeal, two of three judges in a partial sitting of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disregarded the context and trust relationship and 
“rigidly applied a formerly flexible contextual analysis” usually applied to private 
employment affirmative action policies. 15   ‘Race-conscious’ equalled racial 
discrimination.  The policy was not legitimate. 
The bastion had become a constitutional blasphemy.  And my mother and the 
aunties wept. 
                                                          
11 See Rice v Cayetano 528 US 495 (2000); Mohica-Cummings v Kamehameha Schools No CV03-
00441 (D Haw dismissed 8 December 2003) and John Doe et al v Kamehameha Schools, 295 F 
Suppl 2d 1141; 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23434.  See advance copy of Avis Poai and Susan Serrano 
“Alii Trusts” in Melody MacKenzie, Susan Serrano and Kapua Sproat (eds) Native Hawaiian Law: 
A Treatise (Honolulu, Native Hawaiian Legal Corporation, Ka Huli Ao Center for Excellence in 
Native Hawaiian Law at the William S. Richardson School of Law and University of Hawaiʻi at 
Mānoa, 2015) (advance copy) for an in-depth discussion on these cases. 
12 See Doe v Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate 625 F3d 1182 (9th Cir 2010) 
which was brought by a similar group of plaintiffs, also represented by Eric Grant, hoping to proceed 
anonymously but who were not granted name suppression. 
13 42 U.S. Code § 1981 - Equal rights under the law. 
14 Doe v Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate 295 F Suppl 2d (D Haw 2003), at 
1145 and 1148. 
15 Poai and Serrano, above n 11, at 1189. 
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In 2006, a slim 8-7 majority of a full sitting of the Ninth Circuit overturned that 
decision holding that the policy constituted a legitimate affirmative action policy 
aimed at racial parity after modifying the intermediate scrutiny tests.  However, five 
members of the majority were also persuaded that the policy was justified by the 
exception made for institutions serving Native Americans recognized in Morton v 
Mancari.16   Under imminent threat of appeal,17 however, the Schools settled with 
Doe for a sizeable sum in 2007.18   
The colorblindness campaign behind Doe began advertising for new litigants 
almost immediately, vowing19 to force the question to the Supreme Court where 
their identity-blind arguments had been successful in Rice v Cayetano.20  Against 
the backdrop of recent cases including Gratz v Bollinger,21 Grutter v Bollinger22 
(‘the University of Michigan cases”) and Schuette v BAMN23—where the Supreme 
Court seemed to disavow affirmative action and almost any identification 
constitutes discrimination—the question of what it might say when the admissions 
policy finally reaches its doors continues to hover like a ghost.   
More than this, the case must undoubtedly leave what the thesis will call the earnest 
liberal—that is, anyone concerned with de facto or substantial equality of outcomes 
rather than merely the formal guarantee of equality—at least a little unsettled.  The 
wrestle of the Ninth Circuit over which standard of judicial review should apply to 
the admissions policy of a private school under section 1981—as well as the 
continuing challenges to the admissions policy—suggest uncertainty in the law, 
always an uncomfortable notion in a democracy.   The dissent’s adamant insistence 
on a stricter scrutiny—despite significant evidence of a unique historico-legal 
context and the Schools’ positive impact on present disparities—suggests that 
almost one-half of the court interpreted the policy in terms of a highly formalized 
                                                          
16 Morton v Mancari 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
17  Eric Grant, lead counsel for Doe, describes how settlement occurred the Friday before the 
Supreme Court was set to hear the petition on Monday: Eric Grant “The Undiscovered Opinion” 30 
U Haw L Rev 355, at 355. 
18  One of the plaintiff’s attorneys disclosed it was $7 million dollars despite a confidentiality 
agreement: Jim Dooley “Kamehameha Schools settled lawsuit for $7M” Honolulu Advertiser 
(online ed, Honolulu, 2 August 2008).  
19 Poai and Serrano, above n 11, at 1193. 
20 Rice v Cayetano 528 US 495 (2000). 
21 Gratz v Bollinger 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
22 Grutter v Bollinger 539 US 306 (2003). 
23 Schuette v Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action 572 U.S.___ (2014). 
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and abstract notion of equality devoid of substantial assessment.  The majority’s 
stretching of section 1981 tests seems to demonstrate that slightly more than one-
half of the court recognized the admissions policy as a measure of equality but 
seemed to intuitively sense that affirmative action did not quite fit Native Hawaiian 
identity.  The fact that most of the majority—the concurrence—would have 
preferred to rely on the special trust relationship—but did not—suggests similar 
ambiguity.   
Given the supposedly homogenous and anonymous coverage of formal 
constitutional guarantees including the Fourteenth Amendment, these wrestles of 
equality raise deep concerns.  Some commentators have likened indigenous learners 
to the proverbial canary in the coalmine, their situation reflecting the health of rights 
generally in the United States. 24  As subsequent chapters describe,25 the Native 
Hawaiian learners for whom the admission policy was established are among the 
most disadvantaged of learners in the State of Hawaiʻi and the United States—the 
most vulnerable of the vulnerable in some respects.  As also described later, similar 
real-time inequalities are increasing at an alarming rate within the United States and 
other developed nations, further heightening one’s sense that the case raises doubts 
about the validity of equality itself within so-called liberal democracies.   
These wrestles seemingly indicate that not one of the narratives—neither the 
dissent’s adamant identity-blindness, the majority’s temporary exception to 
identity-blindness, nor the tribal identity ascribed to Native Hawaiians by the 
concurrence—fits the unique history and current circumstances of Native 
Hawaiians, further heightening the sense of uncertainty.  Ultimately, Native 
Hawaiians seem to represent a people in the sense of international law, even an 
internationally-recognized nation which never ceded its sovereignty by treaty or 
any other means—unlike Native American tribes.  These facts raise the possibility 
that any discussion on the admission policy needs to go beyond questions of 
equality—either formal or substantial—and consider the demands of restorative 
justice and self-determination, even international law. 
                                                          
24 By the venerable American legal scholar Felix S Cohen, quoted in Tsianina Lomawaima and 
Teresa McCarty “When Tribal Sovereignty Challenges Democracy: American Indian Education and 
the Democratic Ideal” (2002) 39 AERJ 279, at 279-280. 
25 See discussion in Chapter Three, at 3.2.2. 
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Given the onslaught of identity-blindness campaigns and lingering legal uncertainty, 
these legal questions need resolution.   
 
1.3 IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO THE CASE 
Various legal scholars have discussed the admissions policy, the intuitions, the 
wrestle and the gaps in the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning.  Political theory and primary 
and secondary sources of law provide the main source of literature in the thesis and 
will be critically analysed and reviewed throughout the chapters.  But the following 
provide a brief introduction to legal issues and illustrate the range of immediate 
scholarly responses to the case.  This literature is also discussed in greater depth in 
Chapters Two and Three. 
While a few scholars echo the dissent in Kamehameha and argue for a stricter 
scrutiny,26 some have concluded, like the majority, that the admissions policy is 
consistent with a constitutionally appropriate affirmative action policy.   Echoing 
the concurrence, others have argued that the policy is justified by the special trust 
relationship between the federal government and Native Hawaiians which justifies 
the Morton v Mancari27 exception.  The policy has often been discussed largely 
within the bounds indicated by the dissent, majority and concurrence.   
Arguing that the admissions policy was in fact a legitimate affirmative action policy, 
subsequent legal articles have focused on the proper standard of judicial review 
which should have been applied to such a policy, especially given the private nature 
of the Schools and the educational rather than employment context.28  Writing post-
Kamehameha, David Ezra 29  has focused on the potential of United States v 
                                                          
26 For instance, Donald Thompson “Brown v. Kamehameha Schools: An instrumental critique of 
remedial self-segregation in private education” (2008) 81 S Cal L Rev 831; and Rebecca Faust, “Doe 
v Kamehameha Schools: What is the proper standard for analyzing a §1981 claim?” (2007)  34 N 
Ky L Rev 703.  While admittedly not unbiased, the lead counsel for Doe, Eric Grant drafted a 
hypothetical opinion allegedly predicting what the Supreme Court might have said if the case had 
not settled in “Doe v. Kamehameha Schools: The undiscovered opinion” (2008) 30 U Haw L Rev 
355.  He asserts that the highest court in the land would have reversed the en banc Ninth Circuit 
decision.  
27 Morton v Mancari 417 US 535 (1974). 
28 See, for instance, Sharon Hsin-Yi Lee “Justifying Affirmative Action in K-12 Private Schools” 
(2007) 23 Harv BlackLetter L J 107. 
29 Retired United States District Judge for the District of Hawaiʻi, Chief Judge Emeritus. 
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Carolene Products Company (1938) 30  Footnote Four 31  to recognize genuine 
affirmative action policies according to purpose, to justify a lower standard of 
scrutiny, and otherwise sway the dissent.32  Similar articles largely approve the 
majority’s reliance on an affirmative action categorization of the policy and its 
modification of the intermediate scrutiny tests.33  
Other commentators, following the concurrence, have argued that the most 
appropriate category in which to place the admissions policy is the special trust 
relationship-based exception established in Morton v Mancari.  Most of these 
articles lay out the consistency of this exception with basic principles of federal 
Indian law and its long history, and demonstrate through historico-legal analysis 
how often Native Hawaiians have been treated like Native American tribes in both 
federal legislation and jurisprudence.34  Still others promote Native American-like 
federal recognition for Native Hawaiians—including the passage of the the Native 
Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act of 201135—the latest ‘Akaka Bill’—as 
the answer to protecting the policy in future.36   
However, others seemingly exceed the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning and suggest the 
“logical fallacy of the ‘false dilemma’” 37  of current federal narratives.  Susan 
Serrano, Eric Yamamoto, Melody MacKenzie, and David Foreman, for instance, 
                                                          
30 United States v Carolene Products Company 304 US 144 (1938) 
31 Which first established the principle in federal law that a law or policy which targeted and 
disadvantaged ‘a discrete and insular minority’ should be subjected to a higher level of judicial 
scrutiny: discussed in Chapter 2, at 36. 
32 David Ezra “Doe v Kamehameha Schools: ‘A Discrete and Insular Minority’ in Hawaiʻi Seventy 
Years After Carolene Products?” (2008) 30 U Haw L Rev 294.   
33 For example, Christopher Schmidt “Doe v. Kamehameha: Section 1981 and the Future of Racial 
Preferences in Private Schools” (2007) 42 Harv CR-CL L Rev. 557. 
34 Including Gavin Clarkson “Not Because They Are Brown, But Because of Ea: Why the Good 
Guys Lost in Rice v Cayetano, and Why They Didn’t Have to Lose” (2002) 7 Mich J Race & L 317; 
and Angela Kuo “Let Her Will Be Done: The Role of the Kamehameha Schools’ Admissions Policy 
in Promoting Native Hawaiian Self-Determination” (2008) 13 UCLA Asian Pac Am LJ 72.  See 
also Kathryn Nalani Setsuko Hong “Understanding Native Hawaiian Rights: Mistakes and 
Consequences of Rice v. Cayetano” (2008) 15 Asian Am  LJ 9. 
35 The Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act 2011, (s 675) 112th Congress (2011-2012), 
“A bill to express the policy of the United States regarding the United States relationship with Native 
Hawaiians and to provide a process for the recognition by the United States of the Native Hawaiian 
governing entity”.  Last amended December 17, 2012. 
36 Including Crystal K Glendon “A Political Solution for a Legacy Under Attack: The Akaka Bill’s 
Potential Effect on the Kamehameha Schools” (2003) 26 U Haw L Rev 69.  See also Justin Pybas 
“Native Hawaiians: The Issue of Federal Recognition” (2006) 30(1) Am Indian L Rev 185. 
37 Chris Iijima “Race over Rice: Binary Analytical Boxes and a Twenty-First Century Endorsement 
of Nineteenth Century Imperialism in Rice v. Cayetano” (2000) 53 Rutgers L Rev 91, at 93. 
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drafted amicus curiae briefs submitted during the case 38  which justified the 
admissions policy as a restorative remedy for historical injustices perpetrated 
against Native Hawaiians by the United States government and the ongoing 
“harm”39 of that injustice.  Rather than a “privilege[]” or “handout”, these scholars  
claim the policy represents a Native Hawaiian-generated remedy for “severe and 
systemic educational disadvantages” causally connected with historic injustices 
perpetrated by the United States.40  The amicus briefs universally disagreed with 
the application of equal protection analysis to the admission policy. 
Both Yamamoto—with Ashley Obrey41—and the late Chris Iijima42 have written 
extensively on the uniqueness of the injustices perpetrated on Native Hawaiians, 
distinguishing the historico-legal context of Native Hawaiians and legal responses 
to it from racial minorities.43  In terms of restorative justice, Yamamoto and Ijima 
view self-determination as a proportional response to the ongoing “deep harm” of 
those injustices.44  While Yamamoto—with Catherine Betts—has described the 
denial of Native Hawaiian self-determination in similar cases as a “disfiguring” of 
“civil rights”,45 Iijima has equated denial with “continued overthrow”.46   
These responses are consistent with scholarship on the nature of Native Hawaiian 
rights generally which emphasizes their unique historico-legal context.  MacKenzie, 
                                                          
38  See Susan Serrano, Eric Yamamoto, Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie and David Forman 
“Restorative Justice for Hawaiʻi’s First People: Selected Amicus Curiae Briefs in Doe v. 
Kamehameha Schools” (2007) 14 Asian Am LJ 205. 
39 Eric K Yamamoto, Susan K Serrano and EA Hoʻoipo Kalaenaʻauao Pa, Amicus Brief of the 
Japanese American Citizens League of Hawaiʻi-Honolulu Chapter and the Equal Justice Society and 
in support of Defendant-Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, 29 August 2005, in Doe v 
Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate 416 F 3d 1025 (9th Cir 2005) (No 04-15044). 
40 Serrano and others, above n 38. 
41 Eric K Yamamoto and Ashley Kaiao Obrey “Reframing Redress: A ‘Social Healing Through 
Justice’ Approach to United States-Native Hawaiian and Japan-Ainu Reconciliation Initiatives” 
(2009) 16(1) Asian Am LJ 5. 
42  See Chris Iijima “Race over Rice: Binary Analytical Boxes and a Twenty-First Century 
Endorsement of Nineteenth Century Imperialism in Rice v. Cayetano” (2000) 53 Rutgers Law 
Review 91.  Iijima and Yamamoto have likened its uniqueness to that of the Japanese-American 
internment during World War II and the situation of the Ainu in Japan. 
43 See, for instance, Chris Iijima “Rice v. Cayetano: Trouble in Paradise for Native Hawaiians 
Claiming Special Relationship Status” (2001) 79 NC L Rev 812.  Bradford Morse and Kazi Hamid 
“American Annexation of Hawaiʻi: An Example of the Unequal Treaty Doctrine” (1990) 5 Conn J 
Int’l L 407 actually describes the American Annexation of Hawaiʻi as a “war of aggression”. 
44 Yamamoto and Obrey, above n 41. 
45 Eric K Yamamoto and Catherine Corpus Betts “Disfiguring Civil Rights to Deny Indigenous 
Hawaiian Self-Determination: The Story of Rice v. Cayetano” in Rachel E. Moran & Devon Wayne 
Carbado (eds) Race Law Stories, Foundation Press (New York, Foundation Press, 2008) 541. 
46 Chris Iijima “New Rice Recipes: The Legitimization of Continued Overthrow” (2002) 3 Asian-
Pacific L & Pol'y J 385. 
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for instance, has long argued that Native Hawaiians retain the right to self-
determination of a fully sovereign nation which never ceded that sovereignty. 47   
Forman has similarly argued that equal protection analysis is inappropriate given 
the historical continuum of Native Hawaiian customary law recognized by the State 
of Hawaiʻi.48   
Approaching similar issues from the perspective of international law, James Anaya 
and Julian Aguon have similarly argued that Native Hawaiians retain identity-
specific human rights to self-determination akin to that of an internationally 
recognized people or nation-state.   Anaya has written extensively on the remedial 
capacity of self-determination expressed as an indigenous human right and 
fundamental principle of international law, as well as the “responsibility” of the 
United States government to secure such rights for Native Hawaiians.49  Placing 
these rights in a decolonization context, Aguon has also proposed that Native 
Hawaiians adopt a “dual-rights strategy” justified in terms of both domestic 
mechanisms and international law.50  Such scholarship seems to exceed traditional 
liberal projects—since self-determination implies collective peoples’ rights rather 
than the individual guarantees at stake in Kamehameha.  These are, however, 
justified at least partially in terms of the disparities which persist for indigenous 
peoples in the wake of colonization, assimilation and discrimination. 
                                                          
47 See, for instance, Melody K MacKenzie “Self-Determination and Self-Governance” in Melody 
Kapilialoha MacKenzie (ed) Native Hawaiian Rights Handbook (Native Hawaiian Legal 
Corporation and Office of Hawaiian Affairs, Honolulu, 1991) at 77.  MacKenzie’s position is most 
recently discussed in her chapters “Historical Context” and “Native Hawaiians and US Law” in 
Melody MacKenzie, Susan Serrano and Kapua Sproat (eds) Native Hawaiian Law: A Treatise 
(Honolulu, Native Hawaiian Legal Corporation, Ka Huli Ao Center for Excellence in Native 
Hawaiian Law at the William S. Richardson School of Law and University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa, 
2015) 2 and 64. 
48 David M Forman “The Hawaiian Usage Exception to the Common Law: An Inoculation against 
the Effects of Western Influence” (2008) 30 U Haw L Rev 319. 
49 For instance, in James Anaya “The Native Hawaiian People and International Human Rights Law: 
A Remedy for Past and Continuing Wrongs” (1994) 28 Georgia Law Review 309.  Most recently, 
see S James Anaya and Robert A Williams Jr Study on the International Law and Policy relating to 
the Situation of the Native Hawaiian People (Indigenous Peoples Law and Policy Program, 
University of Arizona, James E Rogers College of Law, June 2015) in which Anaya and Williams 
recognize that Native Hawaiians retain rights and remedies for infringement under international law 
and that the United States federal government has a “responsibility” to “secure” those rights. 
50 Julian Aguon “Other Arms: The Power of a Dual Rights Strategy for the Chamoru People of Guam 
Using the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in U.S. Courts” (2009) 21 U Haw L Rev 
113; and Julian Aguon “Native Hawaiians and International Law” in Melody MacKenzie, Susan 
Serrano and Kapua Sproat (eds) Native Hawaiian Law: A Treatise (Honolulu, Native Hawaiian 
Legal Corporation, Ka Huli Ao Center for Excellence in Native Hawaiian Law at the William S. 
Richardson School of Law and University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa, 2015), at 352. 
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In fact, several scholars suggest that the admission policy and other preferences for 
Native Hawaiians are consistent with equality but not necessarily with a racially-
justified affirmative action scheme or even the current Native American exception 
in Morton v Mancari.51  Others recognize the limited nature of current “binary” 
legal constructions of indigenous identity.52  As discussed in Chapter Three,53 such 
intuitions are also consistent with multi-disciplinary findings demonstrating that 
Native Hawaiians are the most socioeconomically disadvantaged ethnic group in 
Hawaiʻi.54  This body of literature seems to describe how Native Hawaiian identity 
inherently attracts disparities and predicts negative outcomes.  Moreover, the 
numbers and statistics appear to describe a significant real-time gap between 
constitutional guarantees of equality and substantial outcomes for many Native 
Hawaiian learners.   
Ironically, as discussed, a majority of the Ninth Circuit seemed to share similar 
intuitions and awareness of the guarantee/reality gaps.  
 
1.4 NARRATIVES 
Drawing on such scholarship, this thesis approaches these intuitions and gaps from 
a theoretical perspective, examining the case through its narratives of equality. 
It is hardly revolutionary to say that law is narrative in character, that it tells and 
retells stories and that sometimes these stories conflict.  The very language of law 
has power to affect substantial outcomes for individuals and groups, given its 
“centrality in the production, exercise, and subversion of legal power”.55  More than 
“rules and policies”, the law also inherently relates “stories, explanations, 
                                                          
51 See, for example, Kara ML Young “Kamehameha’s Hawaiians-Only Admissions Policy Under 
42 U.S.C. §1981: A Permissible Pursuit of Practical Freedom” (2004) 26 U Haw L Rev 309.  Also 
see Jennifer L. Arnett “The Quest for Hawaiian Sovereignty: Argument for the Rejection of Federal 
Acknowledgment” (2005) 14 Kan JL & Pub. Pol'y 169.     
52 Rose Villazor “Blood Quantum Land Law and the Race Versus Political Identity” (2008) 96 Cal 
L Rev 801, suggesting, in the wake of Rice v Cayetano, that current binary racial/political legal 
constructions of indigeneity be expanded.     
53 Chapter 3 at 16-17. 
54  For example, Shawn Malia Kana‘iaupuni, Nolan Malone, and Koren Ishibashi. Income and 
Poverty among Native Hawaiians (Honolulu, Kamehameha Schools, 2005). 
55 John Conley and William M O’Barr Just Words: Law, Language, and Power (2nd ed, Chicago and 
London, University of Chicago Press, 2005), at xi. It can be hegemonic and patriarchal, for instance. 
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performances, [and] linguistic exchanges—as narratives and rhetoric”.56  In any 
courtroom, particularly within adversarial settings, judges must weigh competing 
narratives—for instance, counsel’s theory of the case, or conflicting witness 
statements.57  Importantly, such narratives “do not simply recount happenings; they 
give them shape, give them a point, argue their import, proclaim their results”.58   
Narrative theory fundamentally examines which stories and whose stories the law 
is telling and retelling.  One common approach to the study of legal narratives is 
the “juxtapos[ition]” of “personal accounts of marginalized individuals with 
dominant legal narratives to advocate rights and critique hegemonic legal practices” 
including minority-specific perspectives.59  This thesis uses the term narratives to 
describe the underlying stories that are told in the law itself—in jurisprudence, 
legislation, and international law—about Native Hawaiian identity and legal claims.  
It employs political theory, domestic and international law to explain and reconcile 
those narratives.  Moreover, the thesis specifically seeks to get underneath the so-
called “text of the debate swirling through” 60 the Kamehameha case —that is, the 
racialized, dichotomized, identity-blind rhetoric evident in the reasoning of the 
Ninth Circuit—to the “intricately woven subtext” 61 of the case that hints at a unique 
historico-legal context and substantial inequality but is “inhabited with demons 
from the far and not so distant past” which “subtly roil[] public discourse” 62—and 
sometimes the reasoning of federal courts.   
This thesis critically analyses the narratives of equality evident in the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning in Kamehameha, arguing that the dissent, majority and 
                                                          
56 Paul Gerwitz “Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law” in Peter Brooks and Paul Gerwitz (eds) Law’s 
Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Yale University Press, 1996) 
2, at 2. 
57 Peter Brooks “The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric” in Brooks and Gerwitz, 14-23.  
58 Peter Brooks “Narrative in and of the Law” in James Phelan and Peter J Rabinowitz (eds) A 
Companion to Narrative Theory (Malden, Massachusetts, Blackwell, 2005) 415, at 419. 
59 Two other common approaches to the study of legal narratives are “investigations into legal 
narration as a contest of narratives” and “examinations of law as narrative literature or as rhetoric”.  
Subject areas include: the stories told in courtroom trials by witness and prosecutors; the crossover 
between law and literature; and minority-specific perspectives including critical race theory, 
feminist jurisprudence and intersectional legal analysis: Greta Olson. "Narration and Narrative in 
Legal Discourse" in Peter Hühn, Jan Christopher Meister, John Pier and Wolf Schmid (eds) 
Handbook of Narratology (Berlin and Boston, Walter de Gruyter, 2014) 371, at 372-373. 
60 The quote borrows the language which Rosemary C Salmone employs in her discussion of similar 
issues in relation to single-sex schools in Same, Different, Equal: Rethinking Single-Sex Schooling 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), at 6. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
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concurrence opinions suggest three conflicting narratives of equality—what this 
thesis calls the adamant everyone/no-one, weak someone and limited indigenous 
learner narratives.  The thesis seeks to demonstrate how these narratives fail to 
account entirely for either the unique historico-legal history of the Native Hawaiian 
people or the huge gap between formal constitutional guarantees of equality and 
everyday realities of complex discrimination and disparities almost unrelentingly 
attracted to Native Hawaiian identity.  It recommends an expansion of these 
narratives within federal law consistent with liberal theory, international law and 
the legal experience of a sister settler jurisdiction—but, more importantly, with 
substantial equality, non-discrimination and rights of self-determination which may 
have the greatest capacity for reconciling the guarantee/reality gap.  The thesis 
makes a series of recommendations ranked in terms of good, better and best.  These 
include philosophical consistency with the expanded multi-narrative, the 
intentional importation of the human right to education and the intentional 
incorporation of Article 14 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples 2007.   
 
1.5 METHODOLOGY 
In terms of methodology, the specific aims of the research were to: critique the case; 
determine why United States federal courts struggled with the admissions policy; 
identify obstacles currently preventing federal courts from legally recognizing 
similar measures of equality, including the narratives of equality which have been 
relied upon in the case; explore alternative narratives of equality which the 
preferential admissions policy; identify markers signalling measures of equality; 
test obstacles, narratives and markers within a sister settler jurisdiction; and make 
specific recommendations which might make similar determinations more 
straightforward in future cases. 
In terms of specific research questions, the thesis asks why the Ninth Circuit seemed 
to wrestle so much with determining whether the admissions policy was a measure 
of equality and how a policy which has apparently allowed the most vulnerable of 
learners to overcome discrimination and disparities in education might have been 
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confused, even momentarily, for a form of discrimination.  It also explores which 
narratives of equality the court weighed in making its determination, why these 
narratives seemingly conflict and whether any other narratives were suggested by 
the facts. 
The thesis next explores how the same conflict of narratives been resolved in 
political theory and international law and how the gap between formal, 
constitutional guarantees of equality and the reality of complex discrimination and 
disparities has been resolved in theory and law.  Again, it asks which narratives 
emerge from such reconciliation but also what the relationship is between whether 
equality is formally or substantially defined and the degree to which rightsholder 
identity will be specified in the law, and, importantly, which features mark a 
substantial right to equality and non-discrimination in education in terms of Native 
Hawaiian and other indigenous learners.  Finally, the thesis asks what specific legal 
recommendations might clarify the conflict of narratives evident in federal 
jurisprudence in regards to the admissions policy. 
To answer the research questions, the thesis examines the historical and socio-
economic context of the law in question, federal and Hawaiʻi state law, political 
theory, international human rights law, and the legal experience of a sister settler 
jurisdiction for comparison.  Various liberal theorists have similarly wrestled with 
conflicting narratives, reconciling guarantee/reality gaps, and/or the unique 
historico-legal context of indigenous rights. 63   The evolution of the right to 
education in international law has been triggered by persistent gaps and historical 
context.64  Other liberal democracies have struggled with eerily similar histories of 
colonization, assimilation, discrimination and disparities.65  Ultimately, given the 
United States’ exceptionalism in terms of human rights,66 comparison with a similar 
domestic jurisdiction is vital.  One should question the applicability of the theory 
and international law unless they can translate into domestic law. 
The law itself will provide the bulk of ‘data’ gathered in this process from both 
primary—including domestic legislation and jurisprudence, international 
                                                          
63 See Chapter Four. 
64 See Chapters Five and Six. 
65 See Chapters Six and Seven. 
66 Discussed extensively in Chapter Two at 2.5. 
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conventions and common law principles—and secondary sources—for instance, 
guidelines, reports and recommendations of UN bodies, American and New 
Zealand executives and legislatures.  Other secondary sources consulted include 
commentaries, texts, journals, and websites.  Throughout the thesis, the law has 
been allowed to ‘speak for itself’, as it were, as much as possible. 
The foregrounding of multiple, complementary narratives also fundamentally raises 
questions of historical and socio-economic context.  In particular, this thesis 
requires that the law be situated within a specific historical and socio-economic 
context.  Thus, Chapters Two, Three, Five, Six and Seven draw on the work of 
historians, archaeologists, physicians, psychologists, educators, and various other 
researchers.  These sources have been utilized as sources of cross-disciplinary data 
in the more traditional sense—including statistics—but also expert opinion relevant 
to historical and socio-economic context and disparities.   
As signalled in Chapter Eight, the thesis can only represent a starting point for these 
issues.  It seeks to remove a priori theoretical stumbling blocks in the form of legal 
narratives that currently influence the reasoning of federal courts when they 
approach admissions policies like that of the Kamehameha Schools.   It makes 
preliminary recommendations regarding the importation and incorporation of 
international and New Zealand equality narratives into federal law, but subsequent 
questions of implementation and practice are beyond the ambit of this thesis. 
 
1.6 CHAPTERS 
Ultimately, the data gathered has been critically reviewed, analysed and organized 
logically into chapters to respond to the research questions.   
Chapter Two illustrates how an identity-specific history of slavery, Jim Crow laws 
and segregation first justified then was lost in the singular prioritization of a 
racialized, dichotomized everyone/no-one narrative of equality.  Two parallel 
narratives have emerged from or survived that history—namely, the racial someone 
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of Brown v Board of Education67 and affirmative action, and the Native American-
specific indigenous preference recognized in Mancari.  However, a critical analysis 
of federal jurisprudence reveals the undermining of both someone and indigenous 
narratives since Brown by the adamant everyone/no-one narrative evident in 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,68 the more recent University of 
Michigan cases,69 and the dissent in Kamehameha—as well as the No Child Left 
Behind Act 2002. 70  The chapter finally notes the reluctance of federal courts to 
recognize a standalone constitutional or human right to education despite the 
significant constitutive commitment attributed to education in cases such as Brown 
and Plyler v Doe71—and persistent inequalities in education which cluster around 
minority group identity and defy constitutional guarantees.       
Chapter Three discusses the wrestle of federal equality narratives in the KS case.  It 
describes the unique historico-legal history of the Native Hawaiian people 
including nation status, overthrow and annexation by the United States and 
subsequent denials of rights.  The chapter further discusses the overwhelming 
species of discrimination and disparities resulting from this history which defy 
constitutional guarantees of equality.  The chapter demonstrates how the same 
history affirms a Mancari-like narrative but also indigenous, self-determination 
based rights which exceed the trust relationship.   The courts’ wrestles and intuitions 
in Kamehameha will suggest that current federal accounts of equality lack the 
narrative capacity to account for the unique historico-legal context of the admission 
policy and the concerning constitutional guarantee/reality gaps it was designed to 
address.  Pre-overthrow, historically continuous Native Hawaiian customary law, 
indigenous-specific Hawaii State law and recent developments including the 
passing of Hawaiʻi Act 19572 and the most recent version of the ‘Akaka Bill’ will 
suggest the need for an alternative indigenous narrative exceeding current federal 
narratives and possibly framed in human rights terms. 
In an attempt to resolve the wrestle, intuitions and gaps, the thesis will then examine 
political theory and international law where the very same narratives have been 
                                                          
67 Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas 347 US 483 (1954). 
68 Regents of the University of California v Bakke 438 US 265 (1978). 
69 See Gratz and Grutter. 
70 Public Law 107-110—Jan 8, 2002. 
71 Plyler v Doe 457 US 202 (1982). 
72 Hawaiʻi Act 195, Session Laws of Hawaii 2011. 
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debated at length and various lessons learned.  The admission policy was defended 
and maligned in liberal terms.  Crucially, liberal theory and international law offer 
an expanded equality multi-narrative which can liberally account for 
guarantee/reality gaps and the unique historico-legal context of the policy. 
Chapter Four weighs the narratives and reasoning in Kamehameha in terms of 
liberal theory.  The theorists in question have been chosen both because of their 
influence but also the close resemblance between their theories and the federal 
narratives debated in the case.  The identity-blindness of the dissent—and its 
insistence on a rigid intermediate scrutiny with all the practical effects of strict 
scrutiny—are likened to John Rawls’ original position and veil of ignorance but 
also the adamant cosmopolitanism of Jeremy Waldron and callous utilitarian math 
of Richard Posner.  The modified intermediate approach of the minority is 
compared with Ronald Dworkin’s equality of opportunity which would temporarily 
approve of racially justified affirmative action.  Like the concurrence, Will 
Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism will justify group-differentiated indigenous 
rights including self-determination because they buffer indigenous individuals 
against majoritarian bias and institutionalized discrimination and provide access to 
substantial rather than merely formal equality.  Kymlicka’s reconciliation of Rawls 
and Dworkins will represent the project of the earnest liberal eager to address the 
guarantee/reality gap.  However, because Kymlicka is less amendable to historical 
remediation and would let individual everyone/no-one rights ‘trump’ indigenous 
group rights, his liberal multiculturalism illustrates the limits of a purely liberal 
defence of the admissions policy.  Historical self-determination theory is, therefore, 
posited as a reconciliation of Kymlicka’s limits and, particularly, a liberal account 
of the deep ongoing harm attracted to Native Hawaiian identity narrated in the 
amicus curiae briefs. 
Chapter Five demonstrates how—as if Kymlicka’s buffer-and-access thesis is 
correct—the international human right to education has evolved from a formalized, 
universalized, everyone/no-one right to a complex, highly identity-aware multi-
narrative toolbox of rights options.  The human right to education—also considered 
an economic, social and cultural right (ESCR)—includes homogenous guarantees 
of a universal right, semi-anonymous racial- and gender-specific prohibitions on 
discrimination in education, as well as special temporary measures aimed at parity, 
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but also permanent, quasi-collective minority rights to language, culture and 
parallel institutions which buffer ethnic minority members against systemic, 
institutionalized majoritarian bias, rights of availability, access, adaptability and 
acceptability, and participation, and the rights of children specifically and also their 
families and communities.  In response to cynical everyone/no-one critiques, the 
chapter demonstrates the crucial importance of the right in international law 
including its organic multiplication and indivisibility capacity, emphasized legality 
and justiciability, demands positive state parties’ obligations and affirmation of the 
fundamental no-one right to non-discrimination—and as it would approve of the 
admission policy on multiple grounds. 
Chapter Six further explores the adoption of the United Nations Declaration on 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2007 (UNDRIP)—including the Article 14(1) right 
of indigenous peoples to establish and control their own schools—as the earnest 
culmination of the international human right to education affirming both buffer-
and-access and historical self-determination projects.  It will discuss how this 
rational and remedial indigenous learner right remains consistent with substantial 
everyone/no-one and complex someone narratives entailing identity-aware 
formalized guarantees, special measures, minority rights and indigenous rights.  
Article 14 will represent an organic multiplier of other indigenous and human rights, 
a legal, justiciable, and enforceable right.  Moreover, Article 14 will demonstrate 
the capacity of specifically indigenous rights to reconcile Kymlicka’s theory with 
itself, and account for collective rights, actual prior sovereignty and a historical 
continuum of rights. 
Finally, the thesis compares current federal narratives of equality with those of a 
sister settler jurisdiction which has and continues to wrestle with similar narratives 
of equality—Aotearoa New Zealand.  Article 14 appears to operate daily in New 
Zealand where indigenously established and controlled education systems and 
schools prefer Māori children in admission on a grand scale.  Chapter Seven flips 
the central question of the thesis around to ask why such schools are not being sued 
for discrimination in New Zealand 
Chapter Seven will first discuss eerie similarities between the Native Hawaiian and 
Māori historico-legal context, including prior sovereignty, ongoing harm and a 
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historical continuum of rights.  A critical analysis of domestic jurisprudence and 
legislation will then demonstrate how domestic law can narrate equality in multi-
narrative terms and, consequently, how human, constitutional and indigenous rights 
can reinforce and coincide with one another.  The expanded domestic multi-
narrative will then be tested against familiar everyone/no-one criticisms including 
trumping, ESCR and self-determination denial.  Ultimately, the chapter will argue 
that New Zealand law reveals intentional human rights incorporation and an organic 
interface between human, constitutional and indigenous rights, and recognizes a 
remedial, historical self-determination which would approve the admission policy 
on multiple grounds. 
Chapter Eight then summarizes previous discussions including seven markers of 
equality that have emerged as consistent features of the expanded multi-narrative 
in regards to the indigenous learner.  The expanded multi-narrative and markers 
underwrite recommendations that might clarify equality narratives in terms of the 
admissions policy.  Good, better and best recommendations include philosophical 
consistency with the expanded multi-narrative, the intentional importation of the 
complex human right to education and the intentional incorporation of Article 14 
of the UNDRIP.   
 
1.7 DISBELIEF AND HOPE 
Ultimately, the thesis will reveal a disjuncture between American federal narratives 
and liberally valid political theory, the consensus of international law and the legal 
experience of a domestic jurisdiction with a similar indigenous history and present 
inequalities.  It will demonstrate that the wrestle of the Ninth Circuit, its intuitions 
regarding the unique historico-legal context of the policy and the guarantee/reality 
gaps it addresses can be resolved by an expansion of present federal narratives of 
equality consistent with substantial equality, non-discrimination and remedial self-
determination.  Particularly where constitutional rights coincide with human rights 
and indigenous rights, the admission policy can be more accurately interpreted as 
both a measure of earnest equality and legitimate self-determination, both 
individual rational revision and collective rational revision projects.  The thesis will 
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demonstrate that the admission policy is consistent with a multi-narrative toolbox 
of rights options which disadvantaged individuals and groups, lawmakers and 
federal courts can appeal to in the name of equality and remedial self-determination.  
Such expansion is seemingly consistent with landmark federal cases such as Brown 
and Plyler and possesses a greater narrative capacity to deliver on constitutional 
guarantees. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE BURDENS OF A 
SINGULAR NARRATIVE 
2 CHAPTER TWO: THE BURDENS OF A SINGULAR NARRATIVE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Attorney Goemans conjured [racist former Alabama governor George] Wallace’s 
ghost, then, not to help end or redress the longstanding subordination of Native 
Hawaiians in America.  Instead, he appeared to deploy Wallace’s white 
supremacist image in a twisted present-day attempt to benefit white Americans and 
others at the expense of Native Hawaiian children—and all in the name of civil 
rights.  How did Kamehameha Schools’ opponents distort the very idea and 
language of civil rights in order to characterize two hundred years of anti-black 
apartheid in America as the moral and legal equivalent of one private school’s 
attempt to educate indigenous Hawaiian children and repair the continuing 
damage of twentieth century American colonialism?  What lay behind the apparent 
distortion of history and twisting of the language of equality—the disfiguring of 
civil rights to deny indigenous Hawaiians’ claim to the international human right 
to self-determination? 1 
The legal narratives apparent in Doe v Kamehameha Schools2 are the result of the 
development of law, constitutional principles and legal precedent, over generations 
to a finite moment in the Ninth Circuit.  These narratives retell a particular history, 
account of the rightsholder and response to discrimination which may or may not 
be accurately applied to the admission policy.  These narratives are apparent in the 
dissent, majority and concurrence’s reasoning in Kamehameha and in section 1981 
of Title 42 of the United States Code. 
This chapter describes how an identity-specific history of slavery, Jim Crow laws 
and segregation drove the singular prioritization of racialized, dichotomized 
everyone/no-one narrative of equality.  It describes, nevertheless, how two parallel 
                                                          
1 Eric K Yamamoto and Catherine Corpus Betts “Disfiguring Civil Rights to Deny Indigenous 
Hawaiian Self-Determination: The Story of Rice v. Cayetano” in Rachel E. Moran and Devon 
Wayne Carbado (eds) Race Law Stories, Foundation Press (New York, Thomson Reuters/ 
Foundation Press, 2008) 541 at 541-542, referring to the attorney representing the plaintiffs in Rice 
and Kamehameha. 
2 Doe v Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate 295 F Supp 2d 1141 (D Haw 2003), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 416 F3d 1025 (9th Cir 2005), reh’g en banc granted, 441 F3d 1029 (9th 
Cir 2006) 470 F3d 827 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).  
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identity-aware narratives emerged and survived—namely, the temporary, racially-
specific someone evident in Brown v Board of Education3 and affirmative action, 
and the time-honored, Native American-specific indigenous preference recognized 
in Morton v Mancari4 based on remedial self-determination.  However, a closer 
examination of federal jurisprudence reveals the undermining of both someone and 
indigenous narratives since Brown by the adamant everyone/no-one narrative 
evident in cases stretching from Regents of University of California v Bakke5 to the 
more recent University of Michigan cases,6 Fisher v Austin7and dissent in KS, as 
well as legislation such as the No Child Left Behind Act 2002.8    The chapter finally 
notes the reluctance of federal courts to recognize a standalone constitutional or 
human right to education despite the significant constitutive commitment attributed 
to education in Brown and Plyler v Doe9and despite persistent inequalities in 
education which cluster around minority group identity.       
  
2.2 EVERYONE, NO-ONE AND THE ‘BURDENS OF HISTORY’ 
Slavery, racial segregation, and racism left a large and lasting legacy.  They 
scarred American history, and they continue to frame our country’s self-
understanding.10 
In 1776, the Declaration of Independence11 famously pronounced that, despite “a 
long train of abuses and usurpations…these truths” are “self-evident, that all men 
are created equal”.   However, equality was not guaranteed plainly until the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States 
responded to a burdened, identity-specific history of discrimination.  Both 
Amendments were expressed in everyone and no-one terms, interpreted in both 
formalized and substantial terms and would underwrite section 1981. 
                                                          
3 Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas 347 US 483 (1954) [Brown I]. 
4 Morton v Mancari 417 US 535 (1974). 
5 Regents of the University of California v Bakke 438 US 265 (1978). 
6 Gratz v Bollinger 539 US 244 (2003); and Grutter v Bollinger 539 US 306 (2003). 
7 Fisher v Univ of TX at Austin 570 U.S. ___ (2013). 
8 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 USC § 6319, PL 107-110 (2002). 
9 Plyler v Doe 457 US 202 (1982). 
10 John Arthur Race, Equality and the Burdens of History (New York, Cambridge University Press, 
2007) at 1. 
11  Declaration of Independence (US 1776). 
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2.2.1 THE THIRTEENTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS 
Slavery has been called “America’s ‘original sin’”,12 and the degree to which it 
impacted the American narrative of equality is evident in both the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitution.   
Political and economic questions of slavery plagued the drafting of the Declaration 
of Independence13 , as did moral questions arising from a plain reading of the 
promise that “all men are created equal”14.  The “power of the slave-owning class”15  
is also clearly evident in the original Constitution.  Article 1, section 2, contains the 
infamous “Three-Fifths Clause” which counted whites as a “whole Number” and, 
“excluding Indians not taxed”, counted “all other persons”—that is, slaves16—as 
“three fifths”.  David Waldstreicher has also identified “a meaningful silence” in 
the original Constitution: 
The Constitution never mentions slavery.  The word does not appear.  And yet 
slavery is all over the document.  Of its eighty-four clauses, six are directly 
concerned with slaves and their owners.  Five others had implications for slavery 
that were considered and debated by the delegates to the 1787 Constitutional 
Convention and the citizens of the states during ratification…all but one of these 
clauses protects slavery; only one points toward a possible future power by which 
the institution might be ended.  In growing their government, the framers and the 
constituents created fundamental laws that sustained human bondage.17 
                                                          
12 “The forced migration of Africans to the thirteen original British colonies and the United States 
during the time of slavery involved an estimated 472,000 people who left the African continent.  Of 
them, more than 83,000 never made it to these shores; almost 18 percent died on the notorious 
Middle Passage….As a whole, the transatlantic slave trade displaced an estimated 12.5 million 
people, with about 10,650,000 surviving the Atlantic crossing”. By the second half of the nineteenth 
century, “a fully articulated theory of biological (and therefore permanent) black inferiority” or 
“racism in its ultimate, intellectualized form [had become] a conspicuous part of the rationale for 
slavery…and slavery itself had been institutionalized and legalized” in the United States of America: 
Don Fehrenbacher The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics (New York, 
Oxford University Press, 1978 (reprinted 2001)) at 11-13. Quote at 11. 
13 David Waldstreicher Slavery’s Constitution: From Revolution to Ratification (New York,  Hill 
and Wang, 2012) at 21-56. 
14 Fehrenbacher, above n 12. 
15  Frances Graham Lee Equal Protection: Rights and Liberties under the Law (Santa Barbara 
California, Denver Colorado and Oxford, England, ABC-CLIO, 2003) at 2. 
16 Lee, above n 15, at 3-4. 
17 Waldstreicher, above n 13, at 3. 
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Prior to the Civil War, the Supreme Court18 “infamous[ly]”19 decided Dred Scott v 
Sanford (1857)20  which reinforced the non-citizenship, chattel status and inferiority 
of African-Americans—or the inequality of some human beings on a racial basis.  
Post-Civil War, “the constitution was amended so as to repudiate [the Dred Scott 
decision], prohibit slavery, and establish the basic liberties and equality of black 
persons.”21 
The Thirteenth Amendment,22 passed in 1865, formally “forbade slavery”23 and 
answered initial legal questions left by Dred Scott but was popularly viewed as a 
“controvers[ial]” and “dubious predicate for establishing or securing civil rights” 
without the legal substantiality or standing to bind States,24 and “it barely dented 
the racism of the time”. 25   Enacted by states in response to the Thirteenth 
Amendment, the so-called Black Codes—which mostly prohibited black 
interactions with whites and real political participation—were primarily aimed at 
maintaining the social status quo and “putting [legal] distance between whites and 
blacks”.26  The Codes emphasized racial identity and negatively depicted African-
Americans in law in terms of a “dualized”, “dichotomized” or “polarized” 
identity—that is, an untrustworthy, inherently suspect, inferior one in opposition to 
a superior white identity in need of protection from the newly freed slaves.27    
                                                          
18 In the United States, the District Court is the first level, Federal Courts of Appeal the second, and 
the United States Supreme Court the final appellate court in the federal system.  The Supreme Court 
is the ultimate interpreter of the US Constitution and thus the supreme interpreter of the supreme 
laws of the nation. 
19 Lee, above n 15, at 198. 
20 Dred Scott v Sanford 60 US 393 (1857). 
21 Donald Lively The Constitution and Race (New York, Praeger, 1992) at 39. 
22  US Constitution amend XIV, which reads: “Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, 
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within 
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.  Section 2. Congress shall have power to 
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”. Passed by the Senate on April 8, 1864, by the House 
on January 31, 1865, and adopted on December 6, 1865. 
23 Carl Cohen “Equality as Moral Ideal” in Carl Cohen and James Sterba Affirmative Action and 
Racial Preferences: A Debate (Cary, NC, USA, Oxford University Press, 2003)7 at 7. 
24 See Lively, at 62, especially his discussion on how the 14th Amendment has strengthened the 13th 
Amendment through judicial development in segregation cases. 
25 Cohen, above n 23. 
26 Lively, above n 21, at 42-43. 
27  Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, in “Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and 
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law” in Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings That Formed 
the Movement (New York, New Press, 1995) 103 at 103-122. 
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The Civil Rights Act of 1866 reflected more genuine attempts at addressing the 
civil rights of African Americans but retained the black-white polarity and 
dichotomy of the Black Codes, stating, for instance, that: 
…all persons born in the United States…excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby 
declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and 
color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary 
servitude…shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United 
States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to 
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to 
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and 
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, 
pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or 
custom, to the contrary notwithstanding. 28  
This right “to make and enforce contracts” and the “full and equal benefit of all 
laws and proceedings” would eventually become section 1981 of Title 42 of the US 
Code29—the very code relied upon by Doe in Kamehameha.  References to ‘race’ 
and ‘color’, ‘slavery’ and ‘white citizens’ indicate that the proto-section was meant 
to protect the recently freed slaves now recognized as equal to all other citizen-
persons and possessing the same rights.  While seemingly insisting that everyone 
was equal, however, the standard was parity with the European American majority. 
In 1868, section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment stated that: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State in which they reside.  No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.30  
Responding to a history of racial discrimination, its Equal Protection Clause 
describes its rightsholder in homogenous and anonymous terms, as everyone and 
anyone.  “[W]ith the cruel history of black slavery fresh in mind”31, section 1 
stipulates that “all”—or everyone—born or naturalized in the United States is a 
citizen entitled to “equal protection of the laws”—that is, all rights, “privileges and 
immunities”.   
                                                          
28 Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat 27-30, enacted 9 April 1866. 
29 42 USC §1981. 
30 US Constitution amend XIV §1, adopted 9 July 1868. 
31 Cohen, above n 23, at 7. 
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In subsequent decades, equality became more specific.  The Fifteenth Amendment, 
passed in 1869, like the 1866 Act, negatively recognized certain identities prone to 
discrimination during Reconstruction: “The right of citizens of the United States to 
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account 
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude”.32   While homogenous, this 
narrative of equality remained, nonetheless, preoccupied with a certain history—
slavery—and identity—the former slave.   
Simultaneously, ‘race’, ‘color’ and ‘previous condition of servitude’ negatively 
reference a certain group of individuals with a particular history of discrimination—
that is, those who are not to be discriminated against.  Where the Fourteenth 
Amendment uses the language of homogenenity—or of everyone—and guarantees 
equality—the Fifteenth Amendment is concerned with the apparent no-one of a 
right to non-discrimination.  In other words, no one is to be discriminated against 
because they are a former slave, a certain ‘color’or race. 
The increasingly specific nature of these civil rights signalled a more substantive 
version of equality.  Their development “communicated a swift and powerful 
message that civil rights would not be self-actuating as a result of the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s ratification”33.  Similarly, the increasing specificity and explicitness 
of these guarantees—and particularly the shift from an everyone to a no-one 
standard, and from equality to non-discrimination guarantees—demonstrates 
lawmakers’ awareness of residual de facto discrimination in state and local law and 
everyday life.34  Such ongoing discrimination required greater specification about 
who was a rightsholder and what rights were theirs.   Importantly, these everyone 
and no-one narratives where driven by both the burdens of a history of slavery and 
the failure of subsequent antebellum constitutional guarantees and legislation to 
effect de facto equality. 
 
                                                          
32 US Constitution amend XV §1. 
33 Lively, above n 21, at 42. 
34 Cohen, above n 23, at 8. 
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2.2.2 ANTEBELLUM JURISPRUDENCE 
Thus, in The Slaughterhouse Cases, the Supreme Court held that: 
The most cursory glance at [the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments] 
discloses a unity of purpose…the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm 
establishment of the freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and 
citizen from the oppression of those who had formerly exercised unlimited 
dominion over him…35 
Despite similar attempts in the Civil Rights Act 1875, 36  however, a very 
conservative Supreme Court, in The Civil Rights Cases (1883), held that equal 
protection would only be violated where there was evidence of “State action”37—
that is, de jure discrimination resulting from action by law or official government 
rather than de facto discrimination arising from supposedly private, even arbitrary 
individual choices of, for instance, cab or restaurant owners. “Individual invasion 
of individual rights [was] not the subject matter of the amendment” but rather “the 
domain of local jurisprudence”.38  Thus, despite history, substantive equality was 
to be left to majoritarian-biased social forces. 
Foreshadowing modern arguments against identity-aware admissions, the Court 
also held that: 
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation, 
has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage 
in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases 
to be the special favourite of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, 
are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other men’s rights are protected.  
There were thousands of free colored people in this country before the abolition of 
slavery…Mere discriminations on account of race or color were not regarded as 
badges of slavery. 39 
Despite the historic and ongoing disadvantages, the Court presumed that former 
slaves, given the same formal rights as white citizens—‘the mere citizen’ of the 
day—would find parity regardless of in-built, real-time social discrimination.  In 
                                                          
35 Slaughterhouse Cases 83 US 36 (1872), at 67 (emphasis added). 
36 The Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat 335–337. 
37 Civil Rights Cases 109 US 3 (1883), at 11, per majority. 
38 Such as where they choose to live, what restaurant they choose to frequent, or, conversely, who 
one will entertain as “guests”, “take into [one’s] cab or car, or admit to his concert or theatre”: ibid.    
39 At 25, per majority. Emphasis added. 
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contrast to no-one narratives, preference which disadvantaged the majority not the 
minority was unequal and unfair.   
Justice Harlan’s dissent foreshadows identity-blindness but also current arguments 
for indigenous education rights which equate them with the realization of 
fundamental constitutional rights.  He wrote: 
It is, I submit, scarcely just to say that the colored race has been a special favourite 
of the laws. What the nation, through Congress, has sought to accomplish in 
reference to that race is what had already been done in every state in the Union for 
the white race, to secure and protect rights belonging to them as freemen and 
citizens; nothing more.  The one underlying purpose of congressional legislation 
has been to enable the black race to take the rank of mere citizens…Today it is the 
colored race which is denied, by corporations and individuals wielding public 
authority, rights fundamental in their freedom and citizenship.  At some future time 
it may be some other race that will fall under the ban…there cannot be, in this 
republic, any class of human beings in practical subjection to another class with 
power in the latter to dole out to the former just such privileges as they may choose 
to grant…40 
Justice Harlan’s reasoning is consistent with no-one racial parity and everyone 
integration.  But he also recognized the subtleties of de facto discrimination and the 
real-time advantages of ‘classes’ with more social and political clout than African-
Americans.  Crucially, Justice Harlan differentiated between the formalized 
guarantee of equality and its realization, as well as the potential diversity of those 
who would claim the right.41 
Justice Harlan also dissented in Plessy v Ferguson (1896) where both the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments were argued and the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine was 
sanctioned. 42    Famously, the appellant, “7/8 white and 1/8 black”, sued after being 
asked to move from the ‘whites-only’ carriage on a train.43  Such segregation was 
widely practiced and mandated by Louisiana law, but the Supreme Court found no 
violation of equal protection.  Instead, it recognised that the facts did not, 
technically, involve slavery or servitude and that the distinction only corresponded 
with de facto social distinctions between the races. Incredibly, the majority held 
that the Fourteenth Amendment was not meant “to abolish distinctions based upon 
                                                          
40 At 61, per Harlan J dissenting.  Emphasis added. 
41 Harlan J disagreed with the majority interpretation on the grounds that it “proceed[ed]…upon 
grounds entirely too narrow and artificial” and resulted in “the substance and spirit of the recent 
amendments of the Constitution [being] sacrificed by a subtle and ingenious verbal criticism”: at 26. 
42 Plessy v Ferguson 163 US 537 (1896). 
43 At 538, per majority. 
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color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a 
commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.” 44 
The Court again trusted majoritarian-biased social forces—or “natural affinities, a 
mutual appreciation of each other’s merits, and a voluntary consent of 
individuals” 45 —to equalize prevalent discrimination. The decision seemingly 
reinforced the legal and socio-economic space between the races.   
Dissenting, Justice Harlan argued that the no-one Thirteenth Amendment “prevents 
imposition of any burdens or disabilities that constitute badges of slavery or 
servitude”—that is, distinctions which produce discrimination in fact—when read 
with the Fourteenth Amendment.46   Together, he argued, the two amendments 
“protect all the civil rights that pertain to freedom and citizenship” and have 
“removed the race line”.47  Segregation was unequal because it was what whites not 
blacks wanted.  In what would become constitutional catchphrases generations later, 
Justice Harlan concluded that: 
…In view of the constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no 
superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens.  There is no caste here.  Our 
constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among its 
citizens.  In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.  The 
humblest is the peer of the most powerful.  The law regards man as man, and takes 
no account of his surroundings, or of his color…48 
However, Justice Harlan was in the minority and Plessy would stand for generations, 
representing the breaking of America’s “first civil rights promise”.49 
 
                                                          
44 At 551. 
45 At 551.  The majority decision condones the most dogmatic, ignorant, and overt species of racial 
discrimination, explaining why current federal courts treat distinctions based on racial identities with 
such suspicion.  The decision is laced with backwards fears of “the colored race [becoming] the 
dominant power in the state legislature” where it might “relegate the white race to an inferior 
position” among other unspoken fears of parity and integration: majority at 551.   
46 At 555, per Harlan J dissenting. 
47 At 555. 
48 At 559. 
49 Language of Yamamoto and Betts, above n 1.  
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2.2.3 BROWN AND THE ‘SECOND CIVIL RIGHTS PROMISE’50 
With Reconstruction, African Americans finally gained access to education,51 but, 
with Plessy’s blessing, ‘separate-but-unequal’ education punctuated other 
constitutional violations common since the end of Reconstruction in 1877, 
including poll taxes, literacy tests and other voting fraud—and lynchings.52  In 
terms of education, the Jim Crow era, especially in the South was formally equally 
in law but unequal in practice.  While equal funding was often mandated by state 
law administrative decisions regarding “teacher salaries and qualifications, student-
teacher ratios, spending on physical plants and equipment” were left to local, 
usually, white officials53 as implied in Plessy.  Often, funds earmarked for African 
American schools were used for other schools. Such decisions resulted in huge 
disparities in educational outcomes between African American learners and 
others.54  Despite changes in racial attitudes across the country post-World War II—
and constitutional guarantees of equal protection—these practices remained 
entrenched in the South particularly in elementary schools.55 
Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas (1954)56 (‘Brown I’) and its sequel, 
Brown v Board of Education II (1955) 57 (‘Brown II’) combined lawsuits from four 
states, all challenging the constitutionality of racially segregated school districts in 
terms of equal protection.  In Brown, the Court unanimously held that Plessy’s 
‘separate but equal’ doctrine had no place in public education.58  One year later, the 
Court ruled on how Brown I would be implemented in Brown II.  Incredibly, the 
                                                          
50 Ibid. 
51 Michael J Klarman Brown v. Board of Education and the Civil Rights Movement: Abridged 
Edition of "From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality 
" (Cary, North Carolina, Oxford University Press, 2007), at 3.  However, note Heather Andrea 
Williams Self-Taught: African American Education in Slavery and Freedom (Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina, University of North Carolina Press, 2005); and Grey Gundaker “Hidden Education among 
African Americans during Slavery” (2007) 109 Teach Coll Rec 1591.  Both describe how African-
American resistance to slavery included self and community education in secret. 
52 Ibid, at 3. 
53 Ibid, at 30. 
54 Ibid, 30-31: In 1915 the expenditure per white student was 3 times that spent on African-American 
students in North Carolina, six times in Alabama, and twelve times in South Carolina.  In 1910, only 
2.8 per cent of African Americans attended high school and there were only four high schools for 
colored students in the entire South. 
55 Ibid, at 31.   
56 Brown I, above n 3. 
57 Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas 349 US 294 (1955) [Brown II]. 
58 Brown I, at 495. 
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greater equality narrative was to be redefined on the basis of the minority child’s 
grade school experience, but several other features of Brown I are remarkable.   
In the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment, the unanimous bench held that equal 
protection was not to be judged on “tangible factors” alone but also on the effect of 
segregation itself on public education”59  and “qualities which are incapable of 
objective measurement but which make for greatness in a…school”60 including a 
student’s ability in a particular environment to interact with other students, 
exchange ideas with them and “learn his profession”. 61   Even where physical 
facilities and teacher’s salaries might be comparable,62 intangibles including the 
psychological effects of forced segregation made “[s]eparate educational 
facilities…inherently unequal” violating equal protection.63 
The Court also seemingly recognized the long-term effects of such discrimination 
when it held that: 
[t]o separate them from others of similar age and qualification solely because of 
their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that 
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely to ever be undone…64 
This outcome measured discrimination had “the tendency to [retard] the educational 
and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the 
benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.65 
Such de facto inequality had wider implications given “the importance of education 
to our democratic society” as it enabled citizenship, the gaining of a profession and 
“normal” adjustment.  After calling education the “most important function of state 
and local governments”, the Court judged that “it is doubtful that any child may 
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an 
                                                          
59 At 492. 
60  At 492-493, referring to two contemporary cases Sweatt v Painter 339 US 629 (1950) and 
McLaurin v Oklahoma State Regents 339 US 637 (1950).  In Sweatt, the state tried to argue that by 
providing a separate law school for African-Americans it was treating them equally but the Court 
had also recognized the importance of intangibles, for instance, the school’s reputation. 
61 At 493, noting the Court’s decision in McLaurin.  Compare the constitutional value of intangible 
factors with Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop’s hope for the Kamehameha Schools and its modern 
mission statement and apparent success with a preferential admissions policy. 
62 Again, Klarman describes how these tangibles were also unequal: Klarman, above n 51, at 30. 
63 At 495. 
64 At 495. 
65 At 494. 
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education.”66  However, the Court went further, concluding: “Where a State has 
undertaken to provide an opportunity for an education in its public schools, such an 
opportunity is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.”67 
Ultimately, the Court held that “separate educational facilities [were] inherently 
unequal” and violated the Constitution’s equal protection guarantee.  In Brown II, 
the Warren Court flatly stated that “racial discrimination in public education is 
unconstitutional”, requiring that “all provisions of federal, state, or local level 
requiring or permitting such discrimination must yield to this principle”. 68  
Moreover, segregation was to be remedied according to principles of “good faith 
implementation” and “practical flexibility…for adjusting and reconciling public 
and private needs”.  Such remedies were to be implemented “as soon as practicable”, 
with defendants making a “prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance”.69  
Thus, public authorities were required to take positive steps to remedy inequalities. 
The Brown decisions were a clear response to a particular history of slavery and 
segregation.  In the wake of forced separation on the basis of racial identity, Brown 
required equality to be homogenous and anonymous.  However, it was not just the 
formal existence of the schools themselves or their identity-aware admission 
policies alone which violated equal protection but also the tangible and less tangible 
de facto outcomes in the actual educational experience of students sharing a 
particular racial identity.  Importantly the Court recognized education as a right 
essential to long-term human outcomes.  The positive steps required by the Court 
in Brown II were also tailored to this particular historico-legal context but clearly 
responded to real-time inequalities. 
 
                                                          
66 At 493. 
67 At 493. 
68 At 298. 
69 At 299-300.   
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2.2.4 SECTION 1981 
Meanwhile, the Thirteenth Amendment’s promise of non-discrimination was 
preserved and then resurrected in legislation including section 1981 of Title 42 of 
the United States Code.   
Section 198170 has Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment “roots”71 but especially 
expresses Congress’ “power to enforce [section 1 of the Thirteenth] by appropriate 
legislation”,72 even to “abolish the ‘badges and incidents of slavery’”.73  It was first 
enacted in the Civil Rights Acts of 186674 and 187075 which targeted “explicit”76 
and “intentional discrimination” against former slaves.77  The next re-enactment, 
section 1977 of Title 24 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, was virtually identical to 
the present section 1981, titled “Equal Rights Before the Law” which reads: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in 
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give 
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject 
to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, 
and to no other.78 
All incarnations specifically respond to the history of slavery and segregation, even 
the “events and passions of the time in which the law was forged”.79 
In Runyon v McCrary (1976)80 the Supreme Court extended section 1981 to the 
sphere of education.  It found that two private schools which received no federal 
financial aid and whose admissions policies formally excluded students of African-
American ancestry violated section 1981 because “neither school offered services 
                                                          
70 Above n 29.   
71 Kamehameha, above 2, at 836, per majority. 
72 US Constitution, amend XIII §§ 1-2.  Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress 
similar powers to legislate civil rights regarding the Equal Protection Clause. 
73 See Kamehameha, at 836. 
74 Above n 28. 
75 The Enforcement Act of 1870 also known as the Civil Rights Act of 1870, Act of May 31, 1870, 
ch 114, §§16, 18, 16, Stat 141, 144 (1870). 
76 Gen Bldg Contractors Ass’n v Pennsylvania, 458 US 375 (1982), at 386-388.  
77 Kamehameha, at 835-836, per majority. 
78 42 USC §1981, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L no 102-166, 105 Stat 1071 
(emphasis added). 
79 See Kamehameha, per majority, at 836, quoting Gen Bldg Contractors, above n 76, at 390. 
80 Runyon v McCrary 427 US 160 (1976), at 176. 
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on an equal basis to white and non-white students”.81  Runyon showed that the 
Thirteenth Amendment would not be hampered by the public/private divide.  
Crucially, the Court applied an intermediate rather than strict level of scrutiny to 
section 1981, allowing the possibility that positive, identity-aware measures might 
coincide with equality.   
Later section 1981 jurisprudence allowed the same possibility.  In General Building 
Contractors v Pennsylvania (1982) the Court judged, “Liability may not be 
imposed under section 1981 without proof of intentional discrimination”. 82   In 
Patterson v McLean Credit Union (1989) the Court held that the plaintiff had the 
initial burden of proving such.  In their defence, an employer had only to show they 
had “a legitimate non-discriminatory reason” where a “plaintiff was rejected, or the 
other applicant was chosen”.83    
Thus, the Thirteenth Amendment right to non-discrimination entailed a lower level 
of scrutiny than Brown, targeted intentional discrimination and recognized the 
constitutionality of some identity-aware policies admission and hiring policies. 
 
2.3 ADDITIONAL NARRATIVES 
An identity-specific history of slavery and segregation justified a homogenous and 
anonymous everyone/no-one narrative of equality.  Nevertheless, two parallel 
identity-aware equality narratives, respectively, emerged and survived in federal 
law, namely: the temporary, racially specific someone of affirmative action; and the 
time-honored, Native American-specific indigenous preference recognized in 
Morton v Mancari84 based on remedial self-determination. 
                                                          
81 At 172-173.  The schools tried to argue that their First Amendment rights to association with 
people who shared their beliefs about segregation would be violated by applying section 1981. The 
Court made it clear that such rights were not protected by the Constitution.  The schools also tried 
to argue that section 1981 violated parental rights to choose private, “specialized” education for their 
children consistent with cases such as Meyer v Nebraska 262 US 390 (1923), and Pierce v Society 
of Sisters 268 US 510 (1925).  The Court again held that such a right was not guaranteed by the 
Constitution or “unfettered by reasonable government regulation”: at 176-179. 
82 At 382-391. 
83 Paterson v McLean Credit Union 491 US (1989). 
84 Above n 4. 
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2.3.1 AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
Brown II required the federal government, states, and local government—including 
school districts—to take positive, affirmative steps to remedy racial discrimination.  
Several subsequent Supreme Court cases emphasise the substantive nature of this 
equality narrative which displays greater identity-awareness.    
Judicial frustration over the slowness of desegregation throughout the country is 
evident in Green v County School Board (1968) where the Fourteenth Amendment 
was found to impose an “affirmative duty”.  A “freedom of choice” plan was not 
inherently discriminatory but was unacceptable to the Court because it had not 
produced de facto desegregation and more effective ways to do so existed. 85   
Potential remedies included “compulsory integration”.86   In Swann v Charlotte-
Mecklenburg School District (1971), the Court also recognized that “school 
authorities [had] fail[ed] in their affirmative obligations”87 in failing to “eliminate 
invidious racial distinctions” apparent in less tangible differences in 
“transportation”, staff, “extracurricular activities”, building maintenance and 
equipment, and the “location and capacity [of the school in question] in light of 
population growth, finances [and] land values”.88  To achieve integration, the court 
was willing to allow the “remedial altering of attendance zones[]”—or 
“gerrymandering”—and the transportation of students by bus to school districts 
some distance away.89   
In Keyes v School District No 1, Denver (1973), “no statutory dual system ha[d] 
ever existed”90 and assignment plans initially appeared to be “racially neutral”.91 
However, the facts “intentional” and “systematic” de facto evident in 
“concentrat[ions]” of Hispanic and African American learners at schools92 where 
tangible differences in resources, budget allocation and building location were 
                                                          
85 Green v County School Board of New Kent County 391 US 430 (1968), at 441-442 and 439-441. 
86 At 437-438.   
87 Swann v Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 402 US 1 (1971), at 15. 
88 At 19-21. 
89 At 27-31.  This was based on the fact that a white student, for instance, was likely to meet only 
other white students when she attended the school closest to her regardless of the admissions policy. 
90 Keyes v Denver School District No 1 413 US 189 (1973), at 198. 
91 At 212-213. 
92 At 201. 
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obvious. 93  Justice Powell, concurring, would have dispensed with “identifying 
“segregative acts” or “segregative intent” as the school district was segregated in 
fact.94   
There were limits to the facts which would violate the Equal Protection Clause.  
Regarding racial “balances” or “quotas”, the Swann court opined: 
We are concerned in these cases with the elimination of the discrimination inherent 
in the dual school systems, not with the myriad factors of human existence which 
can cause discrimination in a multitude of ways on racial, religious, or ethnic 
grounds.95 
In San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez (1973),96 arguments for 
“wealth discrimination” were also rejected.  The plaintiffs from a lower socio-
economic area of predominantly Hispanic American ancestry alleged that Texas’s 
school finance system—which distributed school funds on the amount of property 
taxes paid by the district residents—produced actual inequality and was 
unconstitutional.  The Court refused to apply strict scrutiny because it could not 
identify a suspect class—that is a racial minority group rather than a “class of the 
disadvantaged poor”.  It held that the “asserted deprivation” was “relative—rather 
than absolute—[in] nature”. 97  In another case, Milliken v Bradley (1974), the 
Supreme Court overruled a District Court ruling mandating cross-district bussing, 
holding that school districts were responsible for their own segregation and not for 
another school district’s.98   
However, through its bussing decisions, “[t]he Supreme Court established strong 
precedent for race-based remedial measures”.99  Positive, identity-aware measures 
were amenable with equality and even demanded by it—at least until integration 
                                                          
93 At 201.  For example, the district in question had been, apparently, using mobile classrooms for 
some lower income areas where most of the students were members of racial minorities while 
building schools of a more permanent nature and higher standard for other areas.  as the school board 
formed a “state agency” and for instance, amounted to “state action”. 
94 At 219-236, per Powell J concurring and dissenting in part.   
95 Swann, at 22. 
96 San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez 411 US 1 (1973). 
97 Rodriguez, at 18-28. 
98 Milliken v Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).  Desegregation continues to this day: See Cowan and 
United States v Bolivar County Board of Education (Cleveland City School District) (2012), Civil 
Action No 2:65-CV-00031-GHD, filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Mississippi Delta Division.  
99 Carl Livingston “Affirmative Action on Trial: The Retraction of Affirmative Action and the Case 
for Its Retention” (1996) 40(1) How LJ 147. 
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was achieved.  A host of legislation100 and federal agencies were created in the wake 
of these cases to enforce anti-discrimination law including the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), a federal law enforcement agency. 101  
Affirmative action was bolstered by President Lyndon Johnson’s signing of 
Executive Order 11246102 which required the Labor Department to ensure that all 
federal government contractors were non-discriminatory in their employment 
practices.  Goals of diversity led to the targeted recruitment of minority workers.  
Eventually, private and public educational institutions and businesses nationwide 
adopted similar policies to be consistent with the government as failure to do so 
could result in loss of federal contracts or funds.103   
Applying similar reasoning, the Supreme Court recognized disparate impact or 
discriminatory effect104 against an ethno-linguistic minority as discrimination and 
mandated identity-aware education as a remedy.  In Lau v Nichols (1974)105 a group 
of Chinese American students who spoke little or no English but were only 
instructed in English106 brought suit against their school district under section 601 
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 1964 which still bans discrimination “on the 
ground of race, color or national origin” in “any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance”107, including public schools.  While a lower court 
                                                          
100 Including Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Equal Educational Opportunities Act 
of 1974, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, as well as the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA) of 1990, and the ADA Amendments Act of 2008. 
101 Created under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
102 Also see President John F Kennedy’s Executive Order 10925 signed in 1961 which created the 
forerunner of the EEOC, the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity. 
103  Lee Epstein and Thomas G Walker Constitutional Law: Rights, Liberties, and Justice 
(Constitutional Law for a Changing America) (8th ed, Thousand Oaks, California, SAGE, 2013), at 
690.  For instance, see Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which makes federal funding 
dependent on an absence of discriminatory practice:   
104 In terms of Title VI specifically but the reasoning is, like Brown and its progeny, focused on real-
time outcomes.  
105 Lau v Nichols 414 US 563 (1974). 
106 Ironically, there were other students of Chinese-American heritage in the school with little or no 
English who were already being given some English instruction. 
107 Title VI, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC §2000d, also a progeny of the Thirteenth Amendment 
states: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance”.  As Rachel E Moran explains in 
“Undone by Law: The Uncertain Legacy of Lau v. Nichols” (2005) 16(1) Berkeley La Raza LJ 1, at 
2: “In response to civil rights protests and ongoing unrest, Congress enacted the omnibus bill to 
target segregation and discrimination in the South.”  However, the provision ended up protecting 
the education rights of an ethno-linguistic community.  
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would have allowed any student to bring “to the starting line of his educational 
career” arbitrary “advantages and disadvantages”108, the Supreme Court held that: 
[i]t seems obvious that the Chinese-speaking minority receive fewer benefits than 
the English-speaking majority from the respondents’ school system which denies 
them a meaningful opportunity to participate in the educational program—all 
earmarks of discrimination…109 
Lau exemplifies dichotomous no-one-ness—no one is to be discriminated against 
in the classroom intentionally or not110—but revolved on non-racial factors.  The 
narrative is openly diverse, even multicultural.  Despite integrative purpose, the 
discrimination arose within a school not necessarily between schools and from the 
same treatment provided to other students.  The remedial provision of alternative 
education is aimed at parity but responds to identity-specific needs—at least 
temporarily.  In de facto rather than de jure terms, the decision recognizes a 
particular ethnic or linguistic—rather than racial—community,111 language rather 
than race being the issue.   
This someone narrative demanded a more substantive interpretation of equality with 
the capacity to account for slavery and segregation but also disparate impact and 
real-time inequalities generally.    
 
2.3.2 THE NATIVE AMERICAN PREFERENCE 
Another long and painful identity-specific history preceded slavery, segregation 
and racial discrimination.  European colonization traumatized the indigenous 
peoples of the Americas before it stole human beings from Africa.  Despite the 
equality guarantees in the Declaration and Constitution, various federal acts and 
policies of the federal government later resulted in gross injustices including 
                                                          
108 At 565.   
109 At 568.  Compare the result in Lau with the Supreme Court’s decision in the much earlier case 
of Yick Wo v Hopkins 118 US 356 (1886) involving blatant de jure discrimination against Chinese-
Americans. 
110 A lack of intention could not provide a defense for defendant school district.  Discriminatory 
effect rather than intention gave rise to Title VI discrimination. 
111 That is, the plaintiffs were discriminated against as Chinese speakers rather than as Asian-
Americans. 
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population removal,112 the stealing of land, and other treaty violations, both de jure 
and de facto discrimination, other violations of fundamental constitutional rights, 
and genocide.113  Similar injustices were apparent in education. 
As in Hawaiʻi 114 and Aotearoa New Zealand,115 education was used to assimilate, 
integrate and discriminate against the indigenous peoples within the United 
States—depending on which narrative successive governments adopted towards 
Native Americans.  Traditionally recognized eras of federal Indian policy include 
“Treaty-making”, “Removal”, “Assimilation”, “Reorganization”, “Termination” 
and “Self-Determination”. 116   These eras are reflected in Native American 
education.  For instance, where educational efforts amongst Native Americans from 
colonial times to the early nineteenth century—during Treaty-Making and 
Removal—focused on Christianization and civilization,117 efforts from the 1880s 
to 1920s reflected an everyone/no-one assimilation and were aimed at 
indoctrinating Native American learners and subduing their communities.118  This 
aggressive form of Westernization took place at boarding schools where children 
were often forcibly abducted or coerced into attending, separated from their 
families and communities, renamed, given corporal punishment for speaking their 
own language, and faced other “de-humanizing or de-Indianizing treatment”.119  
Rather than focusing on academic subjects, these government-run schools focused 
on vocational training for subservience.  These approaches to education were 
                                                          
112 For the history of the Cherokee Removal and subsequent Trail of Tears: see John Ehle Trail of 
Tears: The Rise and Fall of the Cherokee Nation (New York, Doubleday, 1989). 
113 As described by Ward Churchill A Little Matter of Genocide: Holocaust and Denial in the 
Americas 1492 to the Present (San Francisco, City Lights, 1997). 
114 See discussion in Chapter 3.  
115 See discussion in Chapter 7. 
116 See, for instance, Steve Pevar The Rights of Indians and Tribes (New York, Oxford University 
Press, 2012), at 1-16. 
117 K Tsianina Lomawaima and Teresa L McCarty To Remain Indian: Lessons in Democracy from 
a Century of Native American Education (New York: Teacher’s College Press, 2006). 
118 See Gary Y Okihiro, Island World: A History of Hawaii and the United States (University of 
California Press, Oakland, 2008), “Schooling for Subservience” at 98-134, on the infamous Carlisle 
Boarding School where the children of chiefs were literally held hostage to subdue their elders.  
Other methods included “cajolery”, “threats”, bribery”, and “fraud” and food rations being withheld 
unless families let their children go:  Jana Noel “Education toward Cultural Shame: A Century of 
Native American Education” (2002) 16(1) Journal of Educational Foundations 19, at 24.  Compare 
the forcible abduction of Native American children from their families with the “Stolen Generations” 
of Australia discussed in Margaret Jacobs, White Mother to a Dark Race: Settler Colonialism, 
Maternalism, and the Removal of Indigenous Children in the American West and Australia, 1880-
1940 (Lincoln, Nebraska and London, England, University of Nebraska Press, 2010). 
119 Noel, ibid. 
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inherently discriminatory, racist and based on false science and dying race 
theories.120  
Between 1925 and 1985, federal Indian education law and policy fluctuated with 
political whim between neglect, progress, termination and relocation, assimilation, 
and self-determination. 121  Significant government reports on Native American 
education recorded concerns about the qualifications of teaching staff, health 
conditions, the integrity and suitability of facilities, and the discouragement of 
community and parental participation at government-run boarding schools which 
show little improvement between 1926 and 1969.122  While the Self-Determination 
Era from 1969 to the present has seen improvements, Native American education 
for the better part of United States history would seem the antithesis of equality. 
However, this burdened, identity-specific history also recognized another exception 
to identity-blind equality, an alternative legal discourse to slavery, segregation and 
racial discrimination which justified preference in terms of self-determination not 
equality or non-discrimination.   This discourse does not revolve around the 
individual everyone or no-one but recognizes collective groups of specifically 
indigenous rightsholders, the constitutional line being political not racial.  
James Anaya has written that:  
…federal Indian law doctrine[] treats Indian rights as an exception to the norms of 
equality and non-discrimination, rather than their embodiment… 
… 
                                                          
120 Okihiro, above n 118. 
121 Thomas Glass “Federal Policy in Native American Education, 1925-1985” (1988) 3(2) Journal 
of Education Policy 105.   
122 The 1926 Meriam Report noted that “only one in eight…Indian children in school were at the 
normal level according to age” and further concerns regarding quality of teaching staff at Bureau of 
Indian Education-run schools, “teaching techniques”, “[d]eplorable health conditions” related to the 
quality of facilities, “discouragement of community and parent participation”, and other concerns.   
In 1969, a US Senate committee report, the Kennedy Report, recognized that most of the 
recommendations of the Merriam Report had not been met by the federal government: summarized 
and discussed in Glass, at 109.  Compare with deficiencies in segregated schools serving African 
American learners in the South prior to Brown. 
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As a result, equal protection discussions within a constitutional framework stay 
away from Native Americans…123 
Article 1, clause 3—the infamous Three-Fifths clause—of the Constitution narrates 
Native Americans as outside the constitutional norm: "Representatives and direct 
Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States ... excluding Indians not 
taxed”.124  A similar exception also appears in the Fourteenth Amendment, clause 
2. 125   Article 1, clause 8 (‘the Commerce Clause’) of the Constitution gives 
Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes”.126  Given this plenary power, Congress 
has unique jurisdiction to determine this political relationship. 
Native American peoples, however, retain inherent sovereignty, a separate political 
identity and pre-existing rights.  From the Marshall Trilogy,127 the Supreme Court 
has recognized that indigenous nations retain occupation rights post-European 
‘discovery’, 128   retain inherent sovereignty which pre-dates discovery, 129  and 
constitute “distinct political societ[ies], separated from others, capable of managing 
[their] own affairs and governing [themselves]”.  Tribes have been considered 
“states” capable of making treaties and “people[s] capable of maintaining the 
relations of peace and war”. 130   Constitutionally, Native American tribes are 
political entities somewhere between a federal state and a foreign government.131   
But they have also been considered “domestic dependent nations” whose 
relationship with the federal government “resembles that of a ward to his 
                                                          
123 S James Anaya “Indigenous Peoples and International Law: Lands, Liberties, and Legacies” 
(2007) 31 Am Indian L Rev 257, at 258.  
124 US Constitution, art 1, cl 3. 
125 US Constitution, art 1, s 2. 
126 US Constitution, art 1, s 8 (emphasis added). 
127 Three Supreme Court cases, namely: Johnson v M'Intosh (1823), 21 US (8 Wheat) 543, 5 L Ed 
681; Cherokee Nation v Georgia 30 US (5 Peters) 1 (1831); and Worcester v Georgia 31 US (6 Pet) 
515 (1832).  Each decision was delivered and significantly influenced by Chief Justice John 
Marshall.  These decisions established the three governing principles of federal Indian law: retention 
of occupation and land usage rights, inherent tribal sovereignty and the federal trust responsibility. 
128 See Johnson v M’Intosh. 
129 See Cherokee Nation v Georgia. 
130 Based on historic treaties, the Marshall Court found that Native American nations “had always 
been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their natural rights, as the 
undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial…The very term “nation,” so generally 
applied to them, means “a people distinct from others”: Worcester, at 519. 
131 See Cherokee Nation v Georgia, at 1-2, 16-17; United States v Antelope 430 US 641 (1977), at 
645; and Fisher v District Court 424 US 382 (1976), at 390. 
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guardian”.132   These “sovereign and independent states” remained “tributary and 
feudatory” under the “protection” of the federal government. 133   The Supreme 
Court would later describe this special trust relationship thus: 
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities dependent 
on the United States,—dependent largely for their daily food; dependent for their 
political rights. They owe no allegiance to the states, and receive from them no 
protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the states where they are 
found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, 
so largely due to the course of dealing of the federal government with them, and 
the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and 
with it the power.134 
Later courts135 attributed a “moral obligation to act in good faith in performing the 
stipulations entered into” on behalf of Native Americans 136  “of the highest 
responsibility and trust” to the federal government.137  In United States v Mitchell 
(1983), the Court held the federal government “accountable for breaches of 
trust”,138 identifying “[a]ll of the necessary elements of a common-law trust” and 
resultant fiduciary relationship, including a “trustee”, “beneficiary”, and “trust 
corpus”.139   
The narrative implications of the trust relationship were evident in Morton v 
Mancari (1974),140 an action brought by non-Indian employees of the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs whose employment policy included a preference in hiring for Native 
Americans.  The plaintiffs claimed the preference was racially discriminatory and 
                                                          
132 Cherokee Nation v Georgia, at 17. 
133 Worcester v Georgia, at 560. 
134 United States v Kagama 118 US 375 (1886), at 383-384. 
135 In United States v Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913), at 230-231, the Supreme Court found that “an 
unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized 
nation the power and duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian 
communities within its borders…” 
136 Lone Wolf v Hitchcock 187 US 558 (1903), at 566. 
137 Seminole Nation v United States 316 US 286 (1942), at 297. 
138 Where it mismanaged tribal resources it was meant to manage on behalf of, and for the benefit 
of, the tribe—and especially where it had “elaborate control” of those resources: United States v 
Mitchell 463 US 206 (1983) [Mitchell II], at 224-225.   
139 Mitchell II, at 226. William Canby has written: “At its broadest, the relationship includes the 
mixture of legal duties, moral obligations, understandings and expectancies that have arisen from 
the entire course of dealing between the federal government and the tribes.  In its narrowest and 
most concrete sense, the relationship approximates that of trustee and beneficiary, with the trustee 
(the United States) subject in some degree to legally enforceable rights”: William Canby American 
Indian Law in a Nutshell (2nd ed, St Paul, Minnesota, West Publishing, 1988), at 32. 
140  Mancari, above n 4, at 549-551. 
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violated the Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1972 (EEOA). 141   The 
Supreme Court, however, rejected this notion. 
The Court held that the preference was consistent with the plenary authority.  
Congress had legislated section 472 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934142 
which restored local self-government to tribes and was part of Title 25 of the United 
States Code,143 a voluminous tome of federal law devoted to federal Indian law and 
significant evidence of the exception itself.  Congress had not either explicitly or 
impliedly (sub silentio) repealed that law when they legislated either the EEOA or 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  In fact, Title VII’s144 anti-discrimination provisions 
treated the Native American preference as a “longstanding” exception to identity-
blindness.145    Given the plenary power, “[c]ourts are not at liberty to pick and 
choose among congressional enactments”.146  
The preference was also consistent with the special trust relationship.  A substantial 
and consistent body of law had been “explicitly designed to help only Indians”.   
Finding the preference constituted invidious racial discrimination would have 
“erased” Title 25 “in its entirety” and “jeopardized” the fiduciary relationship. 147  
The Court noted that “[l]iterally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian 
tribes…single [them] out for special treatment”.  Moreover, “[a]s long as the special 
treatment of Indians can be tied rationally to the fulfilment of Congress’ unique 
obligations toward Indians, such legislation will not be disturbed.”148 
Ultimately, the preference had nothing to do with race.  Neither “racial 
discrimination” nor “racial preference”, it was “an employment criterion designed 
to further the cause of Indian self-government and to make the BIA more responsive 
                                                          
141  Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub L No 92-261, 24 March 1972, 86 Stat 103, 
another Civil Rights-era law designed to give effect to the Fourteenth Amendment.   
142  Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934, 25 USC §472.  The Act was passed during the 
presidency of Franklin D Roosevelt and also known as the “Howard-Wheeler Act” or the “Indian 
New Deal”.   
143  25 USC. 
144 See sections 701(b) and 703(i). 
145 At 549.  In legislation passed just after the EEOA, the Education Amendments 1972, Congress 
had again legislated preference for Native Americans in the training of teachers for Native American 
children. 
146  At 549-551.   
147  At 549-551. 
148 At 554-555.   
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to the needs of its constituents.” 149  That is, to further the purposes of the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934 and give effect to the special relationship between the 
federal government and Native American tribes.   
Later cases would emphasize the political rather than racial nature of the exception, 
based on the Constitution 150  and tribes’ residual sovereignty 151  but also its 
genealogical character.  In United States v John (1978)152 the trust relationship 
appeared to operate regardless of federal recognition or reservation residency since 
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934:  
defined "Indians" not only as "all persons of Indian descent who are members of 
any recognized [in 1934] tribe now under Federal jurisdiction," and their 
descendants who then were residing on any Indian reservation, but also as "all other 
persons of one-half or more Indian blood."153 
Ultimately, Mancari established that a preference for Native Americans will not 
constitute invidious racial discrimination where it is the identifiable will of 
Congress and highlighted significant philosophical differences between the 
everyone/no-one, someone and indigenous narratives. 
In contrast to narratives burdened by slavery and segregation, the purpose of the 
preference was not everyone/no-one racial parity but greater indigenous self-
determination.  Although the preference was remedial, the BIA’s preference was 
not designed to further equal protection or any constitutional right but “derived 
from historical relationships and …explicitly designed to help only Indians”.  Its 
purpose was not to promote equality per se or to “alleviat[e] minority 
discrimination”.  Rather the preference was “designed to deal with an entirely 
different problem”: 154  again, how to further tribal self-determination. 155   
Importantly, the preference neither advantaged nor disadvantaged any race but 
recognized the government-to-government relationship between the federal 
                                                          
149 At 553-554. 
150 Antelope, above n 131, at 645. 
151 Fisher, above 131, at 390. 
152 United States v John, 437 US 634 (1978). 
153 Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat 988, 25 USC § 479 (1976 ed). 
154 Mancari, at 549-551. 
155 At 553-554. 
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government and tribes possessing residual sovereignty, the political basis of that 
relationship and the government’s accountability therein.   
The Court approved the federal government’s fiduciary role as “prepar[ing] the 
Indians to take their place as independent, qualified members of the modern body 
politic”. 156   Mancari’s explanatory footnotes, particularly those on the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934, emphasize that the relevant ‘independence’ was not 
individualized but that which accrues to tribes and nations who yet retain 
sovereignty.  The footnotes emphasize that the purpose of the Act was to “teach[] 
Indians to manage their own business and control their own funds and to administer 
their own property”,157 “to extend to the Indian the fundamental rights of political 
liberty and local self-government”, and to promote tribal “economic and political 
self-determination”. 158  Most tellingly: 
[The Act was] designed not to prevent the absorption of Indians into white 
communities, but rather to provide for those Indians unwilling or unable to compete 
in the white world some measures of self-government in their own affairs. 159 
Given the political rather than racial nature of the special trust relationship, Native 
Americans are not automatically subject to integration but retain the option of self-
determination.  For instance, Native Americans belonging to federally-recognized 
tribes are entitled to self-determination160 and the preference in almost the same way 
that someone else bears dual citizenship: as United States citizens161 but also tribal 
members and trust relationship beneficiaries. 162    Even during the post-Brown 
period, Native Americans had the right to claim constitutional rights as 
homogenous or anonymous individuals, but their indigenous identity remained an 
exception to the same.  Ultimately, while Congress retains its plenary power: 
                                                          
156 Relying on Board of Commissioners v Seber 318 US 705 (1943). 
157 At footnote 9. 
158 At footnote 10.   
159 At footnote 12 (emphasis added). 
160 At footnote 24.  
161 See the Fourteenth Amendment and the General Allotment Act of 1887 as well as the Indian 
Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 USC §§1301-1303. 
162 See Winton v Amos 255 US 373 (1921); and commentary in Canby, at 237-238. 
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…the powers that tribes possess are not delegations of authority from the United 
States; rather, tribes possess them as a consequence of their historical status as 
independent nations, and the United States supports the exercise of these powers.163 
The Supreme Court had earlier held that the tribes’ powers of self-government did 
not “spring[] from the [US] constitution” but instead predated it and were “not 
operated upon” by its provisions.164  In fact, the BIA was intended to develop into 
“an Indian service predominantly in the hands of educated and competent 
Indians”.165 
Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez (1978)166 later illustrated how strong the Mancari 
exception was despite legislation whose avowed purpose was to override it.167   The 
Court found that the Indian Civil Rights Act 1968168 (ICRA) evidenced a struggle 
between “[t]wo distinct and competing purposes”: strengthening the position of 
individual tribe members in relation to tribal government but also “furthering Indian 
self-government”.  But it determined that Congress had “selectively incorporated 
and in some instances modified the safeguards of the Bill of Rights to fit the unique 
political, cultural, and economic needs of tribal governments.” 169 
Ultimately, the “goal of tribal self-determination” as expressed in Title I, affirmed 
Congress’ intention “to protect tribal sovereignty from undue interference”170 and 
that tribal courts were the proper forum for resolving issues of the ICRA and best 
to judge  matters of “tribal tradition and custom” including membership criteria.171  
The plaintiff was a member of the tribe but invoked her constitutional rights as a 
citizen of the United States, essentially the everyone/no-one standard, but even 
                                                          
163 Pevar, above n 116, at 82.  Also see Executive Order No 13084 “Consultation and Coordination 
with Indian Tribal Governments” 65 Fed Reg 67249 (9 Nov 2000).  
164 Talton v Mayes 163 US 376 (1896), at 382 and 384-385. 
165 Mancari, at footnotes 17 and 18.   
166 Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez 436 US 49 (1978). 
167 In Martinez, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a Pueblo ordinance which denied 
membership to children of female members who married outside the tribe on the basis of non-
discrimination on the grounds of section 1302 (8) of Title I of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 
(the ICRA) which states that: “No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall…deny 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws”.  The drafting history revealed 
that the section’s central purpose was to “secur[e] for the American Indian the broad constitutional 
rights afford[ed] to other Americans,” and thereby to “protect individual Indians from arbitrary and 
unjust actions of tribal governments”. 
168 Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 USC §§1301-1304. 
169 At 62. 
170 At 63. 
171 At 71-72. 
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where legislation seemed to allow the exception to be overridden, rights accruing 
to indigenous group identity and a particular history were successful. 
In terms of education, Congress had also previously recognized tribal self-
determination in the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 
1975,172 the result of significant American Indian activism and the Civil Rights 
Movement.  Section 450(a)(1) acknowledges that “prolonged Federal domination 
of Indian service programs” including education had “retarded…the progress of 
Indian people and their communities” towards self-determination.  Crucially, 
sections 450(b)(1) and (3) recognized that “true self-determination” was dependent 
on educational progress and that “parental and community control of the 
educational process is of crucial importance to the Indian people”. 173  To give 
greater control over education to tribes, Part C authorizes several government 
agencies to enter into self-determination contracts with federally-recognized tribes, 
make grants to tribes and otherwise transfer control from agency to tribe in areas 
such as education.174 
Thus, in the wake of Brown, federal legal narratives displayed minority identity-
awareness and were consistent with a substantive version of equality which 
admitted and tried to remedy de facto inequalities attracted to group identity.  Since 
the Marshall Trilogy, a massive body of federal law has recognized the unique 
                                                          
172 Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 USC §§450-458, also 
known as PL 93-638. 
173 25 USC §450, “Congressional statement of findings” reads: 
“(a) Findings respecting historical and special legal relationship, and resultant responsibilities 
“The Congress, after careful review of the Federal Government’s historical and special legal 
relationship with, and resulting responsibilities to, American Indian people, finds that— 
“(1) the prolonged Federal domination of Indian service programs has served to retard rather than 
enhance the progress of Indian people and their communities by depriving Indians of the full 
opportunity to develop leadership skills crucial to the realization of self-government, and has denied 
to the Indian people an effective voice in the planning and implementation of programs for the 
benefit of Indians which are responsive to the true needs of Indian communities; and 
“(2) the Indian people will never surrender their desire to control their relationships both among 
themselves and with non-Indian governments, organizations, and persons. 
“(b) Further findings 
“The Congress further finds that— 
“(1) true self-determination in any society of people is dependent upon an educational process which 
will insure the development of qualified people to fulfill meaningful leadership roles; 
“(2) the Federal responsibility for and assistance to education of Indian children has not effected the 
desired level of educational achievement or created the diverse opportunities and personal 
satisfaction which education can and should provide; and 
“(3) parental and community control of the educational process is of crucial importance to the Indian 
people”. 
174 25 USC §§458-458e, Part C, “Indian Education Assistance”. 
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historico-legal context of certain indigenous identity-aware preferences.  Although 
remedial, the Mancari preference is sourced in residual self-determination, 
seemingly exceeding equal protection analysis.   
 
2.4 THE POWER OF EVERYONE/NO-ONE: LIMITS OF THE EXCEPTIONS 
Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are, by their very 
nature, odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of 
equality.175 
Given these features, someone and indigenous narratives seem to have a significant 
capacity to account for the unique historico-legal context and real-time disparities 
evident in Kamehameha.  In reality, however, a singular, adamant everyone/no-one 
narrative, divorced from its historico-legal context, currently dominates federal law 
at the expense of both someone and indigenous narratives and has significantly 
undermined the civil rights promise of Brown and centuries of federal Indian law.  
 
2.4.1 SLIM SOMEONE: THE DEMISE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
Whether “put[ing] an end to an existing discriminatory practice”, “compensat[ing] 
for past discrimination and the effects of that discrimination”, attempting to 
increase diversity or representation in the classroom or workplace,176 or providing 
“legal relief for the effects of societal bias on groups”177 affirmative action is meant 
to remedy de facto disparities.   State and federal law, however, increasingly rejects 
Brown’s substantive interpretation of equality and is hostile to positive measures.   
 
 
                                                          
175 Bakke, above n 5, at 290-291, citing Hirabayashi v United States 320 US 81 (1943), at 100. 
176 James Sterba “A Definition of Affirmative Action” in Cohen and Sterba, above 23, 199 at 202. 
177 Samuel Leitner and William Leitner Affirmative action in Antidiscrimination Law and Policy: 
An Overview and Synthesis (Albany, New York, State University of New York Press, 2002). 
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STATE BANS 
Race-neutrality rhetoric, for instance, has been persuasive among state lawmakers 
and voters.  California has been particularly active.  In 1995, the Regents of the 
University of California (UC) passed resolution SP-1,178 “a policy eliminating the 
consideration of race, ethnicity and gender in admissions decisions for schools in 
the [University of California] system”.  In 1996, Californian voters passed  
Proposition 209, a state constitutional amendment “prohibit[ing] state and local 
agencies from granting preferential treatment to any individual or group on the basis 
of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in public education…”179   Two years 
later, the state of Washington passed a similar measure, Initiative 200.180  These 
resulted in the elimination of “affirmative action programs at all public colleges and 
universities in the two states.181  Eight other states introduced similar measures; 
seven have passed.182   Famously, the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative passed in 
2006.183 
In several states, affirmative action plans have been replaced with non-racial 
“Percent Plans” which have had mixed results at best.184  Generally, while minority 
participation in higher education increased during the 1980s and early 1990s when 
affirmative action was common, it has dropped in states where bans and “’color-
                                                          
178 SP-1: Resolution of the University of California Board of Regents Adopting a Policy "Ensuring 
Equal Treatment" of Admissions, 20 July 1995.  After significant public controversy, SP-1 was 
rescinded by Regents Policy 4401: Policy on Future Admissions, Employment, and Contracting 
(Resolution Rescinding SP-1 and SP-2), 16 May 2001, found at 
http://regents.universityofcalifornia.edu/governance/policies/4401.html.  Although intended to 
increase diversity, the policy was still subject to state law similar to the previous ban. 
179 California Proposition 209, California Civil Rights Initiative, passed 5 November 1996. 
180 The Washington Affirmative Action Ban, Initiative 200, passed 3 November 1998. 
181  See National Conference of State Legislatures “Affirmative Action” found at  
<<www.ncsl.org>>. 
182 The most recent being State Question 759 passed by the voters of Oklahoma in 2012: see National 
Conference of State Legislatures website found at:  http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/educ/affirmative-action-state-action.aspx, dated 19/09/2013.   
183 The Michigan Civil Rights Initiative or Proposal 2, ballot initiative in state of Michigan, passed 
7 November 2006 and became law 22 December 2006.   
184 Merit-only programs which reserve seats at state universities and colleges for any student within 
the top certain percentage of the state’s graduating high school seniors or their own high school.  For 
in-depth discussion, see Catherine L Horn and Stella M Flores Percent Plans in College Admissions: 
A Comparative Analysis of Three States’ Experiences (Cambridge, Massachusetts, The Civil Rights 
Project at Harvard University, 2003).  In California, Texas and Florida, for instance, affirmative 
action has been replaced with, respectively, the “Four Percent Plan”, “Ten Percent Plan” and 
“Talented Twenty”. 
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blind’ affirmative action program[s]”185 have been enacted.  In Texas, for instance, 
studies undertaken at the University of Texas at Austin showed that, of smaller 
classes, “52 percent had no African Americans and 79 percent had one or none”, 
and in larger classes “65 percent had no African Americans and 90 percent had one 
or none”,186 numbers well below previous figures.  Other studies have shown that 
the probability and actual incidents of minority students “enrolling at public 
flagship universities in Texas [has] decreased considerably”, as well as “the 
percentage of minority students taking college admission tests”.187   In 2006 in 
California, “UCLA located in the county with the second largest African American 
population in the United States…enrolled the smallest number of entering African 
American freshmen ‘since at least 1973’” owing to racially-neutral admissions 
policies.188 
Proposition 209 has had a dramatic effect on Native Americans particularly.  
According to Fletcher et al: 
American Indian freshman enrolment at UCLA declined by one-third.  American 
Indian enrolment in all of the University of California schools declined by one-half.  
Minority law school admissions at Boalt Hall (UC Berkeley law school) fell by 
two-thirds, but American Indian admission at Boalt Hall declined to zero.  
American Indian enrolment for all the University of California law schools 
declined by a full one-half.189  
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
In federal courts, affirmative action policies have been targeted since the 1970s in 
reverse discrimination suits where members of non-minority groups have hijacked 
                                                          
185 Mariana Alfonso and Juan Carlos Calcagno Minority Enrollments at Public Universities of 
Diverse Selectivity Levels under Different Admission Regimes: The Case of Texas (Washington, DC, 
Research Department, Inter-American Development Bank, 2007) at 4. 
186 University of Texas at Austin, “The University of Texas at Austin proposes inclusion of race as 
a factor in admissions process”, posted 24 November 2003, found at 
http://www.utexas.edu/news/2003/11/24/nr_admission/. 
187 Alfonso and Calcagno, above n 185, at 4-5.  Numbers for Hispanic Americans are similarly low 
and particularly concerning given current trends in the actual demographics of the state of Texas 
where “whites are no longer in the numerical majority”. 
188 Matthew Fletcher, Kathryn Fort and Joy Grow “The Michigan Civil Rights Initiative: How Could 
It Impact Michigan Indian People” (Michigan State University College of Law, Indigenous Law and 
Policy Center Working Paper Series 2006-02, 2 October 2006), at 7-8. 
189 Ibid, at 8.  Authors’ emphasis.   
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civil rights legislation designed to specifically protect African-Americans in order 
to “’compete for a share of” the “opportunities” 190  allegedly distributed to 
minorities.  As if resurrecting the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy, the focus has 
changed from remedying intentional discrimination against African-Americans to 
preventing inadvertent, debatable disadvantage against the majority.  Various 
decisions have reduced actual discrimination to differential treatment and ignored 
the unique historico-legal context of constitutional amendments and legislation and 
actual disparities which defy constitutional guarantees.   
In DeFunis v Odegaard (1974),191 a non-minority student, Marco DeFunis, was 
unsuccessful in gaining law school admission when minority students with lower 
scores were under a policy which, at a certain stage, considered minority applicants 
separately. 192   DeFunis alleged a violation of Fourteenth Amendment equal 
protection.   
In their advisory opinion,193 the majority of the Court refused to comment on the 
substantive issues.  In dissent, however, Justice Douglas with Justice Brennan 
argued race neutrality: 
There is no constitutional way for any race to be preferred.  The years of slavery 
did more than retard the progress of blacks.  Even a greater wrong was done the 
whites creating arrogance instead of humility and by encouraging the fiction of a 
superior race.  There is no superior person by constitutional standards.  A DeFunis 
who is white is entitled to no advantage by reason of the fact; nor is he subject to 
any disability, no matter what his race or color.  Whatever his race, he had a 
constitutional right to have his application considered on its individual merits in a 
racially neutral manner.194 
Ultimately, the dissent equated the separate track with a racial quota system 
“fraught with dangers” because it implied “favoured treatment” for a particular 
group and its membership.195   
                                                          
190 Edward Kellough Understanding Affirmative Action: Politics, Discrimination and the Search for 
Justice (Washington, Georgetown University Press, 2006), at 3.   
191 DeFunis v Odegard 416 US 312 (1974). 
192 Specifically, African-Americans, “Chicanos”, Filipinos and Native Americans.  Compare with 
arguments of plaintiff in Fisher, above n 7. 
193  Because of interim relief from an earlier court, DeFunis was only a semester away from 
graduation when his case reached the Supreme Court making his admission a moot point.   
194 At 336-337. 
195 At 338.  Their honors’ dissent is abstracted.  Even as positive measures were being ordered by 
federal courts, the opinion affirmed a highly formalized and historically abstract version of equality.  
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McDonald v Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co (1976)196 took place in the context 
of private employment.197  The decision affirmed the premise of DeFunis in holding 
that section 1981 “prohibits racial discrimination…against white persons as well as 
non-white persons”.198  Despite the origins of section 1981 in the post-slavery Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 and its virtually unaltered text from that time, the Court 
concluded that:  
[s]ection 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in private employment against white 
persons as well as nonwhites, and this conclusion is supported both by the statute's 
language, which explicitly applies to "All persons," and by its legislative history. 
While the phrase "as is enjoyed by white persons" would seem to lend some 
support to the argument that the statute is limited to the protection of nonwhite 
persons against racial discrimination, the legislative history is clear that the 
addition of the phrase to the statute as finally enacted was not intended to eliminate 
the prohibition of racial discrimination against whites. 199 
Given section 1981’s legislative history, McDonald ignored the unique historico-
legal context of section 1981 and the identity-specific history of slavery and 
segregation which it was specifically drafted to respond to.  It is difficult to imagine 
how the plaintiffs could be given “the same right…as is enjoyed by white citizens” 
when they were already ‘white citizens’.  Essentially, their argument was not that 
they had not been treated as another white employee would have been but that they 
wanted the same immunity, privilege or treatment as their African-American co-
worker.   Equal protection had moved from parity with the white race to parity with 
the minority.   
Two years later, another non-minority student claimed discrimination in similar 
circumstances to DeFunis when less qualified minority students under a separate 
                                                          
Having discussed slavery and its burdens, the dissent nonetheless attempted to paint that history as 
equally detrimental to whites.  The dissent also equates a remedial measure for actual disparities 
which might inadvertently disadvantage an individual with intentional racial discrimination 
designed to perpetuate inequalities—and, by extension, the blatant injustices of slavery and 
segregation.  The homogenous or anonymous individual has priority over the racial minority 
member who has been the historical target of identity-attracted discrimination.  Finally, the opinion 
presumes that identity-blindness will create a neutral starting point for equality despite gross historic 
and ongoing disparities. 
196 McDonald v Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co 427 US 273 (1976). 
197 The petitioners in the case were two Anglo American employees who had been caught with 
another African American employee in wrongdoing.  They had been dismissed but he had not.   
198 At 278-279 
199 At 274. See discussion at 285-296.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Kamehameha Schools 
would later note that the Supreme Court in McDonald “avoid[ed] the constitutional questions 
implicated by its broad reading of the statute” and could not pinpoint the Thirteenth Amendment as  
“the source of Congress’s power to prohibit all private discrimination against whites” under section 
1981: Kamehameha, at 8937-8938. 
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admissions process which included apparent quotas.  In Regents of University of 
California v Bakke (1978),200 the Supreme Court outlawed the use of racial quotas 
and using separate tracks for such admissions.  While public educational institutions 
could continue to use race as a factor in admissions, such policies would be subject 
to the highest level of judicial review—strict scrutiny.  
Ironically, the Bakke majority relied on the Japanese-American internment cases of 
Hirabayashi v United States (1943)201 and Korematsu v United States (1944)202 
which established that “[r]acial and ethnic classifications of any sort are inherently 
suspect and call for the most exacting judicial scrutiny”.203  Strict scrutiny required 
any policy to meet two criteria: compelling government interest in the policy and 
that the policy be tailored to further that interest.204  ‘Compelling’ required that the 
Court weigh the value of policies on a case-by-case basis205 against the “burden” 
which the individual who is disadvantaged by the policy is being asked to bear or 
“suffer”.  The policy also had to be “necessary” to achieve the compelling 
government interest. 206    
In Bakke, the majority of the court concluded that the policy was compelling 
because it furthered a government interest in diversity but did not meet the second 
criteria because it denied Bakke the opportunity to compete for a spot in the medical 
                                                          
200 Bakke, above n 5. 
201 Hirabayashi, above n 175. 
202 Korematsu v United States 323 US 214 (1944).  The argument could have been made that anyone 
except members of the four minority groups preferred in the UC Davis admissions policy might be 
disadvantaged by the policy as Bakke had thereby making it impossible to identify a single racial 
group or suspect classification.  In Hirabayashi and Korematsu, of course, the discrimination was 
not the unintentional by-product of a remedial policy but explicit de jure discrimination aimed at a 
specific group highly identified by their ethnicity rather than their race.  Though a few members of 
other Asian ethnic groups were also interned, Japanese Americans rather than Asian Americans 
generally were targeted in internment.   
203 Both cases discussed in Bakke, at 281-287.  Those cases represent the last time that Supreme 
Court upheld an intentional or de jure measure.  Adarand Constructors Inc v Peña 515 US 200 (1995) 
has since established that all governmental racial classifications must be analysed by strict scrutiny. 
204  Ironically, strict scrutiny still approved the internment of Japanese Americans, an act now 
considered to be a significant act of discrimination and injustice, one for which the federal 
government has apologized for in much the same way it has to Native Hawaiians for the overthrow 
and annexation, but also tried to redress through financial reparations: see Eric K Yamamoto and 
Ashley Kaiao Obrey “Reframing Redress: A ‘Social Healing Through Justice’ Approach to United 
States-Native Hawaiian and Japan-Ainu Reconciliation Initiatives” (2009) 16(1) Asian Am LJ 5, at 
5-72. 
205 Allan Ides and Christopher May Constitutional Law and Individual Rights (3rd ed New York, 
Aspen Publishers, 2004), at 210. 
206 Bakke, at 287-320. 
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school, and the goal of diversity might be met another way.207  Ultimately, the 
majority also rejected the distinction between “benign” racial classifications and 
others in United States v Carolene Products (1938)208 Footnote Four which seemed 
to support a lower, rational basis level of judicial review where policies were meant 
to protect, or remedy discrimination against, a “discrete, insular minority” rather 
than aimed at them.209   
Justice Powell was the deciding vote in the tight 5-4 majority which invalidated the 
admissions policy and ordered Bakke’s admission. 210   That opinion reflects a 
historically and substantively unaware everyone/no-one narrative. 
Rejecting remediation wholesale, Justice Powell opined that “benign” 
discrimination against a white person could not turn “[t]he clock of our 
liberties…back to 1868”.211   Although noting the particular history of the passage 
of the Fourteenth Amendment,212  Justice Powell opined:  
                                                          
207 At 287-299.  A minority of four judges would have upheld the policy as constitutional because 
of its remedial purpose and applied an intermediate level of scrutiny which required only that the 
state demonstrate an “important” purpose for the admissions policy and that it be “substantially” 
related to that purpose: at 278, per dissent. 
208 United States v Carolene Products 304 US 144 (1938), Footnote Four, perhaps the “most famous 
footnote in US legal history”: Felix Gilman “The Famous Footnote Four: A History of the Carolene 
Products Footnote” 46 South Texas Law Review 163, at 165.  The footnote actually introduced the 
concept of two-tiered judicial review in terms of equal protection analysis which gave rise to the 
current levels of judicial review: rational basis which requires the defendant to prove a legitimate 
government in the law or policy, intermediate and strict which requires defendants to prove a 
compelling government interest in the law or policy and the narrow tailoring of the law or policy to 
furthering that interest: see Wygant v Jackson Board of Education 476 US 267 (1986).   
209 In Carolene Products, the Supreme Court applied a lower, rational basis review which presumed 
the constitutionality of the law or policy in question to the economic regulation at issue in the case.  
However, Footnote Four, part of the majority opinion written by Justice Harlan Stone, recognized 
that legislation aimed at “discrete and insular minorities” was an exception to rational basis review 
and would trigger heightened scrutiny.  Notably, the footnote says nothing about either outright 
discrimination aimed at or differential treatment which inadvertently disadvantages a member of the 
majority.  Also see David A Strauss “Is Carolene Products Obsolete?” (2010) U Ill L Rev 1251. 
210 A minority of four judges, including Brennan J, would have denied Bakke’s admission, upheld 
the policy as constitutional because of its remedial purpose and applied an intermediate level of 
scrutiny which required only that the state demonstrate an “important” purpose for the admissions 
policy and that it be “substantially” related to that purpose: see Bakke, at 278, per dissent. 
211 At 294. 
212 At 285: “The problem confronting Congress was discrimination against Negro citizens at the 
hands of recipients of federal moneys. Indeed, the color blindness pronouncements cited in the 
margin at n.19 generally occur in the midst of extended remarks dealing with the evils of segregation 
in federally funded programs. Over and over again, proponents of the bill detailed the plight of 
Negroes seeking equal treatment in such programs.    [n20]    There simply was no reason for 
Congress to consider the validity of hypothetical preferences that might be accorded minority 
citizens; the legislators were dealing with the real and pressing problem of how to guarantee those 
citizens equal treatment”. 
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The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one 
individual and something else when applied to a person of another color. If both 
are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal.213 
Justice Powell wrestled semantically with terms such as “minority” and “majority” 
and rejected what he called the “’two-class theory’ of the Fourteenth Amendment” 
and the notion that the Equal Protection Clause had any “special wards”.214  Also 
rejecting disparate impact, he equated affirmative action with unfair advantage 
rather than any levelling of the playing field: 215  “Nothing in the Constitution 
supports the notion that individuals may be asked to suffer otherwise impermissible 
burdens in order to enhance the societal standing of their ethnic groups.”216 
The majority opinion in Bakke preserved the possibility that diversity in education 
and in fields such as medicine and law could constitute a compelling government 
interest.  Later, City of Richmond v JA Croson Co (1989)217 would establish that the 
remedying of past racial discrimination might be another, 218  but educational 
institutions now had to squeeze any preference for race or ethnicity into a very small 
box. 
A Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Hopwood v Texas (1996),219  increased 
tensions further, taking Bakke’s race-neutrality to its logical conclusion: use of race 
as a factor in admissions at all violated the Fourteenth Amendment.  Hopwood 
affected admissions throughout the Fifth Circuit’s jurisdiction covering Texas, 
Louisiana and Mississippi, a significant chunk of the American South.  Bakke, a 
Supreme Court case, was still the authority, but affirmative action was in trouble. 
In 2003, two Supreme Court cases—Gratz v Bollinger 220   and Grutter v 
Bollinger221—abrogated Hopwood where racial quotas are not used.  The cases 
again pitted individual Fourteenth Amendment rights against public interest in 
                                                          
213 At 289.   
214 At 295. 
215 At 299. 
216 At 298.  Again, the implication is that inadvertent discrimination and debatable disadvantage 
somehow equate with what Yamamoto and Betts have called “centuries of anti-black apartheid”: 
Yamamoto and Betts, above n 1. Also see discussion in Grutter, above n 6, at 323-324, in terms of 
Powell J’s rejection of the ground of remediation for past discrimination at 323-324.   
217 City of Richmond v JA Croson Co 488 US 469 (1989). 
218 Though the city’s affirmative action policy failed to meet the narrow tailoring requirement. 
219 Hopwood v Texas 78 F 3d 932 (5th Cir 1996). 
220 Cited above n 6. 
221 Cited above n 6.  Together, the so-called ‘University of Michigan cases’. 
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diversity, and petitioners relied on Title VII and s 1981.  Delivered the same day, 
the decisions relied heavily on Justice Powell’s reasoning in Bakke. 
In Gratz, the Court found that the University of Michigan’s freshman admissions 
policy which awarded a certain amount of points to an applicant if they were non-
white 222  was not constitutional.  Although the policy’s goal to reach “critical 
mass223 was a compelling government interest, it was not narrowly tailored enough 
to that goal as race was given a higher percentage of points making it a “decisive 
factor”.224   The majority opinion, delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist, approved 
Justice Powell’s requirement that race could be “a plus” but all of an applicants’ 
other qualities had to be given some weight and worthiness for admission assessed 
holistically on an individual basis.   
The petitioner in Grutter similarly argued that race was a “’ predominant’ factor” 
in the admissions policy of the University of Michigan Law School, but a slim 
majority (5-4) of the Court found the policy narrowly tailored to the compelling 
government interest of increasing diversity.   
The majority opinion, delivered by Justice O’Connor, followed Bakke in holding 
that a narrowly tailored plan must: not “insulate” minority applicants from the 
competition of other qualified candidates; 225  must allow for “flexibility” and 
individualization;226 must not harm non-minority applicants unduly; and be limited 
in time—that is, be temporary until another race-neutral policy which will achieve 
the same results is discovered.227  The law school’s policy considered academics, 
talents and ability to contribute important, as well as grade point average and LSAT 
scores, but allowed the school to holistically note other aspects of a student’s 
background including soft variables such as “enthusiasm” for learning.  Race or 
ethnic group membership was a “plus factor” but not the only factor determinative 
of diversity in a matrix of considerations.228  Additionally, the law school had in 
                                                          
222 The policy awarded 20 points to an applicant if they were non-white in addition to points for 
athletic ability (20 points), essay (5 points), and leadership (up to 5 points). 
223 Or “meaningful representation” of minorities in the student body. Definition from Grutter, at 318, 
but similar reasoning given for freshman admissions policy in Gratz. 
224 Actually, race carried the same amount of consideration as athletic ability. 
225 Grutter, at 334 and 335. 
226 Grutter, at 324-325 and 334. 
227 See Ginsburg and Breyer JJ’s concurrence in Grutter, at 344. 
228 Grutter, at 314-316 and 337-339. 
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“good faith” sought for a race-neutral alternative to their race-conscious program.229  
Thus, the policy “bears all the hallmarks of a narrowly tailored plan”.230   
Fisher v University of Texas at Austin231 “did not disturb the principle that the 
consideration of race in admissions is permissible, provided that certain conditions 
are met”,232 but affirmative action now seemingly hung by the thread of diversity 
submerged in a matrix of admission factors.   As weak as diversity is,233 however, 
any use of race may soon be finished.  In Schuette v Coalition to Defend Affirmative 
Action, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Michigan Civil Rights 
Initiative 2006.234  
Despite its fundamental role as the supreme interpreter of equal protection and 
substantial body of jurisprudence in which it had similarly judged state and local 
laws, the Schuette majority left the fate of affirmative action to the voters, holding: 
…There is no authority in the Federal Constitution or in this Court’s precedents for 
the Judiciary to set aside Michigan laws that commit to the voters the determination 
whether racial preferences may be considered in governmental decisions, in 
particular with respect to school admissions.235 
In doing so, they failed to apply strict scrutiny or any judicial review to the initiative 
itself236 and appeared to leave the interpretation of discrimination and equality to 
majoritarian bias as the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy courts had earlier.    
                                                          
229 Grutter, at 339-340. 
230 Grutter, at 334. 
231 Cited above n 7. 
232 According to the majority in Schuette v Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action 572 US___ (2014), 
per Kennedy J, at 4. 
233 Major G Coleman “Strategic equality and the failure of affirmative action law”, (2012) 12(1) Int 
J Discr Law 27, has argued that “diversity alone is inadequate because it is non-remedial and leaves 
in place both white privilege and Black, Latino, Asian, and Native American disadvantage”.  
Coleman describes “strategic equality” as “the amount of substantive equality necessary to avoid a 
crisis”.  He argues that the current crisis of disparities will continue to be exacerbated as racial 
minorities are predicted to outnumber the Anglo-American majority within 60 years: Coleman, at 
27-28. 
234 Michigan Civil Rights Initiative, discussed above at n 184.  
235 Schuette, at 1.  Also see majority, at 18. 
236 “This case is not about the constitutionality, or the merits, of race-conscious admissions policies 
in higher education.  Here, the principle that the consideration of race in admissions is permissible 
when certain conditions are met is not being challenged.  Rather the question concerns whether, and 
in what manner, voters in the States may choose to prohibit the consideration of such racial 
preference”: Schuette, at 1-2.  
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In substantive terms, Justice Sotomayor writing for the dissent with Justice 
Ginsburg recognized that the no-one standard initiative “has a ‘racial focus’”237 and 
argued that it “changed the rules in the middle of the game” for minorities, 
preventing their meaningful participation in the political process.238  As the benefit 
of affirmative admissions policies accrued to minorities particularly, banning them 
amounted to imposing burdens on those minorities which other individuals did not 
have to bear.239  For Justice Sotomayor, this was another example of the majority 
doing what it had done throughout the nation’s history and a “baffling” denial of 
the Court’s own precedent to the contrary in similar cases.240  The majority also 
ignored the “the unfortunate effects of centuries of racial discrimination”, the “long 
history of racial minorities’ being denied access to the political process”, and 
current realities of “stark socioeconomic disparities” between races.241    
Justice Sotomayor concluded that the “decision eviscerates an important strand of 
our equal protection jurisprudence”.242 It also appears to signal that “the debate over 
affirmative action in Michigan [is] effectively dead, and efforts to ban it in other 
states can get started”.243   In a “baffling and ominous”244 recent development, the 
Texas admission policy previously subjected to strict scrutiny in Fisher v University 
of Texas at Austin (2013)245 is set to go before the Supreme Court for a second time 
later this year, despite also having passed strict scrutiny again in the Fifth Circuit 
last year.   
                                                          
237 At 15. 
238 At 13. In substantially aware terms, Sotomayor J likened the affirmative action ban to a race with 
two competitors where one competitor was required to run twice as far as or leap obstacles which 
the other did not. 
239 At 15.  Sotomayor J noted, at 20, that “on issues dealing with racial and ethnic matters, studies 
show that racial and ethnic minorities do end up more on the losing side of the popular vote’).  In 
fact, ‘[i]t is difficult to find even a single statewide initiative in any State in which voters approved 
policies that explicitly favour racial and ethnic minority groups’.” 
240 The dissent would have depended on two precedents in which the Supreme Court had applied 
strict scrutiny where voters successfully changed laws to prohibit affirmative action measures taken 
to desegregate, respectively, housing and a school district: Hunter v Erickson 393 US 385 (1969); 
and Washington v Seattle School Dist, No 1 458 US 457 (1978).  These cases were distinguished by 
the majority as having involved intentional discrimination but appear to “mirror[]”, according to 
Sotomayor at 12, the circumstances of the present case.  As such they violate the fundamental 
principle of stare decisis: Sotomayor J at 23-24. 
241 At 45 and 46. 
242 At 58. 
243 David Jesse “As justices ponder Michigan's affirmative action ban, observers will eye Kennedy” 
Detroit Free Press (online ed, Detroit, 13 October 2013).  
244 See Adam Liptak “Supreme Court to Weigh Race in College Admissions” NY Times (online ed, 
New York, 29 June 2015). 
245 Fisher, above n 7. 
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The assault on a very slim someone narrative continues, revealing the power of a 
singular everyone/no-one narrative divorced from the burdens of history and its 
identity-aware purpose.  Ironically, this narrative ignores de facto discrimination 
and disparities in much the same way as earlier Jim Crow laws and Plessy did and 
is philosophically contrary to the Civil Rights era law upon which it is argued.  One 
commentator’s description of this series of decisions as “a quiet reversal” of 
Brown246 may be understated. 
Eric Yamamoto and Catherine Betts have described this trend as “a cultural and 
political backlash against the gains of minorities, women, and immigrants”, “’re-
segregating’ America”, and the “second broken civil rights promise”.247  In contrast 
to the conservative elements who backed the earlier segregation, the “New 
Federalism”: 
…employed the language of “equality,” “colorblindness,” and “responsibility.”  
By emphasizing “fairness to the individual” and “states’ rights,” the New 
Federalists purported to embrace civil rights.  Although the New Federalism 
changed its language, it was and remains today the old conservatism in 
substance.248 
Chris Iijima similarly wrote after Hopgood that:  
the colorblind myth of racial vision confuses the ideological end to racial hierarchy 
with what already exists…Indeed, ‘denial is a pervasive symptom of contemporary 
American racism.’ And, of course, the denial of reality merely perpetuates the 
condition of racial subordination.249 
 
                                                          
246 Gary Orfield quoted in Leitner and Leitner, above n 177, at 121. 
247 The first being segregation post-Reconstruction.  Yamamoto and Betts refer to the civil rights 
gains from Brown through the 1960s as the “Second Reconstruction”: Yamamoto and Betts, above 
n 1, at 554. 
248  At 554-555. 
249  “Unfortunately, the colorblind myth of racial vision confuses the ideological end to racial 
hierarchy with what already exists.  That is, the prescriptive ideal of a ‘colorblind’ society, in which 
racism and White supremacy are eradicated, has been transformed by judicial fiat into ‘a condition 
of societal denial’, creating the illusion that racial hierarchy has been eliminated.  Indeed, ‘denial is 
a pervasive symptom of contemporary American racism.’  And, of course, the denial of reality 
merely perpetuates the condition of racial subordination.”: Chris Iijima “Swimming from the Island 
of the Colorblind” (1997) 17 Loy LA Ent L Rev 583, at 591.   
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2.4.2 ARBITRARINESS 
Despite consistent recognition, the Native American exception is also undermined 
by three historico-legal realities: the double-edged nature of the plenary power, the 
inherent prejudice in the trust relationship and judicial activism. 
The plenary power is significant and two-edged.  In United States v Jicarilla Apache 
Tribe (2011), 250  the Supreme Court cautioned that the fiduciary/trust analogy 
“cannot be taken too far”.  Despite the inherent nature of tribal sovereignty:  
[t]he United States retains plenary authority to divest tribes of any attributes of 
sovereignty.  Congress has plenary authority to legislate for the Indian tribes in all 
matters, including their form of government. 251 
Essentially, Congress can “assist or destroy a tribal government as it sees fit”.252   
On several occasions, it has unilaterally terminated its relationships with tribes 
officially via legislation.  During the Termination Era (1953-1968) 109 tribes were 
terminated253  and previous terminations coincide with Assimilation Era federal 
Indian policy which justified boarding school abuses and genocide.  Termination is 
historically linked with an everyone/no-one standard, its admitted purpose to make 
Native Americans subject to the same laws as everyone else.  Similarly, it results 
in the loss of tribes’ political status as “sovereign, self-defining peoples”, 254 
services only available to federally-recognized tribes, their reservation or land base, 
and the exercise of self-government.  Its members become subject to state law255 
and an everyone/no-one equality narrative.  
The trust relationship is defined by federal treaties which can also be abrogated—
that is, unilaterally altered or discarded with little or no notice despite treaty 
                                                          
250 United States v Jicarilla Apache Nation 564 US ___, 131 S Ct 2313 (2011).  In the earlier case 
of United States v Alcea Band of Tillamooks 329 US 40 (1946), at 54, the Supreme Court had held 
that “[t]he power of Congress over Indian affairs may be of a plenary nature; but it is not absolute” .  
It is, nevertheless, substantial.   
251 At 11. 
252 Pevar, above n 116, at 58. 
253 Although some were reinstated later, “[n]othing causes Indian tribes to lose more rights and 
protections than termination”: Pevar, at 67.    
254 Robert Williams “The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail to Decolonizing and 
Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence” (1986) Wis L Rev 219, at 260. 
255 Pevar, at 67.   
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terms256—and legislation which can be unilaterally repealed under the plenary 
power.  In abrogation, the government may simply fail to keep its “word” or 
promise, 257  a characteristic inconsistent “with perfect good faith towards the 
Indians”258 but entirely consistent with the plenary power.  In Jicarilla, the Supreme 
Court opined: 
The Government, of course, is not a private trustee. Though the relevant statutes 
denominate the relationship between the Government and the Indians a 
“trust,” …that trust is defined and governed by statutes rather than the common 
law. …Congress may style its relations with the Indians a “trust” without assuming 
all the fiduciary duties of a private trustee, creating a trust relationship that is 
“limited” or “bare” compared to a trust relationship between private parties at 
common law.259 
This is particularly true when the federal government is acting as a “sovereign” in 
its own interests.260  Ultimately, the trust relationship is a “self imposed policy” in 
which the federal government “has charged itself with moral obligations”261 and, 
consequently, not legally enforceable against Congress.262     
The federal government may itself discriminate between groups of Native 
Americans, for instance, by requiring a certain blood quantum for participating in 
a federal program benefitting Native Americans,263 in distribution of tribal property 
at termination,264 or in determining federal recognition generally, as in Delaware 
Business Committee v. Weeks (1977).265  Following Delaware, an equal protection 
suit against the government is “justiciable” but, under Mancari, only subject to the 
lowest level of judicial scrutiny—rational basis.  The “special treatment” need only 
                                                          
256 See, for instance, Lone Wolf v Hitchcock 187 US 553 (1903), discussed in Walter Echo Hawk In 
the Courts of the Conqueror: The 10 Worst Indian Cases ever decided by the Supreme Court (Golden, 
Colorado, Fulcrum Publishing, 2010).   
257 Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black who dissented in Lone Wolf, quoted in Pevar, at 50. 
258 Canby, above n 139, at 93. 
259 Jicarilla, at 10, citing United States v Navajo Nation 537 US 488 (2003), at 506; and United 
States v Mitchell 445 US 535 (1980), at 542. 
260 Jicarilla, at 10-13. 
261 Seminole Nation v United States 316 US 286 (1942), 296–297. My emphasis. 
262 Menominee Tribe v United States 391 US 404 (1968). Federal courts cannot “order Congress to 
implement a treaty or prevent Congress from abrogating one”. 
263 Delaware Tribal Business Comm v Weeks 430 US 73 (1977), at 84. 
264 See Ute Distribution Corp v Ute Indian Tribe 149 F 3d 1260 (10th Cir 1998). 
265 In Delaware, one of three branches of the same tribe lacked the federal recognition, benefits and 
services afforded the other two. 
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“be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the 
Indians",266 again, a much lower standard than a Bakke-like remedial measure. 
The special trust relationship itself may be inherently prejudicial.  Robert Williams 
has written: 
Numerous late nineteenth and early twentieth century Supreme Court opinions 
freely extend Marshall’s original limited recognition of an overriding sovereignty 
of the federal government in Indian affairs to entail a superior and unquestionable 
power on the part of Congress unrestrained by normal constitutional 
limitations…267 
This jurisprudence has attributed a “free reign” and “broad discretionary powers” 
to Congress which Williams links to ongoing, fundamentally prejudicial 
presumptions about Native Americans—that is, a “legal consciousness that at its 
core regards tribal peoples as normatively deficient and culturally, politically and 
morally inferior to Europeans”. 268    
Such thinking is evident in the Marshall Trilogy, where Native Americans are 
frequently described as fierce, warlike and incapable of civilization but also child-
like—the ‘ward’, ‘pupil’ or ‘dependent’.  Such terms originate in conquest, 
colonialism and the “duality” of international law at the time. 269   The 
“irrationality”270 of such children justifies “exercise of a guardianship ‘to protect 
them and their property and personal rights’”.  According to Williams:  
After rationalizing this hierarchal and totalizing subjugation of the Indian on the 
basis of a superior rational capacity exercised by the European, the only matter left 
to the Court [in the Marshall Trilogy] to determine was which branch of 
government possessed the power to exercise this subrogating power.271   
                                                          
266 Mancari, at 555, discussed in Delaware, at 83-85.  Also see discussion in Pevar, at 61.  In 
Delaware, such discrimination was allowed despite evidence “that Congress deliberately limited the 
distribution under the Act to” the other branches of the tribe merely for convenience—that is “to 
avoid undue delay, administrative difficulty, and potentially unmeritorious claims”: Delaware, at 
87-89. 
267 Williams, above n 254, at 260-265. 
268 In federal-Indian relations and justified “unquestioned abrogation and unilateral determination of 
tribal treaty and property rights”: Williams, ibid.   
269 The language runs through all three decisions and is characterized by “one code applying to 
colonizers, another to the colonized”: Ward Churchill Perversions of Justice: Indigenous Peoples 
and Anglo-American Law (San Francisco, City Lights, 2003), at 39. 
270 Williams, at 260-265. 
271 Williams, at 260-265.   
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Judicial activism also undermines the indigenous narrative.  The current phase of 
federal-Indian relations has been coined the ‘Era of Tribal Self-Determination’, and 
since 1969 the executive and legislative branches of the government seemed to have 
publically pursued tribal “self-government and economic development”272.  Despite 
Congress’s “exclusive” and “preemptive” 273  plenary authority, however, the 
Supreme Court has actively struck down Native American rights in recent 
decades.274 
It has often done so via the doctrine of implied repeal275 by which:  
[T]he Court acts to supersede an existing law, rule, or treaty provision without an 
express congressional directive to do so.  The Court, in essence, assumes the power 
to act in a political arena—Congress’s arena of authority over Indian affairs—
without a directive from Congress to do so.  The Court…assumes that a later law 
repeals, by implication, an earlier treaty if the two appear to be in conflict.276 
As in the case of termination and abrogation, implied repeal has resulted in a 
significant loss of legal rights associated with self-determination. 277    Such 
decisions appear to reject the Court’s own precedent, 278  treaties, time-worn 
                                                          
272 Positive developments have included the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance 
Act of 1975 which gave tribes the right to administer federal Indian programs themselves, the Indian 
Child Welfare Act of 1978 which protects Native American children from being taken from their 
homes by state agencies and courts, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 which has allowed 
tribes to produce revenue through gaming, and the Indian Health Care Improvement Act which gives 
tribes more self-determination over healthcare on reservations: Pevar, at 13. 
273 David Wilkins and Tsianina Lomawaima Uneven Ground: American Indian Sovereignty and 
Federal Indian Law (Norman, Oklahoma, University of Oklahoma Press, 2001), at 98-116. 
274 As Pevar points out, “Since the 1970s, Indian interests have lost more than 80 percent of the cases 
decided by the Court, a worse success rate than convicted criminals have fared on the merits of their 
cases”: Pevar, at 14. 
275 The Cherokee Tobacco (1870) case established that “An act of Congress may supersede a prior 
treaty” or abrogate it without Congressional approval or even intent: The Cherokee Tobacco 78 US 
616 (1870), at 78. 
276 Wilkins and Lomawaima, at 144-145.   
277 Including: removal of Indian children by the state (Decoteau v District Court 420 US 425 (1975)); 
shrinking of reservation boundaries (Rosebud Sioux v Kneip 430 US 584 (1977)); loss of traditional 
hunting rights due to diminished reservation (US v Dion 106 S Ct 2216 (1986); loss of hunting and 
fishing rights generally (Oregon Department of Fish & Wildlife v Klamath Indian Tribe 473 US 753 
(1985); and South Dakota v Bourland 113 S Ct 2309 (1993)); becoming subject to state criminal 
jurisdiction under the implied diminishing of reservation boundaries (Hagen v Utah 1145 S Ct 958 
(1994)) or just outrightly (Negonsott v Samuels 507 US 99 (1993)); and inability to enforce law 
against non-Indians residing within tribal territory (Atkinson Trading Company v Shirley 532 US 
645 (2001)). For other examples, see David Getches (2001) “Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist 
Court’s Pursuit of State Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values” (2001) 86 Minnesota 
Law Review 267. 
278 Shirley, ibid, is a good example.  The issue at hand was whether the Navajo Nation had the right 
to impose a hotel occupancy tax on non-Indians.  The answer to the negative was at conflict with 
earlier precedent in the case of Merrion v Jicarilla Apache Tribe (1982) which recognized that 
Native American tribes had the right to regulate their land and impose taxation on non-Indians who 
were taking natural resources from reservation land.   
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principles of federal Indian law, and congressional intent to the contrary to conclude 
that such rights are inconsistent with the dependent status of tribes.279   
Implied repeal actually may be part of a larger identity-blindness campaign aimed 
at undermining “meaningful”280 tribal self-determination and imposing state law 
and an everyone/no-one standard on Native America: 
The Supreme Court has made radical departures from the established principles of 
Indian law.  The Court ignores precedent, construing statutes, treaties, and the 
Constitution liberally to reach results that comport a majority of the Justices’ 
attitudes about federalism, minority rights, and protection of mainstream values.  
In the process, perhaps unintentionally, the Court is remaking Indian law and 
revising a political relationship between the nation and Indian tribes that was 
forged by the Framers of the Constitution and perpetuated by every Supreme Court 
until now281. 
The result of such activism is the deterioration of federal Indian law as a specialized 
body of law and diminishing of the political relationship between tribes and the 
federal government.282   In addition to this “stain on Indian rights”,283 the backlash 
against affirmative action itself further threatens the Native American exception. 
Equal protection has historically threatened the Native American exception despite 
its extra-constitutionality.  Carole Goldberg has described how: 
…In its earliest incantations, the talk of equal rights focused on restrictions that 
allegedly disadvantaged the Indians.  For example, allotment of Indian lands in the 
late nineteenth century was justified as a means of affording Indians equality with 
other property holders.  In the middle of the twentieth century, proponents of the 
disastrous policy of termination employed the rhetoric of the budding civil rights 
movement, characterizing property owned by the United States in trust for tribes 
                                                          
279 Oliphant and Montana v United States 480 US 202 (1987), at 208; and Montana v United States 
450 US 544 (1981), at 584. 
280  Frank Pommersheim “At the Crossroads: A New and Unfortunate Paradigm of Tribal 
Sovereignty” (2010) 55 S D L Rev 48. 
281 “The Rehnquist Court seems oblivious to the discrete body of Indian law that is based on solid 
judicial traditions tracing back to the nation’s founding….Now, these legal traditions are being 
almost totally disregarded: Getches, at 267-268. 
282 Getches, at 359-362.  William Rehnquist was the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from 1986 
to 2005, a period coinciding with significant deterioration of affirmative action in the Court’s 
jurisprudence and decisions. Of the nine active current Supreme Court justices, five were part of the 
Rehnquist Court: see “Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court” found at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx, dated 6/9/14.  Justice Antonin Scalia has 
been particularly associated with an identity-blind interpretation of equality.  
283 Ronald Steiner “Like a Loaded Weapon: The Rehnquist Court, Indian Rights, and the Legal 
History of Racism in America, by Robert A. Williams Jr.”, (2006) 16(6) Law and Politics Book 
Review 438, at 438. 
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and exempted from taxation as demeaning for Indian men who had returned from 
fighting in World War II.284 
Many of these attacks have come from “[n]on-Indians seeking immediate access to 
Indians’ natural resources” and, over a period similar to the deterioration of 
affirmative action, “the rhetoric has shifted from concern for equal treatment of 
Indians to fear of unequal treatment of whites”.285   Two examples illustrate this. 
The stated purpose of the Native American Equal Rights Act 2000 (NAERA) bill 
was “[t]o repeal the Indian racial preference laws of the United States”.286  The term 
“racial” was used repeatedly in the short document and most often interjected 
between the words “Indian” and “preference” as if to severe the two.  Laws which 
qualify as “Indian racial preference laws” included those “applicable to the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs and Indian Health Service”, 287  as well as the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act288 and the Civil Rights Act 1964.289  
If passed, the bill would have expressly repealed the very preference at issue in 
Mancari but also perhaps fatally undermined the preference fundamental to the core 
piece of legislation on Native American education 290  while questioning the 
centrepiece of civil rights legislation.  The bill’s sponsor appealed to “African-
Americans, Asian-Americans and white Americans”—but obviously identity-
blindness—when he argued that non-Indians should have the “same rights to 
compete for jobs at the Bureau of Indian Affairs…as Indians do” and equated the 
preference with “lawful discriminat[ion]”.291 
                                                          
284 Carole Goldberg “American Indians and ‘Preferential Treatment’” (2002) 49 UCLA L Rev 943, 
at 944-945.  For instance, “[e]qual rights and antipaternalism rhetoric also permeated…the 1971 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act which substituted the Native corporations for the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs as the recipients of lands obtained in settlement” and the 1978 Native American Equal 
Opportunity Act bill which “sought to nullify all treaties entered into by the United States with 
Indian nations, to terminate all separate or special legal protections of Indians, and to end federal 
supervision over the property and members of Indian tribes”: See Goldberg, at 945. 
285 Goldberg, at 944-945. 
286 See Native Americans Equal Rights Act, HR 5523, 106th Congress (1999-2000). 
287 Section 3. 
288 Section 4. 
289 Section 5. 
290  The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA) is a fundamental 
component of tribal self-determination.  It recognizes the rights of tribes to substantive measures 
such as funding.  The ISDEAA embodies a Mancari-like preference for the indigenous rightsholder 
in education.  Without the preference, the Act would seem to be nullified entirely.  
291 See Representative Curt Whedon, sponsor of HR 5523, quoted in Goldberg at 954. 
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While admitting that applying strict scrutiny to Title 25 “would effectively gut” it, 
the Ninth Circuit in Williams v Babbitt292 nevertheless took time to go through the 
hypothetical exercise of applying it to the interpretation of a BIA-like agency of 
federal legislation recognizing Alaskan Native reindeer herding rights.   The Court 
expressed “constitutional doubts” that the identity-specific preference would pass 
narrow tailoring, finding it “comparable to the official discrimination against 
African Americans that was prevalent for most of our history”.  While ultimately 
sidestepping the issue by depending on the plain language of the statute, the court’s 
hypothetical strict scrutiny analysis occupies a significant chunk of the decision and 
led the court to advance the possibility that “Mancari’s days are numbered”.293  
 
2.4.3 STANDARDIZATION: THE NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT 2002 
While someone and indigenous narratives initially appear to have been preserved 
in the text of the No Child Left Behind Act 2002 (NCLB),294 the everyone/no-one 
dominated legislation has undermined both in practice. 
The NCLB is a reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
1965,295 more Civil Rights-era legislation.  Under Title I, “Improving the Academic 
Achievement of the Disadvantaged”, the stated purpose of the current legislation is 
to: 
                                                          
292 Williams v Babbitt 115 F 3d 657 (9th Cir 1997). 
293 Babbitt, ibid, at 665.  Kozinski J, delivering the majority opinion, relied on Stevens J’s dissent in 
Adarand.  
294 No Child Left Behind Act 2002, Pub L No 107-110—Jan. 8, 2002 [NCLB].  The NCLB’s 
successor, the S. 1177 — 114th Congress: Every Child Achieves Act of 2015, passed the Senate on 
16 July 2015.  Both are reauthorizations of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 
20 USC §6301 et seq. 
295 Elementary and Secondary Education Act 1965, 20 USC §6301 et seq, which was part of Lyndon 
B Johnson’s “war on poverty” and contemporary of the Headstart Program which provided funding 
and guidelines for preschools for disadvantaged children, the Bilingual Education Act 1968 which 
required school districts to provide appropriate programs for children needing help with English (see 
Lau), Title XI of the Education Amendments 1972 aimed at gender discrimination, and the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 1975 which required schools to provide free and 
appropriate education to students with disabilities: William Hayes No Child Left Behind: Past, 
Present and Future (Lanham, New York, Toronto and Plymouth, UK, Rowman and Little, 2008), 
at 5-6. 
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…ensure that all children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain 
a high-quality education and reach, at a minimum, proficiency on State academic 
achievement standards and state academic assessments.296 
The then Secretary of Education described its purpose as “to see every child in 
America—regardless of ethnicity, income or background—achieve high 
standards”.297  The legislation proposes to achieve this everyone goal by “align[ing]” 
assessment, accountability, teacher training, curriculum and resources with 
“challenging State standards” so that progress is measurable.298   
In someone terms, however, it recognizes that this goal will not be reached until the 
following are met:  
needs of low-achieving children in our Nation’s highest-poverty schools, limited 
English proficient children, migratory children, children with disabilities, Indian 
children, neglected or delinquent children, and young children in need of reading 
assistance299 
Also of concern is that “the achievement gap between high- and low- performing 
children, especially” that “between minority and nonminority students, and between 
disadvantaged children and their more advanced peers” is closed.300  In substantive 
terms, it is meant to “target[] resources sufficiently to make a difference…where 
needs are greatest”.301 
Title VII of the NCLB specifically addresses Indians, Native Hawaiians and Alaska 
Natives.  Section 7101 recognizes the special trust relationship between the federal 
government and Indians as a matter of “policy” and both the substantive needs and 
unique aspects of indigenous education.  It states that:  
the Federal Government will work with…Indian tribes…toward the goal of 
ensuring that programs that serve Indian children are of the highest quality and 
provide for not only the basic elementary and secondary educational needs, but 
                                                          
296 “Section 1001, Statement of Purpose” (emphasis added). 
297 Rod Paige, Secretary of Education from 2001-2005, quoted in Hayes, at 15. 
298 Section 1001. 
299 Section 1001 (2).   
300 Section 1001 (3). 
301 Section 1001 (5).  It also proposes to grant “greater decisionmaking authority and flexibility to 
schools and teachers” to accomplish the goal, and to allow “parents substantial and meaningful 
opportunities to participate”: see §1001 (7) and (12). 
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also the unique educational and culturally related academic needs of these 
children.302 
Under the Act, “Indian[s]” include members of tribes either federally, state- or self-
defined—including terminated tribes—and their “descendants to the first and 
second degree”303—a standard consistent with the Mancari preference.   Activities 
which meet Title VII’s funding criteria include “culturally-related activities”, 
“activities that promote the incorporation of culturally responsive teaching and 
learning strategies”, “activities that incorporate American Indian and Alaska Native 
specific curriculum content”, and “activities that recognize and support the unique 
cultural and educational needs of Indian children, and incorporate appropriately 
qualified tribal elders and seniors”,304 as well as, “bilingual and bicultural programs 
and projects”.305 
As discussed further in the next chapter, Native Hawaiian provisions incorporate 
the Native Hawaiian Education Act 2002306 which recognizes the special political 
relationship between the federal government and Native Hawaiian people, an 
identity-specific history of discrimination, and the relationship between culturally 
appropriate education and the educational achievement of Native Hawaiian people.  
Beyond these indigenous peoples, no racially or ethnically identified groups are 
provided for.307 
Despite these provisions, the NCLB has been heavily criticized and raises several 
issues in terms of narratives.  It has been said that “[m]ore than any other recent 
event, the passage of the No Child Left Behind law has significantly affected the 
way we are educating our children”,308 but the NCLB is essentially everyone/no-
one focused, part of a wider legislative framework which inherently narrates 
                                                          
302 20 USC §7101. 
303 Section 7151(3). 
304 20 USC §7425, “Section 7115 Authorized Services and Activities”, subsections (b)(1), (8), (9) 
and (11). 
305 20 USC §7441, “Section 7121. Improvement of Educational Opportunities for Indian Children”, 
subsection (a)(1)(C). 
306 Native Hawaiian Education Act, 20 USC §7512.   
307  The only parts which come close are Title III “Language Instruction for Limited English 
Proficient and Immigrant Students”, Section 301, where no particular nationality or ethnicity is 
specified, and Title X, Part C “Homeless Education”, Sections 1031-1034, which specifically relates 
to “homeless children and youth”. 
308 Hayes, above n 288, at 1.  
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rightsholder identity in terms of homogeneity, anonymity and parity,309 and aimed 
at each student achieving minimum standards in English-medium core subjects.310   
The NCLB required schools to make “adequate yearly progress” in what have been 
described as “unrealistic standards” and “unfair expectations”311 assessed through 
standard tests.  Failure to meet adequate progress markers in core subjects has led 
to “sanctions” including the withholding of funds to schools already most at risk.312  
Despite Tenth Amendment limitations on the federal government’s role in 
education, 313  schools have been forced to prioritize “high-stakes” core, tested 
subjects and minimize non-core subjects.314   
In practice, the NCLB did not deliver the hoped-for substantive impact for either 
minorities or indigenous people.  In 2004, the Harvard Civil Rights Project found 
that accountability had disproportionately negative impacts on high-poverty 
schools and resulted in “policy churn” in high-poverty districts.315  A 2005 study in 
Indiana, found that demographic factors, namely, “high percentages of minority 
students, free and reduced lunch, teacher student ratio, teacher experience, being 
geographically located in urban areas” remained the strongest predictors of schools 
                                                          
309 The NCLB is one of several pieces of legislation which form the basic framework for US federal 
education law and policy including the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 1974, the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 1975, Higher Education Opportunity Act 2008, Title II 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act 1990, Title IX of the Education Amendments 1972, Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act 1964, and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 2009.  Most are 
anti-discrimination measures based on an everyone/no-one standard and the goal of parity.   
310 See, for instance, Shiri Klima “The Children We Leave Behind: The Effects of High-Stakes 
Testing on Dropout Rates” (2007) 17(1) S Cal Rev L & Soc Just 3. 
311 Findings of the Harvard Civil Rights Project summarized by Teresa McCarty “American Indian, 
Alaska Native, and Native Hawaiian Education in the Era of Standardization and NCLB—An 
Introduction” (2008) 47(1) Journal of American Indian Education 1 [“Standardization and NCLB”], 
at 1. 
312 See Ronnie Lee Hiller School Demographic Characteristics that Predict No Child Left Behind 
Sanctions in the State of Indiana (PhD Dissertation Indiana State University 107, 2005). 
313  US Constitution, amend X reads: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people”.  Under the Tenth Amendment, the federal government is only supposed to possess powers 
afforded it by the states.  This constitutional provision is the basis of the fundamental principle of 
federalism. See “Laws and Guidelines” for the US Department of Education, found at 
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/landing.jhtml, dated 14/9/14.   
314 Klima, above n 317. 
315 Gail Sunderman and others Listening to Teachers: Classroom Realities and No Child Left Behind 
(Cambridge, MA, The Civil Rights Project at Harvard University, 2004), at 3-4.  It also caused 
teachers to “ignore[] important aspects of the curriculum, de-emphasize[] or neglect[] untested 
topics, and focus attention on tested subjects”.  Also,  “There is evidence from the survey to support 
the idea of ‘policy churn’, that is, schools in high-poverty districts, and particularly low-performing 
schools, are continually changing their educational programs in response to calls for reforms” to the 
detriment of student achievement: Sunderman at 3-4. 
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that were failing or those “flagged by NCLB sanctions”.316   The rigorous standards 
themselves seemed to have resulted in plunging pass rates which have widened the 
achievement gap between black and Hispanic students and their fellow Asian and 
White students in diverse New York City.317   Similar figures seemingly account 
for a “surge in ELL [English Language Learners]” prompting criticism that the 
NCLB has also left Lau-type students behind.  As these students are subjected to 
high-stakes testing and schools passing rates homogenously and anonymously 
include their scores with others, schools have begun placing students with little 
English proficiency in mainstream classrooms where the emphasis is on high-stakes 
subjects,318 effecting what may be a not-so-quiet reversal of Lau.319 
While its impact on disadvantaged minorities is concerning, Tsianina Lomawaima 
and Teresa McCarty have described standardization as “masquerading as a tool for 
equal opportunity” as it “marginalize[s] Native peoples”.320  In 2005, the National 
Indian Education Association (NIEA)321 raised concerns regarding the NCLB’s 
impact on indigenous education including: its “rigid[ity] and tend[ency] to leave 
children behind”; lack of resources required to make progress; and that “([a]ny) 
success has clearly been at the expense and diminishment of Native language and 
cultures” as teachers were forced to focus on high-stakes English-medium 
                                                          
316 Hiller, above 319. 
317 Sharon Otterman and Robert Gebeloff “When 81% Passing Suddenly Becomes 18%”, NY Times 
(online ed, New York, 1 August 2010). 
318 See Mary Ann Zehr “English Learners Pose Policy Puzzle” (2009) 28(17) Education Weekly 8, 
at 8.   The NCLB replaced the Lau-era Bilingual Education Act 1968 with the English Language 
Acquisition, Language Enhancement, and Academic Achievement Act 2002 and shifted the 
emphasis from bilingualism to English language proficiency.  As these students are also subject to 
high-stakes testing and schools passing rates homogenously and anonymously fail to differentiate 
between these students and others, the practical effect may be a ‘quiet reversal’ of Lau as students 
with little English proficiency are placed in mainstream classrooms where the emphasis is on high-
stakes subjects.  
319 Moran has also discussed what she calls the “ritual dismemberment [of Lau] in the courts” in 
Supreme Court cases including Guardians Ass’n v Civil Service Commission 463 US 582 (1983) 
where intention to discriminate did matter and effect did not; and Alexander v Sandoval, 532 US 
275 (2001) which limited private rights of action in terms of the disparate impact provisions of Title 
VI: Moran, above n 107. 
320 Tsianina Lomawaima and Teresa McCarty “When Tribal Sovereignty Challenges Democracy: 
American Indian Education and the Democratic Ideal” (2002) 39 American Educational Research 
Journal 279, at 299. 
321 NIEA produced their Preliminary Report on No Child Left Behind in Indian Country  on the de 
facto effects of the NCLB on the achievement and experience of American Indian, Alaska Natives 
and Native Hawaiians after conducting eleven hearings across the nation, including in Hawaii, where 
participants included “[t]ribal leaders, administrators, school board members, teachers, parents, and 
students”: Preliminary Report on No Child Left Behind in Indian Country (National Indian 
Education Association, 2005), at 1-2. 
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subjects. 322    While approving accountability, participants noted the NCLB’s 
irrelevance to the needs of indigenous learners and the “incredible mismatch 
between the programs NCLB supports, and what we know works with Native 
American children”.323  In practice: 
…The focus on testing and accountability in conjunction with insufficient funding 
has had unintended consequences.  Title VII funding has been diverted to preparing 
children for standardized tests and to provide remedial education.324   
McCarty has noted similarly that the: 
NCLB’s provisions are, on the surface, reasonable and attractive…In practice, 
these activities are highly constrained by a rigid and punitive accountability 
systems that fails to consider improvements over previous performance, is blind to 
racial discrimination and attendant schools funding inequities, and uses English 
standardized tests as the sole measure of proficiency.325   
Overall statistics post-NCLB are concerning.  For instance, the narrowing of the 
gap between Anglo-American and African-American children evident near the end 
of the twentieth century has stalled. 326   The biggest gap between the highest-
performing Anglo-American students and the lowest-performing Native American 
children is either about the same or has widened.327  Ironically, despite its identity-
specific provisions relating to Native Americans and focus on substantive change, 
the NCLB overarching everyone/no-one focus appears to undermine both in 
practice.  
                                                          
322 NIEA, 7-8. 
323 They also noted that the standards seemed to have been created “somewhere far away from Indian 
reservations and where Indian children live” and to show little input from indigenous people: NIEA, 
8-9 and 10. 
324 Tanya Lee “No Child Left Behind Act: A Bust in Indian Country” Indian Country (online ed, 
Verona, New York, 7 March 2012). 
325 McCarty, “Standardization and NCLB”, above n 318. 
326 See findings of Paul Barton and Richard Coley in The Black-White Achievement Gap: When 
Progress Stopped (Princeton, NJ, The Policy Information Center, 2010). Perhaps not coincidentally, 
growth continued into the 1990s but stalls about the same time that affirmative action begins to lose 
favor with the Courts and voters. 
327 See Lee.  Earlier state data collected by David Garcia in 2008 suggested that, in Arizona, the 
NCLB has produced “mixed messages” which appear “positive” but must be tempered: David 
Garcia “Mixed Messages: American Indian Achievement Before and Since the Implementation of 
No Child Left Behind” (2008) 47(1) Journal of American Indian Education 136.  Garcia has 
questioned a spike in 2005 test scores which may have skewed the results and remains concerned 
that while “American Indian students are closing the achievement gap” in some grades, “[i]n other 
subjects and grades, such as eight-grade mathematics and third-grade reading, American Indian 
students not only started out behind their White peers but are being left further behind their White 
peers since NCLB”: Garcia, at 149.  The 2011 national data suggests that even where Native 
American students are improving the gap is still about the same or growing: see Lee. 
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2.4.4 THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE/REALITY GAP 
These results should be put into further context. 
A 2010 study identified African Americans as having the highest rates of poverty, 
a factor shown to predict educational underachievement.328  In schools, eligibility 
for school lunch subsidization, another indicator of poverty, was highest among 
Hispanics, African Americans and American Indian/Alaska Native learners. 329 
Schools with higher percentages of African American students also have much 
higher rates of teachers lacking qualifications in their taught subjects.330  African 
American statistics in education fundamentally translate into higher unemployment 
rates, fewer bachelor’s degrees and significantly lower median incomes than Anglo 
Americans.331 
Native American statistics, however, may be more troubling.  Other recent sources 
attribute the highest rates of poverty in the United States to Native Americans.332 A 
2008 Harvard study333 found that while self-determination policies were having a 
positive impact on educational outcomes for Native Americans, “Indian 
schoolchildren are at or near the greatest risks of receiving poor education and 
underperforming at the elementary and secondary levels.”334  
                                                          
328 Thirty-four percent followed closely by American Indians/Alaska Natives on 33 per cent: Angela 
Kewal Ramani  and others Status and Trends in Education of Racial and Ethnic Groups 
(Washington DC, National Center for Education Statistics and U.S. Department of Education, 2010), 
at iii. 
329 Seventy-seven per cent for Hispanic, 74 per cent for African American and 68 per cent for 
American Indian/Alaska Native: Ramani and others, at iv.   
330 Ramani and others, at iv 
331 Ramani and others, at vi-vii.  The study also indicated that public schools remain segregated in 
fact as schools where the enrolment was at least half White enrolled 87 percent of all White students: 
Ramani and others, at iv.   
332 Over a five-year period, the national poverty rate for “American Indian and Alaska Natives alone” 
was 27.0 per cent compared with “Blacks or African Americans” at 25.8 per cent: Suzanne 
Macartney, Alemayehu Bishaw and Kayla Fontenot Poverty Rates for Selected Detailed Race and 
Hispanic Groups by State and Place: 2007-2011 (Washington DC, US Census Bureau, 2013), Figure 
1 “U.S. Poverty Rates by Race and Hispanic or Latino Origin: 2007-2011”, at 1-2. The same figures 
showed that in some states Native American/Alaska Natives displayed poverty rates of 30 per cent.  
Some reservations, however, have poverty rates of 43 per cent: see Jens Manuel Krogstad “One-in-
Four Native Americans and Alaska Natives Are Living in Poverty” Fact Tank (online ed, 
Washington DC, 13 June 2014). 
333 The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development The State of Native Nations: 
Conditions under U.S. Policies of Self-Determination (New York, Oxford University Press, 2008).   
334 Harvard Project, at 203. 
  73 
 
According to the Harvard study, Native Americans still have the highest rates of 
being placed in “special education and learning disabled programs”, second highest 
dropout rates, highest absenteeism in age group studies, and “lag behind” other 
groups in reading skills.335  American Indians were also 12.7 per cent less likely 
than other Americans to attend university. Various factors affecting these outcomes 
include the “harrowing psychological, sociological, and physical consequences of 
persistent poverty”336  as well as “underfunding”, “substandard” physical facilities, 
less access to computer and telecommunications and other considerations 337 
reminiscent of African-American schools during the Jim Crow era but also the 
concerns of reports on Indian boarding schools throughout the 20th century.338   
Besides “gaps”339 between indigenous learners and other ethnic and racial groups 
in the US, various research indicates that such disparities are “persistent”, 
cumulative and predictive of disparities in other aspects of well-being including 
unemployment, infant mortality, obesity, suicide, substance abuse, domestic 
violence.340   Again, these indicators express extremes—“double”, “three times”, 
“high”, “higher” “highest rates” which frequently “exceed” those of “all other races” 
including African-Americans.341  
In a way which fundamentally defies any assumptions of a level playing field, 
educational disparities spread across multiple areas of human well-being appear to 
cluster around minority and indigenous identity.  These facts indicate a significant 
                                                          
335 Harvard Project, at 204.   
336 Harvard Project, at 203.   
337 Harvard Project, at 204. 
338 See previous discussion on Merriam and Kennedy Reports, in Glass above n 124.  Echoing 
previous administrations, the White House announced last year that “Native American education is 
in a state of emergency”.  The House Education and Workforce Committee is currently investigating 
government-run schools for “shocking” failures regarding such concerns: Catherine Morris, 
“Committee Investigates Failing State of Native American Education” (14 May 2015), Diverse 
Issues in Higher Education <www.diverseeducation.com>. 
339 Duane Champagne “Contemporary Education” in Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples 2009 (New York, United  Nations, 2009) 129, at 133. 
340 See consistencies between disparities in education and those in other areas of well-being such as 
“Violence, Trauma, and Loss” and health in Michelle Sarche and Paul Spicer “Poverty and Health 
Disparities for American Indian and Alaska Native Children: Current Knowledge and Future 
Prospects” (2008) 1136 Ann NY Acad Sci 126. 
341 Terms repeated throughout Sarche and Spicer’s study.  Native Americans, for example, have the 
“highest per capita rate of violent victimization”,  are “more likely to be killed in a motor vehicle 
accident, to be hit by a car, to commit suicide, to drown than either their African American or white 
peers”, with “death due to diabetes, chronic liver disease and cirrhosis, and accidents occurring at 
least three times the national rate” and the “postneonatal death rate roughly twice that of both the 
U.S and white rates”: Sarche and Spicer, ibid, at 127-129. 
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real-time gap between constitutional guarantees of equality and educational realities 
for African American and indigenous learners.  Moreover, as if retelling a story, 
these indicators are predictive, demonstrating over time and geography that group 
identities seemingly attract disparities and negative outcomes.  However, 
indigenous identity seemingly predicts the most extreme disparities. 
 
2.5 LACK OF A STRONG RIGHT TO EDUCATION 
The slimness of the someone narrative and arbitrariness of indigenous narratives in 
federal law may be further exaggerated by the lack of a strong, standalone right to 
education in the United States.  That is, federal law does not recognize a 
constitutional or human right to education. 
There is no constitutional right to education.  In Rodriguez,342 plaintiffs actually 
argued for a “fundamental personal right” justiciable under the Equal Protection 
Clause.343  Earlier cases had recognized “the liberty of parents and guardians to 
direct the upbringing and education of children…under their control”344 but the 
plaintiffs argued for the children’s own rights to a certain quality of education.345   
Facts showed that the predominantly Hispanic American, poorer school district 
received far fewer funds through Texas’ tax-based school funding scheme than its 
predominantly Anglo American and affluent neighbor.  Not unlike Brown’s facts, 
the former had fewer staff, poorer facilities and less resources346.  While the Court 
approved Brown’s view that education is “the most important function of state and 
local governments” and vital to a “democratic society”,347 it denied any violation 
of a “fundamental” right to education because the Constitution did not explicitly or 
                                                          
342 San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez 411 US 1 (1973). 
343 At 34. 
344 Meyer and Pierce, cited above at 81. 
345  In terms of the right to a quality education, see Cass Sunstein’s discussion on Franklin D 
Roosevelt’s list of fundamental economic and civil rights taken for granted by the American people, 
including “the right to a good education”: Cass Sunstein, The Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s 
Unfinished Revolution and Why We Need It More than Ever (New York, Basic Books, 2004), at 9-
16, and discussion below on constitutive commitments. 
346 The poorer school had two-thirds the classroom space and about one-third the amount of books 
per student, a 1:28 teacher/student ratio compared with 1:19, and a 32 per cent dropout rate compared 
with 8 per cent.  Compare with Brown’s, Swann’s and Keyes’s tangible and intangible factors. 
347 At 29-35. 
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impliedly contain such a right348 and because it could not identify a suspect class.349  
Despite Brown’s consideration of similar, even intangible disparities, the Rodriguez 
Court held that the Equal Protection Clause did not guarantee “absolute equality or 
precisely equal advantages” or “equal quality of education”.  Despite recognizing 
the possibility that “quality of education may be determined by” economic factors 
and the “clustered” nature of poverty in certain areas, the Court was content that the 
children were receiving an “adequate” education regardless of quality. 350   The 
Court approved the state’s funding scheme under rational basis instead of strict 
scrutiny despite tangible, Brown-like facts. 
In Plyler v Doe (1982),351 children of illegal aliens were recognized as having the 
right to attend school.  The Court opined that education was not “merely some 
governmental ‘benefit’ but crucially important in terms of collective goods 
including institutional integrity, “the lasting impact its deprivation on the life of the 
child”, transmission of societal values, effective political participation, and as a 
source of “basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive 
lives to the benefit of us all”.352  The Court decided that its complete denial violated 
the Equal Protection Clause: 
In addition to the pivotal role of education in sustaining our political and cultural 
heritage, denial of education to some isolated group of children poses an affront to 
one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition of governmental 
barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of 
individual merit. Paradoxically, by depriving the children of any disfavored group 
of an education, we foreclose the means by which that group might raise the level 
of esteem in which it is held by the majority. But more directly, "education prepares 
individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society".353  
                                                          
348 At 33-34. 
349 At 19-23.  Relative “wealth” was not a suspect classification like race. 
350 At 23. “…Lack of personal resources has not occasioned an absolute deprivation of the desired 
benefit. The argument here is not that the children in districts having relatively low assessable 
property values are receiving no public education; rather, it is that they are receiving a poorer quality 
education than that available to children in districts having more assessable wealth. That is, the Equal 
Protection Clause was not violated by relative disparities between the schools as long as the children 
in question received any education or the policy did not impact all poor children in Texas.”: at 23. 
351 Plyler, above n 9. 
352 At 221. 
353 At 221-222. 
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The decision has been described as “analytically muddled but ultimately ethical”.354  
It was philosophically consistent with Brown’s equal protection reasoning but the 
Supreme Court applied rational basis or review rather than strict scrutiny.  Similarly, 
the decision suggests education should be considered at least a “constitutive 
commitment”—a basic constitutional principle whose legal value is greater than 
mere policy.355  However, the Court held that “public education [was] not a ‘right’” 
guaranteed by the Constitution.356  
International law recognizes the fundamental, unalienable right of every human 
being to education and recognizes both affirmative action and a Mancari-like 
preference as human rights.  As I will discuss in more depth in Chapters 5 and 6, 
the international framework of human rights recognizes strong someone and 
indigenous learner narratives and might add needed moral force and legitimacy to 
a federal right to education. However, federal law also fails to recognize a human 
right to education which might strengthen both someone and indigenous narratives.   
While the United States played a substantial role in the drafting of many of these 
standards and claims to be a human rights defender, it has been criticized for its 
“pick-and-choose” approach. 357  It has “exempt[ed]” itself from international rights 
standards” in various ways including: refusing to sign international agreements; 
refusing to ratify agreements it has signed; failing to pass legislation that would 
give them force in law; refusing to comply with obligations it has agreed to; 
remaining judicially indifferent to international legal decisions; 358  and being 
selective about which signed treaties will be “self-executing”.359  While Congress 
                                                          
354 In Cathy Albisa “Drawing Lines in the Sand: Building Economic and Social Rights Norms in the 
United States” in Shareen Hertel and Kathryn Libal Kathryn (eds) Human Rights in the United States: 
Beyond Exceptionalism (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2011) 68 at 73.   
355 Albisa, drawing on Cass Sunstein’s arguments, ibid.  Also see Cass Sunstein and Randy Barnett 
"Constitutive Commitments and Roosevelt's Second Bill of Rights: A Dialogue" (2005) 53 Drake L 
Rev 205. 
356 Plyler, at 221.   
357 See Harold Koh “Restoring America’s Human Rights Reputation” (2007) 40 Cornell Int’l L J 
635. 
358 Michael Ignatieff “No Exceptions?: The United States’ Pick-and-Choose Approach to Human 
Rights” (2002) in Pierre Claud and Burns Weston Human Rights in the World Community: Issues 
and Action  (3rd ed, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006) 474 at 474-475. 
359 Medellín v Texas 552 US 491 (2008) which relates to 51 foreign nationals on death row in 10 
different states being detained and arrested without being given access to consular notification as 
required by the US’ ratification of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.  Also 
see Robert S Hogue “Medellín v. Texas: The Roberts Court and New Frontiers for Federalism” (2010) 
41(2) U Miami Inter-Am L Rev 255.   
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has ratified the everyone/no-one focused International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) 360  and the no-one-focused, negatively prohibitive 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD),361 it has not ratified key Conventions on the right to education which are 
increasingly someone- and indigenous-specific.362  The Supreme Court has also 
been guilty of “aborted dialogues” with international courts regarding treaty 
obligations.363 
The almost universally supported United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples 2007 (UNDRIP) importantly recognizes both affirmative action 
and Mancari-like preference as fundamental rights of indigenous peoples including 
Native Americans.364  However, when President Obama finally signed UNDRIP 
under international pressure, the State Department emphasized that the document 
is “aspirational” and only affirmed previous rights under federal law and not any 
new rights.365   
Explanations for such behavior include a “deep attachment to popular 
sovereignty”366 and a fear of the “overlegalizing” of human rights367 but also the 
                                                          
360 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 and 1057 UNTS 407 / [1980] 
ATS 23 / 6 ILM 368 (1967) (opened for signature 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 
1976). 
361 International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination T660 UNTS 
195 / [1975] ATS 40 / 5 ILM 32 (1966) (opened for signature 21 December 1965, entered into force 
4 January 1969).  The US has signed and ratified the instrument, but may be ignoring it: see “Status 
of Ratification, Reservations and declarations” on UN Treaties found at <http://treaties.un.org>. 
362 Including: the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 UNTS 3 / 
[1976] ATS 5 / 6 ILM 360 (1967) (opened for signature 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 
January 1976); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
1249 UNTS 13/ [1983] ATS 9/ 19 ILM 33 (1980) (opened for signature 18 December 1979, entered 
into force 3 September 1989); and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1577 
UNTS 3/ [1991] ATS 4 / 28 ILM 1456 (1989) (opened for signature 20 November 1989, entered 
into force 2 September 1990)--though it has ratified the two Optional Protocols to the Children’s 
Convention.  It did not ratify the ICCPR until 1992. 
363 See Melissa Waters “The U.S. Supreme Court and the International Court of Justice: What Does 
‘Respectful Consideration’ Mean?” in Cesare Romano (ed) The Sword and the Scales: The United 
States and International Courts and Tribunals (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2009) 112 
at 114-117. 
364 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples GA Res 61/295, A/Res/61-295 
(2007) [UNDRIP]. 
365 The United States was one of only four UN nations who voted against the Declaration, and 
Obama did not sign the Declaration until 2009 after international pressure had been put on the US. 
366 Ignatieff, at 475 and 477.  Including issues of “contentious jurisdiction”: Tara Melish ”From 
Paradox to Subsidiarity: The United States and Human Rights Treaty Bodies”, in Romano, 210 at 
226.   
367 Curtis Doebbler “An American Legend: The Overlegalization of Human Rights,” published in 
American Society of International Law, Proceedings of the 96th Annual Meeting held in Washington, 
DC from 13-16 March 2002 381-383 (2002). 
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sanctity of an anachronistic Constitution 368  “unusually resistant to 
modernization”.369  Despite Brown’s legacy of positive measure and substantial 
outcomes, a right to education may also be seen as antithetical to the individuality 
of the liberal tradition 370  where interpreted as taxpayers and other individuals 
bearing the burden of “the ‘have-nots’”—or even “a free lunch”371.   While this 
apparent “cultural aversion” to positive, group rights may mask other issues,372 it 
also seems to prioritize the everyone/no-one narrative.373 
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has described how an identity-specific history of slavery, Jim Crow 
laws and segregation first justified than was lost in the singular prioritization of 
racialized, dichotomized everyone/no-one narrative of equality.  Two parallel 
narratives emerged—or survived—namely, the temporary, racially-specific 
someone evident in Brown and affirmative action, and the time-honored, Native 
American-specific indigenous preference recognized in Mancari  based on remedial 
self-determination.  However, a closer examination of federal jurisprudence 
revealed the undermining of both someone and indigenous narratives since Brown 
by the adamant everyone/no-one narrative evident in cases stretching from Bakke 
to the more recent University of Michigan cases and dissent in Kamehameha, as 
well as legislation such as the No Child Left Behind Act.    The chapter finally noted 
                                                          
368 Ignatieff, 475 and 477. 
369 Albisa, at 69. 
370 Curtis Bentley “Constrained by the Liberal Tradition: Why the Supreme Court Has Not Found 
Positive Rights in the American Constitution” (2007) 6 BYU L Rev 1721.  
371  Rita Cartwright and Victor Conde Human Rights in the United States: A Dictionary and 
Documents, Volume 1 (Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO, 2000), at 71.   
372 Melish, at 225-226. 
373 Interestingly, the United States was ranked 17th out of 40 countries in 2013.  Each country ahead 
of the U.S. had one “fundamental commitment in common…a constitutional, or statutory guarantee 
of the right to education” which acted as a centralizing force which “establish[ed] baseline 
requirements that set the frame for policy and judicial challenges, as well as contribute to what the 
Pearson report calls a ‘culture’ of education: where ‘the cultural assumptions and values surrounding 
an education system do more to support or undermine it than the system can do on its own’”: Stephen 
Lurie “Why Doesn’t the Constitution Guarantee the Right to Education? The Atlantic (online ed, 
Washington DC, 16 Oct 2013).  A 2014 report ranked the14th.  All but two of the countries—
Germany and the United Kingdom—ahead of it have a constitutional guarantee of the right to 
education: see Constitute Project <www.constituteproject.org>.  The unwritten constitution of the 
United Kingdom recognizes a statutory right to education: see ss 8,13(1) and 14(1)-14(2) Education 
Act 1996.   
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the reluctance of federal courts to recognize a standalone constitutional or human 
right to education despite the significant constitutive commitment attributed to 
education in cases such as Brown and Plyler—and persistent disparities in 
education which cluster around African American and Native American identity.       
Despite the availability of formal constitutional guarantees, the official end of 
segregation and critics use of the rhetoric of equality, the circumstances of both 
groups ultimately feel like a replay on a loop of historic group experiences of de 
facto and de jure discrimination in education.  In terms of African Americans, one 
has the sense that current federal equality narratives would leave de facto 
discrimination at the mercy of majoritarian bias conjuring the Civil Rights Cases 
and Plessy.  Reverse discrimination would similarly ignore the fact of slavery, 
segregation and ongoing disparate effect even as it hijacks the language of 
equality—its duality, dichotomy and polarization—and undermines the someone 
narrative which might address quantifiable disparities and gaps.   
The venerated American legal scholar Felix S Cohen once equated Native 
American rights in education to the “canary in the coalmine”.374  As concerning as 
African American statistics are, Native Americans may represent the most 
vulnerable of vulnerable rightsholders.  Increasingly historically abstract federal 
narratives clearly fail to adequately account for either the unique historico-legal 
context of the Mancari preference or the extreme real-time disparities which are 
insidiously attracted to Native American identity every day.  Judicial disregard for 
the uniquely indigenous narrative directly threatens time-honored rights of self-
determination and implies a very narrow interpretation of the trust relationship375 
but also speaks volumes about equality since the imposition of everyone/no-one 
narratives on Native Americans in the past has been consistently associated with 
severe discrimination and disparities.   
These troubling developments set the scene for the conflict of narratives apparent 
in Doe v Kamehameha Schools.  In Chapter Three, all three narratives will be 
                                                          
374 “Like the miner’s canary, the Indian marks the shift from fresh air to poison gas in our political 
atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians, even more than our treatment of other minorities, reflects 
the rise and fall of our democratic faith”: Felix S Cohen quoted in Lomawaima and McCarty, above 
n 117, at 279-280. 
375 See Glass, above n 121. 
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compared and contrasted with the unique historico-legal context of the admission 
policy and the extreme disparities attracted to Native Hawaiian identity which—
while eerily similar to the Native American experience—suggests unique historico-
legal context and the existence of an expanded multi-narrative of equality within 
Hawaiʻi state law.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE ADMISSION POLICY ON 
TRIAL 
3 CHAPTER THREE: THE ADMISSION POLICY ON TRIAL 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
For us, each step of the way was a struggle with identity.1 
On 5 December 2006, after a tense legal saga,2 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit announced its decision in the case of Doe v Kamehameha 
Schools3 (Kamehameha).  In a close 8-7 decision, the majority of an en banc panel 
held that the long-standing policy of a private school established for the education 
and betterment of Native Hawaiian children which prefers those children in 
admissions did not violate section 1981 of Title VII of the US Code. 
More than anything the case revealed a wrestle of narratives.  ‘John Doe’ was an 
intentionally anonymous 4  seventh-grader unsuccessful in admission to the 
prestigious K-12 school under the policy.  His attorneys alleged segregation, but 
the indigenous school had been established specifically to educate Native Hawaiian 
children so that they might overcome significant disparities and compete on a level 
playing field in education.  Preferring these children in admissions has, in fact, 
resulted in significantly improved real-life outcomes for a group of students 
historically and continuously associated with alarming negative disparities in 
                                                          
1 African American Civil Rights activist Harry Belafonte Jr quoted in Kate Pickert “One March” 
Time (online ed, New York, 26 August 2013) 36 at 39.   
2 When the initial success of the Schools in the court of first instance was overturned on appeal to 
the Ninth Circuit in the summer of 2005, Native Hawaiians were stunned and then angry.  The 
decision sparked multiple protests in Hawaiʻi and elsewhere: see, for instance, Louise Chu 
“Kamehameha rally draws 400 to protest in San Francisco” Honolulu Star Bulletin (online ed, 
Honolulu, 21 August 2005). 
3 Doe v Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate 295 F Supp 2d 1141 (D Haw 2003), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 416 F3d 1025 (9th Cir 2005), reh’g en banc granted, 441 F3d 1029 (9th 
Cir 2006) 470 F3d 827 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) [Kamehameha]. 
4 He was granted name suppression. 
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education.  Yet, the Ninth Circuit still struggled to decide if the policy was a 
measure of equality or some form of discrimination. 
Chapter Three examines the wrestle of federal equality narratives in Kamehameha.  
It begins by describing the unique historico-legal context of the policy including 
nationhood overthrow and annexation by the United States, as well as the 
discrimination and disparities resulting from these events.  The chapter discusses 
various narratives responding to this history including a familiar Native American-
like preference and trust relationship within federal and state law—but also the 
imposed everyone/no-one narrative evident in Rice v Cayetano5.   The courts’ 
wrestles and intuitions in Kamehameha are then discussed in terms of narratives.  
Ultimately, the chapter argues that current federal accounts fail to account for the 
unique historico-legal context of the policy and the disparities it was designed to 
address.  Pre-overthrow, historically continuous Native Hawaiian customary law, 
indigenous-specific Hawaii state law and recent developments including the 
passing of Act 1956 suggest an alternative indigenous narrative which exceeds 
current federal narratives and references human rights. 
 
3.2 MOʻOLELO: THE BURDENS OF NATIVE HAWAIIAN HISTORY 
…In federal Indian law, lawyerly analysis that is devoid of broader historical and 
theoretical perspectives leads to misleading conclusions about the determinacy 
and substance of what the law "is" at any given moment. More specifically,… what 
is popularly called "politics" has a strong explanatory and predictive value in 
federal Indian law. To assess current questions in Indian affairs as merely matters 
of abstract, backwardlooking doctrinal analysis is to confuse a counterhistorical 
ideal of the rule of law with the reality of a complicated politico-legal, historical, 
and institutional "situation sense”. What results is illusory law without life - mere 
conceptual constructs instead of the complicated calculus of doctrinal and human 
factors that coalesce to form federal Indian law7. 
Native Hawaiians and Native Americans share an eerily similar historico-legal 
context devastatingly marked by colonization.  Like federal-Indian history, the 
                                                          
5 Rice v Cayetano 528 US 495 (2000). 
6 Act 195, Sess L Haw 2011. 
7 Philip Frickey “Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation on Federal Indian 
Law” (1997) 11 Harvard L Rev 1754 at 1767-1768.   
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moʻolelo (history or story)8 of Western and particularly American involvement in 
Hawaiʻi has been “a complicated and difficult one, but when told in broad strokes, 
a familiar one: a story of an indigenous people and of greed, racism, and 
imperialism.”9 
This story of “widespread historical wrongs, including broken treaties and acts of 
oppression, and misguided government policies”10 against an indigenous people 
connects Native Hawaiians with American Indians and Alaskan Natives infinitely 
more than it does with ‘racial’ minorities such as African Americans but also 
reflects historico-legal developments peculiar to Hawaiian history.  The same 
history has produced complex discrimination and disparities seemingly attracted to 
Native Hawaiian identity which defy comparison, categorization and the singular 
narrative. 
 
3.2.1 ‘PRIMARY STATE’ 
The unique Polynesian11 society which Captain James Cook ‘discovered’ in the 
Hawaiian Islands in 1778 12  was one of the world’s “primary states”, akin to 
civilizations such as “Mesopotamia, Egypt, the Indus Valley, China, Mesoamerica, 
and Andean South America”.13   At first contact: 
                                                          
8 Borrowing language of Jonathan Kamakawiwo'ole Osorio Dismembering the Lāhui: A History of 
the Hawaiian Nation to 1887 (University of Hawaiʻi Press, Honolulu, 2002) at 3. 
9 Melodi Kapilialoha MacKenzie “Ever Loyal to the Land: The Story of the Native Hawaiian People” 
(2006) 33(2) Hum Rts 15 at 15. 
10 James Anaya “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples:  Addendum-
-The situation of indigenous peoples in the United States of America” A/HRC/21/47/Add 1, 30 
August 2012, in “Summary”. 
11 Hawaiʻi is believed to have been first settled by people from the Marquesas but has also been 
linked archaeologically and linguistically with Tahiti and other island groups in East Polynesia: see 
Patrick Kirch Feathered Gods and Fishhooks (University of Hawaiʻi Press, Honolulu, 1985).  There 
may have been several periods of settlement with the earliest taking place perhaps pre-AD 600: see 
discussion in Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie “Historical Background” in Melody Kapilialoha 
MacKenzie (ed) with Susan Serrano and Kapua Sproat Native Hawaiian Law: A Treatise (Native 
Hawaiian Legal Corporation, Ka Huli Ao Center for Excellence in Native Hawaiian Law at the 
William S. Richardson School of Law and University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa, Honolulu, 2015) 2 
(advance copy) [Treatise], part II. 
12 For Cook’s interactions with Native Hawaiians see: Anne Salmond The Trial of the Cannibal Dog: 
The Remarkable Story of Captain Cook’s Encounters in the South Seas (Viking, New York, 2003). 
13 One of the “primary states [that] emerged endogenously”—or those who “taught themselves how 
to be states”: Robert Hommon The Ancient Hawaiian State: Origins of a Political Society (Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2013) at ix. 
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[t]he Hawaiian kingdoms of the eighteenth century were large-scale, politically-
centralized societies in which a ruler or co-rulers delegated to a branching 
bureaucratic hierarchy the responsibility for governmental tasks including tax 
collection, public works, and waging war.  In some respects, these Hawaiian 
primary states appear more similar to modern nation-states than to the Polynesian 
societies to which they were bound by history and culture. 14 
This “complex”15 society was spiritually ordered by a world view including the 
complementary concepts of kapu16  and noa,17  and the role of expert-priests—
kahuna.18  Akua and ‘aumakua were a part of everyday life.19  Knowledge was 
treasured and passed orally.20   
Socially, the ʻohana (family) was the “fundamental unit” of Hawaiian society”, 
made up of those related by “blood, marriage and adoption” and “tied by ancestry, 
birth and sentiment to a particular locality called the ‘aina’”.21  Kinship ties ordered 
                                                          
14 Hommon, at ix.  Hommon argues that Tonga may have been another one of these primary states. 
15  Patrick Kirch The Evolution of the Polynesian Chiefdoms (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge UK, 1984).  Ancient Tonga may have been Hawaiʻi’s only rival for complexity in the 
Pacific. 
16 “Taboo, prohibition; special privilege or exemption from ordinary taboo; sacredness; prohibited, 
forbidden; sacred, holy, consecrated…”: Ulukau Hawaiian Electronic Library 
<http://wehewehe.org > (‘Ulukau’) 
17“Freed of taboo, released from restrictions, profane”: Ulukau.  
18 “Priest, sorcerer, magician, wizard, minister, expert in any profession (whether male or female); 
in the 1845 laws doctors, surgeons, and dentists were called kahuna”: Ulukau.  Also see Samuel 
Kamakau Ka Po‘e Kahiko: The People of Old trans from Ke Au ‘Oko’a by Mary Kawena Pukui 
with Dorothy Barrere (ed) (Bishop Museum Press, Honolulu, 1992) at 7-8.  Kamakau was a 
nineteenth-century Native Hawaiian scholar and historian. 
19 Kamakau, at 28-31.  Akua might refer to a “god, goddess, spirit, ghost, devil, image, idol” or the 
“divine, supernatural, godly”, while aumakua referred to “family or personal gods, deified ancestors 
who might assume the shape of sharks (all islands except Kauaʻi), owls (as at Mānoa, O‘ahu and 
Kaʻū and Puna, Hawaiʻi), hawks (Hawaiʻi), ʻ elepaio, ʻ iwi, mudhens, octopuses, eels, mice, rats, dogs, 
caterpillars, rocks, cowries, clouds, or plants. A symbiotic relationship existed; mortals did not harm 
or eat ʻ aumākua (they fed sharks), and ʻ aumākua warned and reprimanded mortals in dreams, visions, 
and calls.”: Ulukau. 
20 See Micheal Kioni Dudley A Hawaiian Nation I: Man, Gods, and Nature (Na Kane O Ka Malo 
Press, Honolulu, 1990) at 5-8. 
21 ES Craighill Handy and Mary Kawena Pukui The Polynesian Family System in Ka-’u, Hawaiʻi 
(The Polynesian Society, Wellington, 1958) at 2.  The term ohana is a literally a combination of the 
term for offshoots from the taro or kalo plant which was the staple of the ancient Hawaiian diet and 
the word aina.  “As the ‘oha or sprouts from the parent taro (or makua) serve to propagate the taro 
and produce the staple of life, or ‘ai, on the land (‘ai-na) cultivated through generations by the given 
family, so the family or ‘oha-na is identified physically and psychically with the homeland (‘ai-na) 
whose soil has produced the staple of life (‘ai, food made from taro) that nourishes the dispersed 
family (‘oha-na)”: Handy and Pukui, at 3-4. 
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society.22  Children were raised and taught collectively by multiple generations of 
relatives.23  Education began at home in the family.24 
Hawaiian society was geographically, politically and economically ordered by 
several types of land divisions but most commonly the ahupua‘a, “an economically 
self-sufficient, pie-shaped unit which ran from the mountain tops down ridges, 
spreading out at the base along the shore”25 which provided a range of resources26 
worked and shared collectively.   Though ruled by aliʻi27 (chiefs) “makaʻāinana 
[commoners] also had liberal rights to use ahupua’a resources” and “could freely 
trade and move within the ahupua‘a”.  There was no “concept of private ownership 
of land…in early Hawaiian thought”.  Instead aliʻi and other rulers ruled as trustees 
of the land and people with each stratum of Hawaiian society having reciprocal 
duties to those above them and below them.28   
Clearly, later foreign-introduced law “entered a field already rich with legal rules 
and practices”. 29   In this system, law was “[i]nterwoven with the religion of 
Hawaiʻi…and with governmental and social organization”.30  Mana and kapu were 
fundamental principles31 but the legal system also prioritized the human rights-like 
                                                          
22 One’s place in stratified Hawaiian society relied on genealogy: see Kamakau, at 4-5.  Despite not 
having a written language, pre-contact Hawaiians had a wealth of oral histories and genealogies 
connecting them with their ohana, aina, and aumakua: see Kamakau, above n18.   
23 Kamakau, at 26-27. 
24  Kamanaonāpalikūhonua Souza and K Ka‘ano‘i Walk “Ōlelo Hawaiʻi and Native Hawaiian 
Education” in MacKenzie and others, Treatise, above n 11, 1259 at 1261-1262.  
25 MacKenzie, “Historical Background”, above n 11, at II. 
26Including timber and other forest resources; freshwater supplies; agricultural land including lohi 
(taro patches) for growing kalo (taro) which provided the staple poi; and aquaculture zones and 
access to other marine resources: MacKenzie, ibid, part III.  They could also approach their ali’i 
directly with grievances relating to the konohiki.  Agricultural methods utilized by pre-contact 
Hawaiians have actually been characterized by a prominent archaeologist as “a model system for 
human ecodynamics”: Patrick Kirch “Hawaiʻi as a Model System for Human Ecodynamics” (2007) 
109 American Anthropologist 8. 
27  “Chief, chiefess, officer, ruler, monarch, peer, headman, noble, aristocrat, king, queen, 
commander; royal, regal, aristocratic, kingly; to rule or act as a chief, govern, reign; to become a 
chief”: Ulukau. 
28 Ahupua‘a were owned by ali’i (high chiefs) who had reciprocal duties of protection and provision 
for the maka’āinana (the people of the land):  MacKenzie, “Historical Background” at III.  They 
could also approach their ali’i directly with grievances.  Also see David Malo Moʻolelo Hawaiʻi: 
Hawaiian Antiquities trans by Nathaniel B Emerson (Bishop Museum, Honolulu, 1951) at 87-88.  
Even, the mo‘i (supreme ali‘i or king) was more of a trustee, subject to divine approval, and not an 
absolute owner.. 
29 Sally Engle Merry Colonizing Hawaiʻi: The Cultural Power of Law (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 2000) at 35. 
30 Ralph Simpson Kuykendall The Hawaiian Kingdom: Volume I, 1778-1854, Foundation and 
Transformation (University of Hawaiʻi, Honolulu, 1938) at 8. 
31 Hommon, above n 13, at 19.  Mana means “supernatural or divine power, mana, miraculous power; 
a powerful nation, authority; to give mana to, to make powerful; to have mana, power, authority; 
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principle of rule of law.32   This system was “sharply different” from Western 
systems.33   
Population estimates of the Hawaiian Islands at the time of contact in 1778 continue 
to be debated.34  But even conservative estimates admit the population was “dense” 
and “large”,35 and David Stannard’s 1989 figures36 of 800,000 to 1,000,000 have 
been described as “plausible” even by his critics.37  Both Congress and federal 
courts have cited the 1,000,000 figure.38 
By 1810, Kamehameha the Great had united all the Islands under his control.39   As 
a sovereign nation literally ‘on the map’,40 the Hawaiian Kingdom entered into 
treaties throughout the nineteenth century with the United States41 and various other 
                                                          
authorization, privilege; miraculous, divinely powerful, spiritual; possessed of mana, power.”: 
Ulukau. 
32 Two examples include the accountability aspects of chieftainship discussed above at n 24 and 
Kamehameha the Great’s formal declaration of the rule of law in 1797 in the Kānāwai Māmalahoe 
(or ‘Law of the splintered Paddle) which translated reads, “Respect alike the [rights of] people both 
great and humble.  May everyone, from the old men and women to the children, be free to go forth 
and lay in the road without fear of harm.  Break this law, and die”: see Keopulaulani Peelitz “Legal 
Duty or Kuleana” Mana Magazine (online ed, Honolulu, May/June 2013); and Troy JH Andrade 
“Ke Kānāwai Mamalahoe: Equality in Our Splintered Profession” (2010) 33 U Haw L Rev 249. 
33 MacKenzie, “Historical Background”, above n 11, at III. 
34 There has been a wide range of estimates over the years including: 200,000-250,000 (Robert 
Schmitt Demographic Statistics of Hawaiʻi, 1778-1965 (University of Hawaiʻi, Honolulu, 1968)); 
800,000-1,000,000 (David E Stannard Before the Horror: The Population of Hawaiʻi on the Eve of 
Western Contact (Social Science Research Institute, University of Hawaiʻi,  Honolulu, 1989); 
110,000-150,000 (Tom Dye and Eric Komori  “A Pre-Censal Population History of Hawaiʻi” (1992) 
14 NZ Journal of Archaeology 113); and 150,000 to 300,000 (Ross Kordy “Reconstructing 
Hawaiian Population at European Contact: Three Regional Case Studies” in Patrick Kirch and Jean-
Louis Rallu (eds) The Growth and Collapse of Pacific Island Societies: Archaelogical and 
Demographic Perspectives (University of Hawaiʻi, Honolulu, 2007) 108 at 126. 
35 Patrick Kirch “Like Shoals of Fish” [“Shoals”] in Kirch and Rallu, at 52.  Also see Kordy at 126. 
36 Stannard, above n 34. 
37 See, for instance, Terry Hunt “Book Review—Before the Horror: The Population of Hawaiʻi on 
the Eve of Western Contact by David Stannard” (1990) 13 Pacific Studies 255 at 258. 
38 Both Congress and federal courts have cited the 1,000,000 figure: see Native Hawaiian Education 
Act 20 USC §7512(7) and Kamehameha at 19055. Of all the island groups in the Polynesian Triangle, 
Hawaiʻi is estimated to have had the biggest population: Kirch, “Shoals” at 52 
39 Melodi, Kapilialoha MacKenzie “Ke Ala Loa—The Long Road: Native Hawaiian Sovereignty 
and the State of Hawaiʻi” (2011) 47 Tulsa L Rev 621 at 624.  
40 See, for instance, “Reich Kamehameha” in the center of the German map, Karte von Polonesien 
und dem Litoral des grossen Oceans, zur Uebersicht der politischen Verhaeltnisse im Jahre 1859, 
by Von A Petermann, dating from 1859.  Image found at Antiquariat Reinhold Berg 
<http://www.bergbook.com>. In English‚ the German noun “reich” translates as “empire”, 
“kingdom”, or “realm”: see Oxford Dictionaries online <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com>. 
41 Treaties between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States include:  Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce, and Navigation Between the United States and the Sandwich Islands (Hawaii) (23 
December 1826); Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation and Extradition (20 December 
1849); Treaty of reciprocity between the United States of America and the Hawaiian Kingdom (13 
January 1875); and Reciprocity Convention (6 December 1884): see US Department of State “A 
Guide to the United States' History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, 
since 1776: Hawaii” Office of the Historian <https://history.state.gov>. 
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nations.42  Its emissaries were received by monarchs and other heads of government 
and accorded all the respect of foreign dignitaries.43   This status among nations 
later earned the Territory of Hawaiʻi a place among the United Nations’ (UN) non-
self-governing territories from 1946 to 1960.44 
Early treaties with the United States speak of “perpetual” “peace and friendship” 
between the two nations, shared benefits in commerce and navigation,45 “mutual 
agreement” and “most-favored nation” status 46 —much like modern free-trade 
agreements.   Later, the language of these international agreements cools, the tone 
becoming a more demanding, even one-sided “reciprocity” which clearly favors 
American commercial and defense interests of the period47 and seems to reflect 
Monroe Doctrine48 foreign policy in regards to Hawaiʻi.49   
Kamehameha the Great’s successors converted to Christianity, were educated by 
foreigners, took counsel from such men and appointed them to positions of 
influence within governments patterned after Western, particularly British and 
American, democracies.50  For various reasons, the monarchy adopted Western-
style constitutions which adopted radical changes including hereditary and 
                                                          
42  Regarding treaties, the Hawaiian Kingdom concluded with other nations, see Tom Bennion 
“Treaty-Making in the Pacific in the Nineteenth Century and the Treaty of Waitangi” (2004) 35 
VUWLR 165 at 173-174. 
43 See, for instance, various occasions described Queen Liliʻuokalani in Liliuokalani Hawaii’s Story 
by Hawaii’s Queen (Charles E Tuttle, Rutland VT, 1964 (sixth printing 1972)). 
44 See David Forman “The Hawaiian Usage Exception to the Common Law: An Inoculation against 
the Effects of Western Influence” (2008) 30 U Haw L Rev 319 at 329.  Non-self-governing territories 
are countries which are seen as possessing rights to decolonization and self-determination under 
international law: see “Decolonization” United Nations <www.un.org>.   Also see discussion on 
self-determination in Chapter Six at 6.6.1. 
45 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the United States and the Sandwich 
Islands (Hawaii) (23 December 1826) art I. 
46 See, for instance, Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation and Extradition (20 December 
1849) arts III and VIII. 
47 For instance, in the Treaty of reciprocity between the United States of America and the Hawaiian 
Kingdom (13 January 1875), Hawaiian goods which can enter American ports duty-free were limited 
to approximately 15 types of goods (Art I) while goods which the United States could bring into 
Hawaiʻi fell into approximately 40 classes.  In the Reciprocity Convention (6 December 1884), the 
1875 treaty’s application was limited to seven years and the United States secured the use of Pearl 
Harbor as a “coaling and repair station” for United States ships until the present day. 
48 In an address to the US Congress on December 2, 1823, President James Monroe announced that 
the establishment by European powers of any further colonies or settlement within the Americas 
would be viewed as acts of aggression against the United States. 
49 The Tyler Doctrine of 1842, discussed in Department of the Interior from Mauka to Makai the 
River of Justice Must Flow Freely: Report on the Reconciliation Process between the Federal 
Government and Native Hawaiians (Washington DC, Department of the Interior and Department of 
Justice, 2000) at 22-23. 
50 See Sally Engle Merry Colonizing Hawaiʻi: The Cultural Power of Law (Princeton University, 
Princeton, 2000). 
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individual ownership of land, the establishment of a Western-style legislature, 
judiciary and executive, and private property rights for foreigners.  The very 
structure of the new legal system increasingly favored planter interests51  to the 
disadvantage of average Native Hawaiians.  Most dramatically, the Māhele52—or 
‘Division’—and subsequent Kuleana Act of 1850 which privatized land ownership 
have been largely credited with widespread land alienation, destruction of the 
ahupua’a system, landlessness and non-access to crucial natural resources.53  Legal 
changes were endorsed by and reflected the agency of the Hawaiian monarchy,54  
but their hands were also increasingly tied by Westernized law and the substantial 
economic and political power of Western business interests.  The 1852 Constitution 
gave suffrage rights only to male taxpayers over the age of 25 and limited the 
powers of the monarchy. 55  Under extreme duress, King David Kalākaua was 
infamously forced to sign the “Bayonet Constitution” in 1887 which further limited 
those powers.  On the verge of signing a new constitution in 1893, King Kalākaua’s 
                                                          
51 MacKenzie, “Historical Background”, above n 11. 
52 By 1839, American interests held great economic power in the Islands.  The Māhele—or literally 
the ‘Division’ --officially began with the passing of legislation in 1845 which established a Board 
of Land Commissioners that was made up of as many Americans as Native Hawaiians and had 
significant powers to issue fee patents for land.  In 1848, according to the plan of Justice William 
Lee, the Board managed the official division of all the lands in Hawaiʻi into three parts: King’s land 
(his private lands and that of the government); konohiki land; and that of tenant farmers, the former 
maka’āinana.  As a result of the Lee Plan and the subsequent Kuleana Act of 6 August 1850, 
konohiki and maka’āinana could make claims for former ahupua’a land.  However, the konohiki 
were, for instance, required to “pay a commutation tax of one-third the value of the unimproved land 
or cede[] one-third of the land to the government”--and their property rights were subject to tenants’ 
rights and boundary determination.  Likewise, any claims for the Kuleana Lands set aside for 
maka’ainana had to be made within four years of the 1850 Act: see MacKenzie, “Historical 
Background” above n 11, Part V, “Māhele Period”. 
53 The long-accepted view is that the Māhele resulted in most Native Hawaiians losing their land. 
Certainly, by 1890, only about 5,000 residents of Hawaiʻi out of a total population of 90,000 owned 
land, three out of four owners were Westerners, and few Native Hawaiians owned land: MacKenzie, 
“Historical Background”, above n 11 at VI “After the Māhele”.   However, see arguments in 
Donovan C Preza “The Empirical Writes Back: Re-Examining Hawaiian Dispossession Resulting 
from the Māhele of 1848” (PhD Thesis, University of Hawaiʻi, 2010).  Preza argues that while the 
Mahele began the process of dispossession, the “loss of governance” resulting from the overthrow 
of the Native Hawaiian government in 1893 “was the single most critical dismemberment of 
Hawaiian society”: Preza, at 170.     
54 See arguments in B Kamanamaikalani Beamer “Na Wai Ka Mana? ʻŌiwi Agency and European 
Imperialism in the Hawaiian Kingdom” (PhD Thesis, University of Hawaiʻi, 2008). 
55 For instance, in the 1852 Constitution signed by pro-Western Kamehameha III and drafted by 
Justice Lee, suffrage rights--like those in America at the time--favoured white, male property owners.  
Because of that constitution’s limits on the monarch’s powers, his successor, Kamehameha IV--who 
took the throne in 1855, post-Mahele--was unsuccessful in replacing the 1852 Constitution.  The 
later Bayonet Constitution was a response to Kamehameha V’s success in passing a new constitution 
in 1864 which reinstated some royal power: MacKenzie, “Historical Background”, above n 11 at 
VII “Overthrow of the Hawaiian Monarchy”. 
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sister and successor, Queen Liliuokalani, was deposed and imprisoned by American 
businessmen with the help of American diplomats and military forces. 56 
There is much current discussion on the United States’ subsequent role in events. 
The overthrow of the internationally-recognized, sovereign nation of Hawaiʻi was 
illegal. 57  Two Executive Agreements between President Grover Cleveland and 
Queen Liliuokalani afterwards recognized that illegality and agreed to a return of 
power to the queen and Native Hawaiians.58 More recently, both legislative and 
executive branchs of the federal government have recognized the illegality of the 
subsequent annexation in 1898.59  Hawai‘i was later included among the UN’s non-
self-governing territories from 1946 to 1960, a status legally entitling the 
indigenous population to seek self-government and, ultimately, full independence. 
The legitimacy of the plebiscite in 1959 in which Hawaiʻi ‘residents’ voted for 
statehood and were thereafter removed from the UN list is also greatly debated.60   
Crucially, at no point did the Native Hawaiian people “directly relinquish[] their 
claims to their inherent sovereignty as a people…either through their monarchy or 
through a plebiscite or referendum”.61  In a manner which violates fundamental 
justice, and despite significant evidence of resistance,62 our country and rights were 
simply taken from us.  The Westernization of the Native Hawaiian legal system pre-
                                                          
56 The Clinton Apology, Joint Resolution of the 103rd United States Congress, Pub L 103−150, 107 
Stat 1510, S J Res 19, enacted November 23, 1993.  “To acknowledge the 100th anniversary of the 
January 17, 1893 overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, and to offer an apology to Native Hawaiians 
on behalf of the United States for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii.” 
57 Matthew Craven “Continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom” (2004) 1 Hawn J L & Politics 508 at 512.  
Presidential approval had been given by President Benjamin Harrison one year earlier.  In 1893, the 
American Minister to Hawaii ordered United States Marines to land (or invade) in support of the 
insurrectionists: MacKenzie, “Historical Background”, above n 11 at VII “Overthrow of the 
Hawaiian Monarchy”. 
58 HR 107, resolution of the House of Representatives in the Hawaiʻi State Legislature; MacKenzie, 
ibid at VII. 
59 The Clinton Apology, above n 55.   
60 The legitimacy of the vote is questionable given both the “substance” and “suffrage” of the vote.  
There are significant questions about whether a majority of Native Hawaiians—that is, the 
indigenous population of the Islands at the time of colonization or occupation, depending on how 
one looks at it—actually voted for statehood as required by international law and because statehood 
was the only option offered to voters on the ballot.  The vote seemed to be timed by the United States 
to achieve a non-indigenous majority.  Under international law, other options should have included 
complete independence from the United States and free association with the United States and not 
just complete integration into the United States.  Voters were not even informed that the territory 
was on the UN list: Julian Aguon “Native Hawaiians and International Law” in MacKenzie and 
others, Treatise, at III B. 
61 As recognized in the Clinton Apology, above n 55.  Also see discussion on the Blount Report in 
MacKenzie, “Historical Background”, at VII. 
62 See MacKenzie, ibid, on political organization, petitions, armed resistance and other methods. 
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overthrow seems to have made these later, blatant acts of imperialism easier, but 
the overthrow and annexation undoubtedly mark a watershed moment after which 
the pace of colonization, assimilation and discrimination dramatically accelerated.  
Given the causal connection between these events and subsequent discrimination 
and disparities attracted to Native Hawaiian identity, these events are increasingly 
narrated as a source of great “harm”.63   
 
3.2.2 DISCRIMINATION IN LAW AND FACT 
Both acceleration and harm are apparent in education.  Prior to the overthrow, 
profound paradigm shifts were apparent in education and language law and policy.  
Post-overthrow and –annexation, education and language would be stolen and the 
long-term effects brutal.  
In the mid-nineteenth century, Richard Armstrong, second minister of education 
and former missionary, established an education system in the Hawaiian Kingdom 
which included boarding schools designed to teach indigenous children to be 
“subservient” and Western.  Mainland boarding schools which committed later 
injustices against Native American learners were actually patterned after the 
Hawaiian schools.64  Like many contemporaries, Armstrong believed that Native 
Hawaiians were “filthy”, “ignorant”, “lazy” heathen who “hardly know how to do 
anything”.65  Not unlike early efforts with Native American peoples, educating the 
Native Hawaiian child was about Christianizing and civilizing them, 66  about 
                                                          
63 See, for instance, Aguon, above n 59; and Eric K Yamamoto, Susan K Serrano and EA Hoʻoipo 
Kalaenaʻauao Pa, Amicus Brief of the Japanese American Citizens League of Hawaiʻi-Honolulu 
Chapter and the Equal Justice Society and in support of Defendant-Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing 
En Banc, 29 August 2005, in Doe v Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate 416 F 3d 
1025 (No 04-15044) (9th Cir 2005). 
64 These schools would eventually inspire the creation of the infamous boarding school system 
which essentially took Native American children hostage and tried to forcibly assimilate them into 
American culture at locations such as the Carlisle Boarding School.  His son Samuel Chapman 
Armstrong founded the Hampton Normal and Agricultural Institute in Virginia which educated 
African-American children, including the likes of Booker T Washington, in what Gary H Okihiro 
describes as “schooling for subservience” or helping African-Americans “adjust…to a subordinate 
role in the Southern political economy”.  Later, Hampton received Native American students and 
served as the model for, first, the Carlisle Boarding School and then the federal government’s entire 
Indian Boarding School program: Gary Y Okihiro Island World: A History of Hawaii and the United 
States (University of California Press, Oakland, 2008) at 98-133. 
65 Quoted in Okihiro at 99.   
66 Compare with assimilationist federal-Indian policy discussed in previous chapter at 2.3.2.  
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overcoming “not mere ignorance, but deficiency of character” inherent to their race.  
As with African-Americans, Native Hawaiians were often viewed as inherently 
weak and corruptible, mentally and morally, and, therefore, more in need of 
‘industry’.  Armstrong believed that “[e]specially in the weak tropical races, 
idleness like ignorance breeds vice”.67  Thus, from the 1820s and 1830s, Armstrong 
and other missionaries established a school system designed to train young 
Hawaiian males to become Westernized, Christianized teachers, preachers and 
missionaries and young Hawaiian females to be their wives—but also to separate 
Native Hawaiian children from the perceived barbarism of Hawaiian culture.68  
Despite Westernizing forces, Noelani Goodyear-Kaʻopua has described how, until 
the late nineteenth century, education in Hawaiʻi remained largely community-
based and taught by Native Hawaiians in the Hawaiian language.  Community-run 
schools were “sites of struggle” in terms of governance, curriculum and language.69  
In the midst of attempted colonization and assimilation, Native Hawaiians were not 
passive objects in terms of education but rather active and resisting agents, as 
Jonathan Kamakawiwo'ole Osorio, 70  Donovan Preza 71  and Kamanamaikalani 
Beamer72 have similarly argued in more general terms.   
Such agency also accounts for the voluntary choice of Native Hawaiians to learn 
English, a language which had become the language of business and politics and 
constituted “an immediate stepping-stone to success and power in the rapidly 
changing world that intruded on their own”.73  However, a well-known Hawaiian 
                                                          
67 Okihiro, 114. 
68 Okihiro, 107-111.  Missionary William Lyman defrayed running costs at the Hilo Boarding school 
by having the Native Hawaiian students grow their own food and otherwise support themselves 
while also demanding tuition and fees from their parents.  While Armstrong may have genuinely 
believed that he was helping Native Hawaiian learners (as discussed by Souza and Walk, above n 
24, at 1264) this approach was inherently discriminatory. 
69  Noelani Goodyear Kaʻōpua “Rebuilding the ʻAuwai: Connecting Ecology, Economy and 
Education in Hawaiian Schools” (2009) 5(2) AlterNative 46 at 57-59. 
70 Above n 8. 
71 Above n 52.  
72 Above n 53, 
73 “Support for English–medium schools from the Native Hawaiian community was born of a desire 
to obtain equality with the haole (white foreigners).  Both Kamehameha III (Kauikeaouli) and 
Kamehameha IV (Alexander Liholiho) supported English instruction, as they felt it was requisite to 
‘meeting the foreigners on terms of equality.’ Kānaka Maoli were well aware of the influence and 
power that foreigners possessed in politics and business…”  It was “natural” to want to learn English 
because “Kanaka Maoli understood that Hawaiian ‘was not an immediate stepping-stone to success 
and power in the rapidly changing world that intruded on their own’”: Souza and Walk, above n 24, 
at 1264. 
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proverb says: “I ka ‘ōlelo nō ke ola, I ka ōlelo nō ka make”—“In language there is 
life and in language there is death”.74  As among other indigenous peoples, language 
law and policy inflicted significant harm in Hawaiʻi.   
Missionaries originally taught Native Hawaiians in the Hawaiian language, creating 
the first primer in 1822.  The response was impressive:  
By 1853, nearly three-fourths of the Native Hawaiian population over the age of 
sixteen years were literate in their own language.  The short time span within which 
native Hawaiians achieved literacy is remarkable in light of the overall low literacy 
rates of the United States at the time.  Given Hawaiians’ rapid and successful 
transformation from an entirely oral culture to a literal culture, Hawaiʻi had the 
opportunity to become a bilingual nation comparable to some European 
countries.75 
By 1850 English had become the “language of business, diplomacy, and to a 
considerable extent, of government itself”.  Legislation enacted in 1846 required all 
laws to be published in English and Hawaiian.  Initially, the Hawaiian version was 
to be preferred where there was any question of translation.  However, “‘English-
Mainly’ advocates” later successfully passed legislation which made the English 
translation the preferred version.  Essentially, “English remained the controlling 
law in Hawaiʻi”.76 
Armstrong was a significant English advocate.   During his administration, the first 
government-sponsored school opened in 1851, taught the “three Rs” in English and 
was followed by others which began to compete with private Hawaiian-medium 
schools for staff and resources.  Subsequent administrations “fiscal[ly] neglect[ed]” 
Hawaiian-medium schools, claiming that there would soon be little need for such 
instruction as Native Hawaiians were a supposedly dying race.77  
However, “it was not enough to arm the Hawaiians with English.  The next logical 
step was somehow to disarm them”.78  Following the overthrow, suppression of the 
                                                          
74 Mary Kawena Pukui ‘Ōlelo No’eau” Hawaiian Proverbs and Poetical Sayings (Bishop Museum 
Press, Honolulu, 1983) at 129.  
75 Paul Nahoa Lucas “E Ola Mau Kākou I Ka Ōlelo Makuahine: Hawaiian Language Policy and 
Courts” (2000) (34) Haw J Hist 1 at 2. 
76 Lucas, at 3-4. 
77 Lucas, at 5-6.  Consistent with contemporary American beliefs about Native Americans, cultural 
practices such as the hula and kahunaism rather than Westernization were blamed: Albert J Schutz 
The Voices of Eden: A History of Hawaiian Language Studies (University of Hawaiʻi Press, 
Honolulu, 1994) at 347.     
78 Schutz, at 350. 
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Hawaiian language was aggressive.  The Act of June 8, 1896 of the ‘Republic of 
Hawaii’ officially mandated that:  
The English language shall be the medium and basis of instruction in all public and 
private schools, provided that where it is desired that another language shall be 
taught in addition to the English language, such instruction may be authorized by 
the Department, either by its rules, the curriculum of the schools, or by direct order 
in any particular instance.  Any schools that shall not conform to the provisions of 
this section shall not be recognized by the Department.79 
This outright prohibition on Hawaiian language constituted blatant, unapologetic 
discrimination de jure and de facto against Native Hawaiians.  The effects were 
stunning.  Paul Nahoa Lucas notes that by 1902 there were no Hawaiian-medium 
schools in Hawaiʻi.80  Native Hawaiian children were corporally punished and 
Native Hawaiian teachers dismissed for speaking Hawaiian in the classroom or 
even on school grounds.  Once numerous, Hawaiian newspapers numbered only 
one by 194881 despite previously high rates of literacy.  
Westernization had already had a devastating physical impact on the Native 
Hawaiian people.  By 1853, the Native Hawaiian population of the Islands had been 
reduced to 71,019.   By 1900, that figure was a mere 39,656 including part-
Hawaiians.82  The introduction of Western diseases, such as influenza, tuberculosis, 
leprosy, smallpox, and venereal diseases which Native Hawaiians lacked natural 
immunity against, partially account for these tragic figures.83   
However, other factors included “cultural conflict”, “prostitution”, “despair”, “new 
social ills”, land alienation and the imposition of a propaganda of “Western 
superiority”84—circumstances resulting from the Māhele and other legal and social 
changes.  As Osorio describes, this “moʻolelo” 
is a story of how colonialism worked in Hawaiʻi not through the naked seizure of 
lands and governments but through a slow, insinuating invasion of people, ideas 
and institutions.  It is also a story of how our people fought this colonial insinuation 
                                                          
79 Act of June 8, 1896, ch 7, s 30 (codified 1897 Haw Comp Laws s 123).   
80 Lucas, at 8. 
81  Though Hawaiian language was still spoken at home by older Hawaiians, many younger 
Hawaiians lost fluency: Lucas, at 9. 
82 Sumner La Croix “Economic History of Hawaiʻi” Economic History Association <https://eh,net>.   
83 See Native Hawaiians Study Commission Report on the Culture, Needs and Concerns of Native 
Hawaiians, Pursuant to Public Law 96-565, Title III, Final Report Volume I (Washington DC, 
Department of the Interior, 23 June 1983) at 102-104.   
84 See Native Hawaiian Study Commission, ibid. 
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with perplexity and courage.  But, ultimately, this is a story of violence, in which 
that colonialism literally and figuratively dismembered the lāhui (the people) from 
their traditions, their lands, and ultimately their government. The mutilations were 
not physical only, but also psychological and spiritual.  Death came not only 
through infection and disease, but through racial and legal discourse that crippled 
the will, confidence and trust of the Kānaka Maoli [Native Hawaiians] as surely as 
leprosy and smallpox claimed their lives and limbs.85 
The history remains dramatically evident in current socio-economic statistics.   
While numbers have rebounded,86 “[i]n all areas of interest, the Native Hawaiian 
population is suffering and at risk”.87   
While Hawaiʻi has “the highest ethnic minority population in the nation”—or 
highest diversity88—Native Hawaiians are most likely to be arrested, incarcerated 
and to end up back in prison.89  Despite association with “a number of resiliency 
factors”, Native Hawaiian children and adolescents have the highest rates of infant 
mortality, mental health diagnoses, suicide, and obesity.90  The same children are 
more likely to attend a school in need of “restructuring”, have less experienced and 
qualified teachers, have a disproportionate rate of excessive absences, and be in 
special education.  Collectively, Native Hawaiians are consistently below the state 
median in math and reading achievement tests, have the lowest graduation rates, 
and are most likely to graduate late and require subsidized school lunches.91   
                                                          
85 Osorio, above n 8 at 3. 
86 The 2010 US Census records a total of 527,077 Native Hawaiians living in the United States with 
289,970 living in the state of Hawaiʻi.  The total number is a 31.4 percent increase in just 10 years 
and represents the largest group of Pacific Islanders in the nation: Lindsay Hixson, Bradford B 
Hepler and Myoung Ouk Kim The Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander Population: 2010 
(Washington DC, US Census Bureau, 2012) at 14 and 19. 
87 Lahela Hiapola‘ela‘e Farrington Hite “Maka’ala Ke Kanaka Kahea Manu: Examining a Potential 
Adjustment of Kamehameha Schools’ Tuition Policy” (2009) 31 U Haw L Rev 237 at 247-248.   
88 See “Hawaiʻi’s ethnic diversity still tops” Honolulu Star Bulletin (online ed, Honolulu, 1 May 
2008). 
89 Office of Hawaiian Affairs and others The Disparate Treatment of Native Hawaiians in the 
Criminal Justice System (Honolulu, Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 2010), 26-42.  The joint study 
involved the Justice Policy Institute, Georgetown Law and University of Hawaiʻi shows that Native 
Hawaiians are far more likely to be arrested, more likely to receive a sentence of incarceration over 
probation, receive longer prison sentences, serve longer probation periods, have more women 
incarcerated, and have lower rates of early parole and higher rates of parole revocation than all other 
ethnic groups in Hawaiʻi, despite similar rates of criminal activity.   
90 David Liu and Christian Alameda “Social Determinants of Health for Native Hawaiian Children 
and Adolescents” (2011) 70 Hawaiʻi Med J 9.   
91 Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate Native Hawaiian Educational Assessment Update 2009: A 
Supplement to Ka Huaka‘i 2005 (Honolulu, Kamehameha Schools, Research & Evaluation Division, 
2009). 
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In terms reminiscent of American Indians and Alaska Natives,92 Native Hawaiians 
are the most socioeconomically disadvantaged ethnic group in Hawaiʻi. 93  
Moreover, such disadvantage tends to “accumulate” and be “cyclical”, 
compounding and distorting disproportionate impact further94 and creating a higher 
“allostatic load” 95 for Native Hawaiian individuals—as well as a complex, almost 
overwhelming species of inequality.  The link between the history and such 
inequality is unquestionable and widely accepted96—as is the link between ongoing 
“multigenerational trauma and discrimination…poverty and inequities of housing, 
education, environment, healthcare access, and social capital” 97 and statistics in 
specific areas such as health and education.  Such disparities are organically 
interdependent and interrelated to disparities in other areas and inherently linked to 
Native Hawaiian identity.98   
These disparities identify Native Hawaiians collectively with extreme 
discrimination and inequality.  Like Native American identity, Native Hawaiian 
                                                          
92 See discussion in Chapter 2 at 2.3.2. 
93 Shawn Malia Kana‘iaupuni, Nolan Malone, and Koren Ishibashi. Income and Poverty among 
Native Hawaiians: Summary of Ka Huakaʻi Findings (Honolulu, Kamehameha Schools, 2005). 
94 See, for instance, in regard to this phenomenon in the context of criminal justice: “The disparate 
impact of [criminal] laws and their enforcement on Native Hawaiians is apparent at every stage of 
the criminal justice system, starting from arrest and continuing through parole.  The impact is 
cumulative, starting with the relatively small disproportionality at arrest, but revealing itself to be 
more distinct at sentencing and incarceration…The cycle repeats itself and notably, negative cyclical 
effects are concentrated on Native Hawaiian communities.”:  OHA “Disparate Treatment”, above n 
89 at 27 
95 “[A]llostatic loads” are described as the “the sum total of stresses encountered over the life of an 
individual” which in turn contribute to “chronic stress”: Liu and Alameda, above n 90, at 9.   
96 This connection has been accepted as fact by all branches of government: see, for example, the 
Clinton Apology, above n 55; Department of the Interior from Mauka to Makai the River of Justice 
Must Flow Freely: Report on the Reconciliation Process between the Federal Government and 
Native Hawaiians (Washington DC, Department of the Interior and Department of Justice, 2000); 
and the Ninth Circuit in the Kamehameha case.  Also see Shawn Malia Kana’iaupuni and Nolan 
Malone “This Land Is My Land: The Role of Place in Native Hawaiian Identity” 2006 3(1) Hūlili: 
Multidisciplinary Research on Hawaiian Well-Being 281. 
97 Liu and Alameda, above n 90, at 9.  “The theory of multigenerational, or historical trauma posits 
that significant negative life events are transmitted intergenerationally and thus may continue to 
affect future generations decades or even centuries after the inciting event…It is important to note 
that a possible explanation for the persistence of historical trauma, in addition to the magnitude of 
the initiating events constituting the trauma(s), [is] that such events are not simply in the past.  They 
are constant new, or similar events which may contribute to historical trauma.  There are constant 
struggles to [protect native Hawaiian rights].  Some Native Hawaiians may see the largely ethnic 
differential of political and economic achievement in Hawaiʻi as a reminder of a second or third 
class status, reinforcing historical trauma.  So Native Hawaiian children and adolescents may be 
directly experiencing their own historical trauma, in addition to being recipients of transmitted 
trauma from their families”: at 12. Liu and Alameda further recognize the impact of “limited 
economic opportunities structured by colonial legacies and the everyday oppression of perceived 
second-class status in one’s own homeland”, “marginalization”, and “racism and colonialism” as 
factors which increase allostatic load, chronic stress and multigenerational trauma: at 12. 
98 Or “the perceived and experiential role of being Native Hawaiian”: Liu and Alameda, at 6. 
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identity appears to inherently attract disparities and predict extreme negative 
outcomes which fundamentally challenge the notion of equality.  In doing so, our 
very identity defies homogeneity, anonymity, the singular narrative itself, and any 
presumption of a level playing field. 
 
3.3 MULTIPLE NARRATIVES OF EQUALITY 
In Hawaiʻi state law, the legal narratives available to address this particular history 
and the disparities are complicated, including a Mancari-like exception and a 
unique indigenous rights discourse—but also an adamant narrative.  These 
narratives recognize a more substantial version of equality but have been fettered 
by an everyone/no-one standard.   
 
3.3.1 THE FEDERAL-NATIVE HAWAIIAN TRUST RELATIONSHIP 
Both the Newlands Resolution99 which annexed Hawaiʻi and the Organic Act of 
1900 100  which established the subsequent territorial government recognized a 
“special trust under the federal government’s proprietorship”—that is, a Native 
American-like trust relationship where the US held legal title but “beneficial title 
rested with the inhabitants of Hawaiʻi” and the territorial government became the 
“conduit of Congress”.101 
As early as 1920, crime and other socio-economic statistics indicated that “the 
position of the Hawaiian community had deteriorated seriously” and that “the 
remnants of Hawaiians required assistance to stem their precipitous decline”.102  As 
                                                          
99 Joint Resolution of Annexation of July 7, 1898, 30 Stat 750. Via the Newlands Resolution, the 
United States officially annexed the long coveted Islands from the so-called ‘Republic of Hawaiʻi’ 
in 1898.  The Republic ceded sovereignty and absolute title of Hawaiʻi’s public lands to the United 
States.  Public lands included the formerly designated government land and Crown lands totally 
approximately 1.75 million acres. 
100 The Organic Act of 1900 established Hawaiʻi’s territorial government and, under section 91, 
designated that those lands would remain in the possession and management of the territorial 
government until Congress determined otherwise.   
101 Sheryl Miyahira “Hawaiʻi’s Ceded Lands” (1981) 3 U Haw L Rev 101 at 121.  Also, see extensive 
discussion in Hawaiʻi et al v Office of Hawaiian Affairs 556 US 163, 129 S Ct 1436 (2009). 
102 MacKenzie “Historical Background”, above n 11, at X, B. “Hawaiian Homes Commission Act”. 
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if acting in its fiduciary role in relation to Native Americans, Congress passed the 
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act in 1921 (HHCA)103 which set aside 188,000 
acres of the ceded public lands for 99-year leases at “nominal” fees for Native 
Hawaiians of at least 50 percent blood quantum and established the Hawaiian 
Homes Commission (HHC), a government body to administer the leases.  While 
blood quantum and other features were driven by sugar interests, this legislation 
was consistent with long-established American and Hawaiian legal traditions and 
lessees returning to “ancestral lands”.104  When Hawaiʻi became a state in 1959, 
section 5(f) of the Admission Act mandated that the state hold all public land in 
trust and administer the income towards five purposes including “support” for 
public education and “for the betterment of the conditions of native Hawaiians”.105   
The late David Getches and others have concluded that the HHCA recalls the 
“history of federal Indian policy”,106 and Gavin Clarkson has demonstrated that 
fluctuations in Amerian foreign and domestic policy regarding Hawaiʻi’s 
indigenous people reflect federal Indian policy eras. 107   For instance, during 
Allotment when federal Indian policy was directed at “break[ing] up the tribal mass 
directly upon the family and the individual”, American citizens and agents 
orchestrated the overthrow and annexation of Hawaiʻi 108  and then language 
suppression.  The Newlands Resolution and Organic Act then gave the US control 
                                                          
103 Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, Act of July 9, 1921, c 42, 42 Stat 108.   
104  Quoted in MacKenzie “Historical Background”, above n 11, at X, B “Hawaiian Homes 
Commission Act”.  Regarding the passing of the HHCA, David H Getches and others noted: “The 
House Committee Report on HHCA defended the bill against the charge that it was ‘unconstitutional 
class legislation’ by noting that congress has the authority to provide special benefits for unique 
groups such as ‘Indians, soldiers and sailors’...”: David H Getches “Hawaiʻi: Islands of Neglect” in 
David H Getches and others Cases and Materials on Federal Indian Law (5th ed, Eagan MN, West 
Publishing, 2004) 945 at 949. 
105 The Admission Act, “An Act to Provide for the Admission of the State of Hawaii into the Union”, 
Act of March 18, 1959, Pub L 86-3, 73 Stat 4. Statehood was conditional on this provision: David 
M Forman “The Hawaiian Usage Exception to the Common Law: An Inoculation Against the 
Effects of Western Influence” (2008) 30 U Haw L Rev 319, at 322-323.  
106 Getches above n 104. 
107 Gavin Clarkson “Not Because They Are Brown, but Because of Ea: Why the Good Guys Lost in 
Rice v. Cayetano, and Why They Didn't Have to Lose” (2002) 7 Mich J Race & L 317 at 320-325. 
108 Clarkson, ibid, at 320-325.  Earlier in the nineteenth century, when “government-to-government” 
political relationships between the federal government and Native American tribes resulted in lands 
ceded by treaty in return for the trust relationship and a measure of autonomy, the sovereign, 
collective political entity of the Hawaiian Kingdom entered into treaties with the United States.  
Later, Native Hawaiians lost land through the American-influenced Mahele. As Clarkson points out, 
the United States had entertained the idea of first the voluntary and then forced annexation of 
Hawaiʻi—as in the case of many of the tribes of the era—since the mid-nineteenth century: Clarkson, 
at 326-327. 
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over ceded lands and established a federal-Native Hawaiian trust relationship in the 
same manner it had with other Native American peoples.109   
The subsequent failure within the HHCA to recognize “Native Hawaiians as a 
separate political entity” was consistent with “the overall [federal] policy of 
destroying indigenous political sovereignty":110  
Significantly, the HHCA defined Native Hawaiians racially" rather than politically, 
because a collective political identification would have been inconsistent with the 
anti-tribal policies of the time. The "pulverizing engine" was, in effect, still 
running".111 
Thus, despite the mirroring effect, federal Indian policy often “worked to the 
detriment of Native Hawaiians”, the “timing” of Hawaiian history112   creating 
“deleterious anachronisms” 113  which, for instance, left Allotment-era, 
“constitutionally-defective racial categorizations” of Native Hawaiian identity in 
place114—or rights based on an individualized everyone/no-one standard rather than 
the more accurate political classification.   
The trust relationship nevertheless continued to be assumed by the federal 
government.  The subsequent Admissions Act showed that “[i]n setting aside 
Hawaiian home lands, [the] federal government undertook [a] trust obligation 
benefitting aboriginal people” and that the “[s]tate assumed a fiduciary obligation 
upon being admitted as a state”.115  Section 4 of the Admissions Act directed that 
                                                          
109 Clarkson, at 328: “Just as it had with regard to the Pueblo, Navajo, and California Indians after 
the war with Mexico and the subsequent Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, the United States also 
inherited a trust responsibility with regard to Native Hawaiians at the moment of annexation”.   
110 Clarkson, at 328.  
111 Clarkson, at 326: The HHCA “…created a system somewhat similar to allotment; whereby 
200,000 acres of the land ceded to the United States at annexation were set aside for the purpose of 
leasing homesteads for a nominal fee to individual Native Hawaiians. According to Professor 
Williams, ‘The Hawaiian Homes Commission Act was remarkably similar in purpose and effect to 
the General Allotment Act. Both statutes submerged Congress's good intentions in the ambitions of 
others who coveted the lands. Both were poorly carried out, often giving their purported 
beneficiaries parcels of inarable land’”.  
112 Clarkson, at 319. 
113 Clarkson, at 331. 
114 Clarkson, 330-331.  During Reorganization, for instance, when allotment was “repudiated” with 
regards to Native Americans and some modicum of tribal self-governance, tribal land and other 
features of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 benefitted tribes, Native Hawaiians were stuck 
with the HHCA drafted only a decade before, an “allotment-era policy” focused on civilizing, not 
self-government.  During Termination, the federal government “delegated” its trust responsibility 
for Native Hawaiians to the State of Hawaiʻi upon statehood but, because it would have been 
inconsistent with federal policy at the time, left Allotment’s HHCA as the governing instrument of 
the trust relationship. 
115  See Ahuna v Department of Hawaiian Home Lands 64 Haw 327, 640 P 2d 1161 (1982). 
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the HHCA be “adopted as a provision of” Hawaiʻi’s constitution” and section 5(f) 
directed that the “proceeds” and “income” from the public lands were to be 
managed and held by the state of Hawaiʻi “as a public trust” whose five purposes 
included “the betterment of the conditions of native Hawaiians”.  To be clear, “their 
use for any other object” beyond these purposes “shall constitute a breach of trust 
for which suit may be brought by the United States”.   Retaining Allotment-era 
racial categorization, the Admissions Act relies upon the 50 per cent blood-quantum 
definition of “Native Hawaiian” used in the HHCA.116   
Section 5(f) was revisited at the landmark 1978 Hawaiʻi State Constitutional 
Convention which recognized the Hawaiian language as an official language of 
Hawaiʻi117 and established the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (‘OHA’) which, like the 
BIA, acts as both government agency and public trust.  OHA manages a portion of 
the income and proceeds of the ceded public lands as a trust for “native 
Hawaiians”—50 percent or more blood quantum descendants of inhabitants of 
Hawaiian Islands at time of Cook—and also for “Hawaiians”—any descendants of 
those inhabitants. 118   The Office of Hawaiian Affairs almost recalls a tribal 
governing entity as it allows Native Hawaiians some self-determination in the form 
of voting and operates independently of the executive branch of the state 
government.  Ultimately, it manages the remaining public portion of Native 
Hawaiian land.119 
                                                          
116 Admission Act, s 5(f).  Emphasis added.  Section 5(f) reads: “(f) The lands granted to the State 
of Hawaii by subsection (b) of this section and public lands retained by the United States under 
subsections (c) and (d) and later conveyed to the State under subsection (e), together with the 
proceeds from the sale or other disposition of any such lands and the income therefrom, shall be 
held by said State as a public trust for the support of the public schools and other public educational 
institutions, for the betterment of the conditions of native Hawaiians, as defined in the Hawaiian 
Homes Commission Act, 1920, as amended, for the development of farm and home ownership on as 
widespread a basis as possible for the making of public improvements, and for the provision of lands 
for public use. Such lands, proceeds, and income shall be managed and disposed of for one or more 
of the foregoing purposes in such manner as the constitution and laws of said State may provide, 
and their use for any other object shall constitute a breach of trust for which suit may be brought by 
the United States. The schools and other educational institutions supported, in whole or in part out 
of such public trust shall forever remain under the exclusive control of said State; and no part of the 
proceeds or income from the lands granted under this Act shall be used for the support of any 
sectarian or denominational school, college, or university.”  Section 201 “Definitions” of the HHCA 
defines “Native Hawaiians” “any descendant of not less than one-half part of the blood of the races 
inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778”. 
117 It is the only state in the Union which has two official languages, English and Hawaiian, and is 
an obvious exception to the homogenizing trends of “English-only” legislation enacted elsewhere. 
118 The Constitution of the State of Hawaii, art XII §5. 
119 Art XII §6. 
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The HHC also has BIA-like trust responsibilities and can be sued for breach of that 
trust.120  That right is protected by federal law121 and under the Admissions Act122—
in effect, by the federal trust relationship delegated to the state of Hawaiʻi upon 
statehood.  Congress’ unquestionable plenary power has been similarly expressed 
in a plethora of identity-specific legislation relating to diverse aspects of Native 
Hawaiian well-being including healthcare, education, and housing.  A plethora123 
of current federal law recognizes specifically identifies Native Hawaiians in the 
manner of federal-Indian policy, class Native Hawaiians with Native Americans 
generally for rehabilitative purposes and otherwise acknowledge the federal-Native 
Hawaiian trust relationship.  While the Native Hawaiian Government 
Reorganization Act of 2011124—the ‘Akaka Bill’ discussed below—was drafted 
specifically to recognize a Native American-like trust relationship, the Native 
Hawaiian Education Act of 2002125 (‘NHEA’) appears to currently constitute a 
straightforward recognition of the trust relationship.   
The NHEA was the result of significant grassroots efforts on the part of Native 
Hawaiians, especially Native Hawaiian educators and drafted to recognize the trust 
relationship between Native Hawaiians and the federal government.126   It is part of 
                                                          
120 Keaukaha-Panaewa Community Association v Hawaiian Homes Commission 588 F 2d 1216 (9th 
Cir 1978) [Keaukaha I]. 
121 See Keaukaha-Panaewa Community Association v. Hawaiian Homes Commission 739 F 2d 1467 
(9th Cir 1984) at 1472 [Keaukaha II]. 
122 Price v Akaka 915 F 2d 469 (9th Cir 1990). 
123 See Doe v Kamehameha Schools 470 F3d 827 (9th Cir 2006), at 847-848.  Examples listed in the 
Native Hawaiian Education Act 20 USC §7512 include: “(A) The Native American Programs Act 
of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 2991 et seq.); (B) the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (42 U.S.C. 1996); 
(C) the National Museum of the American Indian Act (20 U.S.C. 80q et seq.); (D) the Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (25 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.); (E) the National Historic 
Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. 470 et seq.); (F) the Native American Languages Act (25 U.S.C. 2901 
et seq.); (G) the American Indian, Alaska Native, and Native Hawaiian Culture and Art 
Development Act (20 U.S.C. 4401 et seq.); (H) the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (29 U.S.C. 
2801 et seq.); and (I) the Older Americans Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. 3001et seq.).” 
124 The Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act 2011, s 675—112th Congress (2011-2012), 
“A bill to express the policy of the United States regarding the United States relationship with Native 
Hawaiians and to provide a process for the recognition by the United States of the Native Hawaiian 
governing entity”.  See also: Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act of 2009 
S1011/HR2314, 111th Congress, nicknamed after Senator Daniel Akaka who introduced its first 
version in 2000.   Previous versions not only echoed the name of the Indian Reorganization Act 
1934 and were consistent with political classification, but replayed the role played by the federal 
government in the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii  and the discrimination against Native 
Hawaiians which followed; were premised on the federal government’s responsibility for  and 
rehabilitative will towards the Native Hawaiian people; recognizes their political status and residual 
inherent sovereignty ; and is aimed at the return of a greater degree of self-determination and self-
governance .    
125 NHEA, above n 123. 
126 See “History” Native Hawaiian Education Council <www.nhec.org>. 
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Title VII of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB)127  with sections regarding 
Native Americans and Alaskan Natives. Virtually reciting the Clinton Apology, it 
describes the relevant history of Hawaiʻi, including population decimation128 and 
disparities129 with the “incalculable harm” done by overthrow and annexation130 
and, using the language of federal Indian law, recognizes the ongoing “special 
relationship between the United States and the Native Hawaiians”—even “the 
unique status of the Hawaiian people”, “the trust relationship between the United 
States and the Native Hawaiians”, “the special relationship”, “the political status of 
Native Hawaiians…comparable to that of American Indians and Alaska Natives”, 
and “Federal trust responsibility”131 in terms of “wards” and “trustees”.132  The act 
provides examples of Native American-specific legislation in which the United 
States has “recognized and reaffirmed” “[t]he political relationship between the 
United States and the Native Hawaiian people”133 and grouped Native Hawaiians 
with Native Americans and Alaskan Natives for trust purposes.  The legislation has 
nothing to do with “race” but results from Native Hawaiians’ “unique status as the 
indigenous people of a once sovereign nation as to whom the United States has 
established a trust relationship.”134   
Like other federal Indian law and policy, the purposes of the NHEA are 
rehabilitative—for instance, “to authorize and develop innovative educational 
programs to assist Native Hawaiians”. 135   Funding priorities include programs 
aimed at addressing “at-risk children and youth”, underrepresentation in 
employment fields, “early childhood and preschool programs” and reading and 
literacy136—or almost a someone-based affirmative action-like standard.  But the 
NHEA also implies “a continuing right to autonomy in internal affairs” and “an 
                                                          
127 No Child Left Behind Act 20 USC § 6319, PL 107-110 (2002). 
128 NHEA, § 7202 (1-7).  Compare with Clinton Apology, above n 55.  Such apologies have been 
issued by the federal government and various states to various groups including Japanese Americans, 
African Americans, and Native Americans for various historical injustices including slavery, 
segregation, and internment.  These are examples of what Yamamoto and Obrey call reconciliation 
though perhaps not adequate redress: see Eric K Yamamoto and Ashley Kaiao Obrey “Reframing 
Redress: A ‘Social Healing Through Justice’ Approach to United States-Native Hawaiian and Japan-
Ainu Reconciliation Initiatives” (2009) 16(1) Asian Am LJ 5. 
129 Section 7202 (14-17). 
130 Section 7202 (18-19). 
131 See s 7202 (8-11) and (12)(C). 
132 NHEA s 7202 (8). 
133 NHEA s 7202 (13). 
134 NHEA s 7202(12)(B). 
135 NHEA s 7203(1). 
136 NHEA s 7202 (a)(2)-(3). 
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ongoing right to self-determination and self-governance”.137  Another purpose of 
the Act is to “encourage the maximum participation of Native Hawaiians in 
planning and management of Native Hawaiian education programs”. 138   Other 
funding priorities include Hawaiian language acquisition and Hawaiian-medium 
instruction while “reading and literacy in either the Hawaiian or the English 
language” is targeted.139 
Similar to the BIA and HHC, the NHEA established the Native Hawaiian Council 
on Education (‘NHEC’) and Island Councils, self-governing boards entrusted with 
coordinating federal education available to Native Hawaiians, assessing needs, data 
collection, “provid[ing] direction and guidance, through…reports and 
recommendations, to appropriate Federal, State and local agencies” in order to 
improve delivery of education services, and distributing federal funds for the 
NHEA’s purposes.140   Current NHEA requirements prefer Native Hawaiians be 
represented on the NHEC.141 
The assumption of a special trust relationship with Native Hawaiians by both 
federal and state governments and a Mancari-like exception in federal and state law 
would appear to be beyond debate.  Importantly, this body of law recognizes the 
link between the moʻolelo and present disparities and is accordingly based on 
rehabilitation and greater self-determination for Native Hawaiians.  This body of 
law clearly associates greater self-determination with positive outcomes for Native 
Hawaiians as a group.  The NHEC itself represents both substantiality-based efforts 
to effect positive outcomes in education—an understanding that a uniform, 
standardized approach has not worked—but also a quasi-autonomous body making 
decisions for its indigenous constituents as it were. 
                                                          
137 NHEA s 7203(1). 
138 NHEA s 7203(4). 
139 NHEA s 7205(3)(C). 
140 NHEA s 7204.  The board has been historically made-up of Native Hawaiian educators. 
141 NHEA s 7204(b) and (c).  However, see Every Child Achieves Act of 2015, S 1177 — 114th 
Congress, a reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 USC §6301 
et seq, s 7204 on composition of the NHEC including political officials who may not necessarily be 
Native Hawaiian or have significant associations with Native Hawaiian education.  Also, 
membership is not determined, for instance, by in an OHA-like vote. 
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3.3.2 ANOTHER INDIGENOUS NARRATIVE: THE NATIVE HAWAIIAN LEARNER 
However, the NHEA also hints at another narrative.  In contrast to Native American 
treaty relationships, 142  the NHEA acknowledges Native Hawaiians’ previous 
“sovereignty and independence” and “international recogni[tion] as a nation”143 as 
a people which “never relinquished its claims to sovereignty or its sovereign 
lands”.144   
Similarly, Melody MacKenzie has argued that: 
The claims of Native Hawaiians have often been analogized to those of other 
Native American groups.  While there certainly are similarities, there also are 
significant differences.  By 1831, the U.S. Supreme Court had held that the Indian 
nations were “domestic, dependent nations” that possessed some, but not all, 
aspects of sovereignty.  The Kingdom of Hawaiʻi possessed all of the attributes of 
sovereignty and was recognized by the world community of nations.  Native 
Hawaiians were citizens of an organized, self-governing nation whose status as an 
independent sovereign entity was acknowledged by other nations, including the 
United States.145 
As a result, Native Hawaiian customary rights are law in their own right and not 
mere survivors of federal benevolence.  Native Hawaiian customary law is currently 
protected and expressed in the Constitution of the State of Hawaiʻi and in legislation 
which recognizes: 
… customs and practices related to each major aspect of Hawaiian lifestyle and 
livelihood, including family, community life, human well-being and spirituality, 
natural environment, cultural and ecological resources, rights, and economics.146 
For example, section 7 of Article XII of Hawaiʻi’s constitution recognizes 
“Traditional and Customary Rights”: 
The State reaffirms and shall protect all rights, customarily and traditionally 
exercised for subsistence, cultural and religious purposes and possessed by 
ahupua'a tenants who are descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the 
                                                          
142  Where Native American tribes ceded some sovereignty and land in exchange for the trust 
relationship. 
143 NHEA s 7202(1) and (2).  See also s 7202(4). 
144 Section 7202(12)(A). 
145 Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie “Native Hawaiians and U.S. Law” in MacKenzie and others, 
above n 10, 264 [“NHs and US Law”] at I.   
146 Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie “Hawaiian Custom in Hawaiʻi State Law” (2010) 13 Yearbook 
of New Zealand Jurisprudence 112 [“Native Hawaiian Custom”] at 112. 
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Hawaiian Islands prior to 1778, subject to the right of the State to regulate such 
rights.147  
Section 7 was specifically drafted to “recognize[] and reaffirm[] native Hawaiian 
rights”.148 
Rather than a renaissance or reassertion, these rights represent a historical 
continuum of law which has endured from the pre-contact era, through Kingdom, 
Republic and territorial law into current state law.  Relevant law has been 
interpreted as protecting the “continued existence of…customary rights which 
continue[] to be practiced”.149  Moreover, Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes, section 1–1, 
originally passed in 1892, recognizes that customary “Hawaiian usage” can 
establish law in the State of Hawaiʻi.150    
Hawaiian courts have accordingly upheld customary ahupua’a rights against 
everyone/no-one property rights,151 found violations of such rights to be justiciable 
even when breach of trust under the Admissions Act is not,152 recognized a wide 
range of rights protected under section 1-1 and held that Native Hawaiians have 
standing to claim such rights based on genealogy and ancestry rather than a 
racialized standard.153 
Far from abstract, this jurisprudence is historically-aware, identity-specific and 
ancestrally-defined.  The weaving of indigenous education and associated language 
rights into the state constitution and legislation may similarly signal a more 
                                                          
147 Constitution of the State of Hawaii, art XII §7. 
148 MacKenzie, “Hawaiian Custom”, at 113. 
149 Kalipi v Hawaiian Trust 656 P 2d 745 (1982) at 752.  Emphasis added. 
150 Haw Rev Stat S 1-1 (2004): “Common law of the State; exceptions. The common law of England, 
as ascertained by English and American decisions, is declared to be the common law of the State of 
Hawaiʻi in all cases, except as otherwise expressly provided by the Constitution or laws of the United 
States, or by the laws of the State, or fixed by Hawaiian judicial precedent, or established by 
Hawaiian usage; provided that no person shall be subject to criminal proceedings except as provided 
by the written laws of the United States or of the State”.  “’Hawaiian usage’ is usage which predates 
25 November 1982”: See discussion in MacKenzie, “Hawaiian Custom”, at 113.  Section 1-1 itself 
descends from both Kingdom and Territorial period legislation which, in turn, was derived from pre-
contact Native Hawaiian customary law, making it pre-federal, indigenous precedent. 
151 Kalipi, above n 149. 
152 Pele Defense Fund v Paty 837 P 2d 1247 (1992).  
153 Public Access Shoreline Hawaiʻi v Hawaiʻi County Planning Commission 79 Hawaiʻi 425, 903 
P 2d 1246 (1995); and State v Hanapi, 89 Hawaiʻi 177, 970 P 2d 485 (1998). 
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substantial narrative of equality at work, one that exceeds both the singular narrative 
and a Mancari-like exception.   
Article X, section 4 of Hawaiʻi’s constitution reads:  
The State shall promote the study of Hawaiian culture, history and language.   
The State shall provide for a Hawaiian education program consisting of language, 
culture and history in the public schools.  The use of community expertise shall be 
encouraged as a suitable and essential means in furtherance of the Hawaiian 
education program.154  
Instead of a necessary evil, section 4 appears to recognize the greater collective 
good of Native Hawaiian identity.  It not only allows Native Hawaiian identity 
recognition in private education but mandates it as a constitutional value in public 
education—a supposedly identity-blind environment. 155    Terms including 
‘promote’, ‘provide for’ and ‘encouraged’ denote a proactive, positive obligation 
rather than the usual negative rights of equal protection.  Including identity-specific 
sections indicates the high constitutional value drafters and voters placed on 
protecting this particular identity, and the possibility of an alternative model of 
federalism at work and a more robust narrative where identity complements 
equality.  The use of community expertise—including kupuna (senior community 
members) knowledgeable in language, culture and history—similarly references 
traditional Native Hawaiian methods of education.  Kupuna knowledge is 
transmitted between generations and constitute community-generated sources of 
teaching and pedagogy—again, in the private and public classroom.   
Legislation has been enacted to give effect to Article X, section 4, including Chapter 
302H of the Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes which sets out the provisions for Hawaiian 
language medium programs156 and openly prefers the Native Hawaiian speaker: 
Attendance and eligibility.  All children of compulsory school age choosing to 
enroll in the Hawaiian language medium program in families of fluent Hawaiian-
speaking persons may be given preference for admittance.  Other persons may 
enroll at the discretion of individual school sites under the conditions described 
above and in compliance with applicable state and federal laws.  All students and 
                                                          
154 Constitution of the State of Hawaii, art X §4. 
155 See Article X § 1: “There shall be no discrimination in public educational institutions because of 
race, religion, sex or ancestry”. 
156 Chapter 302H-1 HRS. 
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their families shall abide by the special rules of the program with respect to family 
participation.157 
The legislation gives Hawaiian language medium providers some discretion in 
admissions and the ability to prefer Native Hawaiian students—as most “fluent 
Hawaiian-speaking persons” are likely to be—for such identity-specific programs.  
Current bills also relate to appropriations to “develop annual assessments in the 
Hawaiian language” in language arts, mathematics and science,158 “to establish and 
maintain a kupuna in schools program”159 and the establishment of an “instructional 
office in Hawaiians studies” within the state Department of Education.160   
These rights resemble the specifically-indigenous human rights described in the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2007161 (UNDRIP) which reserves 
the rights of indigenous peoples to transmit culture, language and history to “future 
generations”,162 to determine the appropriateness of teaching methods163 and to 
establish, maintain and control autonomous educational institutions and systems.164  
As discussed in Chapter 6, these human rights are pre-existing regardless of federal 
or any other domestic law, being simultaneously universal165 but also rooted in the 
inherent right to self-determination of indigenous peoples. 166   State Native 
Hawaiian customary and indigenous-specific rights are likewise sourced in the 
indigenous people of Hawaiʻi.  
In fact, Hawaiʻi Act 195, passed in 2011, recognizes Native Hawaiians’ human right 
to self-determination in section 1 which restates article 3 and the core of article 4 
of UNDRIP: 
                                                          
157 Chapter 302H-2 HRS. 
158 HB224 HD3 SD2.   
159 HB1555.  
160 SB481 and HB253.  The stated purpose of the proposed legislation is to oversee and coordinate 
the currently “disjointed” delivery of such programs. 
161 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples GA Res 61/295, A/Res/61/295 
(2007) [UNDRIP]. 
162 UNDRIP art 13(1). 
163 UNDRIP arts 14(1) & (3). 
164 Article 14(1).  The NHEA also echoes indigenous human rights language recognizing that: 
“Native Hawaiian people are determined to preserve, develop, and transmit to future generations 
their ancestral territory and their cultural identity in accordance with their own spiritual and 
traditional beliefs, customs, practices, language, and social institutions”: NHEA, section 7202(20). 
165 UNDRIP art 1. 
166 Articles 3 and 4. 
  107 
 
Article 3—Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of 
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development. 
… 
Native Hawaiians have continued to maintain their separate identity as a single, 
distinctly native political community through cultural, social, and political 
institutions and have continued to maintain their rights to self-determination, self-
governance, and economic self-sufficiency.167  
In contrast to exceptionalism, Hawaiʻi state law recognizes a collective, indigenous, 
human right to self-determination not necessarily predicated on a purely liberal 
project though aimed at facilitating Native American-like federal recognition and 
self-government. 168   Act 195 also notes that when the United States endorsed 
UNDRIP in 2010 it also referred to several other pieces of federal legislation which 
recognize various aspects of self-government and even use the term “self-
determination”. 169   
While earlier versions were more detailed and prescriptive, the Native Hawaiian 
Government Reorganization Act of 2011170--the latest ‘Akaka Bill’—had only eight 
short sections and was couched in decidedly different language.  It would have 
granted Native Hawaiians federal recognition on the same basis as other indigenous 
peoples—the original single purpose of the bill—but also affirmed Act 195 and 
UNDRIP articles 3 and 4 .   
The bill is reconciliatory171 but, unlike the NHEA and previous versions, spends 
virtually no space on reciting the history of overthrow and disparities.172  Instead it 
recognizes that of the three major indigenous groups recognized as having a special 
trust relationship with the federal government—American Indians, Alaska Natives 
and Native Hawaiians—only Native Hawaiians lack federal recognition.   Far from 
equality measured against the everyone/no-one individual, the standard is a 
                                                          
167 Section 1, 11th and 13th paras.   
168 Section 1, 15th para. 
169 Section 1, 12th para. 
170 The Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act 2011, (s 675) 112th Congress (2011-2012), 
“A bill to express the policy of the United States regarding the United States relationship with Native 
Hawaiians and to provide a process for the recognition by the United States of the Native Hawaiian 
governing entity”.  Last amended December 17, 2012. 
171 Section 2(5) reads: “the United States shall continue to engage in a process of reconciliation and 
political relations with the Native Hawaiian people”. 
172 Compare with Act 195. 
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collective, identity-specific “parity in policy and treatment among all indigenous 
groups with which the United States has a special political and legal 
relationship…”173 
In addition to Act 195’s recognition of Native Hawaiians’ right to reorganize a 
governing entity and to create the Native Hawaiian Roll, 174  the current bill 
importantly affirms both Articles 3 and 4 of UNDRIP175--that is, both internal and 
external manifestations of self-determination.176  The Senate Committee on Indian 
Affairs described this self-determination as “a full-fledged right of all peoples that 
can be used to claim their inherent sovereignty”.177 
 
3.4 ‘GLITTERING GENERALITIES’  
Despite the above features, a counter-indigenous discourse is also apparent in 
Hawaiʻi state law and the application of federal law to the Islands, one which has 
overridden the historical federal trust relationship on several occasions and ignores 
the unique political status of the Native Hawaiian people. 
 
3.4.1 EVERYONE/NO-ONE IN HAWAIʻI 
Article I of the Hawaiʻi State Constitution, as if written at the time of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, proclaims “Rights of Individuals” in section 2, that “[a]ll persons are 
                                                          
173 Section 2(4).  For a more in-depth discussion on parity among indigenous peoples see Daniel 
Akaka Report of the Committee of Indian Affairs, December 17, 2012, 112th Congress 2d Session, 
Senate, Report 112-251, Calendar No 568 written by Senator Daniel Akaka, at 14.  The Report 
explains that parity would “put an end to…discriminatory practices” within the Department of the 
Interior in distinguishing between indigenous groups: at 14-15 
174 Section 2(8). 
175 While art 3 is quoted above, art 4 reads: “Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-
determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal 
and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions”. 
176 See Chapter 6 discussion on the arts 3 and 4 at 6.3.3. 
177 Akaka, above n 173. 
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free by nature and are equal in their inherent and inalienable rights”, 178  while 
section 5 declares that: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, 
nor be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the 
person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of 
race, religion, sex or ancestry.179  
Section 8 also presents a fairly anonymous, colorblind version of the rightsholder: 
“No citizen shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any of the rights or privileges 
secured to other citizens, unless by the law of the land.”180 Likewise, in education, 
Article X, section 1 prohibits any “discrimination in public educational institutions 
because of race, religion, sex or ancestry”.181   
Statehood means that the Fourteenth Amendment and the Constitution of the Untied 
States itself are also the law of Hawaiʻi as are the Civil Rights Act 1964 and various 
other pieces of colorblind federal legislation.  The Supreme Court has ultimate 
jurisdiction to interpret the Constitution in regards to Hawaiʻi residents as it does 
elsewhere.  Consequently, state Native Hawaiian education and language rights 
have conflicted with federal law. 
In Tagupa v Odo(1994)182  a Native Hawaiian lawyer was unsuccessful in a claim 
brought under both the state constitution’s official language provisions and the 
Native American Language Act (NALA)183  because the facts were outside the 
sphere of education.184   Ironically, in Office of Hawaiian Affairs v Department of 
Education (1996),185 NALA also failed to protect Native Hawaiian language rights 
in the educational context.  Essentially, OHA argued in substantial terms that a lack 
                                                          
178 Constitution of the State of Hawaii, art I §2.  Emphasis added. 
179 Constitution of the State of Hawaii, art I §5.  Emphasis added. 
180 Constitution of the State of Hawaii, art I §8.  Emphasis added. 
181 Constitution of the State of Hawaii, art X §1.  Emphasis added.. 
182 Tagupa v Odo 843 F Supp 630 (D Haw 1994) at 631. 
183 Native American Languages Act 25 USC §2901 (2000).  
184 In Tagupa, an attorney of Native Hawaiian descent was unsuccessful in a federal court under the 
state constitution and the Native American Languages Act (‘NALA’)  when he was denied the right 
to give a deposition in Hawaiian—a right implied by the official language provisions of Article XV, 
section 4 of the state constitution.  Ironically, while NALA’s purpose is described as to “preserve, 
protect, and promote the rights and freedom of Native Americans to use, practice, and develop 
Native American languages “, Tagupa’s suit failed because the judge limited the application of 
NALA to the sphere of education .Despite provisions within the act itself which stipulate its use by 
“States… to take action on, and give official status to, their Native American languages for the 
purpose of conducting their own business”: see NALA 1990, section 104 (6).   
185 Office of Hawaiian Affairs v Dept of Educ 951 F Supp 1484 (D Haw 1996). 
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of resources and qualified teachers and the general inaccessibility of the state’s 
Hawaiian language immersion program violated NALA. However, the US district 
court for the District of Hawai̒i found that there was no enforceable right under 
NALA to make such claims.186   
OHA had originally asserted violations of both article X section 4 and HRS 1-1, but 
the Court was unwilling to examine “state law”.187   Neither was the Court willing 
to test the alleged failures of the state in terms of the trust relationship. It did 
entertain a possible cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment, specifically 
under the desegregation precedent in Keyes v School District No. 1 (1973)188 and 
Milliken v Bradley (1977).189   However, after apparently approving Milliken’s 
substantial interpretation of present disparities as the continuing effects of past 
discrimination—almost multigenerational trauma—and violations of equal 
protection eligible for injunctive relief, the Court fell back on a more conservative 
test in Keyes without being persuaded by the similar facts in the same case.190   
Other commentators have argued that the No Child Left Behind Act 2001 
(NCLB) 191  presents “myriad setbacks” to NALA given its “restrictive teacher 
requirements” including qualifications and licensing at odds with the state’s 
constitutional provision for “community expertise”.   The criteria also seem to 
double the requirements for qualified immersion teachers, particularly in higher 
grades where they must be “both fluent in an indigenous language and ‘highly 
qualified’ to teach math, science, or another content area”.192   Since the NCLB also 
bases funding on English-medium assessment,193 immersion students are a priori 
disadvantaged since instruction in English may not begin for several years in 
                                                          
186 NALA’s failure to protect Native Hawaiian rights is particularly ironic since Hawaiian policy 
helped to shape the federal legislation: see William Wilson “The Sociopolitical Context of 
Establishing Hawaiian-Medium Education” 11(3) Language, Culture and Curriculum 325 at 326-
327.   
187  The defendants successfully argued that the Eleventh Amendment to the United States 
Constitution prevented the court from looking at violations of Article X Section 4 and HRS 1-1. 
188 Keyes v Denver School District No 1 413 US 189 (1973). 
189 Milliken v Bradley 418 U.S. 717 (1974).   
190 Where lack of access to adequate facilities and resources for students in certain neighbourhoods 
constituted a violation of equal protection: see discussion in previous chapter at 2.3.1. 
191 Discussed in previous chapter at 2.4.3. 
192 Mary Ann Zehr “NCLB Seen Impeding Indigenous-Language Preservation” Education Week 
(online ed, Bethesda MD, 14 July 2010). 
193 See discussion in Chapter 2 on NCLB’s homogenizing effect… 
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immersion program. 194    Critics allege that the NCLB actually “imped[es] 
indigenous language preservation”,195 apparently neutralizing both NALA and state 
Native Hawaiian education and language rights. 
The NCLB’s overwhelming standardizing, homogenizing and anonymizing effect 
on education196 must inevitably impact the NHEA.  A quick glance shows that the 
NCLB is 670 pages long with the NHEA beginning on page 507 after hundreds of 
pages of standardizing, homogenizing and anonymizing provisions.  Despite the 
NHEA’s recognition of the trust relationship, it is literally submerged within an 
everyone/no-one document and largely concerned with creating federally-
recognized bodies to manage federal funds rather than recognizing substantial 
rights to indigenous self-government or self-determination in education.  
Ultimately, the NHEA falls short of state-promised Native Hawaiian education and 
language rights.197  
Recent efforts to “eliminate”198 the NHEA altogether are even more concerning.  
Last year, United States House of Representatives Resolution 5 (HR 5)—the so-
called Student Success Act199 meant to rectify the failings of the NCLB—proposed 
to repeal Title VII regarding American Indian, Alaska Native and Native Hawaiian 
education.  While the original bill proposed to remove some and bury other 
American Indian provisions among the minutiae of Title I,200  the next version 
removed all provisions relating to Native Hawaiians and Alaska Natives.  
Ultimately, the bill passed the House with Title VI in place, but the threat to “critical 
programs” which “remedy educational disparities, support Native Hawaiian 
language revitalization, and allow innovative community-based programs” to assist 
“disadvantaged Native Hawaiians from preschool to post-secondary education” 201 
                                                          
194  See Kelsey Klug “Native American Languages Act: Twenty Years Later, Has It Made a 
Difference?” (19 July 2012) Cultural Survival <wwwculturalsurvival.org>. 
195 Zehr, above n 192. 
196 See my discussion in previous chapter at 2.4.3. 
197 For a more in-depth discussion on the NCLB and NHEA including implementation see Souza 
and Walk, above n 24, at 1259-1307. 
198 “Effort to eliminate Native Hawaiian Education Act defeated” OHA <www.oha.org>. 
199  See HR 5, introduced by Rep John Kline (R-Minnesota), 6/6/2013, amended 11/7/2013 to 
reinstate the NHEA but to amend, among other things, membership requirements for the Native 
Hawaiian Education Council, passed House 19/7/2013, received in Senate 24/7/2013.   
200 Where, incidentally, American Indians and Alaska Natives would have, with other groups such 
as rural learners, “migratory children”, and “English learners”, been submerged in Title I which is 
still standards-based but perhaps even more identity-blind: “Summary: H.R. 5—113th Congress 
(2013-2014)” 
201 OHA, above n 198. 
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is clear.  Ultimately, in legislatively severing Native Hawaiians from Native 
Americans, HR 5 would have renounced both the federal-Native Hawaiian trust 
relationship and the NHEA’s indigenous learner narrative, leaving only American 
Indians identified in the NCLB.202   
The very recently passed Every Child Succeeds Act 2015 203  has reserved the 
previous Title VII including American Indian, Alaskan Native and Native Hawaiian 
provisions under Title VI—at least for now—but remains funding and 
standardization based. 
 
3.4.2 RICE V CAYETANO 
The 2001 case of Rice v Cayetano204 dramatically illustrates the insinuation of the 
singular narrative into Hawaiʻi. The case has been a lightning rod for reverse 
discrimination in Hawaiʻi and foreshadows Kamehameha.   
Harold Rice, a wealthy rancher and descendant of American missionaries, sued the 
State of Hawaiʻi when he was not allowed to vote in the OHA trustees election.  
Rice, admittedly, did not qualify as either a native Hawaiian or Hawaiian but 
alleged a violation of his Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment rights on the 
grounds that voting requirement was a racial rather than political classification.  
The state logically argued Mancari given the special trust relationship between 
Native Hawaiians and both federal and state governments.  Subsequently, several 
federal courts arrived at radically different conclusions.   
Judge Ezra in the federal district court of first instance,205 a unanimous three-judge 
panel in the Ninth Circuit on appeal206 and a dissenting minority in the Supreme 
                                                          
202  The bill would have still made allowances for ESOL students until they became English 
proficient with the emphasis on parity not bilingualism, as well as migrant students and homeless 
children. But the bill remained largely focused on school accountability and English-based 
assessment.  
203  Every Child Succeeds Act of 2015, S 1177 — 114th Congress, a reauthorization of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 USC §6301 et seq. 
204 Rice v Cayetano 528 US 495 (2000). 
205 Rice v Cayetano 963 F Supp 1547 (D Haw 1997). 
206 Rice v Cayetano 146 F 3d 1075 (9th Cir 1998). 
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Court207 of Justices Stevens and Ginsburg (what might collectively be called ‘the 
minority’) rationally tied the voting requirement to the special trust relationship and 
Mancari.  The minority recognized the political rather than racial nature of native 
Hawaiian and Hawaiian.   Significant evidence supported the application of 
Mancari including: the voter-approved constitutional amendments which 
established OHA and made it a BIA-like state agency whose ‘constituents’ were 
Native Hawaiians; 208  the funding of OHA by the federal government for the 
purpose of furthering the federal trust relationship; 209  the acknowledgment of 
previous sovereignty in the Clinton Apology in 1993;210 and the plethora of federal 
legislation which classed Native Hawaiians with Native Americans regarding 
special programs benefitting Native Americans.211  
The Rice minority recognized that Congress’ powers to deal with Native Hawaiians 
did not arise from their “ancient racial origins”, a formal allotment of tribal lands, 
federal recognition or being “Indians”.  These facts were not enough to overwhelm 
the evidence of Native Hawaiian history. 212 While the relationship between the 
state and Native Hawaiians was not identical to that with the federal government, 
Mancari’s rational basis of review still applied.213   
According to the minority, the voting requirement met Mancari’s criteria because 
it was “reasonably and rationally”214 tied to the goal of promoting self-government 
and making OHA “more responsive to the needs of its constituent groups”, based 
on a trust relationship with OHA as a trustee and Native Hawaiians as beneficiaries, 
and represented the participation of the governed in the governing agency.  
Accordingly, the goal of the voting requirement was political not racial.215   
                                                          
207 Rice v Cayetano 528 US 495 (2000).  However, the dissent of Stevens and Ginsburg JJ in the 
Supreme Court will be most relied upon. 
208 Rice v Cayetano 528 US 495 (2000) at 528 Steven J dissenting. 
209 Discussed by Stevens J at 538. 
210 Per Stevens J at 533. 
211 Per Stevens J at 533. 
212 Per Stevens J at 531, citing United States v John, 437 US 634 (1978), at 653, and Delaware Tribal 
Committee, 430 US 73, 82, n 14, 84-85 (1977). 
213 See Stevens J at 537 discussing Washington v Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation 
439 US 463 (1979) at 500-501. 
214 Rice v Cayetano 963 F Supp 1547 (D Haw 1997) at 1554-1555. 
215 Per Stevens J at 538. 
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The similarities between the facts of Rice and Mancari are persuasive: a 
government agency given a clear mandate by the state and—via delegated powers 
and federal legislation—the federal government to administer trust property for an 
indigenous people with whom it has previously dealt as a foreign nation and for 
whom it has also clearly and repeatedly expressed its continuing fiduciary 
responsibility for.   However, the majority of the Supreme Court (7-2) was 
unconvinced of—or wilfully blind to—minority arguments, excluded the Mancari 
exception and applied a historically-abstract, colour-blind standard to the OHA 
voting requirement. 
The majority focused almost solely on misapplied everyone/no-one Fifteenth 
Amendment precedent in cases such as United States v Reese (1876).216  Reese 
established: “If citizens of one race having certain qualifications are permitted by 
law to vote, those of another having the same qualifications must be”. 217   
Admittedly, qualifications were “manipulative” and deliberate “devices”218 from 
the Jim Crow era including so-called “grandfather clauses”, poll taxes, literacy tests 
and gerrymandering which effectually excluded African-Americans from voting219 
rather than a voting structure meant to rehabilitate an indigenous peoples via self-
determination.   
The majority emphasized the ancestry requirement in grandfather clauses though 
there was no suggestion of manipulation or deliberateness in the OHA voting 
requirement.  As if arguing otherwise, the majority itself briefly touched on the 
history which led to the “tragedy” of introduced diseases, “high mortality figures”, 
and later “despair, disenchantment, and despondency” amongst Native Hawaiians 
and recognized Congress’ rehabilitative will towards Native Hawaiians as 
expressed in various legislation.220   Crucially, their honours did not at any point 
use words such as ‘discrimination’, ‘inequalities’, or ‘injustice’ to describe that 
history.221   Rather the Court equated Native Hawaiians with African-Americans 
                                                          
216 United States v Reese 92 U S 214 (1876) at 218. 
217 See Hill v Stone 421 US 289 (1975) discussed in Rice v Cayetano 528 US 495 (2000) at 289 per 
majority.  Thus, if two persons of different race both fulfil age, citizenship and residency 
requirements they share the ‘same qualifications’ and should both be able to vote. 
218 Rice v Cayetano 528 US 495 (2000) at 513 per majority. 
219 Examples cited include Guinn & Beal v United States 238 US 347 (1915) and Harper v Virginia 
Board of Elections 383 US 663 (1966). 
220 Rice v Cayetano 528 US 495 (2000) at 506 per majority. 
221 The majority very briefly mentions the Clinton Apology, above n 55.   
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while failing to recognize the common experiences of these minority groups, 
namely, the broader phenomenon of identity-driven, de facto and de jure 
discrimination.  Instead, the majority glossed over Native Hawaiian history, citing, 
for instance, Native Hawaiian population figures in 1878 without putting them into 
perspective and failing to cite a range of original figures when the number is debated 
and when higher figures are commonly cited by other branches of government.  
Ultimately, all figures present a holocaust-level event222 most analogous to that of 
other indigenous peoples.  The majority, however, spent little time on context, 
choosing instead to emphasize the influx of other ethnic groups into the islands, 
their seemingly cosmopolitan contributions to the culture of the island223 and the 
fact that, upon statehood, the federal Constitution had become the law and “heritage” 
of the Islands.224   In emphasizing the most negative aspects of the history without 
context or the vocabulary of equality and discrimination, the majority also appeared 
to be retelling the old dying-race story. 
Ultimately, the majority concluded that “[t]he ancestral inquiry mandated by the 
State implicates the same grave concerns as a classification specifying a particular 
race by name”225  and that  
[t]he voting structure in this case is neither subtle nor indirect, it specifically grants 
the vote to persons of the defined ancestry and to no others.  Ancestry can be a 
proxy for race.226 
As a result, the court applied strict scrutiny—but without City of Richmond v JA 
Croson Co’s227 possible exception on the grounds of past discrimination or Grutter 
v Bollinger228 and Regents of the University of California v Bakke’s229 diversity 
argument.  It also found the OHA requirement to be unlawful racial discrimination.   
                                                          
222 See previous discussion at 5-6. 
223 Rice v Cayetano 528 US 495 (2000) at 506 per majority.   
224 Per Kennedy J at 524: “When the culture and way of life of a people are all but engulfed by a 
history beyond their control, their sense of loss may extend down through generations; and their 
dismay may be shared by many members of the larger community. As the State of Hawaiʻi attempts 
to address these realities, it must, as always, seek the political consensus that begins with a sense of 
shared purpose. One of the necessary beginning points is this principle: The Constitution of the 
United States, too, has become the heritage of all the citizens of Hawaiʻi”. 
225 Rice v Cayetano, 528 US 495, 517 (2000). 
226 Rice, at 514. Emphasis added. 
227 City of Richmond v JA Croson Co 488 US 469 (1989) discussed in previous chapter at 2.4. 
228 Grutter v Bollinger 539 US 306 (2003) discussed in the previous chapter at 2.4. 
229 Regents of the University of California v Bakke 438 US 265 (1978) discussed in the previous 
chapter at 2.4.  
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Interestingly, the Rice majority did not engage in any robust discussion on possible 
Fourteenth Amendment standards.  This avoidance is significant since the right to 
vote is also a measure of equal protection—or “the right to participate in the 
electoral process equally with other qualified voters”. 230   The Fourteenth 
Amendment was part of the petitioner’s original suit.  Moreover, the Fourteenth 
Amendment could have provided a more specific test for the voting requirement.  
In Hill v Stone (1975),231 for instance, the Supreme Court held that:  
As long as the election is not one of special interest, any classification restricting 
the franchise on grounds other than residence, age, and citizenship cannot stand 
unless the district or State can demonstrate that the classification serves a 
compelling state interest.232 
Hill could have afforded a rational basis of review, akin to that in San Antonio 
Independent School District v Rodriguez233 or Mancari.   
In terms of the Fifteenth Amendment, the Rice majority rejected the special-purpose 
exception applied in Salyer Land Co v Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist 
(1973) 234  where, in somewhat analogous circumstances, water storage district 
elections were limited to the landowners who used that water.  The stumbling block 
for the majority was the “race neutrality command of the Fifteenth Amendment”:235 
The argument fails on more essential grounds. It rests on the demeaning premise 
that citizens of a particular race are somehow more qualified than others to vote on 
certain matters.  There is no room under the Amendment for the concept that the 
right to vote in a particular election can be allocated on race.236 
                                                          
230 See Harris v McRae 448 US 297 (1980) at 322 n 25.  Emphasis added. 
231 Hill v Stone 421 US. 289 (1975). In that case, state action was excused because the election was 
reasonably restricted to those who have an interest in the outcome—as in the case of a state agency 
whose whole purpose is to administer a trust and programs for the benefit of a unique and particular 
ethnic and political community.  The State of Hawaiʻi could have argued a compelling state interest 
in the identity-specific requirement, given the 1978 state constitution amendments and regardless of 
a trust relationship.   
232 Hill at 289.  Emphasis added. 
233 San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez 411 US 1 (1973). 
234 Salyer Land Co v Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist 410 US 719 (1973). 
235 Rice v Cayetano 528 US 495 (2000) at 522 per majority.   
236 Rice v Cayetano 528 US 495 (2000) at 497 per majority.  There is a certain, consistency, however, 
between the majority’s distinguishing of Salyer, where economic considerations appear to drive the 
constitutionality of the exception, and the acceptance of economic discrimination in Rodriguez, 
discussed in previous chapter at 2.5. 
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Despite copious evidence of the trust relationship—and some recognition of 
disparities—the majority apparently refused to see anything but race, prompting 
Justice Stevens to opine: 
The Court’s holding today rests largely on the repetition of glittering generalities 
that have little, if any, application to the compelling history of the State of Hawaiʻi. 
When that history is held up against the manifest purpose of the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments, and against two centuries of this Court’s federal Indian law, 
it is clear to me that Hawaiʻi’s election scheme should be upheld.237 
There is a stark contrast between the state law and the Supreme Court’s position.  
In a surprising twist on recent trends,238 the Court overrode voter-approved state 
law.   Once again, however, it ignored the historical context and centuries of federal 
Indian law precedent.  As a result, OHA’s fundamental purpose as a vehicle for 
Native Hawaiian self-government and self-determination has been undermined.   
Easily recognized constituents are almost impossible to identify as they are now 
hypothetically diluted to include everyone and anyone in the state.  The trust corpus 
itself is in jeopardy.  Following Rice, at least three cases have come before federal 
courts challenging the use of OHA funds and assets for the betterment of Native 
Hawaiians alone. 239   And, as a Supreme Court ruling, Rice carries no small 
authority. 
In imposing an adamant federal everyone/no-one narrative on multi-narrative state 
law, the majority decision is ‘illusory’ and devoid of the historico-legal complexity 
required to clarify the substantive issues.  The late Chris Iijima wrote that the Rice 
decision:  
not only…represents a distortion of the condition of Native Hawaiians and their 
justice claims, but also…it is a stark reminder…of this Supreme Court’s inability 
and unwillingness to distinguish different claims of the Native Hawaiian people 
and people of color in general…240 
                                                          
237 Rice v Cayetano 528 US 495 (2000) at 527-528 per Stevens J dissenting. 
238 See its hands-off approach in Schuette v Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action 572 US___ 
(2014). 
239 Discussed in Hite, above n 87 at 244.  Cases include Arakaki v Cayetano 324 F 3d 1078 (9th Cir 
2003): Carroll v Nakatani 342 F 3d 1078 (9th Cir 2003); and Arakaki v Lingle 477 F 3d 1048 (9th 
Cir 2007). 
240 Chris K Iijima “New Rice Recipes: The Legitimization of Continued Overthrow” (2002) 3 Asian-
Pacific L & Pol'y J 385 at 387-392. 
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Iijima recognized that, while affirmative action is aimed at the inclusion of excluded 
minorities, Native Hawaiian claims demand “justice” and “redress for loss of 
sovereignty” in the wake of “the immense harm caused by the dispossession of 
Hawaiʻi by the United States”.  These are not claims of “racial oppression” but of 
an “indigenous” people in the wake of “the forcible taking of their land and 
culture”.241  Instead, as Iijima might describe, the Court placed Native Hawaiians 
in dichotomized, “binary analytical boxes”242 of race. 
Just as the imposition of an identity-blind, historically abstract narrative represents 
the “resegregating” of America in terms of various minorities,243 Rice seems to 
“legitimiz[e] continued overthrow”244 in terms of Native Hawaiians.  Despite its 
distortion, Rice would haunt Doe v Kamehameha Schools. 
 
3.5 THE CASE: DOE V KAMEHAMEHA SCHOOLS  
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over centuries 
of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who had been excluded 
from the American dream for so long' constituted…the first legislative prohibition 
of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of 
racial segregation and hierarchy.245   
                                                          
241  Ibid at 386-387.  By way of example, Iijima recognizes that affirmative action would be 
appropriately applied to racial discrimination which took place in the sugar plantation system 
whereby “Hawaiians, Filipinos, Pacific Islanders, and African Americans, among others,” were 
subjected to “unequal opportunity and treatment”.  However: “Native Hawaiian harms are not solely 
rooted in the vestiges of the racially discriminatory plantation social structure.  They are rooted in 
the forcible taking of their land and culture for the plantations themselves, among other reason.  In 
sum, not all people in Hawaiʻi have an equal claim to the immense harm caused by the dispossession 
of Hawaiʻi  by the United States—even those harmed by the racially stratified plantation history. 
The claims for loss of Hawaiian land and culture are a claim of the indigenous Hawaiian people.  
This fundamental difference the Supreme Court in Rice never addressed, could not understand, and 
refused to even acknowledge.”: Iijima, “New Rice Recipes” at 387. 
242  Chris K Iijima “Race over Rice: Binary Analytical Boxes and a Twenty-First Century 
Endorsement of Nineteenth Century Imperialism in Rice v. Cayetano” (2000) 53 Rutgers L Rev 91.  
His boxes refer to the black-white dichotomy described in Chapter 2 at 2.2.1, for instance. 
243 See Eric K Yamamoto and Catherine Corpus Betts “Disfiguring Civil Rights to Deny Indigenous 
Hawaiian Self-Determination: The Story of Rice v. Cayetano” in Rachel E Moran and Devon Wayne 
Carbado (eds) Race Law Stories, Foundation Press (New York, Thomson Reuters/ Foundation Press, 
2008) 541.  
244 Iijima, “New Rice Recipes”, above n 240. 
245 Johnson v Transportation Agency 480 US 616 (1987) at 630. 
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In some ways, it is difficult to accurately encapsulate everything that the 
Kamehameha Schools are, but, clearly, it is not your average school.   
The Schools are an expression of Native Hawaiian customary law.  Princess Bernice 
Pauahi Bishop (‘Pauahi’), great-granddaughter of Kamehameha the Great and his 
last surviving heir 246  made provisions in her last will and testament for the 
establishment of a school.  Though Western-educated, Pauahi affirmed a traditional 
aliʻi role of trust and protection247 when she bequeathed the bulk of her substantial 
estate, representing the residue of the Crown Lands of Hawaiʻi:248 
to erect and maintain in the Hawaiian Islands two schools, each for boarding and 
day scholars, one for boys and one for girls, to be known as, and called the 
Kamehameha Schools.249   
In these arrangements, trustees were to “giv[e] preference to Hawaiians of pure or 
part aboriginal blood”.250  The Princess passed away in 1884, but a school for boys 
                                                          
246 As the last direct descendant of Kamehameha I, Pauahi was actually offered the succession to the 
throne by a dying Lot, Kamehameha V, but refused, thus making way for the Kalākaua family to 
rule: see Liliuokalani, above n 43, at 36. 
247 Avis Kuuipoleialoha Poai and Susan K Serrano “Aliʻi Trusts: Native Hawaiian Charitable Trusts” 
in MacKenzie and others, Treatise, above n 11, also note at 1171: “In fulfilling the traditional role 
of Hawaiian aliʻi (chiefs), certain aliʻi established perpetual trusts to benefit the Native Hawaiian 
people.  These ali’i trusts are Kamehameha Schools/Bernie Pauahi Bishop Estate, the Queen 
Liliʻuokalani Trust, the King William Lunalilo Trust, and the Queen Emma Trust.  The trusts were 
established by will or deed of trust and, at least initially, were all supported by an endowment of 
land.  Income from the lease, and in some instances the sale, of trust lands support their programs 
and services.  Each of the aliʻi trusts was intended to address a specific social need: Kamehameha 
Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, education; the Queen Liliʻuokalani Trust, care of orphans 
and indigent children; the King William Lunalilo Trust, care of indigent and elderly Hawaiians; and 
the Queen Emma Trust, medical care.   
“These trusts reflect the reciprocal duties of the aliʻi and the makaʻāinana (common people). 
Traditionally, the makaʻāinana had the duty to care for the land, and wise management of the people 
and land enhanced the right of the aliʻi to rule.  Productive use of the land and mutual cooperation 
ensured the right of the makaʻāinana to live off the land and use its resources.  Although the 
traditional social structure was dramatically altered through the creation of private property rights 
in the mid-nineteenth century and the transition from a subsistence to a market economy, the creation 
of these trusts suggests that the aliʻi continued to understand and attempted to fulfil their obligation 
to provide for the needs of their people.” 
248 Part of the lands owned by the King post-Māhele, the Bishop Estate currently comprises 9 per 
cent of the total land in Hawaiʻi.  According to Poai and Serrano, at 1194, the Kamehameha 
Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate’s assets were recently valued at $9.2 billion dollars perhaps 
explaining why non-Hawaiians may want access.  However, as originally envisioned, those 
resources are used to heavily subsidize the education of Kamehameha Schools students but also to 
assist students of many ethnicities and races in public education.       
249 Thirteenth point, Last Will and Testament of Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop, dated 31 October 
1883. 
250 Ibid. 
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was established in 1887 and another for girls in 1894 just prior to the Hawaiian 
language ban.   
The Schools were a direct response to the moʻolelo of Westernization, established 
to help Native Hawaiian children overcome disparities and compete on a level 
playing field:251   
The founder of these schools was a true Hawaiian.  She knew the advantages of 
education… Her heart was heavy when she saw the rapid diminution of the 
Hawaiian people going on decade after decade and felt that it was largely the result 
of ignorance…And so, in order that her own people might have the opportunity for 
fitting themselves for such competition, and be able to hold their own in a manly 
and friendly way, without asking the favors which they were not likely to receive, 
these schools were provided for, in which Hawaiians have the preference, and 
which she hoped they would value and take advantage of as fully as possible.252 
The modern Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate (‘the Schools’) 
are a private charitable education trust”—even an aliʻi trust253—and “Hawaiʻi’s 
largest private landowner” but also an indigenous educational system which serves 
“more than 47,400 learners” from preschool to high school “on its campus[es] and 
community-based education programs and services statewide”. 254    Despite 
working with the NHEC and other institutions to improve educational standards for 
Native Hawaiians, the Schools receive no federal funds and most students are 
heavily or fully subsidized by the Schools.255 
The Schools’ curriculum is identity-responsive, with Native Hawaiian language, 
culture and arts instruction required in addition to standard ‘college-prep’ subjects 
such as English, mathematics and science.  Native Hawaiian values inform 
pedagogic practices and Native Hawaiian identity is affirmed and celebrated.256 The 
Schools have instituted “a ‘Leadership Model’ of education, meant to ‘restore self 
                                                          
251 See Poai and Serrano, at 1171, quoted in footnote 268. 
252 Charles Bishop, Founder’s Day speech 1889, found in Kamehameha Schools Bishop Estate 
archives < http://kapalama.ksbe.edu>. 
253 See Poai and Serrano, at 1171, quoted in footnote 268. 
254 Poai and Serrano at 1194. 
255 In Kamehameha, above n 123, at 832, the Ninth Circuit noted that while the actual cost of tuition 
was somewhere around $20,000 per student annually, students were only asked to pay $1,784 per 
year with 65 per cent of those enrolled receiving financial aid with their portion: Kamehameha, 
above n 3, at 19058 
256 Materials, for instance, celebrate the accomplishments of notable Native Hawaiians in various 
fields: see Kamehameha Schools Ka Lamakū: Hawaiian Culture resource materials which, for 
instance, spotlights influential Native Hawaiians, and describes prayers, chants, cosmology and 
genealogies, astronomy and navigation, and other  traditional practices,  and uses all these things to 
describe Hawaiian identity.  
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identity, integrate Native Hawaiian culture, heritage, language, and traditions into 
the educational process, and provide a first-rate educational experience for Native 
Hawaiians.’”257    
 The Schools play a unique levelling role in the Native Hawaiian community.   The 
most complete study of educational and other outcomes for Kamehameha Schools’ 
students in 2003 showed that when the rate of high school graduation across the 
nation generally was 71 per cent, Hawaiʻi’s general rate 69 percent, and Native 
Hawaiians generally 72 per cent, Kamehameha Schools had a 99 percent high 
school graduation rate. 258   At a time when the rate of college enrollment for 
European-Americans nationwide was 64 percent, 92 percent of Kamehameha 
Schools students attended college.  Of that number, 64 percent complete a 
bachelor’s degree or higher.259  The Schools appear to achieve the same “favourable 
outcomes” as other private schools while the student body is socioeconomically 
comparable to public school students.260   
Such statistics clearly represent an actual levelling of the playing field, a de facto 
equality which somehow transcends the moʻolelo of colonization, its residual 
trauma and discrimination, allostatic load and disparities.  Significantly, this has 
been accomplished without any welfare, subsidization or other privileges from the 
public, or at any great expense to other individuals since funds, expertise and other 
resources have come from the disadvantaged class itself—that is, from the Native 
Hawaiian community.  Ironically, because students may qualify for the preference 
with any amount of Native Hawaiian blood, the Schools’ student population is 
                                                          
257 Kamehameha, at 832. 
258  Linda Serra Hagedorn and others "The Academic and Occupational Outcomes of Private 
Residential High School Student Instruction" (2005) 13(1) Pacific Educational Research Journal 21 
at 13-14. 
259 Hagedorn and others at 14.  The same study found positive correlations between “Hawaiian 
Culture Exploration and the number of closest friends in college who were Hawaiian”.  Students’ 
strong sense of these factors predicted college completion.   
260 Hagedorn and others at 16-17.  While current data such as Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate 
Native Hawaiian Educational Assessment Update 2009: A Supplement to Ka Huaka‘i 2005 
(Honolulu: Kamehameha Schools, Research & Evaluation Division, 2009) and the Native Hawaiian 
Data Book 2011 Office of Hawaiian Affairs <www.ohadatabook> show improvements in some of 
these areas for Native Hawaiians since 2003, Kamehameha Schools’ success is still impressive.  For 
instance, the OHA figures show that the number of Native Hawaiians attempting a college education 
currently is still only 45.7 percent versus 92.6 percent of Kamehameha Schools’ students.  The 
Schools’ provision of financial aid was also a significant factor. 
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extremely diverse, representing some 60 ethnic groups. 261   Sourced in both 
traditional ali’i trust and protection and the will of the Native Hawaiian community, 
the Schools also appear to evidence the continuous exercise of self-determination 
by Native Hawaiians.   
Given their impressive academic record, many Native Hawaiian and non-Native 
learners apply for admission.  The Schools’ policy still prefers the admission of 
Native Hawaiian children in “indigent” circumstances 262  who academically 
qualify. 263    Other students are not excluded from admission, but, given the 
overwhelming number of applicants who qualify and apply as ‘Native Hawaiian’, 
non-Native Hawaiian students are rarely accepted.264   
 
3.5.1 IN THE FIRST INSTANCE: SOMEONE AND RELAXED SCRUTINY 
Counsel for John Doe relied heavily upon the everyone/no-one narrative in Runyon 
v McCrary (1976),265 McDonald v Santa Fe Trail Transportation (1976),266 and 
Rice in arguing that: section 1981 applied to private schools and also protected 
Anglo Americans from any racially-based discrimination; ‘Native Hawaiian’ was a 
racial rather than political classification; and that the admission policy was an 
                                                          
261 To qualify as ‘Native Hawaiian’ applicants are only required to show that they had at least one 
Native Hawaiian ancestor prior to 31 December 1959: see “Hawaiian Ancestry Verification 
Documentation Information” Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate 
<www.ksbe.edu>.   Since Kamehameha students may qualify with any amount of Native Hawaiian 
blood under the policy, the Schools’ student population is actually quite diverse, representing some 
60 ethnic groups: Kamehameha, at 832 per majority. 
262 Pauahi’s will “devote[s] a portion of each year’s income to the support and education of orphan’s, 
and others in indigent circumstances, giving the preference to Hawaiians of pure or part aboriginal 
blood” and gives her trustees “full power to make all such rules and regulations as they may deem 
necessary for the government of said schools and to regulate the admission of pupils”: see article 13 
“Pauahi’s Will” Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate <www.ksbe.edu>. 
263 All applicants to Kamehameha Schools at various entrance levels undergo substantial academic 
testing as part of the application process.   Applicants for entrance at 7th grade, for instance, undergo 
standardized testing in “reading comprehension and general mathematics”, must “submit their final 
report cards from the previous year”, interview with a Kamehameha teacher or administrator, and 
complete a “timed writing test” (write an essay on a topic chosen from a list in 20 minutes).  The 
purpose of such testing is to “admit[] children who show potential”: “Admissions and Program 
Enrollment” Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate  <http://apps.ksbe.edu>. 
264  There are approximately 70,000 students of Native Hawaiian ancestry of elementary, 
intermediate and high school (K-12) age in the State of Hawaiʻi, while the Schools’ current 
enrolment capacity is only 5,400 children: see “Financial Aid and Scholarships Services” 
Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate <http://apps.ksbe.edu>. 
265 Runyon v McCrary 427 US 160 (1976). 
266 McDonald v Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co 427 US 273 (1976). 
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affirmative action scheme subject to a strict level of judicial scrutiny.  As discussed 
in the previous chapter, strict scrutiny would have required the Schools to prove 
that the policy served a compelling government interest and was narrowly tailored 
to meet that purpose.267   Accordingly, strict scrutiny is usually “fatal” to any 
identity-conscious policy.268 
In the district court of first instance Judge Kay acknowledged the “unique” 
circumstances of the Schools for which there was no precedent to decide:  
whether §1981 permits the remedial use of race by a private school that receives 
no federal funding, especially one involving an educational preference for 
descendants of an indigenous people who have been disadvantaged by past 
history.269 
The strict judicial scrutiny applied in cases involving publically funded schools, 
such as Grutter270  and Gratz,271  was quickly rejected by Judge Kay, since the 
Schools are privately funded.  According to Judge Kay, “such a narrow lens forces 
the inquiry to ignore the unique historical context which surrounds Kamehameha 
Schools”.272   Because “context matters”, Judge Kay recognized the moʻolelo of 
overthrow and annexation, present disparities and a federal-Native Hawaiian trust 
relationship akin to the federal-Indian relationship. 273    
In finding for the Schools, however, Judge Kay applied an adapted or “flexible”274 
version of the test established in Johnson v Transportation Agency,275 where the 
Supreme Court applied a Title VII standard to an affirmative action policy in private 
employment,276 while admitting that such tests were “not entirely analogous” to the 
                                                          
267 As required by Adarand Constructors, Inc v Pena 515 US 200 (1995) at 235. 
268 Or “strict in theory but fatal in fact”: Eric Yamamoto quoted in Poai and Serrano, footnote 222, 
at 1229.  “Over time, the U.S. Supreme Court transformed the strict scrutiny analysis from one that 
protects minorities to one that invalidates all racial classifications…” 
269 Doe v Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate 295 F Supp 2d 1141 (D Haw 2003) 
at 1146. 
270 Grutter v Bollinger 539 US 306 (2003). 
271 Gratz v Bollinger 539 US 244 (2003). 
272 At 1166. 
273 At 1148, quoting Justice O’Connor in Grutter. 
274 At 1166.   
275 Johnson v Transportation Agency 480 US 616 (1987). 
276 Title VII, 42 USC s 2000e-2(a), previously discussed in Chapter Two, reads: “It shall be lawful 
employment practices for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way 
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise 
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circumstances of Kamehameha Schools.277    Prior to Johnson, United Steelworkers 
of America v Weber278 had protected a private employment affirmative action plan 
and held that intermediary Title VII standards rather than strict scrutiny were 
appropriate for §1981 claims.279  Together, the Weber-Johnson criteria were three-
fold: the admission policy must respond to a “manifest imbalance” between Native 
Hawaiian children and others in education, must not unnecessarily trammel the 
rights of members of non-preferred groups, and must do no more than necessary to 
achieve “parity” between groups.280   
Judge Kay found that the admission policy specifically addressed the manifest 
imbalance arising from the history of disadvantage and discrimination particular to 
the Native Hawaiian child and was consistent with congressional recognition of the 
same.281  Rather than internally within the workplace or school population, the 
admission policy’s external “goal is to foster the inclusion of people of Native 
Hawaiian ancestry, as a whole, into society by means of education”.282   In fact, the 
admission policy was a legitimate remedial measure.   
 
3.5.2 IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT: EVERYONE/NO-ONE & RIGID SCRUTINY 
Doe’s lawyers appealed. 
Addressing the same facts, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit recognized that 
the Schools had admitted that the admission policy was purposefully283 conscious 
of Native Hawaiian ancestry and that, as Rice established, ancestry could be a proxy 
for race.  This admission of ‘racial’ preference triggered a rebuttable but inferred 
presumption of unlawful racial discrimination.   Under Patterson v McLean Credit 
                                                          
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin”.  The standard applied was intermediate as in Weber and Johnson rather than the 
strict scrutiny applied in Runyon. 
277 At 1164. 
278 United Steelworkers of America v Weber 443 US 193 (1979). 
279 Discussed at 1164. 
280 At 1172. 
281 At 1166. 
282 At 1167. 
283 According to Gen Bldg Contractors Ass’n v Pennsylvania 458 US 375 (1982) a violation of 
§1981 must be purposeful. 
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Union, the Schools now bore the burden of proving284  that it had “legitimate non-
discriminatory reasons for its conduct”.285   
Counsel for the Schools argued that sometimes “it is necessary…to trammel the 
interests of non-aboriginal applicants in order to” help Native Hawaiian children 
overcome actual discrimination.  In terms of legitimacy, they raised “abundant 
evidence” of cumulative levels of discrimination in education, as well as other 
socio-economic areas such as health and incarceration rates.286   
However, in a 2-1 decision, the majority equated the admission policy with that in 
Runyon and de-emphasized the first Weber-Johnson criterion finding that “[e]ven 
if we assumed that some, limited racial preferences might be appropriate in order 
for the Schools to advance its mission”, according to the second Weber-Johnson 
criterion, the policy operated as “an absolute bar on the basis of race” to the 
admission of non-Native Hawaiian students, since such students are rarely 
admitted.287  Crucially, the Court found that Congress had not exempted Native 
Hawaiians from the racialized standards applied to other schools despite the 
plethora of legislation produced. 288  Importantly, the majority equated the identity-
awareness of the policy with racial discrimination and “rigidly applied a formerly 
flexible contextual analysis, which had been developed to assess private 
employment affirmative action programs”.289 
 
                                                          
284 Patterson v McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).  Also discussed in Chapter Two, at 2.2. 
285 Discussed in Doe v Kamehameha Schools, 416 F3d 1025, 1036 (9th Cir 2005). 
286 In Doe v Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate 416 F3d 1025 (9th Cir 2005) at 
1041, the majority acknowledged “abundant evidence demonstrating that native Hawaiians are over-
represented in negative socio-economic statistics such as poverty, homeless, child abuse and neglect, 
and criminal activity; they are more likely to live in economically disadvantaged neighborhoods and 
attend low-quality schools; and, because of low levels of educational attainment, they are severely 
under-represented in professional and management positions, and under-represented in low-paying 
service and labor occupations”.   
287 Doe v Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate 416 F3d 1025 (9th Cir 2005) at 1042. 
288 Doe v Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate 416 F3d 1025 (9th Cir 2005) at 1042-
1043.   
289 Poai and Serrano, above n 247, at 1189. 
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3.5.3 THE EN BANC MAJORITY:  RACIAL MINORITY AND RELAXED SCRUTINY 
When the Schools petitioned for a rehearing en banc they were joined by 45 amici 
curiae representing state and local government, civil rights organizations, 
indigenous nations and minority groups farther afield290 who argued that the policy 
was a measure of indigenous self-determination by—and restorative justice for—a 
historically unique indigenous people to whom section 1981 tests were 
misapplied.291    
For instance, in their amicus curiae brief for the Japanese American Citizens League 
of Hawaiʻi, Eric Yamamoto, Susan Serrano and Hoʻopio Pa argued that the policy:  
does not violate civil rights; rather it serves to restore to Native Hawaiians that 
which 19th and 20th Century “western influence” nearly destroyed: Hawaiian 
education, culture and a measure of self-governance.292 
Importantly, Yamamoto et al have argued that, in this context, the policy did not 
“denigrat[e] one group as inferior to justify better treatment of another” but 
represented “a private self-determining effort of restoration” and displayed 
“remedial legitimacy”. 293 
On 6 December 2006, a full panel of the Ninth Circuit, by a slim majority of 8-7, 
affirmed the district court decision, recognizing the legitimacy of the admission 
policy.   However, it did so not in terms of a Mancari exception or indigenous rights 
generally but by adopting Rice’s racial categorization of ‘Native Hawaiian’294 and 
applying Weber-Johnson criteria to an affirmative action policy.   
                                                          
290 The Schools were joined by amici curiae representing the highest levels of state and local 
government including the Attorney-General of the State of Hawaiʻi, the City and County of 
Honolulu, and the Hawaiʻi Civil Rights Commission.  Perhaps more telling, they were joined by 
groups including other indigenous and minority bodies farther afield, such as the Native American 
Rights Fund, Alaskan Federation of Natives, Japanese American Citizens League, and Centro Legal 
de la Raza, also joined as amici curiae.   
291 See Susan Serrano and others “Restorative Justice for Hawaiʻi’s First People: Selected Amicus 
Curiae Briefs in Doe v. Kamehameha Schools” (2007) 14 Asian Am LJ 205. 
292 Eric K Yamamoto, Susan K Serrano and EA Hoʻoipo Kalaenaʻauao Pa, Amicus Brief of the 
Japanese American Citizens League of Hawaiʻi-Honolulu Chapter and the Equal Justice Society and 
in support of Defendant-Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, 29 August 2005, in Doe v 
Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate 416 F 3d 1025 (9th Cir 2005) (No 04-15044) 
at 2. 
293 Ibid, at 5. 
294 See Doe v Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate 441 F3d 1029 (9th Cir 2006) 470 
F3d 827 (9th Cir 2006) (en banc) footnote 9, at 837: “...For the purposes of our decision, we accept 
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The Court demonstrated historico-legal awareness.  After reciting the burdens of 
Native Hawaiian history leading to present-day disparities, the majority set out the 
legal genealogy of section 1981, its Reconstruction origins and Civil Rights Era re-
emergence.295  Given that history, the majority distinguished both Runyon and 
McDonald on their facts and issues: 
In neither case did the Court have occasion to consider whether and under what 
terms (i.e., under what standard of scrutiny) a private remedial racial preference 
would be permissible in the educational context under §1981, nor has it since.296 
The majority later recognized: “By contrast, the very nature of affirmative action 
plans is that historically disfavored and underachieving minorities may be given 
preferential treatment in certain narrowly defined, limited programs.”297 
Like the lower court, the majority relied on the Weber-Johnson test, recognizing 
the elephantine manifest imbalance affecting the Native Hawaiian learner but 
focusing the test on “demonstrable”, current and “present” disadvantages rather 
than historical discrimination and disadvantage. 298  ‘Modifying’ Weber and 
Johnson’s internal employment context, the majority recognized that imbalance in 
the context of the state of Hawaiʻi not just the school itself.   Regarding trammelling, 
the majority found that although the policy rarely results in students of non-Native 
ancestry being admitted it did not trammel their rights since other educational 
opportunities in the State of Hawaiʻi are not deficient and all other non-Native 
Hawaiian groups actually fare well despite the policy.299  Finally, the majority 
found that the policy did “no more than necessary to correct the manifest imbalance 
suffered by students of Native Hawaiian ancestry” because it was temporary, as 
preference would only be given until “the current educational effects of past, private 
and government-sponsored discrimination and of social and economic deprivation” 
are remedied.300  Moreover, it was “true to the spirit of §1981 by supporting Native 
                                                          
that ‘Native Hawaiian’ ‘—like ‘Negro’—is a racial classification.  See Rice v Cayetano, 528 U.S. 
495, 514 (2000) (so holding in the context of a voting rights case)”. 
295 See my discussion in Chapter Two, at 2.2.4. 
296  At 837 per majority.  Again in Runyon, the preference worked to the disadvantage of the 
disadvantaged racial minority, rather than working as a levelling mechanism for the disadvantaged 
minority.   
297 At 843 per majority. 
298 At 843. 
299 At 844. 
300 At 845-846.  
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Hawaiian students so that they may attain parity with their non-Native Hawaiian 
peers”.301   
Importantly, the majority partially justified their modification of the Title VII 
employment standard in terms of the fundamental importance of education to civic 
participation, societal cohesion, the workforce and long-term life outcomes citing 
Brown and Plyler.302   Again, these were cases where a direct appeal to equal 
protection had favoured groups identified by minority identity and socio-economic 
disparities not unlike Native Hawaiian learners.303  For the majority, the policy 
constituted a legitimate remedial measure. 
 
3.5.4 THE CONCURRENCE: POLITICAL CLASSIFICATION AND MANCARI  
However, five members of the majority304 were persuaded that the federal-Native 
Hawaiian trust relationship justified the application of a Mancari-like exception. 
The concurrence asked: “can Congress constitutionally provide special benefits, 
including educational benefits, to descendants of Native Hawaiians because ‘Native 
Hawaiian’ is a political classification” and if so, “has Congress done so in 
§1981?”305 
The concurrence noted the unique historico-legal context of trust relationship 
between federal and state governments and the Native Hawaiian people—as well 
as the plethora legislation in which “Congress has repeatedly ‘affirmed,’ 
‘acknowledged,’ ‘reaffirmed,’ and ‘recognized,’ that relationship”. 306 —and 
answered affirmatively to the first question.  Ironically, their honors cited Stevens 
J’s dissent in Rice as a source of legislation supporting political classification307 
while otherwise limiting “its analysis to voting rights under the Fifteenth 
                                                          
301 At 846.   
302 At 841-842. 
303 See discussion in previous chapter at 2.5. 
304 W Fletcher, Pregerson, Reinhardt, Paez and Rawlinson JJ. 
305 At 850. 
306 At 850.  Also footnote 2 at 854 for examples of relevant legislation. 
307 At 850.  As Judge Kay in the lower court was able to do: Doe v Kamehameha Schools/Bernice 
Pauahi Bishop Estate 295 F Supp 2d 1141 (D Haw 2003) at 1150. 
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Amendment”.308   Ultimately, the concurrence acknowledged that Congress had 
“invariably treated ‘Native Hawaiian’ as a political classification for the purposes 
of providing exclusive educational and other benefits”.309 
Regarding the second question, the concurrence rejected the idea that Congress’s 
own preference for Native Hawaiians could be “invalidate[d], sub silentio”310 via 
section 1981311 or the host of legislation recognizing the trust relationship312 as Doe 
had argued.  Furthermore, the minority recognized a congressional preference for 
the Schools, despite its non-use of federal funds, in various pieces of legislation313 
which acknowledged the unique role that the Schools play in native Hawaiian 
learner outcomes.  Such legislation “specifically directed Kamehameha Schools to 
do precisely what plaintiffs in this case say is forbidden”.314  Ironically, the Schools’ 
admissions definition of ‘Native Hawaiian’ was virtually the same as Congress’s in 
the NHEA.315 
The affirmative answer to both questions was consistent with the federal-Native 
Hawaiian trust relationship and an interpretation of the policy as a Mancari-type 
preference. 
 
3.5.5 THE DISSENT: ADAMANT EVERYONE/NO-ONE 
Most of the dissenting opinions criticize the majority’s modification of the Weber-
Johnson test.  All deny the existence of the federal-Native Hawaiian trust 
relationship and applicability of the Mancari exception.  Identity-blindness, 
historical abstraction and an adamant everyone/no-one narrative are apparent. 
                                                          
308 Doe v Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate 441 F3d 1029, 470 F3d 827 (9th Cir 
2006) (en banc) at 852-853 per concurrence. 
309 At 856-857 per concurrence. 
310 At 854-856.   
311 See discussion on implied repeal in terms of Native American rights in Chapter 2 at 2.4.2. 
312 This was very similar to the argument attempted by the plaintiff in Mancari that the Equal 
Employment Opportunities Act of 1972 had invalidated the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.  
313 At 856.   
314 At 854. 
315 At 856. 
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Writing the main dissent, Judge Bybee commended Kamehameha Schools for 
trying to educate Native Hawaiian children but “[could not] turn a blind eye to a 
classic violation of §1981”.316  At all three steps of the Weber-Johnson test, his 
dissent would exclude “context”.317  
His honor, for instance, insisted that manifest imbalance should be assessed within 
the highly successful but somewhat anomalous Kamehameha Schools student 
population where educational opportunities were not lacking and Native Hawaiians 
could not be underrepresented because every student was Native Hawaiian. 318 
Where the majority had intuited that the external assessment would provide a more 
accurate snapshot of the manifest imbalance, Judge Bybee opined that the 
majority’s external assessment “green-light[ed] discrimination” and gave all 
schools a “broad and perpetual license” to circumvent the temporary requirement 
of the Weber-Johnson test. 319   
Ignoring the implications of the unique historico-legal context of the policy, Judge 
Bybee’s analysis also clearly prioritized the homogenous, anonymous individual.  
He judged that section 1981 protected individuals or “all persons” not groups of 
individuals or a “body of persons”.320  Ironically given the multigenerational trauma 
and discrimination, allostatic load and actual disparities suffered by Native 
Hawaiians, Judge Bybee also prioritized “the rights of the disfavored race” and the 
“respective rights of the non-preferred group” 321 —meaning non-Native 
applicants—in determining whether trammelling had occurred.   
                                                          
316 At 858. 
317 At 864, for instance, Bybee J reasons: “Context alone cannot explain why, under the majority’s 
view, racial discrimination in some communities would be wrong and actionable, but in other 
communities, it would be acceptable and praiseworthy.” 
318 At 862-863.  Like “the employer’s work force” in previous section 1981 cases. 
319 At 863: “In contrast to Weber and Johnson, the majority’s test merely requires a private school 
to ‘demonstrate that specific, significant imbalances in educational achievement presently affect the 
target population’ in the relevant community…Thus, by completely eliminating any schoolbased 
analysis and jettisoning any historical inquiry, the majority rejects the constraint developed in the 
Title VII context that affirmative action programs must be limited in scope and duration. Indeed, the 
majority effectively green-lights discrimination so long as the identified group currently suffers from 
“significant imbalances in educational achievement.” … Because such a broad and perpetual license 
conflicts with the Supreme Court’s consistent emphasis on the limited and temporary nature of 
permissible affirmative action plans…cannot endorse the majority’s new standard.” (footnotes 
omitted). 
320 At 864-866.  His emphasis. 
321 At 864-865.  The use of ‘respective’ recalls the wording of section 1981 which was drafted to 
guarantee African-Americans the same rights as white citizens.  However, as in McDonald v Santa 
Fe Trail Transportation Co 427 US 273 (1976) where white employees tried to claim the same rights 
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Similarly, while all dissents largely ignored the Reconstruction origins of section 
1981, all maintained the black-white dichotomy.  Judge Bybee, for instance, 
described the majority’s decision to distinguish Runyon as “unfortunate and wrong” 
and judged that the Kamehameha Schools policy was one that also “bars African 
American…children”322—despite the Schools’ de facto diversity.323   
Despite the preponderance of legislative evidence and centuries of federal Indian 
law principles to the contrary, Judge Bybee also excluded the federal-Native 
Hawaiian trust relationship because Congress had not expressly stated an exception 
to section 1981 within the legislation324 and Native Hawaiians were not a federally-
recognized Indian tribe.325   While they largely echo Judge Bybee, a few notes about 
the remaining dissenting opinions are necessary. 
Judge Rymer with four others did question applying section 1981 to a philanthropic 
charitable trust and whether the same right as whites to make contracts in 
employment could be equated with the same rights as Native Hawaiians to make 
contracts in education.  However, he considered precedent such as McDonald 
binding on the court326—despite the distinguishing facts recognized by the majority.  
He also dismissed the legislative evidence as merely “Congressional applause” for 
federal programs benefitting Native Hawaiians and not federal recognition since, 
based on Rice, ‘Native Hawaiian’ was a racial not political classification. 327  
Moreover, Judge Rymer dismissed the use of such policies to remedy historical 
injustice.328 
                                                          
as and African American, the rights at stake were not Doe’s but that of the historically disadvantaged 
minority group, in this case, Native Hawaiian learners.   
322 At 858. 
323  The majority of cases relied upon by the dissents involve either African-Americans being 
discriminated against or supposedly preferred versus whites Interestingly, Bybee J never addresses 
the significance of a lack of blood quantum in the Kamehameha Schools admission policy or the 
fact that the ‘Native Hawaiian’ students at Kamehameha Schools apparently represent over 60 
nationalities or ethnicities. 
324See discussion at 874-879.  In response, see Fletcher J, concurring opinion at 855-856 regarding 
the harmonious reading of statutes.   
325 At 879-882. 
326 At 885 Rymer J dissenting.  See my critique of McDonald in previous chapter at 2.4.1. 
327 At 887. 
328 At 886: “…I am not persuaded that precedent allow the Kamehameha Schools to justify its 
preferential admissions policy on the footing that the policy redresses past societal discrimination 
against Native Hawaiians”. 
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Judge Kleinfeld with others disagreed on the standard of review, recognizing, 
perhaps rightly, that Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment.  However, 
his honor would have applied Runyon’s strict scrutiny and not Title VII as the 
proper standard since Title VII specifically prohibits discrimination in employment.  
Instead, he would have applied Runyon because it also involved the admission 
policy of a private school, and section 1981 “prohibits a private school from 
denying admission to prospective students because of their race”.  Following 
McDonald, Judge Kleinfeld concluded that section 1981:   
protects whites as well as non-whites from discrimination.  A fortiori it protects all 
ethnic groups in Hawaiʻi: blacks, Filipino-Americans, Japanese-Americans, 
American Samoans, Chinese-Americans, and all others, regardless of their 
ancestry329. 
Finally, Judge Kozinski, with some regret about applying Runyon to the admission 
policy, 330  kindly suggested that the Schools stopped charging its students the 
meagre amount of tuition that it does to avoid further claims under section 1981 
which had never been applied to a charity.   
Ultimately, Judges Kleinfeld, Kozinski and O’Scannlain disagreed with Judge 
Bybee’s application of a Title VII standard but similarly equated present facts with 
those in Runyon—that is, they equated an admission policy meant to address 
significant socio-economic disparities with a policy designed to perpetuate such 
disparities.331 
                                                          
329 At 888. Despite the multicultural nature of the student body and the support various minority 
rights advocates for the Schools: see amicus curiae briefs including Eric K Yamamoto, Susan K 
Serrano and EA Hoʻoipo Kalaenaʻauao Pa, Amicus Brief of the Japanese American Citizens League 
of Hawaiʻi-Honolulu Chapter and the Equal Justice Society and in support of Defendant-Appellee’s 
Petition for Rehearing En Banc, 29 August 2005, in Doe v Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi 
Bishop Estate 416 F 3d 1025 (9th Cir 2005) (No 04-15044); and Susan Serrano, Eric Yamamoto, 
Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie and David Forman “Restorative Justice for Hawaiʻi’s First People: 
Selected Amicus Curiae Briefs in Doe v. Kamehameha Schools” (2007) 14 Asian Am LJ 205. 
330 In addition to Rymer J’s comments, Kleinfeld J actually admitted that he would rather not have 
heard the case, as the result of some “jurisdictional defect”: at 888. 
331 At 888-889, the policy which has done so much actual good was equated with the intentionally 
discriminating policy of a school run by white supremacists.  Also see Runyon, above n 265. 
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3.6 SOME OBSERVATIONS 
Ultimately, the Court found that “a Hawaiian private, non-profit K-12 school that 
receives no federal funds” does not “violate[] §1981 by preferring Native 
Hawaiians in its admissions policies”.332  Several observations are relevant. 
First, the substantial value of education was approved and used to justify Johnson’s 
modification.  The majority opinion displays aspects of the kind of constitutive 
commitment to education which swayed the Supreme Court in Plyler v Doe.   The 
importance of education to human development and well-being was obviously 
persuasive in their honors’ modification of the Johnson factors.  In perhaps another 
“analytically muddled but ultimately just” decision, 333  the Ninth Circuit’s 
modification enabled them to examine the admission policy in its historical context 
but also in real-time among the demographics of the state of Hawaiʻi—though not 
in terms of state-promised indigenous education rights.  As in Brown and Plyler, 
the decision moves beyond formalized equality and into the realm of substantial 
equality.  
Next, the majority distinguishes the admission policy in Runyon from the Schools’, 
practically affirming United States v Carolene Products (1938) Footnote Four’s 
distinction in terms of purpose334 and undermining the identity- and history-blind 
premise of reverse discrimination itself.  In contrast to Rice, the majority draws a 
clear line between policies which deliberately discriminate against a particular 
group and those which are meant to assist a particular group in overcoming 
discrimination, finding the latter constitutionally appropriate where they meet the 
modified Johnson criteria.  This differentiation is a matter “of consistency”: “To 
open the door for such plans under [T]itle VII and close it under section 1981 would 
make little sense”.335  The majority remembered that section 1981 was meant to 
address the “explicit discrimination faced by recently freed slaves”. 336   This 
historical awareness contrasts with decisions such as Bakke where that very 
                                                          
332 At 829. 
333 See discussion in previous chapter on Plyler v Doe at 2.5.  
334 United States v Carolene Products 304 US 144 (1938) Footnote Four: see discussion in previous 
chapter at 2.4.1. 
335 At 838. 
336 At 835-836. 
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argument was attempted without success.  Rice itself, was barely mentioned in the 
majority decision, appearing only as a seemingly reluctant footnote.337 
In trying to justify the admission policy, the Ninth Circuit seemingly stretched 
precedent towards it.  The majority settled on an affirmative action test and racial 
interpretation of Native Hawaiian identity which substantially engaged with the 
burdens of Native Hawaiian history and recognized a relationship between Native 
Hawaiians and the federal government “akin to that of Native Americans”.  The 
court recognized the inconsistency of applying law aimed at eradicating 
discrimination against racial minorities to a policy aimed at overcoming such 
discrimination:  
Even if we were to try to shove a square peg into a round hole by strictly applying 
the test developed in employment cases to the Kamehameha Schools’ admission 
policy, that policy would still be valid.  As the Supreme Court has cautioned, “[i]t 
is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not 
within the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its 
makers”.338 
Where the Rice court refused to bend, the Ninth Circuit was willing to modify 
precedent to fit the admission policy—for instance, to examine the local context of 
discrimination and underachievement in education—in order to meet the demands 
of a more substantial equality. 
One-third of a full sitting of the Ninth Circuit, believed that ‘Native Hawaiian’ was 
a political classification and endorsed Mancari.  More importantly, the concurrence 
believed this to be “an easier and narrower ground for upholding Kamehameha 
Schools’ admission policy”.339  As in federal Indian law, the minority judged the 
constitutionality of the admission policy within an identity-specific historico-legal 
context—within the moʻolelo—recognizing Native Hawaiians as “a once sovereign 
nation” and Congress’ preference for Native Hawaiians in education arising from 
its unique obligation towards them.340   There is little or no hesitation, bending or 
                                                          
337 At 837, footnote 9 which reads: “...For the purposes of our decision, we accept that ‘Native 
Hawaiian’ ‘—like ‘Negro’—is a racial classification.  See Rice v. Cayetano”. 
338 At 846, quoting the Supreme Court in Weber, at 201. 
339 At 849. 
340 At 850-851. 
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stretching of precedent to fit the admission policy or its circumstances in the 
concurrence.   
While the above features are significant given the predominance of the 
everyone/no-one narrative, other features remain troubling.  Despite modifying the 
Weber-Johnson criteria to fit the unique circumstances of Native Hawaiian history 
and ethnic composition of the State of Hawaiʻi, the majority still classed the 
preference as an affirmative action policy premised on Rice’s concerning racial 
classification.  Rice clearly haunts the decision.  While the majority generally 
recognize the unique history of Native Hawaiians and see the discrimination, they 
fail, once again, to be swayed by compelling arguments for a Mancari-like 
exception and instead apply affirmative action tests based on race to the admission 
policy—despite the copious evidence they themselves expound.  The majority’s 
failure to unreservedly recognize such a relationship while not unique is an 
uncomfortable consistency between the courts in Kamehameha Schools and Rice.  
In this light, the stretching of the Johnson factors seems a jurisprudential aberration 
of sorts, another exception to the general rule of identity-blindness.   
The decision displays a certain level of historico-legal abstraction in failing to apply 
federal Indian law principles to the admission policy.  Again, the modified Weber-
Johnson factors utilized by the majority focus on demonstrated, present 
disadvantages rather than historic discrimination and disparities. 341   Johnson’s 
temporariness requirement ignores the Mancari exception and state-recognized 
Native Hawaiian rights, distinguishing the preference from a true right, as in the 
case of human rights which are inalienable and the historical continuum of Native 
Hawaiian customary rights.  Temporariness is, in fact, the embodiment of historico-
legal abstraction having less regard for historical injustices and more for current 
numbers without putting those numbers into a proper historical perspective which 
gives them meaning.  Again, parity, temporariness and its dichotomy seemingly 
recall only the integration-driven anonymity of Brown and its progeny but not their 
original substantial purpose as counters to persistent ongoing inequalities resulting 
from an identity-specific history.  
                                                          
341 At 843. 
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In terms of section 1981, the court distinguished Runyon because the policy in that 
case was deliberately aimed at excluding African-Americans, but it also applied the 
Title VII test rather than strict scrutiny to the admission policy because the 
Kamehameha Schools are a “purely private entity that receives no federal funding” 
adding that “[t]he Supreme Court has never applied strict scrutiny to the actions of 
a purely private entity”.342  Again, however, Runyon did involve a private school, a 
fact which caused Judge Bybee to accuse the majority of “stand[ing] Runyon on its 
head”. 343    The Schools’ private status alone may not be able to protect the 
admission policy or the Schools’ larger mission. 
If Kamehameha Schools were not private and had received public funds, strict 
scrutiny and not the more relaxed Title VII standard would have applied; Bakke, 
Grutter and Gratz would have applied.  This would almost certainly have been 
“fatal”344 to the policy.  The funding question creates the finest of lines between a 
constitutionally acceptable admissions scheme and one that is not.  That line is an 
economic and arbitrary one which wholly ignores the moʻolelo of colonization and 
discrimination, all dealings between the federal government and the Native 
Hawaiian people, and centuries of federal Indian law.  Particularly given the 
seemingly utilitarian calculations which must accompany any economic exercise, 
that line favors majoritarian interests.   
Ultimately, Mancari remains susceptible to the liberalizing trends in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence over the past three decades.345  The power of the singular narrative to 
reach the Islands was clear in Rice.  The modified Title VII standard’s protection 
of affirmative action plans is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s increasingly 
restrictive approach to affirmative action as evidenced in Grutter and Gratz346--as 
well as the growing number of state voters and legislators opposed to affirmative 
action and preference of any kind.347   Interestingly, though largely approving a 
Title VII intermediate standard, the dissent in Kamehameha, would have made that 
                                                          
342 At 839.  Otherwise, Grutter and Gratz would have applied. 
343 At 857 per Bybee J dissenting. 
344 Yamamoto, above n 268. 
345 See previous chapter at 2.4.2. And yet, as in the case of Native American rights generally, both 
state-recognized indigenous rights and the special trust relationship remain vulnerable to the 
everyone/no-one narrative.    
346 See previous chapter at 2.4.1. 
347 See discussion on Schuette v BAMN in previous chapter, at 2.4.1. 
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standard as fatal and unassailable as the strict scrutiny standard applied to public 
bodies in terms of equal protection since in both cases virtually any identity-
awareness alone will invalidate a policy.  Without a stronger legal claim than 
affirmative action—a legal mechanism which is, at best, an exception to the rule 
and whose demise appears imminent—the admission policy remains incredibly 
vulnerable to the everyone/no-one narrative. 
 
3.7 ‘TREACHEROUS LANDSCAPE’ 
This was a very difficult decision.  From the beginning of this lawsuit, we have 
been prepared to defend our policy to the very end of the judicial process.  However, 
it has become increasingly clear that this lawsuit is only one piece of a much 
broader risk to the rights of Native Hawaiians, as the indigenous people of this 
state, to manage and control our resources. 
We cannot ignore the treacherous landscape before us…348 
Despite the hard-won nature of Doe v Kamehameha Schools, the en banc decision 
feels neither triumphant nor conclusive.  Instead, various uncertainties linger. 
Faced with subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court, the Schools settled with Doe 
out-of-court for a substantial amount 349  leaving the conflicted Ninth Circuit 
decision standing.  There was never any question of whether there would be another 
John Doe and the same lawyers filed a similar lawsuit in 2008.350    
Notwithstanding colorblind advocates, the Supreme Court may have to decide on 
the policy given its constitutional importance to the State of Hawaiʻi. 351   In 
Kamehameha, Judge Kozinski opined, perhaps ominously, that “[g]iven the scores 
                                                          
348  J Douglas Ing and others “Trustee Message: Kamehameha Schools and ‘John Doe’ Settle 
Admissions Lawsuit” Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate <www.ksbe.edu>. 
349 For a reported $7 million: Jim Dooley “Kamehameha Schools settled lawsuit for $7M” Honolulu 
Advertiser (online ed, Honolulu, 2 August 2008).  
350 The Supreme Court declined to review the case anonymously but the case reached its doors as it 
were: see Doe v Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate 625 F3d 1182 (9th Cir 2010); 
and “Trustees Message: US Supreme Court Declines Review; Jacob Doe, et al Lawsuit Pau” 
Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate <www.ksbe.edu>.  Pau means ‘finished’ but 
this seems unlikely.  Ironically, future litigants though pushing anonymity may not be able to hide 
behind it in court.      
351 The late Jon Van Dyke quoted in “Hawaiʻi schools' policy called discriminatory” USA Today 
(online ed, Honolulu, 3 August 2005).    
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of pages we have written on both sides of this issue, it should be clear that the 
question is close and ours may not be the last word”.352   Predictions of what the 
current Supreme Court—largely composed of the same justices who decided Rice, 
Grutter, Gratz and Schuette—might say when the substantive issues do breach its 
doors must be pessimistic.  Currently, Rice would require the court to treat ancestry 
as a proxy for race and similarly foreclose an appeal to Mancari.  
Even within state law, the landmark amendments to the 1978 Hawaiʻi State 
Constitutional Convention—perhaps unparalleled in United States history in terms 
of recognizing indigenous rights—were apparently, an unexpected and rare 
constitutional moment.  In Hawaiʻi, such so-called “ConCons” are known for 
producing radical changes to the state constitution.  The ConCon put to Hawaiʻi 
voters in 2008353 was backed by conservative elements but opposed by those who 
feared “[a] ConCon…could erode the rights of Native Hawaiians, which continue 
to come under attack in the courts”.354   Given those fears, Schuette355 also suggests 
the danger that the legal fate of unique, time-honored Native Hawaiian rights—and 
any preference—might be left to unsympathetic non-Native Hawaiian voters, 
something that has happened before.356 
Nevertheless, the history one cannot ignore—so eerily like that of Native 
Americans but also uniquely Hawaiian—remains.  This history affirms a nineteenth 
century Western-style legal system complete with full-fledged nationhood but also 
its own peculiar developments.  The shape of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s 
constitutional arrangements pre-overthrow and -annexation is more accurately 
described as a fledgling Western democracy than a tribe.  Given the Māhele and 
other “pre-annexation” changes to land title enacted by the Hawaiian monarchy, for 
instance, R Hōkūlei Lindsey has concluded that “[t]he analogy of Native American 
tribes provides only a guidepost for the Native Hawaiian claim to ceded lands”.  
                                                          
352 Doe v Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate 441 F3d 1029, 470 F3d 827 (9th Cir 
2006) (en banc) at 889. 
353 Hawaiʻi is one of five states which automatically puts the question of constitutional amendment 
on the statewide voting ballot every 10 years. 
354 See Dan Nakaso “Should Hawaiʻi Rewrite Its Constitution—Again?” Time (US) (online ed, 
Washington DC, 30 October 2008).  Since statehood in 1959, Hawaiʻi has had two constitutional 
conventions in 1968 and 1978.  The next opportunity for opponents to rewrite Native Hawaiian 
rights will come in 2018. 
355 See previous chapter at 2.4.1. 
356 See questions about the legitimacy of the 1959 plebiscite on statehood discussed above at 9, 
footnote 60. 
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Given these peculiarities, the question is not about “equal protection analysis” or 
“the allocation of benefits by the government.  It is about guaranteeing self-
determination”. 357   
That self-determination has, according to Danielle Conway-Jones, “[a]bsolutely 
nothing…in common” with affirmative action “except in the manner that” the 
federal government responds to “people of color”.358  Given this history, David 
Forman has similarly concluded that the application of equal protection theory and 
strict scrutiny to the admission policy is “impractical and anomalous” while 
“humanitarian principles” which consider local law are better suited to both the 
former territorial status of Hawaiʻi 359  and the historical continuum of Native 
Hawaiian law. 360  Hawaiʻi’s former territorial context, of course, raises questions 
of decolonization.361 
A Mancari-like narrative certainly has the capacity to speak in terms of self-
determination.  However, both state and federal recognition have limits.  State 
recognition of Native Hawaiian rights in terms of the policy were ultimately 
overridden by a misapplied slim someone narrative—by federal narratives 
increasingly hostile to identity.   Moreover, as Chapter Two has described in detail, 
federal recognition is highly reliant on arbitrary congressional will and judicial 
activism—to political forces generally. For instance, while the latest version of the 
Akaka Bill, “signaled a change in the overall approach to federal recognition”, it 
was never voted on and “died when the 112th Congress adjourned in January 
2013”.362   
                                                          
357 R Hōkūlei Lindsey “Native Hawaiians and the Ceded Lands Trust: Applying Self-Determination 
as an Alternative to the Equal protection Analysis” (2011) 34(2) Am Indian L Rev 223 at 226-227.  
Lindsey concludes that “the purpose of the ceded lands trust is not to achieve equality among its 
citizens.  Its purpose remains as King Kamehameha II mandated in 1848: these lands are meant to 
provide for the Native Hawaiian people through time.  The Native Hawaiian people own these lands.  
The lands are a means for Native Hawaiian self-determination”: Lindsey at 228. 
358  Danielle M Conway-Jones “The Perpetuation of Privilege and Anti-Affirmative Action 
Sentiment in Rice v. Cayetano” (2002) 3 Asian-Pacific L & Pol’y J 371 at 371. 
359 Forman, above n 105, at 328-331 
360 Forman at 345-352. 
361 See Chapter 6 at 6.6.1. 
362 Mackenzie, “Native Hawaiians and U.S. Law” 101-102 iBook version.  MacKenzie notes that it 
also lost its two greatest advocates in the Senate when Senator Daniel Inouye (HI-D) unexpectedly 
died in December 2012 and Senator Daniel Akaka (HI-D) retired in January 2013. 
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Ultimately, the wrestle in Doe v Kamehameha Schools suggests that not one of the 
Ninth Circuit’s narratives has the capacity—at least on its own—to account for the 
causal connection between the moʻolelo of Native Hawaiian history and ongoing 
chronic stress, multigenerational trauma, increased allostatic load and complex 
disparities almost unrelentingly attracted to the Native Hawaiian learner.  Rather 
than entitling Native Hawaiians to some special advantage as identity-blindness 
advocates contend,363 these realities represent what Eric Yamamoto and Ashley 
Obrey have called “deep harms” embedded in the psyche and social experience of 
Native Hawaiians which are also pervasive, even “‘comprehensive’, encompassing 
resources, culture, and governance; ‘sustained’ over generations; ‘systemwide,’ 
implicating national and local governments, businesses, and citizens.”364 
As noted in Chapter One,365 prominent indigenous and non-indigenous scholars 
have suggested expanded narratives which would recognize the admission policy 
as a form of restorative justice appropriate in terms of both historical injustices 
committed against Native Hawaiians and legitimate claims to an expanded self-
determination arising from unique historico-legal context.  The simple calculus of 
justice would seemingly call for a positive and proportional remedy to this 
overwhelming species of inequality and injustice.  According to Yamamoto and 
Obrey, “The remedies must be tailored to the harm.  That is, when the injuries are 
long-term and systemic, so must be the response.”366   
The majority’s intuitions demonstrate some awareness of the harm but not one of 
the narratives expresses a sense of remedial proportionality.  However, scholars 
have suggested that an expanded version of self-determination like that recognized 
in international law is not only consistent with the unique historical context of the 
admission policy but is seemingly proportional to that harm.367   
                                                          
363 Yamamoto and Obrey, above n 128, at 48. 
364 Yamamoto and Obrey, above n 128, at 36. 
365 At section 1.3. 
366 Yamamoto and Obrey at 39. 
367 See Susan Serrano and others “Restorative Justice for Hawaiʻi’s First People: Selected Amicus 
Curiae Briefs in Doe v. Kamehameha Schools” (2007) 14 Asian Am LJ 205; and S James Anaya 
“The Native Hawaiian People and International Human Rights Law: A Remedy for Past and 
Continuing Wrongs” (1994) 28 Georgia L Rev 309 on remedial self-determination.  More recently, 
see S James Anaya and Robert A Williams Jr Study on the International Law and Policy relating to 
the Situation of the Native Hawaiian People (Indigenous Peoples Law and Policy Program, 
University of Arizona, James E Rogers College of Law, June 2015) in which Anaya and Williams 
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3.8 CONCLUSION 
These wrestles, gaps and intuitions raise doubts about the appropriateness of 
prioritizing the singular everyone/no-one narrative within federal law and, certainly, 
about superimposing such a narrative on Hawaiʻi state law. They indicate the need 
to explore alternate or possibly expanded narratives of equality.  Such narratives 
must seemingly possess the capacity to account for complex discrimination and 
disparities drawn to Native Hawaiian identity and the unique historico-legal context 
of the admission policy including prior sovereignty, the ongoingness of the harm 
and the historical continuum of Native Hawaiian law.   
The next three chapters discuss theoretical and legal tools used to address similar 
conflicts of equality narratives.  Ultimately, both political theory and international 
law has become increasingly aware of historico-legal context and especially 
guarantee/reality gaps.  Both the theory and law utilize the language of rights and 
have become specifically indigenous at least in part by admitting an identity-
attracted history of discrimination and human rights violations.  However, placing 
indigenous identity within a historical context has given both the theory and law 
life in respect to indigenous peoples.  In order to achieve the homogenous, 
anonymous universal, this body of theory and law identifies Native Hawaiians as 
holders of rights shared with other human beings which transcend time and other 
arbitrary factors.  However, it also acknowledges—because the history demands 
it—identity- and history-specific protections in order to facilitate substantial and 
not just de jure equality.  The theory and law may provide, if nothing else, a 
language of rights which might explain and reconcile the wrestle and intuitions in 
the Kamehameha Schools case. 
                                                          
recognize that Native Hawaiians retain rights and remedies for infringement under international law 
and that the United States federal government has a “responsibility” to “secure” those rights. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE ADMISSION POLICY IN 
THEORY 
4 CHAPTER FOUR: THE ADMISSION POLICY IN THEORY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Beyond the actual outcome in the Doe v Kamehameha Schools case, a lawsuit 
against a school established to help a group of children consistently identified with 
disparities in education achieve substantial equality—one that has seemingly done 
so—raises fundamental questions about what constitutes ‘equality’, whether it 
prefers certain rightsholders over others, and whether, as an ideology, it might allow 
the perpetual inequality of certain groups of individuals.  The acute vulnerability of 
Native Hawaiians to forces such as multigenerational trauma, increased allostatic 
load, chronic stress, and otherwise complex discrimination and disparities—the 
way that such forces appear to be unrelentingly attracted to Native Hawaiian 
identity—would seem to violate the very idea of a level playing field.  Given this 
undermining, these realities require hearty political but also intellectual discussion, 
even self-assessment.  
Substantial intellectual discussion has already taken place in liberal theory.  The 
same narratives of equality which have clashed in the wider American legal 
landscape and the Kamehameha case have been both canonized and demonized in 
legal and political theory.  Various scholars and philosophers have also tried to 
reconcile formal guarantees of equality with de facto inequalities seemingly 
attracted to identity.  Some have also addressed the position of indigenous peoples.  
Ultimately, liberal theory is particularly useful because, as Mark Bennett has 
observed, “it is predominantly liberal citizens and politicians that need to be 
convinced of the rights of indigenous peoples.”1 
                                                          
1 Mark Bennett “’Indigeneity’ as Self-Determination” (2005) 4 Indigenous LJ 71 at 87 discussing a 
previous statement by Will Kymlicka. 
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This chapter brings those philosophical and theoretic wrestles with the same gaps 
and intuitions to bear on the narratives and reasoning in Kamehameha in terms of 
liberal theory.  The identity-blindness of the dissent—and its insistence on a rigid 
intermediate scrutiny—are likened to John Rawls’ original position and veil of 
ignorance but also the adamant cosmopolitanism of Jeremy Waldron and utilitarian 
math of Richard Posner.  The modified intermediate approach of the minority is 
compared with Ronald Dworkin’s equality of opportunity that would temporarily 
approve racially justified affirmative action.  Like the concurrence, Will 
Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism will justify identity-specific indigenous rights 
in terms of remedial self-determination but also in liberal terms as they buffer 
indigenous individuals against in-built majoritarian bias and discrimination and 
provide access to fundamental goods intrinsic to rational revision and a more level 
playing field.  Kymlicka’s reconciliation of Rawls and Dworkin will represent the 
project of the earnest liberal eager to address the guarantee/reality gap.  However, 
Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism remains less aware of deep, ongoing harm and 
ongoing injustice and would let individual everyone/no-one rights ‘trump’ 
indigenous group-differentiated rights, illustrating the limits of a more traditional 
liberal defence of the admissions policy.  Historical self-determination theory is, 
therefore, posited as a reconciliation of Kymlicka’s limits and, particularly, a liberal 
awareness of the deep ongoing harm attracted to Native Hawaiian identity 
consistent with the Native Hawaiian claims embodied in the amicus curiae briefs. 
As the works of many of these philosophers have been prolific, discussion focuses 
on aspects and sources most relevant to the thesis.  It also prioritises principles and 
concepts which are consistent throughout their writings. 
 
4.2 RAWLS, EVERYONE AND NO-ONE 
To us it seems that we have simply materialized, as it were, from nowhere at this 
position in this social world with all its advantages and disadvantages, according 
to our good or bad fortune.  I say from nowhere because we have no prior public 
or non-public identity: we have not come from somewhere else into this social 
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world.  Political society is closed: we come to be within it and we do not, and 
indeed cannot, enter or leave it voluntarily.2 
Robert Nozick3 once wrote that “[p]olitical philosophers now must either work 
within Rawls’ theory or explain why not”.4   In terms of this thesis, the late John 
Rawls 5  represents not only the benchmark of liberal equality but also the 
quintessential proponent of homogeneity and anonymity, the mainstream liberalist6 
and theoretical equivalent of the dissent in Doe v Kamehameha Schools generally.  
As the development of Rawls’ liberal theory is extensive—spanning more than 
three decades—this discussion, drawing on multiple sources,7 focuses on relevant 
principles which remain constant throughout his work.   
 
4.2.1 LIBERAL PROJECTS 
Liberal theorists presume that “[i]f we are to treat people as equals, we must protect 
them in their possession of certain rights and liberties”.8  A question which has 
                                                          
2  John Raws Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993) at 135-136.  
Compare with the decision in Lau v Nichols where the lower court was happy to allow students with 
limited English proficiency arrive in the classroom with apparent disadvantage: see discussion in 
Chapter Two. 
3 Rawls’ formal, procedural middle line of mainstream liberalism and Dworkin’s leanings to the 
interventionist left can be contrasted with the position of Robert Nozick on the right.  His theory, 
largely expressed in Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York, Basic Books, 1974), is most particularly 
characterized by an ardent, atomistic individualism and, convexly, his advocacy of the minimal or 
“night-watchman” state.   
4  Because John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1972) was, in 
Nozick’s estimation, “a powerful, deep, subtle, wide-ranging, systematic work in political and moral 
philosophy which has not seen its like since the writings of John Stuart Mill, if then”: Nozick, above 
n 2, at 183. 
5 1921-2002. 
6 Despite claims that Rawls’ theory is now defunct or disproved in some way, the sometimes 
scathing attacks upon his reasoning, and the criticism that his later works are inconsistent with his 
original theory, rare is the journal article or the book on the subject of contemporary political 
philosophy that does not refer to Rawls in some way.  The fact that he is almost inevitably the 
starting point for so many discussions on liberal rights is evidence of his substantial impact on 
political philosophy.  The fact that the dissent in Kamehameha in 2006 appeared to echo his 
prioritization of homogeneity and anonymity in rights distribution in their reasoning appears to 
illustrate the continuing relevance of Rawls to contemporary political philosophy and to indigenous 
rights conversations, regardless of whether one agrees with him or not. 
7 Including: Theory of Justice, above n 4; Political Liberalism above n 2; Samuel Freeman (ed), 
John Rawls: Collected Papers (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1999); John Rawls A 
Theory of Justice (rev ed, Cambridge MA, Belknap Press, 1999); John Rawls The Law of Peoples: 
With “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1999); and 
John Rawls (Erin Kelly (ed)) Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge MA, Belknap Press, 
2001). 
8 Will Kymlicka Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002) at 53. 
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preoccupied such thinkers is which rights and liberties9 should be protected, given 
the diversity of rights claims in modern liberal democracies.  However, that is 
closely tied to whose rights are—or are not—to be recognized.  Liberal theorists 
have traditionally recognized homogenously, anonymously and individually 
distributed civil and political rights held against the potential tyranny of the 
government 10  and other individuals which provide a protective constitutional 
framework of mostly negative rights around the rightsholder.11  These rights enable 
participation as a citizen in society and pursuit of one’s own “ultimate good” 
balanced against the rights of other citizens in pursuit of their own ultimate good.12   
Thus, liberals seek the maximization of the individual’s inherent freedom to choose 
their own life’s path, “the high value [liberal theorists] place on individual self-
determination” being what most unites13 and defines them.    
Rawls’ theory of justice equates anonymity with fairness14 and equality.  Before 
any rights are distributed, he would have us cover each individual’s identity behind 
a “veil of ignorance” preventing identification of any “arbitrary” features of this 
real person such as their age, gender, socio-economic status, family, ethnicity, or 
ambitions.15   This “original position” “conflat[es] all persons into one through the 
imaginative acts of the impartial spectator”.16   With everyone including ourselves 
                                                          
9 Ibid, at 53. 
10 Hence the requirement of a neutral state in mainstream liberal thinking: see David Morrice “The 
Liberal-Communitarian Debate in Contemporary Political Philosophy and Its Significance for 
International Relations” (2000) 26 Review of International Studies 233, at 236. Such rights include 
freedom of speech, thought and association, freedom from false imprisonment, and rights to due 
process and property.  Also see Ronald Dworkin “Rights as Trumps” in Jeremy Waldron (ed) 
Theories of Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984) 77 rights as freedom from government 
interference with choice. 
11 See, for example, the theory of John Locke discussed in Eric Mack and John Meadowcraft John 
Locke (New York, Continuum International Publishing, 2009). 
12 For an example of the liberal balancing act, again, see Dworkin, “Rights as Trumps”, above n10, 
at 77-90.  For Dworkin, the balancing act is not determined by a utilitarian calculation.  Rather, 
individual rights—for instance, a right to pornography—can trump other rights even where an 
opposing argument might be made for the greater benefit of restricting such a right.  Such a right 
protects that individual’s chosen ends from government interference—though, held against other 
individuals, also seems to trump the rights of other individuals.  The ultimate example of the liberal 
prioritization of the individually chosen ultimate good is the Declaration of Independence’s 
recognition of every person’s “inalienable” right to “life liberty and the pursuit of happiness”: 
Declaration of Independence (US 1776).   
13 Christopher Heath Wellman “Liberalism, Communitarianism, and Group Rights” (1999) 18 Law 
and Philosophy 13, at 13. 
14 For instance, in “Fairness to Goodness” in Freeman Collected Papers, above n 11, at 267-285. 
15 Theory of Justice, above n 11, at 16 and 190. 
16 Ibid, at 21.  “This conflation does not include the conflation of memories and desires into those 
of one person”: at 191, but it does relegate such arbitrary considerations to the private rather than 
public persona of the individual. 
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veiled, Rawls theorizes that we can more fairly judge what fundamental rights we 
would all choose for each and every person.17  If we are always someone else, then 
arbitrary “bargaining advantages” such as political position and socio-economic 
status which might affect our formulation of rights should be minimized. 18   
Unimpeded by our own identity and personal history we claim rights in education, 
de novo, free to pursue a rationally-chosen life path unhindered by such influences. 
Some have argued that the veil and the original position are only heuristic models 
of Rawls’ theory,19 or that we must distinguish between the “thick and thin”20 
versions of the theories in question.  However, any heuristic model is, in essence, 
the object lesson of the theory.  As described in the previous two chapters, the 
American legal landscape is profoundly marked by the prioritization of an 
everyone/no-one narrative that similarly affected the narratives in Kamehameha.   
The same narrative is also prioritized throughout Rawls’ writings. 
 
4.2.2 HOMOGENEITY AND ANONYMITY AS FAIRNESS 
Both homogeneity and anonymity are clearly evident in Rawls’ two fundamental 
principles of justice.21 The first requires that: 
Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and 
liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme 
the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair 
value.22 
The second addresses disparities: 
Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be 
attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
                                                          
17 Collected Papers, above n 7, at 267-285. 
18 Or advantages arising from the moral luck of birth: Political Liberalism, at 22-24.   
19 As a learned political science colleague argued after a conference presentation or only a “device 
of representation” as Rawls himself claims: for instance, see  Theory of Justice, at 24.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
20 As Michael Walzer’s somewhat schizophrenic response to Rawls and Dworkin attempts to do: 
see Michael Walzer Spheres of Justice (New York, Basic Books, 1983). 
21 Most fully developed in Political Liberalism, above n 2, at 4-6.  Also see Theory of Justice, above 
n 4, at 60. 
22Political Liberalism, ibid, at 3-4.  Emphasis added.  I have used the revised forms of the two basic 
principles rather than those first stated in Theory of Justice in accordance with Rawls’ self-admitted 
“correction” of Theory in Political Liberalism. 
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opportunity; and second; they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged 
members of society.23 
Rawls prioritizes the first principle24 where words and phrases such as, “each”, 
“adequate”, “basic”, “same”, and “for all” indicate that universality, uniformity, 
homogeneity, and minimalism—a sameness principle, as it were—are to regulate 
rights distribution.   Similarly, he later explains that the rights “to be guaranteed 
their fair value” are “primary goods”—or what all “free and equal citizens need and 
require...as normal and fully cooperating members of society over a complete 
life”.25   
For Rawls these uniformly distributed goods or rights are discoverable through the 
virtual phenomenon of public reason26  in the form of an “overlapping consensus” 
among anonymous, public individuals who simultaneously agree on the 
“reasonable (as opposed to unreasonable or irrational) comprehensive doctrines” 
which will respond to the endless number of competing claims within pluralistic 
democracies “independently of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral 
doctrines”.27   Like the Greek goddess Athena springing fully grown into being,28 
Rawls assumes that the original position will make us more “objective”,29 because 
we are able to “fram[e] our references from a shared point of view” which is more 
likely to result in overall agreement.  Freed from our own identity we are also 
somehow more “autonomous” as we somehow further our own ends without 
knowing them 30  but also choose “unanimity even when there is full 
information”31—perhaps even where we are aware of significant identity-specific 
disparities in education. 
                                                          
23 Ibid. 
24Political Liberalism, above n 7, at 6. 
25 Political Liberalism, above n 2, at 178. This phrase recalls assimilationist policy.  On primary 
goods see “Social Unity and Primary Goods” in Freeman, Collected Papers, above n 7, at 359-387. 
26 Political Liberalism, ibid, at 178.   
27 The features of overlapping consensus are summarized at Political Liberalism, at 144.  This is 
despite, for instance, the very different historico-legal experiences of indigenous communities and 
the consistently disenfranchised position of other minorities in modern liberal democracies.   
28 As Michael Walzer describes Rawls in Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad 
(Notre Dame IN, University of Notre Dame Press, 1994) at 12.  In Greek mythology, the goddess 
Athena is born from the head of Zeus fully grown and cognizant.   
29 Theory of Justice, above n 4, at 417 and 516-517. 
30 Ibid, at 136-142. 
31 Ibid, at 141. 
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In contrast, Rawls equates difference and identity generally with a mercurial,32 
“arbitrary” and private persona—a sort of closet personality that one cannot trust to 
be rational. 33   Fundamentally, he presumes that individual self-interest will 
overwhelm rationality if identity is not disregarded in rights distribution.  Thus, the 
first part of Rawls’ second principle—fair equality of opportunity34—requires “that 
positions should not only be open to all in the formal sense, but that all should have 
a fair chance to attain them”. 35  In other words, everyone is to be guaranteed 
equality of treatment rather than equality of outcome.36  As in the original position, 
Rawls seeks to “mitigate the influence of social contingencies on distributive 
shares” 37  by relying on the safeguard of procedural fairness and institutional 
neutrality, for example, in government’s either subsidizing private education or 
providing a public school system.38   
For Rawls, anything beyond a uniform distribution of rights governed by the 
principles of justice amounts to leaving rights to “a natural lottery”, “historical 
accident and social fortune”.39  Thus, even where the second principle initially 
appears to allow us to recognize difference in the form of disadvantage, the first 
principle takes precedent over the second.  The second is actually a restatement, or 
“underwriting”, of the “egalitarian” first principle40 mainly concerned with policy 
and practices that “exclude applicants [for offices and positions] of certain 
                                                          
32 In the original position, individuals will make decisions from a position of “mutually disinterested 
rationality” which prevents them from acting out of “affection”, “rancor” or “env[y]” or 
“maximiz[ing] or minimiz[ing] the difference between their successes and those of others”: Theory 
of Justice, at 144-145. 
33 For example, the kind of “irrational[]” person who decides principles of justice in terms of hair 
colour or skin colour or whether one is “born on a sunny day” as racists have done: Theory of Justice, 
at 149. 
34 Political Liberalism, above n 23. 
35 “Distributive Justice: Some Addenda” in Collected Papers, above n 7, 154 at 161.  See also Theory 
of Justice, above n 4, at 301.  
36 Instead, Rawls’ seeks to create the “well-ordered society”—that is, a just constitutional framework 
for social cooperation—rather than calculating the intricacies of each potential outcome for 
individuals under that system.  For Rawls, perfect or “pure” justice is expressed in “a correct or fair 
procedure such that the outcome is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the procedure 
has been properly followed”: Theory of Justice, ibid, at 86. Rawls relies on the presumption that a 
uniform distribution of fundamental constitutional guarantees will yield fair and equal opportunities 
and mutual advantage for all individuals in education.  Thus, equal institutions, and not individual 
circumstances, remain Rawls’ priority in the second principle. 
37 By “impos[ing] certain basic structural conditions on the social system”: “Distributive Justice: 
Some Addenda” in Collected Papers, above n 7, 154 at 161. 
38 Ibid, at 141. 
39 Ibid, at 162. 
40 Theory of Justice, above n 4, at 77 
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designated ethnic and racial groups, or of either sex”.41  The focus of the first 
subprinciple is negative “regulation”42 not acknowledging any identity in particular 
or making hearty assignments of identity-specific rights.   
The second subprinciple, known as the difference principle, proceeds on the 
premise that, assuming that there are two people who could possibly benefit from a 
distribution of rights: 
…unless there is a distribution that makes both persons better off…, an equal 
distribution is to be preferred…No matter how much either person’s situation is 
improved, there is no gain from the standpoint of the difference principle unless 
the other gains also.43 
Rawls would allow social inequalities provided that “these improve everyone’s 
situation, including that of the least advantaged” in accordance with “equal liberty 
and opportunity”. Since everyone starts off with equal shares, the least 
advantaged—those who benefit least from natural distribution of talents, wealth and 
other arbitrary attributes—supposedly have a kind of “veto”. 44    
However, the difference principle will only operate where, for instance, both the 
indigenous child and John Doe are better off, a requirement which supports Doe’s 
arguments in the case rather than the Schools’.  And it is not meant to level the 
playing field.  As Rawls states:  
…the difference principle is not, of course, the principle of redress.  It does not 
require society to try to even out handicaps as if all were expected to compete on a 
fair basis in the same race.  But the difference principle would allocate resources 
in education, say, so as to improve the long-term expectation of the least 
favoured.45 
Rawls presumes that a uniform distribution of rights over time within a procedurally 
just framework—or “just savings”—will even out inequalities.46   
                                                          
41 Political Liberalism, above n 2, at 363.   
42 Theory of Justice, above n 4, at 84; and Political Liberalism, ibid, at 364. 
43 Theory of Justice at 76.  Emphasis added. 
44 “A Kantian Concept of Equality” in Collected Papers, above n 7, 254 at 262.  Rawls’ just savings 
depends on incremental gains over generations to even out the kind of disparities affecting the 
indigenous child, who would obviously qualify as ‘the least favored’. 
45 Theory of Justice, above n 2, at 101.   
46 See ibid at 284-298.   
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Approximating strict scrutiny tests applied in Regents of the University of 
California v Bakke (1978) and its anti-affirmative action progeny,47 neither Rawls’ 
first or second principle seem to justify differentiating between policies meant to 
assist disadvantaged groups and those which deliberately disadvantage a group.  
Nor might they recognize the historico-legal peculiarities of Hawaiian history—or 
any history for that matter.  Much like the Kamehameha dissent’s exclusion of 
history,48 Rawls’ exclusion of context would appear to given an inaccurate picture 
and minimize the discrimination in question.  As a restatement of the identity-blind 
first principle, the second, presumably, generally makes the identification of ‘the 
least favored’ nearly impossible. 
 
4.2.3 THE HARD CASE 
Admittedly, Rawls confessed that equality of opportunity might be jeopardized by 
great inequality.49  In fact, he published A Theory of Justice in 1972 during the post-
Brown era.50    
Justice as fairness nevertheless espouses a highly formalized, individualized 
version of equality which fundamentally presumes an adversarial relationship 
between rightsholders’ claims and identities, hence the need for veiling and interest 
conflation.  While the veil of ignorance is admittedly an anonymizing device, the 
original position, overlapping consensus and the very exercise of public reason are 
homogenizing features which conflate individual interests, thereby inherently 
prioritizing majoritarian even utilitarian interests.  Both the veil and the original 
position require a significant degree of historical abstraction, while interest 
conflation and public agreement generally can only promise the recognition of a 
                                                          
47 Regents of the University of California v Bakke 438 US 265 (1978) discussed in Chapter Two in 
terms of the demise of affirmative action at 2.4.1. 
48 See Chapter Three at 3.5.5. 
49 Collected Papers, above n 7, at 143. 
50 Theory of Justice, above n 2, was published in 1971. 
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minimum number of common, basic, immediate rights determined by majority 
interests.51 
Rawls never wrote on affirmative action52 but Samuel Freeman, Rawls’ colleague 
and editor, related that: 
So-called “affirmative action,” or giving preferential treatment for socially 
disadvantaged minorities, is not part of FEO [Fair Equality of Opportunity] for 
Rawls, and is perhaps incompatible with it. This does not mean that Rawls never 
regarded preferential treatment in hiring and education as appropriate. In lectures 
he indicated that it may be a proper corrective for remedying the present effects of 
past discrimination. But this assumes it is temporary. Under the ideal conditions of 
a “well-ordered society,” Rawls did not regard preferential treatment as compatible 
with fair equality of opportunity. It does not fit with the emphasis on individuals 
and individual rights, rather than groups or group rights, that is central to 
liberalism.53 
At best, Rawls’ outer limits would reluctantly approach the Weber-Johnson 
criteria54 in recognizing a temporary, individualized exception to the general rule 
of anonymity and homogeneity.   The Weber-Johnson test was, in fact, only 
triggered after the Court recognized a rebuttable presumption of discrimination 
against the Schools’ admissions policy.  According to the curt test set out in 
Patterson v McLean Credit Union, once the Schools admitted that the policy 
preferred any students on the basis of ‘race’—once it recognized difference or 
identity, as it were—the policy was presumed to be discriminatory.  The burden of 
proving otherwise then shifted to the Schools. 55    
 
4.3 RIGID INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY: POSNER AND WALDRON  
The stricter interpretation of the intermediate Weber-Johnson test by the 
Kamehameha dissent, but especially the dissent’s fallback to Runyon v McCrary56, 
represents an extreme version of Rawls’ everyone/no-one narrative but also the 
                                                          
51 Note the lack of constitutional and human rights to education in federal law: discussed in Chapter 
Two at 2.5. 
52 See Thomas Nagel “John Rawls and Affirmative Action” (2003) 39 J Blacks High Educ 82 at 82. 
53 Samuel Freeman, quoted in Robert S Taylor “Rawlsian Affirmative Action” (2009) 119 Ethics 
476 at 476. 
54 Discussed in Chapter Three at 3.5.1. 
55 Paterson v McLean Credit Union 491 US (1989). 
56 Runyon v McCrary 427 US 160 (1976). 
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more adamant everyone/no-one theories of Richard Posner and Jeremy Waldron.  
Their respective arguments for homogeneity and anonymity resound with a 
dichotomized, racially defined equality narrative and the same species of almost 
wilful blindness displayed by the dissent, particularly Judge Bybee, towards the 
historico-legal peculiarities of Hawaii.57   Posner’s utilitarian math—so much like 
the public/private funding question but also the reasoning in Plessy—is 
dichotomous but seemingly unconscious to historical context and ongoing 
realities—the essence of anonymity and the original position.  Waldron’s 
cosmopolitan and supersession projects actually, to some degree, admit the 
moʻolelo but disconnect that context—the harm itself—from ongoing 
discrimination and disparities.  At his most adamant, Waldron appears to belittle 
the history and the harm while conflating all identities into one which masks actual 
inequalities and majoritarian bias.   
 
4.3.1 TASTES, TRANSACTIONS AND UTILITARIAN MATH 
The previous chapter described the private/public funding query as creating an 
arbitrary line which has little to do with actual disparities but everything to do with 
the cost to non-preferred individuals.58   Chapter Two previously described the 
larger shift in federal reasoning which has transferred concern from actual identity-
attracted disparities to preoccupation with the effect of remedial measures on 
majority individuals largely.  Richard Posner’s economic analysis of law theory 
espouses a similar cost-benefit analysis. 
The theory of Richard Allen Posner has been highly influential in the fields of law 
and economics.59  He is also a veteran judge on the United States Court of Appeals 
                                                          
57 See discussion in previous chapter at 3.5.5. 
58 See discussion in Chapter Three on Ninth Circuit’s decision not to apply strict scrutiny to the 
admissions policy because the school is privately funded in Chapter Three at 3.6.   
59 Former Harvard law professor and current associate justice of the US Supreme Court, Elena 
Kagan has stated that “Richard Posner is the most important legal thinker of our time, and for 
generations to come legal scholars will dissect and analyse, will praise and criticize, his distinctive 
legal vision”; Elena Kagan “Commentaries: Richard Posner, The Judge” (2005) 120 Harvard L Rev 
1121 at 1121.  He is generally credited with revolutionizing the field of law and economics: for 
instance, see Sophie Harnay and Alain Marciano “Posner, Economics and the Law: From ‘Law and 
Politics’ to an Economic Analysis of Law” (2009) 31(2) J Hist Econ Thought 215.   
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for the Seventh Circuit60 uniquely situated to comment on the algebra of rights 
distribution in real-time federal courts. 61   His practical, “scientific” 62  liberal 
approach to the law, introduced in The Economics of Justice63 and expanded in The 
Economic Analysis of Law,64 rests on a “pragmatic” calculation of the costs of rights 
versus their benefits for individuals and society as a whole.  Posner never claims a 
moral high ground but rather that his theory explains and predicts the reasoning65 
of judges66 “trying to maximize economic welfare” in an exercise paralleling “a 
free market operating without significant externality, monopoly, or information 
problems.67   
Regarding distribution, Posner assumes, as economists do, that individuals make 
choices “in a world in which resources are limited in relation to human wants”, and 
that each individual “is a rational maximizer of the ends in his life, his 
satisfactions—what we shall call his ‘self-interest’”.68  Not unlike Rawls, Posner 
assumes that “man is a rational utility maximize in all areas of life”.  Rights 
distribution approximates transactions between individuals within liberal 
democracies, where individuals pursue individual wealth maximization.  As in 
economics, these transactions involve costs and trade-offs, both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary, which individuals may or may not be willing to pay in order to profit 
from the transaction.  Such costs are relative to the value each individual places on 
the transaction and not just actual price.69  As in free-market theory, the most 
efficient distributions are those which are voluntary in a less-regulated 
                                                          
60  See “Contact Information” United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit 
<www.ca7.uscourts.gov>. 
61 Posner’s own theory and practice on the bench is critiqued and explored in countless journal 
articles.  For just a few examples, see Jerry M Santangelo “Changing Configurations of Antitrust 
Law: Judge Posner’s Applications of His Economic Analysis to Antitrust Doctrine” (1983) 32 De 
Paul L Rev 839; and Lawrence A Cunningham “Traditional versus Economic Analysis: Evidence 
from Cardozo and Posner Torts Opinions” (2010) 62(3) Florida L Rev 667. 
62 Posner quoted in Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen Law and Economics (6th ed, Boston MA, 
Addison-Wesley, 2012) at 1. 
63 Richard A Posner The Economics of Justice (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1981).  
64 Richard A Posner Economic Analysis of the Law (3rd ed, Boston, Little and Brown, 1986). 
65 Richard A Posner Economic Analysis of the Law (2d ed, Boston, Little and Brown, 1977) at 10. 
66 Richard A Posner Economic Analysis of the Law (4th ed, Boston, Little and Brown, 1992) at 23. 
67 Posner Economics of Justice, above n 63, at 4-5. 
68 Economic Analysis (1977), above n 65, at 3.  Though Posner argues that self-interest does not 
mean selfishness as self-interest can include the happiness of others: Richard A Posner Economic 
Analysis of the Law (6th ed, New York, Aspen, 2003) at 3-4. 
69 Economic Analysis (2003), ibid, at 5-10. 
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environment.70   While not supposedly utilitarian,71  an overall just distribution 
“exploit[s] …resources in such a way that ‘value’—human satisfaction as measured 
by aggregate consumer willingness to pay for goods and services—is 
maximized”.72   
In somewhat simplistic terms, Posner views discrimination as a series of 
transactions between ethnic and racial groups73 where the majority represents an 
economic superpower while the minority is extremely vulnerable74 to market forces 
and where racial identity equates to “information costs”. 75.  Despite this, Posner 
trusts the free-market system to minimize discrimination because he assumes that—
despite a history of economic exploitation by majoritarian interests which has 
disadvantaged indigenous peoples globally—enough majority members will 
choose economic advantage over prejudice.76  Posner, for instance, would have 
                                                          
70 Economic Analysis (1977), above n 65, at 10.  Emphasis added.  Compare with Civil Rights Cases 
109 US 3 (1883); and Plessy v Ferguson 163 US 537 (1896) where de facto equality was left to 
majoritarian bias: discussed in Chapter Two at 2.2.2. 
71 Economics of Justice, above n 63, at 47-56. 
72 Economic Analysis (1977), above n 65,  at 10.  Emphasis added.  Also see Economics of Justice, 
ibid, at 61. 
73 Prejudiced members of the majority group forgo advantageous economic and other transactions, 
such as real estate and employment, with members of the minority in exchange for the non-pecuniary 
advantages of not having to associate with members of the other group: Economics of Justice, ibid, 
at 351.  As there is little difference in Posner’s position on discrimination between Economics of 
Justice and more recent versions of the Economic Analysis of Law, for instance, the 2003 edition, I 
have referred to the original authority for his views.  For a more recent discussion: see Economic 
Analysis of the Law (2003), above n 69, at 681-692.  Crucially, Posner still views discrimination as 
a kind of consumer choice and tries to explain non-discrimination in terms of transactional costs 
largely in a present tense.  The immediacy and flat math of his economic approach seems to preclude 
the higher costs inflicted on racial minorities by historic injustice and ongoing harm. 
74 Within the liberal democracy, the majority group is equal to an economic superpower such as the 
United States in international trade which can afford to be selective in its transactions, while the 
minority group is as vulnerable to prejudice as Switzerland’s much smaller economy is to changes 
in the tastes or preferences of Americans for chocolate, for instance: Economics of Justice, above n 
63, at 351-352.   
75 Economics of Justice at 362-363.  For Posner, discrimination is more than a taste and may be 
caused by “[s]heer malevolence and irrationality”, or might be anticompetitive—as in the internment 
Japanese-Americans during World War II—or exploitative—as in the case of slavery .  The most 
important explanatory factor in such instances is “information costs”: “To the extent that race or 
some attribute similarly difficult to conceal (sex, accent) is positively correlated with undesired 
characteristics or negatively correlated with desired characteristics, it is rational for people to use 
the attribute as a proxy for the underlying characteristic with which it is correlated…[T]he costs in 
valuable associations forgone may be smaller than the information costs of making a more extensive 
sampling.  Discrimination so motivated is no different in its fundamental economic character (its 
distributive effects may of course be different) from a decision to stop buying Brand X toothpaste 
because of an unhappy experience with a previous purchase of it, albeit the next experience with the 
brand might have been better. It is no different in its fundamental economic character from the use 
of information about a person’s criminal record to infer his likely fitness as  an employee, an example 
of the use of proxies to economize on information costs…”: Economics of Justice, ibid, at 362-363. 
76 Some members of the majority will be only mildly prejudiced and will transact with minority 
members anyway because they will not pass up advantageous transactions.  Their distribution costs 
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decided Brown v Board of Education77  on economic reasoning: segregation is 
wrong, not for moral reasons or its substantial effect on minority children, but 
because it reduces their transactional power.78   
Posner’s utilitarian balancing of costs and benefits, of competing interests as ends 
unto themselves, rather than any reference to any overarching principles of justice 
might explain the public/private line in the strict scrutiny standard, as well as the 
Weber-Johnson trammelling criterion.  Specifically addressing preferential 
admissions policies, Posner questions whether historic injustice can be rectified 
through preference or it simply amounts to reverse discrimination.79  He objects to 
using proxy characteristics—for instance, diversity rather than a particular race or 
ethnicity itself, or the presumption that diversity automatically counters 
discrimination, exclusion and poverty, even where that may not be the individual 
case80 as this involves a “conclusive presumption…that an individual possesses 
some attribute” that justifies their admission, a presumption reminiscent of those 
bigots base their particular prejudice on.81  “[I]dentity” itself becomes a “proxy”.82 
While minimizing the actual disparities of the indigenous learner, Posner, like the 
dissent, imagines the non-preferred student subject to disparities “for no better 
reason than that [his] group lacks one of the racial or ethnic characteristics used for 
administrative convenience to determine entitlement to preferential treatment.”83  
Posner also apparently rejects multigenerational trauma and allostatic load since 
beneficiaries of preferential policies are unlikely to be direct victims of injustice 
                                                          
will be lower because of this and they should come to dominate the “market”: Economics of Justice, 
ibid, at 352.  That is, they have an incentive to not discriminate against minorities. 
77 See discussion in Economics of Justice, ibid, at 354. 
78 That is, as it “reduces the opportunities for associations between races, associations that would be 
especially valuable to blacks because of the dominant economic position of the whites in society”: 
Economics of Justice, ibid, at 355.  Posner explains that we can distinguish between the freedom of 
association claims of the majority and legitimate discrimination claims of the minority in such cases 
in this way: “Because blacks are an economic minority, the costs to them of the whites’ prejudice 
are proportionately greater than the costs to the whites.  This is not to say that discrimination is 
inefficient but that discrimination has systematic redistributive effects that could be used as the 
premise of a neutral, though not wealth-maximizing, anti-discrimination principle”: Economics of 
Justice, ibid, at 355. 
79 Ibid, at 361.   
80 Ibid, at 367.  Note that Posner’s example represents the last bastion of affirmative action currently 
approved by the Supreme Court—at least for now: see Gratz v Bollinger 539 US 244 (2003); Grutter 
v Bollinger 539 US 306 (2003); Schuette v Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action 572 US___ (2014). 
81 Economics of Justice, ibid, at 368. 
82 Ibid, at 370. 
83 Ibid, at 371. 
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and the non-preferred students who pay the costs of preference are not perpetrators 
of the injustice.84 Countering diversity arguments, professional underrepresentation 
is also unacceptable because there is no way of knowing whether the minorities 
preferred would supply a certain percentage of the nation’s lawyers, for instance, if 
not for discrimination.  Neither is there any guarantee that minorities will go on to 
serve their communities as counsel for Kamehameha Schools argued.85  And as 
long as any member of that minority group graduates in a certain profession, those 
that follow should know that way is open.86 
Ultimately, for Posner, “it is not permissible for the government to distribute 
benefits and costs on racial and ethnic grounds”.  A preferential policy might be 
efficient because of lower proxy costs but may also allow significant discrimination 
by giving judges the freedom to “pick and choose among discriminatory measures 
on the basis of personal values, for the weighing of the relevant costs and benefits 
would largely be subjective” 87   Posner does support anti-discrimination law 
because “discrimination imposes proportionally greater costs on the minority than 
on the discriminating majority”.  But he sees preferential admissions policies and 
other affirmative action policies as discrimination, too, one indistinguishable from 
the other.88 
Posner may just be frankly admitting that this is the way judges decide cases, but 
his approach should, like the dissent in Kamehameha Schools, worry the earnest 
liberal.  Even more than Rawls, Posner’s individual is a sort of proto-human, 
consisting largely of self-interest—of wants, desires, “tastes” and “preferences” 
lacking even the basic needs and primary goods which Rawls would afford them.89  
Similarly, Posner’s comparison of discrimination to, for instance, one’s choice of 
toothpaste cannot account for the multigenerational, cumulative and complex 
species of discrimination and disparities affecting Native Hawaiians despite formal 
                                                          
84 Ibid, at 372.  Specifically, in regards to the appropriateness of reparations.  He does make a 
possible exception for Native Americans based on treaty arrangements.   
85 Ibid, at 372.   
86 Ibid, at 373.  Compare with reasoning in San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez 
411 US 1 (1973) that as long as poor children were receiving education than they were equal 
protected: see discussion in Chapter Two at 2.5. 
87 Economics of Justice, above n 63, at 378. 
88 Ibid, at 407. 
89 See Rawls’ primary goods discussed above at 4.2.2.   
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guarantees of equality90 nor their unique historico-legal situation.  Posner’s stance 
on reverse discrimination91 similarly appears to neglect Rawls’ rational revision 
project altogether as discrimination simply amounts to a ‘taste’.   
Posner’s simplistic approach to gauging satisfaction, both individual and aggregate, 
also raises questions of whose satisfactions and costs matter.  In terms of individual 
satisfaction, judging admissions on a case-by-case basis provides an inaccurate 
gauging of guarantee/disparity gaps and ongoing harm not unlike Judge Bybee’s 
insistence on an internal trammelling context.  Alternately, Posner rejects a 
utilitarian label but also gauges justice on aggregate satisfaction in a liberal 
democracy, an exercise which seemingly leaves de facto equality to majoritarian 
interests and even majorititarian bias as the Supreme Court did in Plessy. 
Like Rawls, Posner fails to address the hard case, leaving much to Herculean92 
judges with few distributive principles to guide them.   Like the dissent, Posner fails 
to look beyond the black/white dichotomy although modern liberal democracies are 
multicultural with various stakeholders.  Posner also presumes that identity-based 
claims entail a burden on the public at large much like the Weber-Johnson test itself 
in terms at both trammelling and temporariness steps.  Like the trammelling 
question, Posner’s is not necessarily whether identity-aware rights entail a burden 
but how much of a burden is too much for other individuals to assume.   
Ironically, in terms of a stricter scrutiny, the facts in Kamehameha show that the 
Native Hawaiian institution receives no subsidization from the public at large.  
Rather as described in Chapter Three,93 the Schools are entirely privately funded, 
heavily or fully subsidizing the indigenous learner in an apparent exercise of self-
determination.  As its levels of academic achievement suggest, the Schools also 
apparently foster ideal conditions for rational revision enhancement—even a level 
playing field from which its students set out on their chosen life path.  From a purely 
economic point of view, the Schools are a success story, exhibiting the kind of 
                                                          
90 See Posner’ discussion on reverse discrimination at Economic Analysis of the Law (2003) at 689, 
including his equation of discrimination and reverse discrimination.  See Economics of Justice at 
61-63, 64-65 for examples of his justice math. 
91 Economic Analysis of the Law (2003), above n 69, at 689. 
92 See Ronald Dworkin’s model judge who is able to decide the hard case objectively, or his “judge 
as Hercules”: Ronald Dworkin Law’s Empire (London, Fontana, 1986); and Justice in Robes 
(Cambridge MA, Belknap Press 2006).  
93 See discussion on the Schools’ private nature at 3.5. 
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individual and aggregate satisfaction which is meant to drive rightsholders.  Thus, 
the Schools should represent a multiplication of a Coase Theorem94 calculation of 
happiness and some measure of Posner’s satisfaction.  Interference with the freely 
chosen pursuit of those goods with no apparent utilitarian burden for the public at 
large—albeit by a collective group of individuals—must surely offend a similar 
Coase analysis.  
However, Posner’s economic approach might just as easily be used to interpret 
present disparities as a symptom of significantly higher transactional costs for 
Native Hawaiians in relation to other individuals, perhaps even wealth or 
satisfaction minimization or denial.  And yet, like the dissent, Posner’s homogenous 
and anonymous utilitarian math is unlikely to approve an identity-aware preference 
for a minority group whose satisfaction is subsumed in the greater utilitarian 
equation.  Given such tendencies, Posner—and Law and Economics generally—
has been criticized, among other things, for “veil[ing] a preference for the 
maintenance of the status quo” and various biases.95 
 
4.3.2 DISNEYLAND AND HISTORICAL SUPERSESSION 
Are these goods secured when a dwindling band of demoralized individuals 
continues, against all odds, to meet occasionally to wear their national costumes, 
recall snatches of their common history, practice their religious and ethnic rituals, 
and speak what they can remember of what was once a flourishing tongue?96 
What may be more concerning to the earnest liberal than the private/public funding 
line is that Judge Bybee and others were willing to breach it, being adamant that a 
stricter scrutiny was the proper standard to apply to the admissions policy—
regardless of the school’s private character.  That propensity emphasizes how thin 
an already arbitrary line is—especially given the precedent in Runyon where the 
                                                          
94  See Posner’s formula for wealth maximization/satisfaction/happiness based on the Coase 
Theorem, a sort of graph tracking opportunity costs for transactions: see Economic Analysis (2003), 
above n 69, at 7.  See also Richard A Posner and Francesco Parisi (eds) The Coase Theorem, Volume 
I: Origins, Restatements and Extensions (Cheltenham Glos UK, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013).    
95 See, for instance, Martha Albertson Fineman and Terence Dougherty (eds) Feminism Confronts 
Homoe Economicus: Gender, Law & Society (Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press, 2005). 
96 Jeremy Waldron “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Advantage” in Will Kymlicka (ed) 
The Rights of Minority Cultures (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995) 93 [“Cosmopolitan 
Advantage”] at 97. 
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school in question was private.97  It also, again, signals the operation of an extreme 
version of the everyone/no-one narrative wilfully blind to present guarantee/reality 
gaps and the unique historico-legal context of the admission policy. 
Jeremy Waldron, an “expatriate New Zealander”,98 is a legal positivist influenced 
by Ronald Dworkin,99 as well as John Locke100 and Joseph Raz.101  Waldron has 
also been influential over the last two decades and deliberately addresses 
indigenous rights claims including questions of historical self-determination and 
past injustices.  However, in doing so, Waldron exhibits a wilful blindness to 
present inequalities and historical context reminiscent of the dissent in 
Kamehameha. 
Under the guise of plurality, Jeremy Waldron idealizes the cosmopolitan individual, 
a proudly homogenous, ‘‘mixed-up”, “freewheeling” identity with no deep 
affiliations publicly or privately102 devoid of identities, cultural or otherwise, which 
“he” 103  absolutely needs 104  as an apparently continuously recurring de novo 
personality—though he does owe a duty of acknowledgment and Aristotlean 
“friendship” to the global “community” of which he is a part as a modern, 
“interdependent” human being.  This “hybrid”, “mongrel” person glories in being 
a “mixed-up” individual in a “mixed up world”, and in experiencing life and 
pursuing arbitrary ends as if selecting meals from a Chinese restaurant or travelling 
as a “frequent flyer”.105   
                                                          
97 See discussion in Chapter Three at 3.6. 
98 Mark J Bennett and Nicole Roughan “Rebus Sic Stantibus and the Treaty of Waitangi” (2006) 37 
VULWR 505 at 505. 
99 Who supervised him at Oxford University: Jeremy Waldron “Remembering Ronald Dworkin” 
The Chronicle of Higher Education (online ed, Washington DC, 19 February 2013).  He also, 
admittedly, had significant disagreements with Dworkin over constitutional protection of hate 
speech. 
100 See, for instance, Jeremy Waldron God, Locke and Equality: Christian Foundations in Locke’s 
Political Thought (Cambridge UK, Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
101 See his discussion on Raz in Jeremy Waldron Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981-1991 
(Cambridge UK, University of Cambridge, 1993) [Liberal Rights].  Also see an example of his 
disagreement with Raz (and Rawls) in Jeremy Waldron “Human Rights: A Critique of the 
Raz/Rawls Approach” (2013) New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers 
405. 
102 “Cosmopolitan Advantage”, Waldron above n 96, at 110. 
103 In “Cosmopolitan Advantage”, Waldron usually refers to the liberal individual in the male sense. 
104 “Cosmopolitan Advantage”, above n 102, at 100. 
105 Ibid, at 95. 
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Waldron contrasts this everyone/no-one ideal with the indigenous individual 
claiming special rights outside the modern order of things, a relic limited by his or 
her insistence on an “artificial”, irrelevant communal identity which rejects modern 
technology and democratic participation.  Like the Rice majority,106 Waldron views 
cosmopolitanism as progressive: 
Nor are the citizens of the world, the modernist dreamers of cosmopolis, proposing 
exactly to destroy minority cultures.  Their apartments are quite likely decorated 
with Inuit artifacts or Maori carvings.  Still we know that a world in which 
deracinated cosmopolitanism flourishes is not a safe place for minority 
communities.  Our experience has been that they wither and die in the harsh glare 
of modern life, and that the custodians of these dying traditions live out their lives 
in misery and demoralization.107 
Waldron displays an almost personal distaste for indigenous identity which he 
depicts as an arbitrary, interchangeable choice not a primary good.  In ‘dying race’ 
terms, that choice is incompatible with the modern world, tantamount to racism and 
irrelevant except as an artistic value. 108 
But Waldron goes further: 
Let me state it provocatively.  From a cosmopolitan point of view, immersion in 
the traditions of a particular community in the modern world is like living in 
Disneyland and thinking that one’s surroundings epitomize what it is for a culture 
really to exist.  Worse still, it is demanding the funds to live in Disneyland and the 
protection of modern society for the boundaries of Disneyland, while still 
managing to convince oneself that what is happening inside Disneyland is all there 
is to an adequate and fulfilling life.  It is like thinking that what every person most 
deeply needs is for one of the Magic Kingdoms to provide a framework for her 
choice and her beliefs, completely neglecting the fact that the framework of 
Disneyland depends upon our commitments, structures, and infrastructures that far 
outstrip the character of any particular facade.  It is to imagine that one could 
belong to Disneyland while professing complete indifference towards, or even 
disdain for, Los Angeles.109 
Again, Waldron presumes that indigenous rights require complete immersion in a 
remote, frozen, pre-colonization culture that indigenous people expect others to pay 
for, or even dishonest, unfair public subsidization.  Reducing rights to their bare, 
                                                          
106 See discussion on Rice majority minimisation of unique historico-legal context of the OHA 
voting requirement and emphasis on influx of other ethnic groups in Chapter Three at 3.4.2. 
107 “Cosmopolitan Advantage”, above n 96, at 99. 
108  Waldron’s Disneyland thesis presumes, for instance, that indigenous people reject modern 
technology. 
109 “Cosmopolitan Advantage”, above n 96, at 101. 
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negative minimum,110 Waldron argues that indigenous rights lack the “authenticity” 
of individual civil and political rights because of this subsidization and cannot 
demand the same respect.  Just as meat lovers can learn to subsist on a vegetarian 
diet, the indigenous child can have a “rich and “fulfilling” life 111  in a liberal 
democracy without special rights not vital to individual autonomy.   A lack of 
indigenous-specific rights is “like the death of a hobby, not the demise of anything 
that people really need”.112   
Waldron’s basic cosmopolitan theory seems to ignore both the moʻolelo and present 
discrimination and disparities entirely, but his more recent writings on 
supersession113 address the moʻolelo directly.  However, supersession often just 
sounds like a more politically-correct version of his Disneyland thesis.  The thrust 
is that, even if significant injustices were committed historically—injustices which 
might justify compensation, for instance—transactions between individuals have 
moved on since then to such an extent that there is no way to correct those injustices.  
One cannot change the past and often the facts of history can be mistaken 
anyway.114  Treaties like those which undergird the Mancari exception, the special 
trust relationship and political status generally may have a limited warranty, in 
Waldron’s estimation, as history moves on.115  Indigenous peoples should, therefore, 
accept the current status quo and adapt without special rights or political identity 
which affect the holdings of non-indigenous individuals who did not personally 
commit historic injustices or reverse discrimination.116   
                                                          
110 The most persuasive argument Waldron makes in “Cosmopolitan Advantage” is his likening of 
the strength of indigenous rights claims to the standing of freedom of religion.  Freedom of religion 
is largely a negative right.  Waldron argues that no one would subsidize a dying religion and neither 
should we subsidize a dying culture: ibid, at 100. 
111 Ibid, at 99-100. 
112 Ibid, at 100. 
113 Jeremy Waldron “Superseding Historic Injustice” (1992) Ethics 103 4; “Redressing Historic 
Injustice” (2002) 52 U Toronto L J 135 “Indigeneity?: First Peoples and Last Occupancy” (2003) 1 
NZJPIL 55. 
114 “Superseding Historic Injustice”, ibid. 
115 See Jeremy Waldron “The Half-Life of Treaties: Waitangi, Rebus Sic Stantibus” (2005) 11 Otago 
L Rev 161 [“Half-Life”]. 
116 For instance, “Superseding Historic Injustice”, above n 113, at 25: “Apart from anything else, 
the changes that have taken place over the past two hundred years mean that the costs of respecting 
primeval entitlements are much greater now than they were in 1800. Two hundred years ago, a small 
aboriginal group could have exclusive domination of "a large and fruitful Territory" without much 
prejudice to the needs and interests of very many other human beings. Today, such exclusive rights 
would mean many people going hungry who might otherwise be fed and many people living in 
poverty who might otherwise have an opportunity to make a decent life. Irrespective of the 
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Waldron’s cosmopolitan, historically abstract individual contrasts with both the 
majority decision and concurrence but resembles the dissent’s willingness to breach 
the public/private line and apply stricter scrutiny.  For Waldron, no one community 
can or does provide the context of our choices117 because indigenous cultures are 
not homogenous or “pure” but the result of the input of varied “cultural materials 
which enter our lives in many different ways”.118   Similarly, the dissent in KS 
focused on non-Hawaiians who are socially and economically disadvantaged119 and 
the first panel in the Ninth Circuit held that “race-conscious programs must be 
designed to minimize—if not avoid—burdens upon nonculpable parties”. 120  
Waldron would seemingly conclude that no one school, private or public, with 
specific curriculum content, language of instruction and culturally-appropriate 
pedagogy will be vital enough to the development of the rational revision of an 
individual indigenous child to justify reverse discrimination.   
Despite the moʻolelo of complex discrimination and disparities common to 
indigenous peoples globally and particularly within the United States and New 
Zealand, Waldron fundamentally rejects the notion that indigenous identity or 
history is of “practical importance” 121  to present liberal claims.  Waldron’s 
supersession thesis is, therefore, the height of historical abstraction and a highly 
formalized but also idealized version of equality unmoved by actual disparities.   
Ultimately, Waldron’s cosmopolitan and supersession theses resemble a misplaced 
Plessy-like reliance on everyone/no-one guarantees masking majoritarian bias to 
even out inequalities and even echo assimilative federal policy.  In contrast to Rawls’ 
at least initially neutral original position and rational revision, Waldron is 
prescriptive, even paternalistic: in order to be part of the modern world—to be a 
participant in democracy—the indigenous learner must embrace cosmopolitanism.  
We must show disdain for our own identity, eat food, listen to music and speak 
languages not our own122—values and ends we might not otherwise choose.  In fact, 
                                                          
occurrence of past injustice, this imbalance would have to be rectified sooner or later. That is the 
basis for my argument…” 
117 “Cosmopolitan Advantage”, above n 96, at 106. 
118 Ibid, at 108. 
119 Doe v Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate 416 F3d 1025 (9th Cir 2005) at 8952. 
120 Ibid. 
121 “Superseding Historic Injustice”, above n 113, at 4. 
122 “Cosmopolitan Advantage”, above n 96, at 95.  Knowledge of Spanish marks a cosmopolitan 
gentleman while indigenous languages are relics of a backwards or frozen past. 
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we must pursue a wide and varied range of ends even if we may rationally choose 
just our indigenous identity after weighing all options.   
In fact, Waldron seems to require that the indigenous learner be much like himself.  
His cosmopolitan personality is apparently male, a collector of souvenirs and ethnic 
art, an opera aficionado, and can afford to eat out, fly and otherwise pursue upper 
middle class luxuries “frequent[ly]” 123 —pursuits in stark contrast to the 
multigenerational trauma, extreme allostatic load, cumulative, cyclical and 
otherwise complex discrimination and disparities experienced by many Native 
Hawaiians.  In fact, Waldron’s individual is assumed to be an adult with full mental 
and socio-economic capacity to make such smorgasbord choices rather than a child 
who may not.  To some extent, Rawls and Posner make a similar assumption.  
Rather than fairness, Waldron seems to evoke Rawls’ worst fears about 
arbitrariness—the personification of unequal circumstances. Taken literally, his 
freewheeling cosmopolitan individual has few checks on his choices, legitimate or 
not, and little disregard for others. Ironically, while passionately arguing that the 
indigenous individual have the freedom to be anyone they choose, Waldron 
presupposes a narcissistic, essentially majoritarian identity for the indigenous 
learner.  In doing so, he merely reiterates centuries of integration-justified 
discriminatory language, law, policy, and practice which have historically 
disadvantaged the indigenous child in education—or the moʻolelo itself.   
In contrast to other legal scholars who fail to grapple with indigenous issues and 
history, Waldron consciously and wilfully ignores historic injustices that impact 
present rights distributions and outcomes.  A number of scholars have particularly 
criticized Waldron’s historical supersession project because it disregards the 
continuing legality and relevance of historic rights to self-determination,124  the 
causal connection between present rights denials and historic wrongs, and the 
causal connection between the historic injustices, ongoing harm and future rights 
denials.  These realities justify present not just historic rights claims. 
                                                          
123 “Cosmopolitan Advantage”, above n 96, at 95. 
124 Bennett and Roughan, above n 97. 
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In some ways, Waldron and Posner represent the extreme version of Rawls, with 
utilitarian math and majoritarian bias barely disguised in everyone/no-one 
arguments.  However, while Rawls’ project is directed at the enhancement of the 
exercise of rational revision, Posner’s calculations and Waldron’s 
cosmopolitanism—like the dissent’s insistence on stricter scrutiny—prioritize 
homogeneity and anonymity as measures of equality in and of themselves 
exaggerating the flat nature of a uniform, one-size-fits-all distribution of rights.   
 
4.4 THE MAJORITY: DWORKIN’S SOMEONE 
Equality is a popular but mysterious political ideal.  People can become equal (or 
at least more equal) in one way with the consequence that they become unequal 
(or more unequal) in others.  If people have equal income, for example, they will 
almost certainly differ in the amount of satisfaction they find in their lives, and vice 
versa.  It does not follow, of course, that equality is worthless as an ideal.  But it is 
necessary to state, more exactly than is commonly done, what form of equality is 
finally important.125 
The late Ronald Dworkin’s contribution to legal and political theory has also been 
profound and includes a long-term disagreement with legal positivism,126 the role 
of judges in making law, 127  the integrity of the law, 128  the value of specific 
constitutional rights such as freedom of speech,129 but also a more moral concept of 
equality.  While his theory of individual “rights as trumps”130 does prioritize a 
mainstream everyone/no-one narrative, his strong defence of affirmative action131  
nonetheless recalls someone jurisprudence and, particularly, the majority decision 
                                                          
125 Ronald Dworkin “What is Equality: Part I: Equality of Welfare” (1981) 10(3) Philos Public Aff 
185, at 185. 
126 Stephen Guest Ronald Dworkin (3rd ed, Stanford CA, Stanford University Press, 2013) at 27. 
127 Dworkin Law’s Empire, above n 92. 
128 Discussed by Stephen Guest Ronald Dworkin (2d ed, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 
1997) at 1-18. 
129 As well as freedom of sexual practice, abortion, genetics, and healthcare.  For example, see 
Ronald Dworkin Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Cambridge MA, Harvard 
University Press, 2000). 
130 See Ronald Dworkin “Rights as Trumps” in Jeremy Waldron (ed) Theories of Rights (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1984). 
131 He devotes at least one chapter in most of his books to the subject, taking apart the leading US 
cases in the process.  See, for instance, chapters 14-16 in Ronald Dworkin A Matter of Principle 
(Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1985) [Matter of Principle]. 
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in Kamehameha.  In fact, Dworkin’s132  starting point is a more identity-aware 
homogeneity based on equal concern and respect for each individual which is more 
willing to stretch to address actual disparities.   
Responding to Rawls, Dworkin criticizes what he calls the “flat indiscriminate 
equality” 133 proposed by Rawls, the undesirability of his utilitarian principles of 
justice134 and recognizes the danger of external preferences arising from having too 
little information about the identity of the rights-holder.135   For Dworkin, equality 
means the “right to equal concern and respect”: 
The government must treat those whom it governs with concern, that is, as human 
beings who are capable of suffering and frustration, and with respect, that is, as 
human beings who are capable of forming and acting on intelligent conceptions of 
how their lives should be lived.  Government must not only treat people with 
concern and respect, but with equal concern and respect.  It must not distribute 
goods or opportunities unequally on the ground that some citizens are entitled to 
more because they are worthy of more concern.  It must not constrain liberty on 
the ground that one citizen’s conception of the good life of one group is nobler or 
superior to another’s.  These postulates, taken together, state what might be called 
the liberal conception of equality; but it is a conception of equality, not of liberty 
as license, that they state.136 
He would restrain “any policy that denies any group of citizens, however small or 
negligible, the equal resources that equal concern would otherwise grant them”137.  
Thus, Dworkin’s right to equal concern and respect entails the right to be treated as 
an equal in contrast to the mere right to equal treatment.  This is not an “equal 
distribution of some good or opportunity, but the right to equal concern and respect 
in the political decision about how these goods and opportunities are to be 
distributed”138—or a form of individual self-determination.   
In contrast to Rawls, Dworkin would allow some inequalities—or individual 
“sacrifices”—for the good of the greater society, or “community”, but requires that 
the benefit include those disadvantaged.  Where passive membership is best 
                                                          
132 Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (London, Duckworth, 1977) [Taking Rights Seriously]; 
“What is Equality: Part I: Equality of Welfare” (1981) 10(3) Philosophy and Public Affairs 185; 
Sovereign Virtue, above n 129. 
133 Sovereign Virtue, ibid, at 1. 
134 Taking Rights Seriously, above n132, at 153, particularly describing how the two basic principles 
of justice are not in everyone’s interests. 
135 Ibid, at 152-154. 
136 Taking Rights Seriously, above n 132, at 272. 
137 Matter of Principle, above n 131, at 211. 
138 Taking Rights Seriously, above n 132, at 273. 
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represented by the inherent expectation of deprivation for the greater good 
demanded by a totalitarian regime—or even perhaps by the utilitarian math implicit 
in Rawls’ public reason and, more obviously, in Posner’s aggregate satisfaction—
Dworkin’s active membership gives individuals a stake in their society and reason 
to sacrifice and “carry the burden” of some inequality.  Speaking of those who bear 
inequalities, he writes: 
He can take pride in its present attractiveness—in the richness of its culture, the 
justice of its institutions, the imagination of its education—only if his life is one 
that in some way draws on and contributes to these public virtues.  He can identify 
himself with the future of the community and accept present deprivation as a 
sacrifice rather than tyranny, only if he has some power to help determine the shape 
of that future, and only if the promised prosperity will provide at least equal benefit 
to the smaller, more immediate communities for which he feels special 
responsibilities, for example, his family, his descendants, and, if the society is one 
that has made this important to him, his race.139 
In contrast to the original position, active membership depends on some 
identification, albeit with the wider community, while onus for identification rests 
with the government or the majority interests it represents.  Democracy should give 
indigenous peoples a reason to participate in universal equality.  This stake is to be 
based on actual preference determined through choice of resources, as in a desert 
island auction, where all shipwrecked participants have exactly the same amount of 
clamshells to bid with.140  If we all arrive on this island of liberal democracy with 
no arbitrary baggage, with no resources of any kind, and we are all given the same 
distribution of rights to utilize in pursuit of our rationally-chosen life goals then we 
are equal because our opportunities have been the same.  The key is ensuring that 
all participants have the same amount of resources or rights to bid with. 
For this reason, Dworkin does address the ‘hard case’141—at least in terms of 
minorities—and has strongly and frequently defended affirmative action.142  His 
reasoning is fairly consistent with the modified Weber-Johnson test and with Brown 
v Board of Education.143   From the outset—like the moral sense of the majority 
                                                          
139 Matter of Principle at 211. 
140 The clamshell auction.  See Sovereign Virtue Chapter 2 “Equality of Resources”. 
141  He surmises that there is always a right answer for every case that comes before a judge 
discoverable by applying certain principles including equality of concern and respect.  See his 
description of the ‘judge as Hercules” in Matter of Principle , above n 131, at 119 
142 See various chapters in books...And Ronald Dworkin “Affirmative Action: Is it Fair?” (2000) 28 
J Blacks High Educ 79 [“Affirmative Action”]. 
143 See Chapter Two discussion on the substantial version of equality in Brown I and its progeny 
discussed at 2.2.3. 
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that the moʻolelo was relevant to whether the admissions policy was a measure of 
equality or a form of discrimination—Dworkin recognizes that wealth, education, 
race, luck, raw skill, intelligence and other “native capacities” play a more 
important part in the realization—or lack—of de facto equality than Rawls’ original 
position admits144 and that a genuine “suspect group” 145 will be one: 
…saddled with…disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal 
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command 
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process146 
rather than the mere disadvantage of “fellow citizens” who are not “in any way 
historically associated with prejudice and antipathy”. 147  Thus, for Dworkin—like 
the Kamehameha majority—the equal protection clause was meant to protect 
groups with a “special vulnerability to prejudice or hostility or stereotype 
and…consequent diminished standing—…second-class citizenship—in the 
political community”; the “motive behind the” law or policy in question matters; 
and affirmative action plans—which merely disadvantage a ‘fellow citizen’—
should be subject to a relaxed level of scrutiny.148  Dworkin considers affirmative 
action to be “one of the most effective weapons…against racism”149 rather than a 
form of discrimination.  Like the majority’s stretching of the Weber-Johnson factors, 
he favors judging “improper motives” on a “more case-by-case basis” rather than 
assuming on the “threshold” that any disadvantage to the non-favoured class 
automatically constitutes discrimination and attracts a stricter scrutiny.150 
Although not writing on indigenous rights per se, he has written—as if describing 
the parties in Kamehameha—that: 
It has become common, indeed, to describe the great social issues of domestic 
politics, and in particular the racial issue, as presenting a conflict between the 
demands of liberty and equality.  It may be, it is said, that the poor and the black 
and the uneducated and the unskilled have an abstract right to equality, but the 
                                                          
144 Matter of Principle, above n 131, at 207. 
145 See Korematsu v United States 323 US 214 (1944); and Hirabayashi v United States 320 US 81 
(1943) discussed in Chapter Two at 2.4.1. 
146 “Affirmative Action”, above n 142, at 81. 
147 Ibid, at 81. 
148 Ibid, at 80-81.  See San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez 411 US 1 (1973), 
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149 “Affirmative Action”, above n 142, at 80-81. 
150 Ibid, at 81 and 82. 
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prosperous and the whites and the educated and the able have a right to liberty as 
well and any efforts at social reorganization in aid of the first set of rights must 
reckon with and respect the second.  Everyone except extremists recognizes, 
therefore, the need to compromise between equality and liberty.151 
Dworkin recognizes the connection between de facto freedom—or circumstances 
beyond formalized everyone/no-one guarantees—and the realization of actual 
equality.  He also connects a lack of healthcare, education, housing, employment 
and other background factors with the practical operation of rights.152   
Dworkin does not, however, sanction clearing a person’s “path” of all unnecessary 
obstacles to equality153  or necessarily an additional distribution of strong rights to 
those who suffer from a lack of de facto equality.  His focus is on levelling measures 
like affirmative action154 whose objective is to grant access to the same advantages 
which those who enjoy the benefits of actual equality already have.155 
Similarly, the majority in the case depended on a someone narrative which 
recognized Native Hawaiians as a group—albeit a racial group—plagued 
historically and currently by discrimination and disparities attracted to their identity.  
Like the majority decision, Dworkin conveys a moral intuition that de facto 
disparities undermine formal guarantees of equality.  However, like the majority, 
affirmative action based on individual self-determination and responsibility is his 
apparent limit.  Equal concern and respect allow him to temporarily pull back Rawls’ 
veil of ignorance to recognize that not everyone really starts in an equal, original 
position but not far enough for him to possibly recognize collective self-
determination or special political status as justifying the admission policy.  Thus, 
like the Kamehameha majority’s modification of the Weber-Johnson test, Dworkin 
is willing to admit the manifest imbalance, will weigh it against the rights of 
                                                          
151 Taking Rights Seriously, above n 132, at 266. 
152 Matter of Principle, abov n 131, at 187. 
153 Isaiah Berlin has written: “The sense of freedom, in which I use this term, entails not simply the 
absence of frustration but the absence of obstacles to possible choices and activities—absence of 
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155 Overall, he does not appear to hold liberty in high regard.  He is unwilling to make it a “strong 
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infractions”155—or rather where recognizing individual rights to certain liberties is required by the 
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others—fundamentally, an assessment of equal respect and concern—and approve 
it but, like the majority, still require it to be temporary until statistics reveal parity.  
 
4.5 MANCARI AND BEYOND: KYMLICKA AND THE INDIGENOUS LEARNER 
People on the left who agree on 95 per cent of the actual issues confronting our 
society spend all of our time arguing with each other about the 5 per cent of issues 
we disagree about, rather than fighting alongside each other for the 95 per cent of 
issues we have in common.156 
Dworkin is decidedly less adamant and displays increased awareness of the effect 
of real-time, identity-attracted disparities on the context of rational revision but 
ultimately fails to go beyond a racialized someone narrative.  He approaches race 
but not necessarily indigeneity and largely makes moral arguments for someone-
specific exceptions which enable realization of universally everyone/no-one 
constitutional guarantees.  Given such limits, Dworkin has been specifically 
criticized by Canadian political philosopher Will Kymlicka for failing to explore 
minority cultural structures and language rights as vital contexts of choice,157 the 
very focus of Kymlicka’s own theory. 
Kymlicka has been highly influential since publishing Liberalism, Community and 
Culture in 1989. 158  His theory of liberal multiculturalism takes liberalism beyond 
the individual and attempts to reconcile mainstream liberalism with the increasingly 
multicultural and legally pluralistic nature of modern democracies where various 
minority groups advance diverse rights claims.  Like Waldron, Kymlicka explores 
the implications of equality in former settler nations including the United States but 
recognizes the relevance of certain histories to present rights claims and denials, 
particularly the liberal validity of certain group-differentiated rights.  He would, for 
instance, distinguish the unique historical circumstances of African American 
claims—for instance, their forced rather than voluntary segregation159—from the 
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157 Will Kymlicka “Dworkin on Freedom and Culture” in Justin Burley (ed) Dworkin and His Critics 
with Replies by Dworkin (Blackwell Publishing, 2004) 114. 
158 Will Kymlicka Liberalism, Community and Culture (New York, Clarendon Press, 1991).   
159 Whose rights claims Kymlicka finds incomparable to any other minority group let alone the rights 
claims of indigenous peoples. 
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self-determination based claims of indigenous “minority nations”, such as Native 
Hawaiians, who can claim a prior history of self-government, common culture and 
language, and self-governing indigenous institutions. 160   Indigenous peoples, 
therefore, possess unique rights that are not only permissible but demanded by 
liberalism.161   
The concurrence in Kamehameha equated the admission policy with the self-
determination based preference in Morton v Mancari (1974) 162 and not a measure 
of equality per se and explained the policy as an expression of the special trust 
relationship not a remedy for ongoing historical injustices.163  Kymlicka would also 
recognize remedial self-determination as the right of indigenous peoples partially 
based on historic self-determination and special political status.  However, he would 
also defend the same self-determination in liberal terms that recognize the impact 
of that history on present rights claims and denials. 
 
4.5.1 RECONCILING EVERYONE/NO-ONE WITH INDIGENOUS IDENTITY 
Various scholars have responded to mainstream liberal individualism, including the 
so-called communitarians, a diverse group united by their critique of the 
prioritization of the everyone/no-one in rights distribution and insistence that group 
identity and experience enhance rational revision context.  Alasdair MacIntyre164, 
                                                          
160 One of the fundamental arguments of Liberalism, Community and Culture, above n 158. 
161  Will Kymlicka Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1995). 
162 Morton v Mancari 417 US 535 (1974) discussed in Chapter Two at 2.3.2.   
163 Contrast with Eric K Yamamoto, Susan K Serrano and EA Hoʻoipo Kalaenaʻauao Pa, Amicus 
Brief of the Japanese American Citizens League of Hawaiʻi-Honolulu Chapter and the Equal Justice 
Society and in support of Defendant-Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, 29 August 2005, 
in Doe v Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate 416 F 3d 1025 (9th Cir 2005) (No 04-
15044). 
164 MacIntyre disagrees with liberal individualism’s “schizophrenic” division of the individual into 
public and private personalities which he describes as “partition[ing] each human life into a variety 
of segments, each with its own norms and modes of behaviour”.  Thus, the individual is viewed in 
terms of false dichotomies such as ‘work/leisure’ or ‘corporate/personal’, and her life becomes 
“nothing but a series of unconnected episodes” when really she is the same person with the same 
moralities and interests in both spheres of experience.  Such thinking, to MacIntyre, also results in 
an oversimplification of what are really “complex actions and transactions” and the equation of bits 
and pieces of a human life with a whole person: Alasdair MacIntyre After Virtue: A Study in Moral 
Theory (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1981) at 190.  He similarly rebuts the pan-
societal moral consensus or Rawls’ exercise of public because it is impossible to achieve such 
consensus even publically: “…We all have too many disparate and rival moral concepts…and…the 
moral resources of the culture allow us no way of settling the issue between [us] rationally.  Moral 
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for instance, has emphasized the desirable, even virtuous wider social and historical 
context of a person’s individual heroic narrative, their rationally revised and chosen 
life’s path.  Michael Sandel 165  recognizes that homogeneity and anonymity 
preclude civic affiliations with other individuals prerequisite to forming the public 
consensus necessary for rational revision and democracy while simultaneously 
entangling individuals in a network of unchosen obligations.  Similarly, Charles 
Taylor166 has critiqued the “atomized” self of liberal individualism given the reality 
                                                          
philosophy, as it is dominantly understood, reflects the debates and the disagreements of the culture 
so faithfully that its controversies turn out to be unsettlable in just the way that the political and 
moral debates themselves are”: After Virtue, 235. 
165 For Sandel the liberal individual—the “unencumbered self”—is a being beyond the reach of her 
own experience whose identity is determined not by who she is but by her relationship to the things 
she has, wants or seeks: Michael J Sandel “The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self” 
(1984) 12(1) Political Theory 81.  Rawls’ difference principle represents the unencumbered self 
since the resources to be redistributed are things that we have and not who we are: “Procedural 
Republic” at 84.  This state of “possession” cannot account for the principles of redistribution—or 
“sharing”—required by the difference principle and results in “distance” between the individual and 
her formally promised rights: Michael J Sandel Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge UK, 
Cambridge University Press, 1998) at 55.  
Likewise, the unencumbered self fails to account for not just accidental or contingent assets but 
common assets, or goods, since it rules out the possibility of any communal ties, obligations or 
responsibilities antecedent to the self and its rights: “Procedural Republic” at 84.  As such, this 
distance between the individual and their aims and interests presupposes a certain kind of person: 
Michael J Sandel Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge 
MA, Belknap Press, 1998) at 14.  This is an identity-less individual —one without any communal 
ties, obligations or responsibilities—for whom the two basic principles of justice will work and treats 
the whole of society as a single person by “conflating diverse desires” into “a single system of 
desires”: “Procedural Republic” at 84.  In contrast to the benign conception of the neutral state 
offered by liberal individualists, Sandel argues that the liberal state “offers a powerful promise of 
individual rights” but “demands a high level of mutual engagement”.  This results in individuals 
being “implicated willy-nilly in a formidable array of dependencies and expectations they did not 
choose and increasingly reject”.   In other words, “we are more entangled, but less attached, than 
ever” in a network of obligations which have little to do with will and are unmediated by those 
common identifications or “expansive self-definitions” that would make this reality “tolerable”: 
Democracy’s Discontent at 13-14.  Thus, the unencumbered self is flawed because “[i]t cannot make 
sense of our moral experience” or account for valid communal ties, responsibilities and obligations 
which have claim on the self and are “antecedent to choice”: Democracy’s Discontent at 15.   
166 Like MacIntyre and Sandel, Taylor argues that “primacy-of-rights” theories fail to take account 
of the “principle of belonging or obligation” which precedes individual rights: Charles Taylor 
“Atomism” in Philosophical Papers, Vol 2, Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge UK, 
Cambridge University Press, 1985) 187 at 188.  For Taylor, the problem with modern liberalism is 
that the individual is, as we have seen above, conceived of as necessarily atomistic—that is, defining 
themselves without reference to others’ preferences and ends in order to become a self-sufficient 
and authentic human being: “Atomism” at 189-190, and 194.  Taylor, however, disputes the notion 
of “inward generation” due to the “dialogical” nature of human life: “We become full human agents, 
capable of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining our identities, through the acquisition of 
rich human languages of expression…But we learn these modes of expression through exchanges 
with others.  People do not acquire the languages needed for self-definition on their own.  Rather 
we are introduced to them through interaction with others who matter to us”: Charles Taylor “The 
Politics of Recognition” in Amy Gutmann (ed) Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of 
Recognition (Pinceton, Princeton university Press, 1992) 25 at 32.  The term “language” describes 
communication of all kinds and not just verbal expression.  The “significant others” (“Politics of 
Recognition” at 32) he refers to take the form of family and community and shape other 
“characteristically human capacities” of the individual such as her “convictions” and ‘intuitions’ 
about fundamental rights and freedoms, and of course, her choice-making capacity: “Atomism” at 
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of valid antecedent interests in and obligations to one’s community crucial to 
rational revision.  Communitarians, as a group, fundamentally challenge the 
homogenous, anonymous individual as the only rightsholder and rational revision 
in the original position alone.  Rather, communitarians place a high, even crucial 
value on group input into rational revision and agency.  
Attempting to reconcile these positions, Will Kymlicka167 argues that we should 
recognize difference, even identity, where rights, like education, buffer the 
indigenous child against inequality and help her access equality.  That is, he argues 
that we must differentiate the rights of indigenous rights-holders because their 
group identity inherently attracts disadvantage where others do not, while that same 
identity constitutes an essential good and rich context of choice where the child’s 
individual rights are realized.  Differential minority rights—even identity-specific 
rights—then act as both buffer against the identity-attracted disadvantage and 
provide identity-responsive access to liberal autonomy and equality. 
Given that the indigenous child already has their fair share of a “difference-blind, 
egalitarian distribution of resources and liberties”,168 Kymlicka asks why liberals 
should concern themselves further, apply Rawls ‘difference principle’ or depend on 
Dworkin’s equal concern and respect.  At the outset, Kymlicka accepts that 
liberalism requires individuals to be responsible for the ends they choose.  
Responsibility requires us to weigh our chosen ends in terms of the costs placed on 
the legitimate interests of others.  If the costs of a choice are too high, such interests 
“have no value”.169  Thus, responsibility qualifies autonomy and equality. 
Again, this responsibility account is frequently repeated in criticism of indigenous 
rights—particularly fears of an oppressive internal majority or minority rights 
running rampant over the civil and political rights of external individuals. 
Responsibility explains the trammelling inquiry at the second step of the Weber-
                                                          
191-194.  In fact, rather than a mere choice of principle or anonymous assertion of right, these 
convictions have special moral significance to us.  For Taylor, these are actually the capacities which 
allow us to be authentic human beings making uncoerced choices and as such are worthy of respect: 
“Atomism” at 193-194. 
167  Liberalism, Community and Culture, above n 158; Multicultural Citizenship, above n 161; 
Politics in the Vernacular, above n 156. 
168 Liberalism, Community and Culture, ibid, at 182. 
169 Ibid, at 185.   
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Johnson test.170   Similar liberal reasoning assumes that indigenous identity itself is 
just one possible, arbitrary contingency,171 that the Native Hawaiian learner has the 
rational—not to mention socio-economic—freedom to choose alternative 
educational outcomes or schools and that their indigenous identity is an optional, 
disposable choice.172 
However, Kymlicka seems to rightly conclude that Rawls and Dworkin’s real 
concern is enabling and protecting individual autonomy or self-determination—that 
is the ability of each individual to rationally choose their life’s path on an equal 
basis with others.  In terms of this rational revision capacity, Kymlicka reminds us 
that choice “is only half of the liberal story” because justice as fairness also 
“presupposes” circumstances which have nothing to do with choice. 173  While 
differences resulting from individual choice are the responsibility of the individual 
who has made that choice:   
…differences which arise from people’s circumstances—their social environment 
or natural endowments—are clearly not their own responsibility.  No one chooses 
what class or race they are born into, or which natural talents they are born with, 
and no one deserves to be disadvantaged by these facts.174 
Indeed, this is the reasoning underlying Rawls’ veil of ignorance: that we neutralize 
the effect of these unchosen inequalities or “unequal circumstances”.175    
Thus, Kymlicka notes, both Rawls and Dworkin assume an “abstract egalitarian 
plateau”—the proverbial level playing field of modern liberal democracies—where 
the interests of each citizen are given equal consideration in both the economic 
market and in political process, within a society where each citizen has equal 
opportunity, equal political power and are constrained by the principles of justice.176  
In reality, Kymlicka notes, indigenous people are often “outbid” for important 
                                                          
170 That the policy not unnecessarily trammel the rights of others: see discussion in Chapter Three 
at 3.5. 
171 As Rawls concludes.  He relegates such identities to an individual’s private rather public or 
political life. 
172 As Thomas Pogge argues in "Group Rights and Ethnicity" in Will Kymlicka and Ian Shapiro (eds) 
Ethnicity and Group Rights NOMOS Vol 39 (New York, New York University Press, 1997) where 
he finds little difference between indigenous identity and being a member of a car or other social 
club, 
173 Liberalism, Community and Culture, above n 158, at 186. 
174 Ibid, at 186. 
175 Ibid, at 186-187. 
176 Ibid, at 182-183. 
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resources, such as land, or “outvoted” on crucial policy decisions, such as which 
language will be used as the medium of instruction177—as well as whose curriculum 
or pedagogy will be subjected to.     
Kymlicka revises Dworkin’s clamshell auction to illustrate.  Instead of one ship 
wrecked on a desert island he invites us to see two, one very large and one very 
small.  The auction occurs via the ships’ computers.  Both ships’ occupants have 
prior knowledge of the resources at stake and are fairly even in percentages of those 
choosing certain occupations or lifestyles.  After all resources are bid on, the 
passengers embark to claim their resources178 to find that the passengers on one 
ship share the same nationality and those on the other ship share another.  The group 
from the small ship are now a minority—even an indigenous minority—and “in a 
very undesirable position as they try to execute their chosen life-styles in an alien 
culture”.179 
Rerunning the auction is not to the advantage of individual minority members who 
do not want the actual resources of the majority—for instance, a public school 
system that has historically perpetrated and perpetuated discrimination and 
disparities.  They have already chosen those best suited to their individually chosen 
rational revision projects and values.  What the minority “env[ies]” is the majority’s 
context of choice, that the distribution of rights now reflects and favors a majority 
identity.   In response, they pool their clamshells and votes to outbid the majority 
for a block of land and resources on the island that they would not have chosen 
individually but now need to secure their identity and cultural context.180   
Thus, in modern democracies, Kymlicka argues, indigenous peoples must pay 
additional costs that non-indigenous individuals do not.  He writes: 
This inequality has nothing to do with the choices of aboriginal people.  A two-
year old Inuit girl who has no projects faces this inequality.  Without special 
political protection, ...by the time she is eighteen the existence of the cultural 
community in which she grew up is likely to be undermined by the decisions of 
people outside her community.  This is true no matter what projects she decides to 
pursue.  Conversely, an English Canadian boy will not face this problem, no matter 
                                                          
177 Ibid, at 183. 
178 Ibid, at 188. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid, at 188-189. 
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what choice he makes.  The rectification of this inequality is the basis for the liberal 
defence of aboriginal rights, and minority rights in general.181 
 
4.5.2 BUFFER AND ACCESS 
Additional costs arguments are particularly persuasive given the phenomenon 
Kymlicka calls “nation-building” 182 —that is, the inherent tendency of settler 
nations to systematically discriminate against indigenous minorities in favour of 
majority culture, language and identity through law, policy and institutions.  Given 
this homogenizing phenomenon there is no such thing as a neutral state or neutral 
institutions, a level playing field or de novo original position.   
Nation-building is well illustrated in the educational experience of Native 
Americans and Native Hawaiians already described183 but perhaps more acutely in 
the so-called “Stolen Generations” in Australia and the abusive experiences of 
Canadian First Nations people in boarding school systems.184  In each instance, 
majoritarian-biased law, policy and institutions within settler states exerted 
tremendous overt and subtle, de jure and de facto discriminatory pressures on the 
rational revision context of indigenous individuals and peoples simply because they 
were indigenous.185   Consequently, the internal choices of indigenous minority 
members remain highly vulnerable to external choices that inherently discriminate 
against them.186 
Given this disadvantage of cultural membership, specifically indigenous education 
rights are not, therefore, about indigenous people asking for more than a fair share 
                                                          
181 Ibid, at 189. 
182 Politics in the Vernacular, above n 156, at 32. 
183 See discussions in Chapter Two at 2.3.2 for Native American experience and Chapter Three 3.2.2 
for the Native Hawaiian.   
184 For the Australian, see Margaret Jacobs White Mother to a Dark Race: Settler Colonialism, 
Maternalism, and the Removal of Indigenous Children in the American West and Australia, 1880-
1940 (Lincoln, NB and London, England, University of Nebraska Press, 2010).  For First Nations, 
see Marlene Brandt Castellano, Linda Archibald and Mike DeGagné (eds) From Truth to 
Reconciliation: Transforming the Legacy of Residential Schools (Ottawa, Aboriginal Healing 
Foundation, 2008). 
185  See his discussions on other minorities, including immigrant groups, in Will Kymlicka 
Multicultural Citzenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford & New York, Oxford 
Unviersity Press, 1995). 
186 Liberalism, Community and Culture, above n 158, at 187. 
176   
 
of education rights187 but about the very existence of their context of choice.188  
These rights, Kymlicka argues, may be seen as a type of insurance against the 
impact of unequal circumstances similar to the insurance that a homeowner takes 
out against the possibility of hurricanes and other natural disasters, not a subsidy 
for individual preference or choice.189  Specifically indigenous rights, therefore, 
imply that indigenous individuals should only be responsible for the choices they 
make and not “morally arbitrary and unjust” circumstances they did not.  Such 
disadvantage is inherently unfair because it limits rational revision context and 
requires rectification.190  Thus, indigenous rights buffer the indigenous individual 
against discrimination.   
Conversely, Kymlicka realizes that indigenous identity is an essential good 
providing access to a rich context of choice.191  He asserts that liberals like Rawls 
place a high value on having a range of choices available to the liberated self, which 
is why basic, anonymous civil liberties are prioritized in mainstream liberalism.  
But, he states—sounding like a communitarian—the range of options cannot be 
chosen because we do not start de novo: 
The decision about how to lead our lives must ultimately be ours alone, but this 
decision is always a matter of selecting what we believe to be the most valuable 
from the various options available, selecting from a “context of choice” …192  
For Kymlicka, this “range of options is determined by our cultural heritage”—what 
we learn and choose by “situating ourselves in [our] cultural narratives”.  Language, 
for instance, is vital to that process of discovery because it “renders vivid” “the 
options available to us, and their significance”.  And “a rich and secure social 
structure”—including language, history and other cultural heritage—brings 
awareness of our range of options.193 
Obviously, cultural membership is not a primary good for Rawls, but Kymlicka 
argues that it should be given the principle of self-respect.  Rawls prioritizes rational 
                                                          
187 As Jeremy Waldron argues in “The Cosmopolitan Advantage”, above n 96. 
188 Liberalism, Community and Culture, above n 158, at 189. 
189 Ibid, at 191-192. 
190 Politics in the Vernacular, above n 156, at 330. 
191 Liberalism, Community and Culture, above n 158, at 164. 
192 Ibid, at 164. 
193 Ibid, at 165.  Which must make language prohibition like the 1897 law in Hawaii which forbade 
the speaking of Native Hawaiian in schools immediately suspect in terms of rational revision. 
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revision and especially internal choice on the grounds that every person should have 
self-respect—or feel as if their goals are worth pursuing.194  Kymlicka argues that 
the context of culture provides ‘meaningful’ options for our choices creating self-
respect.  Parties in Rawls’ original position are likely, therefore, to treat cultural 
membership as a primary good since they would not want to undermine their own 
self-respect.195 
Echoing research regarding Native Hawaiian learners, Kymlicka concludes that the 
cultural context of our rational revision affects “our very sense of personal identity 
and capacity”, specifically, our sense of “agency” or autonomy.   Language, for 
instance, is not just a way to identify or convey content but is itself content.  
Similarly, “cultural heritage”, or the “sense of belonging” associated with cultural 
membership, provides “emotional security and personal strength” for individual 
autonomy, one reason why oppressive racist regimes have historically attempted to 
destroy minorities’ sense of cultural heritage and identity.196  To strip the individual 
of cultural heritage and community is to stunt their liberal development.197 
As it empowers and expands rational revision capacity, indigenous identification 
enables rather than impedes individual autonomy and is a valuable primary good in 
the liberal sense.  It provides access to optimum conditions for rational revision.  
Indigenous rights promote equality between cultural groups—buffering against a 
priori disadvantage.  Not unlike the dual citizenship implied in the Native American 
exception,198 Kymlicka’s indigenous group members also simultaneously retain 
basic everyone/no-one rights ensuring fairness “within majority and minority 
political communities”199 whose object is not colour-blind parity but “ethnocultural 
justice”.200  Such rights include self-determination in the form of self-government 
or autonomy in internal matters which buffer against majoritarian bias and which 
are not limited in time but may be needed indefinitely given nation-building 
                                                          
194 Rawls Theory of Justice, above n 4, at 179, for instance. 
195 Liberalism, Community and Culture, above n 158, at 166. 
196 Ibid, at 175.  Kymlicka’s examples: apartheid South Africa and ‘pacification’ programme aimed 
at Native Canadians. 
197 Ibid, at 176. 
198 See discussion in Chapter Two at 2.3.2. 
199 Politics in the Vernacular, above n 156, at 82. 
200 Ibid, at 42. 
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forces.201   Self-determination in regards to community institutions “enable national 
minorities [such as indigenous peoples] to maintain themselves as distinct 
societies”202 thus relieving external pressures on individual rational revision. 
 
4.5.3 MULTICULTURALISM AND THE ADMISSION POLICY 
Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism would seemingly justify the admission policy 
as an identity-specific indigenous rights underwritten by remedial self-
determination but also as it buffers indigenous individuals against in-built 
majoritarian bias and discrimination and provides access to equality through via 
rational revision, his seems to represent the project of the earnest liberal eager to 
address the guarantee/reality gap.   
The manifest imbalance identified by the majority and concurrence in the case 
seemingly constitutes a disadvantage of cultural membership.  Statistics the Court 
considered were overwhelming.  Again, as discussed previously, Native Hawaiian 
children, in their own country, appear to be the most vulnerable of vulnerable 
learners. 203   Various statistics reveal an extreme disadvantage which defies a 
supposedly fair distribution and an extreme vulnerability to external forces as 
Kymlicka predicts.  Moreover, the majority essentially connected those forces with 
the phenomenon of nation-building—even the illegitimate overthrow of the 
Hawaiian monarchy and subsequent events.204   
However, in contrast to trammelling questions, the indigenous-specific admission 
policy can be more accurately viewed as a buffer against the effects of unequal, 
                                                          
201  Kymlicka places no time limits on his group-differentiated rights but rather presumes the 
continued effect of majoritarian bias and nation-building on the rational revision context of 
indigenous individuals: see, for instance, his discussion on group-differentiated rights in 
Multicultural Citizenship, above n 185, at 26-33.  While recognizing that groups like African 
Americans might be seeking integration his focus is not everyone/no-one parity but “ethnocultural 
justice”: Liberalism, Community and Culture, above n 158.  
202 Politics in the Vernacular, above n 156, at 55. 
203 See discussion in Chapter Three at 3.2.2. 
204 See Doe v Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate 441 F3d 1029, 470 F3d 827 (9th 
Cir 2006) (en banc) at 19055-19056 and 19060-19061, quoting reports which connect current 
disparities with historical injustices.  
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unchosen—even cataclysmic circumstances.205 Conversely, the academic success 
of the Kamehameha Schools, as argued, constitutes a proven, real-time levelling of 
the playing field—or an identifiable good of cultural membership.  An educational 
system established and controlled by Native Hawaiians, its identity-specific 
admission policy along with its identity-responsive curriculum, pedagogy and other 
features appear to constitute a rich context for individual rational revision. 
Given the extreme vulnerability of Native Hawaiians to external pressures on 
individual rational revision, Kymlicka would seemingly require buffering of their 
rights in education with the proviso that such weight should not unnecessarily 
burden another’s individual rights.  Kymlicka’s distinction between indigenous 
claims and those of other minority groups overcomes Waldron and Posner’s—and 
the dissent’s—confusion about the purpose of remedial policies.206  That is, the 
difference between a manipulative, deliberate device meant to negatively affect a 
certain group and a law or policy meant to remedy the effects of discrimination.   
Multiculturalism may better explain the majority’s liberal intuitions about the 
admission policy but also supports the concurrence’s reliance on Mancari.  On one 
hand, the admission policy is liberally justified as a both buffer against in-built 
majoritarian bias which limits rational revision context but also access to a richer 
context.  On the other, the admission policy—the preference for the same 
indigenous identity for which the Schools were established—can also now be 
narrated as an expression of the group-differentiated, even collective rights of an 
indigenous, minority nation with a prior history of self-determination and self-
governing institutions like Kamehameha Schools.  The policy is not aimed at parity 
or necessarily limited in time consistent with the Native American exception but 
justified by remedial self-determination which acknowledges the historical reality 
of nation-building—what we understand as overthrow, annexation, assimilation, 
and discrimination—as the Mancari preference and various federal rehabilitative 
legislative measures also do in regards to Native Hawaiians. 
                                                          
205 See arguments in Susan Serrano and others “Restorative Justice for Hawaiʻi’s First People: 
Selected Amicus Curiae Briefs in Doe v. Kamehameha Schools” (2007) 14 Asian Am LJ 205. 
206 See United States v Carolene Products 304 US 144 (1938) Footnote Four discussed in Chapter 
Two at 2.4.1. 
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 Kymlicka’s narrative of equality is fundamentally consistent with the 
concurrence’s acknowledgment of a special trust relationship between the Native 
Hawaiian people and the United States—a political status that should trigger 
rational basis review rather than intermediate or strict scrutiny.207   In doing so, he 
also seemingly argues for time-honored principles of federal Indian law including 
inherent sovereignty of the US’ indigenous peoples.  Kymlicka’s description of 
nation-building and his safeguards for rational revision context against external 
pressure better account for the fiduciary nature of state and federal relationships.  In 
terms of the moʻolelo, nation-building requires self-determination based rights over 
indigenous institutions to buffer Native Hawaiians against majoritarian bias and 
other nation-building forces. 
 
4.6 THE AMICUS CURIAE BRIEFS: AN ALTERNATIVE LIBERAL-INDIGENOUS 
NARRATIVE  
Ultimately, Kymlicka has a subtle, Brown-like appreciation of the pathological way 
that guarantee/reality gaps are attracted to indigenous identity as the result of 
nation-building and create a priori disadvantage.  The policy is seemingly both 
buffer against a priori disadvantage attracted to Native Hawaiian identity as the 
result of the kind of nation-building which resulted in overthrow, annexation, 
assimilation, and discrimination in Hawaiʻi, while also providing a means of access 
to equality through the good of indigenous identity and group membership, even a 
collective pooling of distributed resources.  In terms of buffering, identity and self-
determination in internal matters are essential to countering majoritarian bias left in 
the wake of nation-building that makes seemingly equal distributions of rights 
inherently unequal.   Internal autonomy particularly counters institutionalized 
discrimination in education.  In terms of access, identity specificity is essential to 
this collective rational revision which Kymlicka argues will translate into individual 
rational revision.  
Thus, Kymlicka’s nation-building thesis seemingly predicts the prioritization of an 
everyone/no-one narrative of rights within settler democracies like the United States 
                                                          
207 See Morton v Mancari 417 US 535 (1974).   
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and New Zealand.  From a liberal standpoint, Kymlicka recognizes that in-built 
majoritarian bias will result from nation-building activities—for example, 
overthrow, annexation, assimilation, and discrimination—and will have a negative 
effect on present rights outcomes for Native Hawaiians and other indigenous 
peoples not due to any choices they make but as the result of ancestry.  
Fundamentally, he predicts that law will be narrated in terms of the settler majority.  
Given these realities, what the thesis has called his buffer-and-access argument is 
particularly compelling from the perspective of an earnest liberal trying to reconcile 
substantial constitutional guarantee/reality gaps in terms of Native Hawaiian 
learners as such reconciliation will be seemingly impossible without somehow 
accounting for majoritarian bias and other nation-building forces.   
However, Kymlicka’s multicultural theory may also indicate the limits of 
traditional liberal arguments for a Mancari-like narration of the admission policy.   
 
4.6.1 TRUMPING AND HISTORICAL DISTANCE 
Although he recognizes group-differentiated rights, Kymlicka’s theory may fall 
short of the truly collective self-determination rights of a once-and-future Hawaiian 
nation and people, a historical continuum of customary law and the reality of 
identity-attracted, complex discrimination and disparities symptomatic of ongoing 
deep harm.   
True to Rawlsian liberalism, Kymlicka remains attached to the individual as 
primary rightsholder and would prioritize the individual’s everyone/no-one civil 
and political rights over specifically indigenous group rights.  For Kymlicka, like 
Rawls and Dworkin, individual capacity for rational revisability is of greatest 
importance.  Kymlicka wrote in Liberalism, Culture and Community that a social 
group is not an individual who can be discriminated against or necessarily bear 
rights,208 collective or otherwise, suggesting that he fails to comprehend the way 
                                                          
208 Liberalism, Community and Culture, above n 158, at 241.  In contrast to statistics showing that 
education which affirms Native Hawaiian identity produces positive educational outcomes, 
Kymlicka has also flatly rejected the contention the indigenous child is only a product of her 
community, who merely “inherit[s] a way of life that defines their good for them”: Politics in the 
Vernacular, above n156, at 19. 
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that ongoing harm—that is, complex discrimination and disparities which pervade 
all areas of human well-being—are almost unrelentingly attracted to indigenous 
identity.  As discussed in Chapter 3, inequality clusters around that group rather 
than individual identity, to the extent that indigenous identity is predictive of 
inequalities in education, for instance. 
Kymlicka recognizes group-differentiated rights in an attempt to maximize 
individual rational revision.  As at the trammelling step of Weber-Johnson, his 
specifically indigenous rights must still be weighed in terms of costs to others.  He 
wrote that “nothing in my account...justifies” internal oppression of individual 
members by the majority of the minority group.209  So-called indigenous rights that 
restrict fundamental civil and political rights within the indigenous community are 
illegitimate while those that supplement210 and provide external protections for 
individual rights are valid.  To protect individual rights, Kymlicka recognizes 
internal mechanisms including tribal constitutions and courts but also allows for 
external judicial review, 211  a principle inconsistent with the right to self-
determination recognized in Mancari and Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez. 212  
Essentially, not unlike Dworkin, he would allow equal protection to ‘trump’ the 
self-determination of the indigenous learner despite his seeming equation of 
collective rational revision with individual rational revision and his assumption of 
in-built majoritarian bias within the same legal order that prioritizes an 
everyone/no-one narrative. 
Kymlicka’s buffer-and-access rights are practically remedial and historically aware 
as they respond to majoritarian bias and nation-building—as they reference the kind 
of internal self-determination recognized by federal Indian law.  For this reason, the 
thesis has described Kymlicka as consistent with the concurrence.  However, while 
Kymlicka broadly recognizes the effect of historical events on present rights 
outcomes, even a causal connection, he does not seem to describe the deep harm 
discussed in Chapter Three—that is, the illegality of overthrow and annexation of 
an internationally recognized nation, or the depth of the resulting harm including 
                                                          
209 Liberalism, Community and Culture, above n 158, at 197-198. 
210 Ibid, 193-197. 
211 Politics in the Vernacular, above n 156, at 22.   
212 See discussion in Chapter Two regarding the indigenous rights trumping an everyone/no-one 
narrative of equality in the case of Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez 436 US 49 (1978) at 2.3.2. 
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multi-generational trauma, higher allostatic load, chronic stress, cumulative and 
cyclical discrimination and disparities.  Given its potential trumping by individual 
everyone/no-one rights, the limited self-determination he recognizes cannot be a 
proportionate, remedial response to deep harm generated by historic injustice.  
Rather, Kymlicka’s self-determination really buffers against present majority 
bias—at least until a Martinez scenario arises and everyone/no-one rights clash with 
group interests or choices leaving indigenous peoples once again at the mercy of 
external choices and values.   
Multiculturalism seemingly lacks an account of the historical continuum of Native 
Hawaiian law that pre-dates historical wrongs and has survived in Hawaii state 
law213—including rights to self-determination—as a source of law on its own.   Not 
unlike Rawls’ second principle of justice, Kymlicka’s buffer-and-access model 
almost responds de novo to actual discrimination and disparities because it fails to 
completely account for the ongoing-ness of present disparities that, by their very 
nature, are inseparable from historic injustice, particularly given the multi-
generational, cyclical and cumulative nature of discrimination and disparities.  
While essentially earnest, Kymlicka’s project thus still keeps relevant historical 
context at a distance—though less than other liberals perhaps.  Such distance creates 
an uncomfortable congruency between Kymlicka and Waldron. 
Other scholars have criticized Kymlicka’s reconciliation project more generally.  
For instance, while Joseph Carens214 has accused Kymlicka of losing his “way in 
theoretical constructs” which oversimplify the actually complex, individually 
experienced, even multicultural context of an indigenous group member’s 
choices,215  Chandran Kukathas216  has accused Kymlicka of imposing Rawlsian 
liberalism on cultural communities.  Dwight Newman217 has similarly criticized 
Kymlicka’s dependence on a liberal basis alone for indigenous rights, as well as his 
prioritization of the individual rather than the group as a legitimate rightsholder in 
                                                          
213 See discussion in Chapter Three at 3.3.2. 
214 See Carens’ critique of Kymlicka in Joseph H Carens Culture, Citizenship, and Community: A 
Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000) at 
52-87.  
215 Carens, ibid, at 3 and 52-87. 
216 Chandran Kukathas “Multiculturalism as Fairness: Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship” 
(1997) 5(4) J Polit Philos 406 at 426-427. 
217 Dwight G Newman “You Still Know Nothin’ Bout Me: Toward Cross-cultural Theorizing of 
Aboriginal Rights” (2007) 52 McGill L J 725. 
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light of Canadian law’s willingness to recognize indigenous rights as collective, 
“existing rights”.218   
Regarding liberal narratives, James Youngblood Henderson, the Canadian First 
Nations scholar, might be describing Kymlicka’s theory when he talks about 
“Eurocentric cognitive scripts” within the law which reinforce “superior intellect’ 
mythology and undermine the legitimacy of pre-existing indigenous rights. 219  
Similarly, Patrick Macklem has recognized that there is a seeming contradiction in 
using the legitimizing philosophy of the same legal orders which have historically 
perpetrated and perpetuated significant “wrongs” against indigenous peoples to 
justify specifically indigenous rights. 220   Instead, Macklem rejects the liberal 
project and focuses on the injustices alone, an exercise that seemingly requires 
external determination of indigenous group membership221 and prompts Macklem 
to make similar arguments for non-indigenous minorities as well.222 
However, others suggest an alternative liberal basis for specifically indigenous 
rights that, not unlike Kymlicka’s, seeks to reconcile present discrimination and 
disparities but would more fully examine history to counteract “enduring 
injustice”223 and prevent future injustice.  While Chapter Six provides a more in-
depth discussion of self-determination, the following section discusses scholars 
attempting to proportionally remedy historical injustice by considering self-
determination as a liberal principle itself. 
                                                          
218 For instance, in section 35 of the Canadian Constitution Act, 1982. 
219 James (Sákéj) Youngblood Henderson “Postcolonial Ledger Drawing: Legal Reform” in Marie 
Battiste (ed) Reclaiming Indigenous Voice and Vision (Vancouver, University of British Columbia 
Press, 2000) at 161-171.  In “Sui Generis and Treaty Citizenship” (2010) 6(4) Citizenship Studies 
at 417, Henderson contrasts everyone/no-one equal citizenship to the dual citizenship engendered 
by the co-existence of liberal rights and indigenous rights which are truly indigenous, as “a narrative 
carefully plotted from the colonial ‘insiders’ perspective”.  In contrast, he recognizes section 35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982 as an indigenous rejection of individual everyone/no-one rights and a 
triumph for truly indigenous rights in Canada. 
220 See Patrick Macklem “Minority Rights in International Law” (2008) 6 Int J Constitutional Law 
531. 
221 A requirement fundamentally at odds with Native Hawaiian claims, Martinez, Mancari, Hawaii 
Act 195, articles 3, 4 and 33 of UNDRIP, and the most basic understandings of what self-
determination means. 
222 See Macklem “Minority Rights”, above n 220; and “Indigenous Recognition in International Law: 
Theoretical Observations” 30 Michigan J Int’l Law 177. 
223 Jeff Tully, quoted in Mark Bennett “Indigeneity as Self-Determination” (2005) 4 Indigenous LJ 
71 at 88. 
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4.6.2 HISTORICAL SELF-DETERMINATION 
As described previously, amicus curiae briefs submitted during the Kamehameha 
case 224  justified the admissions policy as a remedy for historical injustices 
perpetrated against Native Hawaiians by the United States government and also the 
ongoing “harm”225 of that injustice.  Rather than a “privilege[]” or “handout”, the 
briefs claimed that the policy represented a Native Hawaiian-generated remedy for 
“severe and systemic educational disadvantages” causally connected with historic 
injustices perpetrated by the United States.226    
Certain scholars—mostly responding to Waldron—recognize that the 
reconciliation of present disparities requires deeper awareness of historical wrongs.  
In the multi-generational trauma and otherwise complex discrimination and 
disparities associated with Native Hawaiians,227 Jeff Spinner-Halev, for instance, 
would seemingly see “enduring injustices” or “injustices that have roots in the past, 
and continue to the present day”.  Such injustices require examination rather than 
ignorance of history “to understand why some injustices endure”.228  These ongoing 
injustices may reveal the lasting effect of significant breaks in the “collective 
memory” of “intergenerational groups”—that is, indigenous peoples’ own legal and 
cultural narratives about who they are—that must be addressed if present ongoing 
disparities are to be remedied. 229  Unremedied breaks may explain why 
everyone/no-one rights distributions have not remedied historic injustices over 
time 230  and, perhaps, the greater significance of indigenous identity in rights 
distribution.   
Historical self-determination scholars also recognize that past denial of self-
determination and subsequent assimilation, discrimination and other practices 
constitute actual rather than abstract wrongs and even deep, multi-generational 
                                                          
224 See Susan Serrano and others “Restorative Justice for Hawaiʻi’s First People: Selected Amicus 
Curiae Briefs in Doe v. Kamehameha Schools” (2007) 14 Asian Am LJ 205. 
225 See Yamamoto, Serrano and Pa, above n 163. 
226 Ibid. 
227 See discussion in Chapter Three at 3.2.2. 
228 Jeff Spinner-Halev “From Historical to Enduring Injustice” (2005) 35 Political Theory 547 at 
574. 
229 Ibid, at 579-580 and 583.  Spinner-Halev recognizes the power of the narratives to story-telling 
peoples. 
230 Ibid, at 578-579 and 592.  As predicted by Rawls’ just savings principle. 
186   
 
harm.  Douglas Sanderson has argued that rather than “abstract wrongs committed 
against abstracted persons”, the history reveals how “settler people committed 
actual wrongs against actual persons” and how such injustices are ongoing and even 
deliberate.  Importantly, “even where those wrongs occurred a long time ago, they 
continue to affect—that is they continue as wrongs against—present-day 
persons”.231  Thus, Mark Bennett argues not for “special” rights for indigenous 
peoples but for the operation of a simpler justice responding to a straightforward 
wrong.232   
A common factor in such wrongs includes the “failure” of settler governments “to 
create just political association” between the government and indigenous 
peoples,233 a charge implying a clamshell-like inequality of groups and obviously 
the political rather than racial nature of inequalities.  Thus, Allen Buchanan has 
similarly argued that justice requires the return of “some form of self-government 
to indigenous peoples who were forcibly incorporated into a polity controlled by 
another group” despite having their own “governance institutions”.  This includes 
those who were “unjustly annexed”234 and where self-government will “prevent[] 
human rights violations and…combat[] the continuing effects of past human rights 
violations.”235 
Ongoing harm is particularly associated with educational institutions. Non-
indigenous institutions including schools are residual sites of ongoing harm.  For 
Sanderson, the “single greatest wrong committed against indigenous peoples” has 
been the “historical and ongoing suppression of institutions”—such as educational 
systems—“in indigenous communities that positively affirm indigenous values, 
cultures and identities”—a seeming description of both the Native American and 
                                                          
231 Douglas Sanderson “Redressing the Right Wrong: The Argument for Corrective Justice” (2012) 
62 Univ Tor LJ 93 at 102-103. 
232 Bennett “’Indigeneity’ as Self-Determination”, above n 223. 
233 Sanderson, above n 231, at 103.   
234 That is, where the “destruction of indigenous self-government by colonial incursions is both 
relatively recent and well-documented.  Here the case for intrastate autonomy is in basic principle 
no more problematic than the case for restoring sovereignty to states that have been unjustly 
annexed”: Allen Buchanan Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for 
International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004) at 416. 
235 Ibid, at 418-419. 
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Native Hawaiian moʻolelo.   Logically and proportionately, the situation can only 
be remedied by a restoration of “identity-affirming Indigenous institutions”.236   
For Sanderson, the ideal indigenous institution should look as it might have if it had 
developed freely under the prior self-determination of the indigenous community 
without external interference, 237  a model that does not preclude pedagogic or 
technological progress, a Native Hawaiian school that teaches both identity-
affirming and college-prep subjects or, potentially, an indigenous school that does 
not prefer the indigenous learner.  Rather than mandating the archaic, frozen 
community Waldron has equated indigenous identity with, this historically-
responsive justice reorients the site of self-determination with the indigenous 
people who originally possessed and exercised—but were unjustly denied—the 
right.  Thus, this dynamic conception of self-determination seems to more 
accurately portray the everyday operation of indigenous institutions including the 
Kamehameha Schools—or some degree of real-time indigenous self-determination 
in education that has seemingly overcome majoritarian bias. 
As a liberal principle, self-determination offers a mediatory language between 
everyone/no-one guarantees and indigenous claims.  Bennett has described 
historical self-determination as representing an “intercultural dialogue” mediating 
liberal and indigenous legal traditions that rests on the assumption that “individual 
freedom…is advanced by collective self-determination” but would also justify it in 
terms of “prior sovereignty”—or both the exercise and collective “memory” of 
inherent self-determination”.238   
Historical self-determination may also represent a more proportionate buffer-and-
access mechanism less vulnerable to everyone/no-one trumping.  Buchanan 
recognizes that self-determination can:  
…provide a non-paternalistic mechanism for protecting indigenous individuals 
from violations of their individual human rights and for counteracting the ongoing 
                                                          
236 Sanderson, above n 231, at 124. 
237 Ibid. Or what a Native Hawaiian education system established by an aliʻi exercising a traditional 
aliʻi role might look like if the overthrow and annexation had not taken place and the Hawaiian 
nation had been free to develop under Native Hawaiian self-determination. 
238 Bennett “‘Indigeneity as Self-Determination”, above n 223, at 102-103.   
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detrimental effects of past violations of their individual human rights or those of 
their ancestors.239   
Crucially, echoing Yamamoto and Iijima, 240  historical self-determination 
proportionately responds to the “severity of the problem of discrimination and its 
ongoing effects and the demonstrated deficiencies of nonindigenous governments 
to respond adequately to it.”241 
In earnest terms, Buchanan recognizes that the strongest case for indigenous self-
determination is the protection of basic everyone/no-one rights and that states have 
“obligations” to remedy institutionalized discrimination. 242   Like Kymlicka, 
Buchanan would also impose limits on Mancari-like indigenous self-determination, 
but those limits would be human243 rather than domestic constitutional rights—a 
proposition implying the substantive, complex and specifically indigenous rights to 
education and non-discrimination detailed in Chapters Five and Six.244   
In the light of historical self-determination, the admission policy is not only 
consistent with equality but demanded by it.  It not only buffers against residual in-
built majoritarian bias that interferes with present enjoyment of rights but against 
ongoing historic injustices that have actually interfered with rights enjoyment 
consistently over generations.  Such injustice does not merely dwell in collective 
memory at the level of national overthrow and forcible annexation but within non-
indigenous institutions where wrongs continue to be perpetrated in real-time.  Thus, 
historic injustice is inseparable from present disparities, ongoing, enduring and 
seemingly pervasive, cumulative, cyclical and otherwise complex discrimination 
and disparities.  
The Schools’ admission policy should be viewed, therefore, as a liberally consistent 
remedy for actual and ongoing wrongs, as is the self-determination that underwrites 
it.  As a logical and proportionate response to such wrongs—but also given its 
historical fact—Native Hawaiian self-determination can also be liberally 
                                                          
239 Buchanan, above n 234, at 415. 
240 See Chapter Three at 3.4.2 in terms of Chris Ijima discussing Rice v Cayetano and Yamamoto 
(and Obrey) at 3.7. 
241 Buchanan, above n 234, at 419. 
242 Ibid, at 422 and 427. 
243 Ibid, at 421-422. 
244 In the case of forcible annexation, he also recognizes that secession may be one possible remedy 
for historic injustice: ibid, at 404. 
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interpreted as a historically continuous principle despite its frequent denial by 
settler states.   
 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter initially brought some of the most influential liberal theorists of the 
past four decades to bear on the intuitions, gaps and wrestles apparent in the KS 
case.  Like the dissent in the case, John Rawls prioritized everyone and no-one—
the original position and veil of ignorance—as the measure of a just or equal rights 
distribution.  In more adamant terms, Richard Posner’s economic analysis of law 
and Jeremy Waldron’s positivist cosmopolitanism and historical supersession 
respectively displayed a callous utilitarianism and willful blindness to ongoing 
injustices and guarantee/reality gaps.  While much more aware of minority-attracted 
discrimination and disparities, Ronald Dworkin’s equal concern and respect 
nonetheless relied on temporary measures like affirmative action.  However, Will 
Kymlicka’s multiculturalism and historical self-determination scholars appear to 
represent earnest attempts at reconciling both the significant guarantee/reality gaps 
attracted to Native Hawaiians in education and the unique historico-legal context 
of the admission policy.  Together, their approaches liberally validate the admission 
policy without ignoring either present disparities or deeper injustices.  
The reality of significant and troubling guarantee/reality gaps almost unrelentingly 
attracted to Native Hawaiian identity in education demand buffer-and-access rights.  
As discussed in Chapter Three, imposed public education systems, curricula and 
pedagogy exhibiting majoritarian bias constitute nation-building, majoritarian bias 
and clear disadvantage requiring buffering.  However, community and ʻohana 
relationships, cultural resilience, and identity-specific and indigenous-established 
educational approaches have been associated with goods in education.  These 
clearly provide a richer context of choice for rational revision.  Besides buffer-and-
access, multiculturalism also implies a range of identity-responsive rights. 
Kymlicka has written that “liberal multiculturalism… repudiate[es]…older models 
of” homogenenity and “is not a single principle or policy, but an umbrella of highly 
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group-differentiated approaches”245 to equality—or what resembles a theoretical 
toolbox of identity-specific rights options tailored to counter pervasive and ongoing 
harm. 
However, the unique historico-legal context of the admission policy requires more 
than buffer-and-access mechanisms which counter present majoritarian bias and 
disparities.  In Hawaiʻi, the causal connection between historic wrongs and present 
disparities in education is well-established.  The identity-attracted nature of such 
disparities—the way they have consistently clustered around Native Hawaiian 
identity over generations—as well as their pervasiveness in every area of human 
well-being obviously makes them predictive of future discrimination and disparities.  
Such predictability particularly advances the idea that everyone/no-one guarantees 
alone have not produced and may not in future be able to produce fairness or 
equality for indigenous peoples.246  In fact, the once-and-future nature of such 
injustices indicates the deeper liberal relevance of the policy’s historico-legal 
context.  The earnest liberal will want to remedy historic injustices not just because 
they explain present rights denials but because they predict future denials. 
As the next two chapters describe, liberal multiculturalism and historical self-
determination seemingly account for an expansion of equality narratives within 
international law.  As if Kymlicka’s buffer-and-access thesis is right, Chapter Five 
describes how the international human right to education has become increasingly 
identity-specific, evolving from an everyone/no-one guarantee to a complex 
someone narrative of equality which approves a toolbox of rights options in 
education.  Chapter Six explores the culmination of this evolution in a specifically 
indigenous right to education to control educational systems like Kamehameha 
Schools which responds to present disparities and deep harm, particularly historic 
injustices committed against indigenous peoples in education.   
                                                          
245 Will Kymlicka Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) at 83. 
246 Courtney Jung, for instance, describes indigenous claims to self-determination as the response of 
marginalized groups with no other option of finding equality within former settler states such as the 
United States: Courtney Jung “Why Liberals Should Value ‘Identity Politics’?” (2006) 135(4) 
Daedalus 32 at 37.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE HUMAN RIGHT TO 
EDUCATION 
5 CHAPTER FIVE: THE HUMAN RIGHT TO EDUCATION 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Visions of human rights…are not only complex, they are also profound and 
disturbing.  The reason for this is that they tend to strike at our very core and make 
us confront difficult and discomforting issues.  They force us to examine critically 
the nature of men and women, consider what it means to be human, view both the 
best and worst of human behavior, wrestle with how we ought to relate to one 
another…and especially examine our own values and deed in response to those 
who suffer.1 
The same basic narratives of equality considered in terms of theory in the previous 
chapter—everyone/no-one, someone and the indigenous learner—are present in 
international law.  These narratives seem to be closely intertwined with both the 
idea and actual law of human rights.  The right to education is particularly 
illustrative and relevant to the admission policy as it reveals an evolution and 
expansion of equality narratives in terms of rightsholder identity.  This evolution 
provides an expansive discussion on equality and various lessons learned in terms 
of narratives. 
On the understanding that Kymlicka’s buffer-and-access thesis is correct, Chapter 
Five demonstrates how the international human right to education has evolved from 
universalized, everyone/no-one guarantees to a complex, highly identity-aware, 
multi-narrative toolbox of rights options in order to reconcile guarantee/reality gaps.  
The chapter first discusses education as a more substantive everyone/no-one 
guarantee which nonetheless entails slim someone measures aimed at parity.  
Exceeding current federal narratives, complex someone narratives approve 
permanent, quasi-collective minority rights to language, culture and parallel 
                                                          
1 Paul Gordon Lauren “My Brother’s and Sister’s Keeper: Visions and the Birth of Human Rights”, 
in Paul Gordon Lauren The Evolution of Human Rights: Visions Seen (2nd ed, Philadelphia, 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003) 4 at 4. 
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institutions but also rights of availability, access, adaptability and acceptability, and 
participation, and the rights of children specifically and also their families and 
communities.  The right has been challenged in adamant everyone/no-one terms.  
However, the chapter shows how, far from a formalized guarantee alone, the right 
displays organic multiplication and indivisibility, emphasized legality and 
justiciability, demands positive state parties’ obligations and is buttressed by the 
fundamental no-one right to non-discrimination to counter actual discrimination.  
Importantly, the chapter demonstrates that this evolution has been driven by an 
awareness of the de facto rights denials attracted to certain identities. 
 
5.2 THE HUMAN RIGHT TO EDUCATION  
Human rights are often described as natural, inherent and otherwise “unalienable”2 
legal claims attached to each person which prioritize ideals such as equality and 
non-discrimination.  In The History of Human Rights, Michelle Ishay writes: 
Human rights are rights held by individuals simply because they are part of the 
human species.  They are rights shared equally by everyone regardless of sex, race, 
nationality, and economic background.  They are universal in content.3 
By this definition, rights such as education are universal in two senses.  First, the 
right is universal because it applies to all human beings without distinction or 
exception.  Second, the right applies to human beings everywhere.  It crosses 
“boundaries” and “borders”,4 and cannot be refuted or taken away by domestic law 
because it is inherently attached to the human being.  Such definitions imply that 
“every human being is sacred” and that “certain things ought not to be done to any 
human being” while “certain things ought to be done for every human being”.  
                                                          
2 Compare with “inalienable rights” in Declaration of Independence (US 1776). 
3 Micheline Ishay The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era 
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 2004) at 3. 
4 Terms used to describe the effect of ICERD in Hadar Harris “Race Across Borders: The U.S. and 
ICERD” (2008) 24 Harv Blackletter LJ 61 at 61. 
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Given individual sacredness, “the good of every human being is worth pursuing in 
its own right”.5  Similar definitions are commonplace in human rights literature.6  
The liberal flavor of human rights is no coincidence.  While the sacredness of every 
human being can be traced back to religious sources linking humankind with the 
divine, 7  the inherent, inalienable nature of human rights themselves may be traced 
to ancient Greek philosophers, later Christian thinkers including Thomas Aquinas 
but also the natural rights theory of the Enlightenment period which strongly 
influenced the drafting of the American Declaration of Independence and 
Constitution.8  John Locke,9 Jean-Jacques Rousseau,10 Thomas Paine11 and other 
thinkers considered rights to be both the natural state of human beings and a “social 
contract” between them.12  Such theories recognize core rights that define what it is 
to be human13 and also the idea that these human rights “trump” “countervailing 
utilitarian calculations” 14  similar to Dworkin’s “equal concern and respect”. 15  
Modern natural rights thinkers such as John Finnis16 and Martha Nussbaum17 have 
attempted to itemize a list of core rights in terms of human goods.18 
                                                          
5 Michael J Perry “Are Human Rights Universal? The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters” 
19(3) Hum Rts Q 461 at 462 and 466.   
6 “Human rights—droits de l’homme, derechos humanos, Menschenrechte, “the rights of man”—
are literally the rights one has because one is human.”: Jack Donnelly Universal Human Rights in 
Theory and Practice (3rd ed, Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press, 2013) at 7.   “What is meant by 
human rights?  To speak of human rights requires a conception of what rights one possesses by 
virtue of being human.  That does not mean human rights in the self-evident sense that those who 
have them are human, but rather, the right that human beings have simply because they are human 
beings and independent of their varying social circumstance and degrees of merit.”: Jerome Shestack 
“The Philosophic Foundations of Human Rights” in Robert McCorquodale Human Rights (Hants 
Eng UK, Dartmouth Publishing, 2003) 3 at 5. However, Shestack questions the meaning of terms 
such as “inalienable”: at 5-7. 
7 Shestack, above n 6, at 7-8. 
8 Ibid, at 8-10. 
9See John Locke Two Treatises of Government (e-book, McMaster University Archive of the History 
of Economic Thought, 2000). 
10 For instance, Jean-Jacques Rousseau The Social Contract (Penguin Classics, 1968). 
11 Thomas Paine The Rights of Man (London, J Dent, 1915). 
12 Shestack, above n 6, at 8-10. 
13 Ibid, at 15-17.  See Andrew Fagan “Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights” in Thomas 
Cushman Handbook of Human Rights (London, Routledge, 2014) at 9-10, regarding implications of 
“who is entitled to possess human rights” and “which rights should be considered as such”. 
14 Shestack, ibid, at 15. 
15 Ibid, at 28-29.  Also see Jack Donnelly Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (2nd ed, 
Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press, 2003) at 38-53. 
16 John Finnis Natural Law and Natural Rights (2nd ed, Oxford, Clarendon, 2011). 
17 Martha Nussbaum Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge UK, 
Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
18  Not unlike John Rawls selection of goods behind the veil of ignorance.  In contrast, see Patrick 
Macklem’s critique of universally shared humanity as the basis of minority rights legitimacy: Patrick 
Macklem “Minority Rights in International Law” (2008) 6 Int J Constitutional Law 531. 
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Human rights have also been approached as a question of justice.  Following 
Immanuel Kant,19 Rawls has applied ‘justice as fairness’ to human rights20 and also 
been used to explain the focus of human rights on advancing rationality, basic 
liberties and equal, same rights, even “fair equality of opportunity” regardless of 
socio-economic background and other ‘arbitrary features—or critiqued for doing 
so.  Core rights become, similar to Rawls’ first principle of justice, a basic set of 
liberties guaranteed to each human being and, akin to his second principle, about 
making both the most and least advantaged human being better off.21  The idea of 
human rights as the normative product of overlapping consensus also approximates 
Rawlsian public reason—or reflexive equilibrium—as well as a stabilizing factor 
in society.22  Ultimately, human rights, like Rawls and Dworkin’s projects, prize 
rational revision—or “individual autonomy”—that capacity of individuals “to 
‘govern’ their lives, to make important life choices for themselves”.23 
Thus, liberal theory is heavily intertwined with the origins and idea of human rights.  
However, while modern human rights instruments initially espoused a very 
Rawlsian everyone/no-one narrative driven by global human wrongs, international 
law has evolved to recognize a complex multi-narrative of equality as if Kymlicka 
is right.  The human right to education not only encompasses a Kamehameha-like 
right to preference in admission but is a relevant example of this evolution.  
 
5.2.1 EVERYONE: THE CHARTER AND INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 
As in antebellum America, early post-World War II narratives of human rights were 
driven by human wrongs and prioritized a universal everyone.  In their resolve24 to 
                                                          
19 For example, Immanuel Kant The Principles of Political Right and Perpetual Peace (translated 
by W Hastie) (e-book, Digireads.com Publishing, 2010). 
20 John Rawls The Law of Peoples: With “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited (Cambridge MA, 
Harvard University Press, 1999). 
21 In the field of human rights, Rawls’ theory is influential: Shestack at 18-20.   
22 Donnelly, above n 15, at 40. 
23 Ibid, at 47. 
24 “It often takes a truly horrific event for humans to make a leap toward progress.  World War II 
was such an event: its senseless slaughter and destruction sent humanity into an existential crisis and 
led our species to rethink our fundamental values.  The outcome of this re-examination was an 
establishment of a new benchmark for the modern world order: the human being.  The war-scarred 
nations, in an unprecedented show of solidarity, came to an agreement that blind adherence to the 
cause of the nation-state would only bring disaster.  If world peace is ever to be secured, every living 
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avoid another Holocaust and the “horrors” of World War II, the united “Peoples” 
of the world adopted the Charter of the United Nations25 (‘the Charter’) in 1945 that 
established the United Nations (UN).26  The UN was established to prevent and 
punish atrocities through recognition and protection of individual human rights.27  
The Charter itself assumes the inherent dignity and worth of every human being, 
who individually possesses “equal” 28  and “fundamental human rights”. 29   It 
presumes that protecting and guaranteeing an individual’s rights will “promote 
social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom” and “maintain 
international peace and security”30—that is, a global collective good—but also 
prevent future human wrongs.31   To promote these goals, the Charter established 
the General Assembly32 and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)33.   
                                                          
human being must be afforded a minimum level of respect”: Evgeny Krasnov “Freedom from Food: 
On the Need to Restore FDR’s Vision of Economic Rights in America, and How it Might Be Done” 
(2013) 41(3) Hofstra L Rev 735 at 736. 
25 Charter of the United Nations, preamble. 
26 Charter of the United Nations, preamble.   The Charter created a legal framework for subsequent 
human rights treaties and bodies including “subsidiary organs”: art 7(2). “Subsidiary organs” may 
be created under bodies such as ECOSOC in order to fulfill their various mandates.  It also provides 
for “specialized agencies” like the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the eventual United 
Nations Educational and Scientific Organization (UNESCO): art 57(1).   
27 Antonio Cassese International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001) at 351.  For instance, 
Henry J Steiner and Philip Alston comment that: “The Charter builds on the precedents to which the 
Nuremberg Judgment...refers”: Henry J Steiner and Philip Alston International Human Rights in 
Context: Law, Politics, Morals: Text and Materials (Oxford, University Press, 2000) at 137. 
28 Preamble and arts 1(2) and (2(1). 
29 Preamble and art 1(3). 
30 Preamble. 
31  Words such as “tolerance”, “peace”, “security”, and “harmonizing” are used generously as 
counters to “force” and “aggression”: preamble and art 1.  Also see art 2 on the steps Member states 
are to take to avoid and resolve conflict.  The dread of war is apparent.  Under the stated purposes 
of the United Nations found in art 1, international peace and security are to be maintained through 
“effective collective measures” for conflict prevention, “suppression” and resolution, “the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”, and “international co-operation in solving 
international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character”, and the 
promotion of respect for human rights “without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion…”: 
art 1(1-3). 
32 The United Nations General Assembly [UNGA] consists of representatives of all Member states, 
discusses “any questions or matters within the scope of the Charter” or related to the organs of the 
UN, and it makes recommendations to Members and the Security Council on such matters: art 10.  
It can also “initiate studies and make recommendations in order to “promot[e] international co-
operation” on “economic, social, cultural [and] educational” concerns: art 13.  Members vote on 
important questions of human rights and “adopt” declarations and treaties: art 18.  Subsidiary bodies 
may also be established under such bodies: Under art 1. 
33The Economic and Social Council [ECOSOC] includes 54 Members elected by the General 
Assembly: art 61.  Its mandate includes “initiat[ing] studies and reports on “economic, social, 
cultural [and] educational” matters in order to “promot[e] respect for, and observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all”.  It may also make recommendations on matters within its 
jurisdiction and obtain reports from specialized agencies of the UN on such matters: art 62(1-2). 
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The subsequent Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 34  (UDHR) 
recognized the human right to education.  Like the Charter, the UDHR represents 
“moral outrage”35 and functions “as an authoritative interpretation of the Charter”36 
especially cementing the Charter’s principles of universality, equality and non-
discrimination.37  That equality is quite Rawlsian, recognizing in Article 1, for 
instance, that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” and 
“endowed with reason and conscience”.38  The UDHR’s rightsholder is part of “the 
human family”, their dignity “inherent” and rights “inalienable”.39  Homogenous 
“rule of law”, same capacity for “reason and conscience”, and equal protection40 
are presumed.  Most UDHR rights literally begin with a homogenous “Everyone” 
or “All”.41   
Including its right to education.  Article 26 reads: 
(1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the 
elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory… 
(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality 
and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms… 
(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to 
their children.42  
This human rights statement recalls Brown v Board of Education 43 and Plyler v 
Doe’s44 substantively aware, fundamental right to education.  However, Article 26 
is a supra-domestic human right listed alongside fundamental civil and political—
                                                          
34 Universal Declaration on Human Rights GA Res 217A (III), A/810 (adopted 10 December 1948) 
[UDHR]. 
35 Johannes Morsink The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent 
(Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999) at 37. 
36 Javaid Reihman International Human Rights Law: A Practical Approach (London, Longman, 
2003) at 57. 
37 See preamble, arts 1 and 2 respectively. 
38 UDHR, art 1.  Compare with the original position and Rawlsian reason and rationality. 
39 UDHR, Preamble. 
40 See UDHR, preamble and arts 1, 6 and 7 
41 See UDHR, arts 2-3,6-8, 10, 11.1, 12-14, 15.1, 17.1, 18-19, 20.1, and 21-29 (emphasis added). 
42 UDHR, art 26.  The rest of Art 26(1) reads: “Technical and professional education shall be made 
generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit”.  
43 Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas 347 US 483 (1954) [Brown I]; and Brown v Board 
of Education of Topeka, Kansas 349 US 294 (1955) [Brown II]. 
44 Plyler v Doe 457 US 202 (1982). 
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and constitutional—rights.45  It is underscored by universality, equality and non-
discrimination though, like a constitutive commitment, 46  justified on the full 
development of individuals as human beings and the collective good of peace and 
security.47  The right to human personality development has been interpreted by the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child as adding “a qualitative dimension which 
reflects the rights and inherent dignity of the” rightsholder but also an education 
“designed to provide…life skills” and “strengthen the child’s capacity to enjoy the 
full range of human rights”, as well as human rights education and tolerance.48 
Article 26 and other UDHR rights echo Rawls’ fair distribution of rights—or rights 
which anyone behind the veil of ignorance might agree on if ignorant of their own 
identity through the phenomenon of public reason.49  The UDHR was a resolution 
adopted by the General Assembly rather than a treaty50 per se and is sometimes 
described as “aspirational”, “exert[ing] a moral and political influence on states 
rather than constitut[ing] a legally binding instrument”. 51   However, even as 
supposed “soft law”,52 the UDHR is the most cited human rights document in the 
world.53  Javaid Reihman submits that its use and acceptance (opinio juris) in 
general practice demonstrate it has become international custom and founded 
general principles of international law which are legally binding on all States. 54  
                                                          
45 Such as “life, liberty and security of person”, freedom from slavery and torture, and rights to a 
fair trial and freedom of thought, conscience, religion, opinion, and expression: see UDHR, arts 3, 
4 & 5, 10, 18 and 19 respectively.   
46 See discussion on Plyler in Chapter Two at 2.5. 
47 See art 26(2). 
48 Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment No. 1 (2001), Article 29 (1), The aims of 
education CRC/GC/2001/1 (2001) paras 1-4.  CESCR endorsed a similar interpretation of Article 
13(1) in General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education (Art. 13 of the Covenant) E/C.12/1999/10 
(1999) paras 4 and 5 which state that “education shall be directed to the human personality's "sense 
of dignity", shall "enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society", and shall promote 
understanding among all "ethnic" groups, as well as nations and racial and religious groups.  
49 See discussion in Chapter Four at 4.2.2. 
50 A treaty has been defined as: “an international agreement concluded between States in written 
form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more 
related instruments and whatever its particular designation”: Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, 1154 UNTS 331 (opened for signature 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 
(1969) [VCLT] art 2. 
51 Steiner and Alston, above n 27, at 358.  Beyond the technicalities, there has been some debate 
about the status of the UDHR as either customary international law or general principles of 
international law.  See discussion in Reihman, above n 36, at 207.  
52 Where “the instrument or provision in question is not of itself ‘law’, but its importance within the 
general framework of international legal development is such that particular attention [must] be paid 
to it”: Malcolm Shaw International Law (5th ed, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 
110-111. 
53 “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the Most Universal Document in the World” 
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights <www.ohchr.org>.   
54 See discussion Reihman, above n 36, at 207-208.   
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Like Rawlsian public reason and goods, the UDHR’s everyone narrative also, 
arguably, represents “the lowest common denominator” in human rights.  
According to Antonio Cassese, it has “formulated a unitary and universally valid 
concept of what values all States would cherish within their own domestic orders”.55  
Thus, these everyone guarantees are also seemingly everywhere. 
Ultimately, the UDHR’s “vision”56  of human rights was codified57  in the twin 
International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)58 and 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 59  (together ‘the Covenants’), 1966.  Both 
Covenants stand on universality, equality and non-discrimination60 but recognize 
that “freedom from fear and want can only be achieved” where economic, social 
and cultural rights—including education—and fundamental civil and political 
rights approximating constitutional guarantees are enjoyed.61   Each Covenant’s 
rights are meant to operate in tandem and to be interdependent with the other’s.62  
Thus, the ICESCR’s right to education complements the civil and political rights 
listed in the ICCPR.   
Article 13 of the ICESCR recognizes “everyone” and, its goals are the “full 
development of human personality”, human dignity, and respect for human rights, 
as well as peace.  But it is also aimed at enabling a human being to “participate 
effectively in a free society” and promoting “understanding, tolerance and 
friendship” between “racial” and “ethnic…groups”.63  According to Article 13(2), 
“full realization” in education will be achieved through free, compulsory primary 
education but also generally “available” and “accessible” secondary education, 
                                                          
55 Cassese, above n 27, at 358.  
56 Lauren, above n 1, at 227. 
57 The drafters of the UDHR intended to draft a single binding convention expressing its rights 
immediately following it, but the Cold War caused ideological schisms which resulted in two 
International Covenants adopted 10 years later and which did not enter into force for another 10 
years: Steiner and Alston, above n 27, at 139. 
58  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 993 UNTS 3 (opened for 
signature 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) [ICESCR]. 
59 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (opened for signature 16 
December 1966, entered into force 13 March 1976). 
60 ICESCR, preamble and arts 2(2) and 3. 
61 ICESCR, preamble.  See discussion on Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Second Bill of Rights below 
at 5.4.1. 
62 See drafting history and comments in Steiner and Alston, above n 27, at 243 and 47.  See Reihman, 
above n 36, at 6-7 on principles of international law. 
63 See ICESCR, art 13(1). 
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higher education and fundamental education.64  This right to education roughly 
covers the age range of Kamehameha Schools students, envisions school systems, 
considers intangibles such as teacher development,65 and protects private schools66 
as well as “the liberty of individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational 
institutions”.67 
Immediately, this universal right to education recalls the moral intuition of the 
federal courts who decided Brown, Plyler and Kamehameha.  Human personality 
development, particularly, approximates the high constitutional value placed on 
education by those courts, while minimum educational provisions for all children 
make that right universal.  In both Brown and Plyler education rights were equated 
with equal protection.68  These everyone instruments also prize a more substantial 
version of equality.   
The UDHR recognizes both the age and family of the rightsholder to some extent.69  
Additionally, Article 3 of the ICESCR—its equality guarantee—entails “equal 
enjoyment of” the right to education “in practice”, is “understood 
comprehensively”, means “both de facto and de jure equality” as “interconnected 
                                                          
64  ICESCR, art 13(2)(b) recognizes the right to”[s]econdary education in its different forms, 
including technical and vocational secondary education…generally available and accessible to all 
by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education”:  
Subsections 13(2)(c) reads: “Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis 
of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free 
education; (d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged or intensified as far as possible for those 
persons who have not received or completed the whole period of their primary education;”  it also 
provides: “(e) The development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively pursued, an 
adequate fellowship system shall be established, and the material conditions of teaching staff shall 
be continuously improved”. 
65 For example, teacher training and professional development.  ICESCR, art 13(2)(e) provides: 
“The development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively pursued, an adequate 
fellowship system shall be established, and the material conditions of teaching staff shall be 
continuously improved”. 
66 “…Which conform to such minimum educational standards as may be laid down or approved by 
the State and to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their 
own convictions”: ICESCR, art 13.  Compare with parental choice rights recognized in American 
cases Pierce v Society of Sisters 268 US 510 (1925); and Meyer v Nebraska 262 US 390 (1923) 
discussed in Chapter Two at 2.5. 
67 “…Subject always to the observance of the principles set forth in paragraph I of this Article and 
to the requirement that the education given in such institutions shall conform to such minimum 
standards as may be laid down by the State”: ICESCR, art 13.   
68 See discussion in Chapter Two at 2.2.3 and 2.5. 
69 Recognizing that “childhood [is] entitled to special care and “[t]he family is the natural and 
fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State”: UDHR, arts 
16(3) and 25(2). 
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concepts” and not merely “neutral” treatment70 but “the effects of laws, policies and 
practices and…ensuring that they do not maintain, but rather alleviate, the inherent 
disadvantage that particular groups experience.”71 
While, the ICCPR’s initial equality clause, Article 3, is brief and falls after its more 
comprehensive non-discrimination clause, Article 2, both hark back to the UDHR 
and the Charter.72  Article 26 of the ICCPR requires States parties to “guarantee to 
all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination”.73  The UDHR 
also describes itself as providing a “common standard of achievement” for 
“universal and effective recognition and observance”.74   
More recently, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)75  
has interpreted Article 13 as establishing four norms for the right to education, the 
so-called ‘4-A Scheme’ including: availability or “functioning educational 
institutions and programmes…available in sufficient quantity within the 
jurisdiction of the State Party”; 76  the accessibility of those institutions and 
programmes “to everyone” on the basis of non-discrimination, both physically and 
economically; 77  the acceptability of “the form and substance of education, 
including the curricula and teaching methods…to students and…parents”;78 and 
                                                          
70 CESCR General Comment No. 16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art. 3 of the Covenant) E/C.12/2005/4 (2005). 
71 ECOSOC General Comment No 16, para 7. 
72 “The non-discrimination clause of paragraph 1 follows that of art 2 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights”: Commission on Human Rights, 5th Session (1949), 6th Session (1950), 8th Session 
(1952), A/2929, Chap. V, § cited and quoted in Marc J Bossuyt Guide to the “Travaux Preparatoires” 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (Dordrecht, M Niljoff, 1987) at 52.  
Article 3 was drafted to emphasize and make unequivocal the non-prejudicial nature of the 
enjoyment of rights protected by art 2 and to “reaffirm” the fundamental principle of 
equality…enshrined in [art 1(3) of] the Charter of the United Nations…especially as there were still 
many prejudices preventing its full application”: see drafting history in Bossuyt, Travaux 
Preparatoires at 75-79. Quote at 78. 
73 ICCPR, art 26 (emphasis added).  For the greater implications, see discussion on justiciability 
below at 5.4.2. 
74 UDHR, preamble. 
75 “The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) is the body of independent 
experts that monitors implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights by its States parties. The Committee was established under ECOSOC Review of the 
composition, organization and administrative arrangements of the Sessional Working Group of 
Governmental Experts on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights Resolution 1985/17 of 28 May 1985 to carry out the monitoring functions 
assigned to the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in Part IV of the Covenant”: 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights <www2.ohchr.org>. 
76  CESCR, General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education (Art. 13 of the Covenant) 
E/C.12/1999/10 (1999) at para 6. 
77 Ibid, para 6. 
78 Ibid. 
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adaptability, or the flexibility of education in response “to the needs of changing 
societies and communities and…to the needs of students within their diverse social 
and cultural settings”.79   
The 4-A Scheme addresses many of the same issues which persuaded the US 
Supreme Court in Brown80 and its progeny to espouse a more substantial narrative 
of equality and reject ‘separate but equal’ arguments.  Availability entails the 
straightforward provision of physical facilities, teaching staff, libraries, “safe 
drinking water” and many other practical considerations, potentially resource-
dependent measures.81   Accessibility, however, requires state obligations in less 
tangible aspects of education.  Not only are facilities to be physically accessible82 
but they must be genuinely “accessible to all, especially the most vulnerable groups, 
in law and in fact, without discrimination on any of the prohibited grounds”.  
Education must also be economically accessible—or affordable—for all. 83  
Furthermore, under acceptability, “the form and substance of education, including 
curricula and teaching methods, have to be acceptable (e.g. relevant, culturally 
appropriate and of good quality)”. 84  Finally, under adaptability, education must be 
socially and culturally responsive to the needs of the students. 85   
This right is significant.  The ICESCR is legally binding, requiring State Parties to 
“guarantee the rights” it contains. 86   Ratifying States commit to “undertake[] 
steps…to the maximum of  [their] available resources” and by “all appropriate 
means” to achieve the “full realization” of those rights.87   States Parties are to report 
                                                          
79 CESCR, General Comment No 13, above n 76, para 6.  For more on 4-A Scheme, see Katarina 
Tomasevski Human Rights Obligations in Education: The 4-A Scheme (Nijmegen, The Netherlands: 
Wolf Legal Publishers, 2006). 
80 See discussion in Chapter Two on intangibles at 2.2.3. 
81 CESCR, General Comment No 13, above n 76, para 6(a). 
82 Here I realize that for the disabled, for instance, physical accessibility may not be such a mundane 
consideration but a very real rights concern and possible ground for discrimination.  Likewise, for 
indigenous and other children in remote or rural situations physical accessibility will be crucial to 
realization of their right to education. 
83 CESCR, General Comment No 13, above n 76, para 6(b). 
84 Ibid, para 6(c). 
85 Ibid, para 6(d). 
86 ICESCR, art 2(2). 
87 ICESCR, art 2(1-2). 
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to ECOSOC, via the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR),88 on a bi-annual basis.89   
Article 14 makes States Parties accountable to substantially realize the right to free 
and compulsory education.90  Similarly, in 2000, CESCR similarly affirmed that 
general principles of international law are to be applied when interpreting party 
obligations under the ICESCR or any treaty addressing economic, social or cultural 
rights.91  Guided by the Limburg Principles,92 parties to the ICESCR must “at all 
times act in good faith to fulfill the obligations they have accepted under the 
Covenant”.93  Post-ratification, they are “to begin immediately to take steps towards 
full realization” and to “use all appropriate means” to accomplish realization.94  
Under the Maastricht Guidelines,95 failure to “comply with a treaty obligation” 
                                                          
88 As summarized in “Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights <www2.ohchr.org>: “The Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) is the body of independent experts that monitors 
implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by its States 
parties. The Committee was established under ECOSOC Resolution 1985/17 (1985) to carry out the 
monitoring functions assigned to the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 
Part IV of the Covenant”. 
89 The CESCR makes recommendations regarding the ICESCR to the Human Rights Council and 
the General Assembly, drafts conventions on ICESCR matters (ICESCR, arts 16(2)(a), 17, 19, 21 
and 23) and has recently been empowered by the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights GA Res 63/117, A/RES/63/117 (2008) [OP-ICESCR] to 
hear individual complaints against States Parties regarding ICESCR rights arts 1 and 2. 
90 Article 14 makes States Parties to the ICESCR accountable to at least develop a plan for free and 
compulsory primary education for all within two years: “Each State Party to the present Covenant 
which, at the time of becoming a Party, has not been able to secure in its metropolitan territory or 
other territories under its jurisdiction compulsory primary education, free of charge, undertakes, 
within two years, to work out and adopt a detailed plan of action for the progressive implementation, 
within a reasonable number of years, to be fixed in the plan, of the principle of compulsory education 
free of charge for all”.  Article 14 is an extension of States obligations under art 2(1) to “take steps, 
individually” and with other States “to the maximum of available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization” of the ICESCR’s rights: See ICESCR, art 2(1).   
91  Also see Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
E/C.12/2000/13 (2000). 
92 The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights E/C.12/2000/13 (2000). The Limburg Principles are considered “soft law” but 
demonstrate the increasing explicitness and concreteness of state parties obligations in terms of 
ESCRs including education.   
93  CESCR, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights E/C.12/2000/13 (2000) general observation 7 (emphasis 
added).  Also see general observation 4: “The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights...should, in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna 
1969), be interpreted in good faith, taking into account the object and purpose, the ordinary meaning, 
the preparatory work and the relevant practice”. 
94 Comment E/C.12/2000/13. 2 October 2000, English, general observations, 16-17, at 5 (emphasis 
added). 
95 The Maastricht Guidelines are also considered “soft law” but frequently referred to by especially 
the CESCR to interpret States obligations in terms of ESCRs.   
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concerning education “is a violation of” the ICESCR. 96   States Parties are to 
“respect, protect and fulfill” those rights.  In each case they must conduct 
themselves in a manner consistent with—and “achieve specific targets” which will 
lead to—full realization of the right.97 
Given these standards, ECOSOC has stated that: “Article 13, the longest provision 
in the Covenant, is the most wide-ranging and comprehensive article on the right to 
education in international human rights law.98 
 
5.2.2 NO-ONE AND A SLIMMER SOMEONE: CADE, THE RACE CONVENTION AND 
CEDAW 
Post-war, the UDHR’s drafters also chose to employ the phrase “no one” 
extensively and often as the companion of everyone or all.99   Under Article 2, the 
list of identifying characteristics which may not be used to deny a human being 
UDHR rights includes “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, [and] birth”.100  The ICCPR’s equality 
clause actually follows the UDHR’s non-discrimination provision.101  While the 
ICESCR does not specifically address ‘no one’, it also contains a general non-
discrimination clause.102  
Similar no-one narratives are dramatically illustrated in three subsequent 
instruments prioritizing non-discrimination.  Like the singular American narrative 
                                                          
96 Maastricht Guidelines, para 5, at 17, referring to economic, social and cultural rights or ESCRs.  
Controversies regarding ESCRs discussed further below at 5.3.1. 
97 Comment E/C.12/2000/13. 2 October 2000, English, paras 6-7.  For more on State obligations to 
respect, protect and fulfil, see discussion below at 5.4.2. 
98 CESCR, General Comment 13, above n 76, para 2. 
99 No less than 8 times: see arts 4, 5, 9, 11(2), 12, 15(2), 17(2) and 20(2). 
100 UDHR, art 2. 
101 “The non-discrimination clause of paragraph 1 follows that of art 2 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights”: Commission on Human Rights, 5th Session (1949), 6th Session (1950), 8th Session 
(1952), A/2929, Chap. V, § cited and quoted in Bossuyt, Travaux Preparatoires, above n 72, at 52.  
Article 3 was drafted to emphasize and make unequivocal the non-prejudicial nature of the 
enjoyment of rights protected by art 2 and to “reaffirm” the fundamental principle of 
equality…enshrined in [art 1(3) of] the Charter of the United Nations…especially as there were still 
many prejudices preventing its full application”: see drafting history in Bossuyt, Travaux 
Preparatoires above n 72, at 75-79. Quoted text found at 78. 
102 ICESCR, art 2(2). 
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evident in recent 14th Amendment jurisprudence—such as the University of 
Michigan cases103—and Rawls’ veil of ignorance, these instruments reluctantly 
negatively recognize dichotomized certain group identities—or what the thesis has 
called the ‘no-one’—only enough to prohibit them as the basis of unlawful 
discrimination.  However, they also approve a slim someone narrative which 
approves affirmative action, consistent with Dworkin’s equal concern and respect 
limits.  Ultimately, dichotomy dominates these conventions. 
These instruments recognize that “[t]he principle of non-discrimination is the 
corollary of the principle of equality” 104  and a fundamental principle of the 
International Bill of Rights.  Accordingly, the Convention against Discrimination 
in Education 1960 (CADE) 105  is directed at “equality of educational 
opportunity”.106  Under Art 1, discrimination:  
…includes any distinction, exclusion, limitation or preference which, being based 
on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, economic condition or birth, has the purpose or effect of nullifying or 
impairing equality of treatment in education107 
which affects access to education “of any type or at any level” and quality of 
education, as well as “separate educational systems or institutions”, and conditions 
incompatible with human dignity.108    
                                                          
103 Where affirmative action hung by the slim thread of diversity submerged within the wider matrix 
of various admission factors: see discussion in Chapter Two at 2.4.1. 
104 CESCR, General Comment No. 16, above n 70, para 10. 
105  UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), Convention against 
Discrimination in Education (opened for signature 14 December 1960, entered into force 22 May 
1962).  Actually drafted and adopted before the International Covenants by the United Nations 
Educational and Scientific Organization (UNESCO), one of two UN bodies specifically mandated 
to advance and monitor the international right to education.  The other is the CESCR, as discussed 
in section 5.1.1.   
106 CADE, preamble. 
107 CADE, art 1. 
108 Likewise, ‘[e]ducation’ includes “all types and levels”108 of primary, secondary, tertiary and 
vocational education:  Yves Daudet and Pierre Michel Eisemann “Commentary on the Convention 
against Discrimination in Education (Adopted on 14 December 1960 by the General Conference of 
UNESCO)” UNESCO <http://unesdoc.unesco.org> at 11.  Compare language with that of 
antebellum law in the United States, discussed at 2.2.1. 
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Articles 4 and 5 resemble the ICESCR’s Article 13.109  Separate institutions and 
systems do not constitute discrimination where they offer “equivalent access”, 
support parental choice, are private,110 and participation is voluntary.111   
The CADE’s right to education is seemingly aware of symptoms of real-time 
disparities. While Article 1 condemns inferior separate institutions, Article 4 
addresses high dropout rates and lack of qualified teachers requiring States to 
“encourage and intensify” efforts to address such discrimination.112  State Parties 
must not only change domestic law where necessary to address discrimination in 
education but end it in “administrative practice.113  Such provisions entail “precise 
obligations to counter discrimination”.114   
Another no-one instrument, the International Convention on the Elimination of all 
forms of Racial Discrimination 1965 (‘the Race Convention’ or ICERD) 115  
specifically condemns “colonialism and all practices of segregation and 
discrimination”, as well as “any doctrine of superiority based on racial 
differentiation” including “apartheid, segregation or separation” arising in the era 
of decolonization116—a category which must also include assimilative education 
                                                          
109 Given their reference to free and compulsory primary education, availability and accessibility at 
other levels, standards requirement, the personality principle, and parental freedom of choice: See 
art 3 (a-b) and art 4 (a-b) respectively. 
110 CADE, art 2 (a-b). 
111 Article 2.  UNESCO, UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960) and 
Articles 13 and 14 (Right to Education) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: A Comparative Analysis (Paris, UNESCO, 2006) at 13. 
112 Article 4 (c) and (d), respectively, require States to “encourage and intensify” efforts to assist 
those who have not completed a primary education to do so and to prohibit discrimination in the 
training of teachers.  For examples of this type of discrimination, see discussion on various peoples 
in Tove Skutnabb-Kangas and Robert Dunbar “Indigenous Children’s Education as Linguistic 
Genocide and a Crime against Humanity?  A Global View” (2010) (1) Gáldu Čála: Journal of 
Indigenous Peoples Rights 53.  Other ethnic minorities such as the Roma have been subjected to the 
indignity of separate and inferior schools: see cases of Roma segregation including Oršuš and Others 
v Croatia (15766/03) Grand Chamber, ECHR 16 March 2010; and DH and Others v the Czech 
Republic (57325/00) Grand Chamber, ECHR 13 November 2007. 
113 CADE, art 3.  A phrase which might include the kind of complex discrimination and disparities 
arising from a majority-biased educational and legal system. Also see Minority Schools in Albania 
(Advisory Opinion) (1935) PCIJ (series A/B) No 64 discussed below at 5.2.4. 
114 UNESCO, Comparative Analysis, above n 111, at 14. 
115 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 660 UNTS 
195 (opened for signatures 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) [‘the Race 
Convention’ or ICERD], one of the nine core human rights treaties in the UN system: see 
“International Human Rights Law” United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human 
Rights <www.ohchr.org>.   
116 ICERD, preamble.  Also see ICERD’s condemnation of segregation in art 3. 
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policy and other intentionally discriminatory practices.  States parties are, 
particularly, to ensure the right to education.117   
The Race Convention defines discrimination much like CADE118 but targets racial 
discrimination.  Generally, any differential treatment based on genealogical identity 
which interferes with an individual’s realization of human rights constitutes racial 
discrimination.  However, State Parties must not discriminate themselves by 
“sponsor[ing]…or support[ing]” private discrimination or effecting de facto 
discrimination through otherwise innocuous law and policy. 119   Racially 
discriminatory propaganda and public institutions are particularly repugnant.120  In 
contrast, “special measures” may be enacted for “the sole purpose” of assisting 
“certain racial and ethnic groups or individuals” to realize human rights on an equal 
basis121 where they are “concrete”122 and are distinguishable from “unjustifiable 
preferences” which unfairly advantage a group.123  Under Article 7, “States Parties 
[are] to adopt immediate and effective measures, particularly in the fields of 
teaching, education, culture and information” to “combat[] prejudices which lead 
to racial discrimination”.124   
Similarly, the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against 
Women 1979 (CEDAW or ‘Women’s Convention’) 125 negatively recognizes that 
women have been discriminated against as a group and that such discrimination 
                                                          
117 ICERD, art 5(e)(v).  It is categorized as “(e) Economic, social and cultural rights” as opposed to 
“(c) Political rights” and “(d) Other civil rights” under art 5. 
118 “…Any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national 
or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment 
or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, 
economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life: ICERD, art 1.1. 
119 ICERD, art 2(1)(a-d).  Accountability, as with the ICESCR and the CADE, depends upon a 
system of reporting, in this case, to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) established by the ICERD: ICERD, arts 8 and 9.  Under art 4, racially discriminatory 
propaganda and organizations, including public institutions, are particularly repugnant.   
120 Article 4. This would seem to provide a legal basis for condemnation of some of the more 
insidious forms of historic nation-building such as the misrepresentation of indigenous people in 
textbooks and other curriculum in schools. 
121 Article 1(4). 
122 And taken in “social, economic, cultural and other fields”: ICERD, arts 1(4) and 2(2).   
123 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) General Recommendation no. 
32, The meaning and scope of special measures in the International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms [of] Racial Discrimination CERD/C/GC/32 (2009) at para 7. 
124 ICERD, art 7.  They must adopt a policy of non-discrimination “without delay”: ICERD, art 
2(1)(a-d).  
125 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 1249 UNTS 13 
(opened for signature 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) [CEDAW of 
Women’s Convention]. 
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violates the inherent dignity and equality they possess as individual human 
beings.126  The Women’s Convention was precipitated by the “equal right of men 
and women” stated in Article 3 of the ICESCR127 and is ideologically related to the 
Race Convention, its definition of discrimination gender-aware rather than race-
aware.128  The Preamble of the UDHR and Article 3 of the ICCPR, provisions 
drafted to reiterate the non-prejudicial nature of equality, also exhibit gender 
dichotomy. 129    Like ICERD, States parties’ obligations under CEDAW entail 
immediate changes to discriminatory policies, prohibit State parties, including 
“public authorities and institutions”, from “engaging in any act or practice of 
discrimination”, and changing law to effectively protect women, and to “eliminate 
[private] discrimination” against women.130   
This right to education, however, is also more substantive and approves Dworkinian 
special measures.  The Women’s Convention groups education with civil and 
political rights131 consistent with the UDHR.  It is also comprehensive in its scope, 
covering nine paragraphs in Article 10 which insist on equality for women in areas 
including “career and vocational guidance”, “pre-school” through “professional” 
education, “curricula”, “examinations” and credentials of teaching staff, “the 
elimination of” gendered stereotypes, scholarship opportunities, continuing 
education and “functional literacy”, “sports and physical education”, and health and 
family planning education.  State Party obligations, likewise, include a commitment 
to reduce “female drop-out rates”. 132    
Unlike previous everyone/no-one instruments, CEDAW recognizes a more 
complex discrimination.  For instance, the Preamble recognizes that, although 
gender attracts the discrimination, forces such as poverty and racism particularly 
affect women, while, conversely, the realization of rights for women is directly 
                                                          
126 CEDAW, preamble. 
127 See authoritative explanation of art 3 in CESCR General Comment No 16, above n 70.  Also see 
ICESCR, art 7(a)(i) on equality of women with men in employment. 
128 CEDAW, art 1. 
129 Article 3 of the ICCPR was drafted to emphasize and make unequivocal the non-prejudicial 
nature of the enjoyment of rights protected by art 2 and to “reaffirm” the fundamental principle of 
equality…enshrined in [Article 1(3) of] the Charter of the United Nations…especially as there were 
still many prejudices preventing its full application” in regard to women: see drafting history in 
Bossuyt, Travaux Preparatoires, above n 72, at 75-79. Quoted text found at 78. 
130 CEDAW, art 2. 
131  Such as voting and political participation, right to nationality and equality before the law, 
CEDAW, arts 7(a), 9 and 15. 
132 CEDAW, art 10. 
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linked to “the welfare…and the development of the family”.133  The Committee on 
the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women has interpreted 
CEDAW as “emphasizing that women have suffered, and continue to suffer from 
various forms of discrimination because they are women”, recognized the need to 
“effectively address[]” and “consider[] in a contextual way” “the underlying causes 
of discrimination against” them, and attributed the need for special measures for 
particularly vulnerable groups of women to “multiple forms of discrimination…and 
its compounded negative impact on them”.134  Importantly, temporary, equalizing, 
special measures are acceptable for the advancement of women.135 
However, CEDAW nonetheless interprets equality and non-discrimination as 
sameness.  In fact, within the nine paragraphs of Article 10, the word “same” is 
used at least eight times.136  Like the Race Convention, the aim of CEDAW is 
integration.  Rather than parity with the majority racial group as in the Weber-
Johnson test, equality means comparable dichotomous parity with the dominant 
gender.137  Similarly, CEDAW’s text expresses a Rawlsian or Waldronian distrust 
of community, for instance, where it assumes “a change in the traditional role of 
men as well as the role of women in society and in the family is needed to achieve 
full equality between men and women”138 and requires States Parties to “take all 
appropriate measures…[t]o modify social and cultural patterns” to eliminate 
discrimination.139   
The education rights in CADE, the Race Convention and CEDAW expand on 
previous law such as Article 26 of the UDHR and  Article 3 of the ICESCR, in 
identity-specific, dichotomous terms, spelling out who will not be discriminated 
                                                          
133 CEDAW, Preamble. 
134  Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) General 
recommendation No. 25, on article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women, on temporary special measures (2004) paras 5, 10 and 12 
respectively.  Paragraph 12 explains: “Certain groups of women, in addition to suffering from 
discrimination directed against them as women, may also suffer from multiple forms of 
discrimination based on additional grounds such as race, ethnic or religious identity, disability, age, 
class, caste or other factors.  Such discrimination may affect these groups of women primarily, or to 
a different degree or in different ways than men.  States parties may need to take specific temporary 
special measures to eliminate such multiple forms of discrimination against women and its 
compounded negative impact on them”. 
135 CEDAW, arts 3-4(1). 
136 CEDAW, art 10.  See arts 15 and 16 for similar repeated emphasis of the word “same”. 
137 For similar gender dichotomy see CESCR, General Comment No 16, above n 70. 
138 CEDAW, preamble. 
139 CEDAW, preamble.   
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against, rather than who is a rights-holder in education.  In Rawlsian fashion, 
possible aspects of the rights-holder’s identity are revealed only so that they can be 
excluded as the basis of the right.  While temporary special measures aimed at parity 
approximate Dworkin’s equal concern and respect and represent a slim someone, a 
dichotomous no-one is clearly prioritized. 
 
5.2.3 EXPANDED SOMEONE: MINORITY RIGHTS 
While Rawlsian theory has often been applied to such treaties, Kymlicka himself 
has argued that the international human rights framework actually reflects his 
theory of liberal multiculturalism.140  This conclusion certainly seems to be true in 
terms of the right to education. 
Beyond current American federal narratives, international law recognizes group-
differentiated minority rights which retain substantial awareness reminiscent of 
Brown and Plyler and recall Kymlickan buffer-and-access.  Minority rights in 
education include special measures but also the minority-specific right to establish, 
maintain and control parallel schools where admission is preferential.  Unlike 
everyone and no-one instruments, minority rights recognize both the disadvantage 
and good of ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious and even indigenous minority 
identity.  They represent an expanded someone narrative but also serve a buffer-
and-access function in liberal terms. 
 
5.2.3.1 PERMANENT COURT OF JUSTICE ADVISORY OPINIONS 
Ethnic minority education rights were recognized in international law prior to 
World War II.  As the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Romanov Empires 
disintegrated and nation-states were redrawn on maps post-World War I,141 the 
                                                          
140 See premise of Will Kymlicka Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics 
of Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
141 See facts set out in Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority Schools) (Advisory Opinion) 
(1928) PCIJ (series A) No 15 [Upper Silesia I] at 8-9.  The Polish majority voted to be part of Poland.  
The treaty provided for rejoinder to League of Nations for German minority. 
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1919 Minorities Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and 
Poland, for instance, guaranteed:  
[m]embers of racial, religious or linguistic minorities …’the same treatment and 
security in law and in fact’ as other…nationals, and the right to establish and 
control at their expense their own religious, social and educational institutions.142 
Such provisions143 were guaranteed by the young League of Nations (‘the League’), 
(1919-1938).144  Minorities within member states could make claims directly to the 
Council of the League when these rights were violated.  The Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ), “the first international court”,145 could then issue an 
advisory opinion on the matter.  Between the two World Wars the issue of minority 
education rights came before the PCIJ on at least three occasions.  Each time, the 
right of private schools to prefer students identified with a certain linguistic and 
cultural minority group were at issue.   
The first two cases concerned German-medium and -curriculum schools in Poland.  
The first, Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (‘Upper Silesia I’)146, came before 
the Court when the Polish government dramatically interfered with admissions to 
private German minority schools. 147   The PCIJ affirmed that members of the 
German minority had the right to self-identify themselves as either a member of a 
“racial, linguistic or religious minority” or not and also to choose the “language of 
instruction and the corresponding school” of a child for which he or she was “legally 
responsible”.148  The majority opinion interpreted equality as “the equal right of [of 
minority members] to establish, maintain and control” German-medium and –
curriculum schools and “the right to use their own language”.149  Such rights were 
                                                          
142 Related in Steiner and Alston, above n 27, at 95 (emphasis added). 
143 Related in Steiner and Alston, above n 27, at 95. 
144 The League of Nations was created in 1919 under the Treaty of Versailles in the wake of WWI.  
At its height, the League had 57 member states.  During the 1930s a number of significant members 
pulled out of the League because of its apparent ineffectualness.  It basically ceased functioning in 
1938 when it became clear that it had failed to prevent WWII.  Its last official act, however, took 
place in 1946 when all of its assets were transferred to the nascent UN: see “UN Documentation: 
International Court of Justice” United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library Research Guides 
<http://research.un.org>.   
145 Steiner and Alston, above n 27, at 97.   
146 Upper Silesia I. 
147 It struck-off the names of over 7000 students accepted to German minority schools on the grounds 
that they were not German speakers or that declarations declaring them so were invalid: Upper 
Silesia I at 79. 
148 Articles 69, 74, 106 and 131 of the German-Polish Convention of May 15th, 1922. 
149 Upper Silesia I, at 42. 
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necessary to avoid the greater “disadvantages” associated with state interference.150  
The second case, Access to German Minority Schools in Upper Silesia (‘Upper 
Silesia II’)151, was, largely, a replay of the first case in the very next school year.  
The court again gave judgment in favor of the German minority.152   
While the PCIJ did not give judgment in the Minority Schools case on what 
constituted equal treatment or constituted discrimination in those facts,153 it did, in 
the case of Minority Schools in Albania.154 The case concerned ethnic Greeks living 
within Albania.  Upon joining the League of Nations in 1922, Albania signed a 
declaration that guaranteed Greek minority members “the same treatment and 
security in law and in fact as other Albanian nationals” and that:  
…they shall have an equal right to maintain, manage and control at their own 
expense or to establish in the future, charitable, religious and social institutions, 
schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own 
language and to exercise their religion freely therein.155 
The matter came before the PCIJ when the Albanian government made changes to 
its constitution which abolished all private schools.156   
The dissenting opinion in the case has a familiar ring to it.  Three members of the 
Court insisted that “[t]he word ‘equal’ implies that the right so enjoyed must be 
equal in measure to the right enjoyed by somebody else”.157  By this standard of 
formal sameness, the Greek children receiving an Albanian-based state education 
were already equal to children of the majority as none of them were allowed a 
private education.158 
                                                          
150 See Upper Silesia I, at 35. 
151 Access to German Minority Schools in Upper Silesia (Advisory Opinion) (1931) PCIJ (series A/B) 
No 40 [Upper Silesia II].  This time the issue was whether, based on language tests which had been 
applied in response to the first case, the children identified by their parents or guardians as German 
but who could not speak German could now attend German minority schools.  The answer was 
affirmative.  
152 Upper Silesia II at 20. 
153 Because, technically, the Polish government did not rebut the German government’s contention 
that Poland’s “hostile” interference with not just the admissions but the maintenance of those schools 
constituted discrimination and a violation of equal treatment. See Upper Silesia II, at 43-44. 
154 Albania, above n 113. 
155 Ibid,, at 8 (emphasis added). 
156 And the Greek minority within Albania alleged that their rights to establish and maintain Greek-
medium and Greek-curriculum schools had been violated.  For constitutional changes, see discussion 
in ibid at 13. 
157 Ibid, at 101 (emphasis added). 
158 See arguments of the Albanian government, ibid, at 14-15. 
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However, the majority of the PCIJ recognized that the purpose of differential 
treatment was to help minorities integrate into national life—an everyone 
consideration directed at sameness—“while at the same time preserving the 
characteristics which distinguish them from the majority, and satisfying the ensuing 
special needs”—a someone matter.  Echoing Pauahi’s hope, minority members 
were to be placed “on a footing of perfect equality” with other nationals and possess 
“suitable means” for the preservation of their cultural identity or “racial 
peculiarities”.159 
The majority concluded: 
Equality in law precludes discrimination of any kind; whereas equality in fact may 
involve the necessity of different treatment in order to attain a result which 
establishes an equilibrium between different situations… 
The equality of members of the majority and the minority must be effective, 
genuine equality… 
[The Greek minority] institutions…are indispensable to enable the minority to 
enjoy the same treatment as the majority, not only in law but also in fact.  The 
abolition of these institutions, which alone can satisfy the special requirements of 
the minority groups, and their replacement by government institutions, would 
destroy this equality of treatment, for its effect would be to deprive the minority of 
the institutions appropriate to its needs, whereas the majority would continue to 
have them supplied by the institutions created by the State.160 
The Court also concluded that rather than “creating a privilege in favour of the 
minority”, this type of equality ensures that the majority does not have an unfair 
advantage in education.161 
This early opinion recognizes a substantive rather than formalized equality but also, 
importantly, the reality of institutionalized majoritarian bias.  Neutral treatment 
does not then automatically create equality, and different treatment recognizes both 
the disadvantage and the good of cultural membership in order to achieve real 
equality.   The minority schools themselves seemingly fulfill buffer-and-access 
functions.   
                                                          
159 Ibid, at 17.  See discussion on Pauahi’s reasons for establishing the Kamehameha Schools in 
Chapter Three at 3.5. 
160 Ibid, at 19-20. 
161 Ibid, at 20. 
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Interestingly, the case was brought by a collective group,162 and the rights accrued 
to a communal identity.  Also, minority language emerges as both a contentious 
issue and tangible measure of equality in the majority opinion in all three cases.163   
The League’s minorities regime suffered from its overall ineffectiveness and 
eventual demise.  As discussed above, the right to education largely focused on 
universality and non-discrimination after World War II.  However, one of CADE’s 
provisions does address “national minorities” in terms similar to the Albania case.  
Like the League declarations, Article 5(1)(c) requires States Parties to: 
…recognize the right of members of national minorities to carry on their own 
educational activities, including the maintenance of schools and, depending on the 
educational policy of each State, the use or the teaching of their own language…164 
Article 5’s drafting history reveals that the drafters were conscious of “non-
dominant” groups within states who: 
…while wishing in general for equality of treatment with the majority, wish for a 
measure of differential treatment in order to preserve basic characteristics which 
they possess and which distinguish them from the majority of the population.165 
This seems to have included indigenous populations. 166    During drafting, it 
appeared to be understood that failure to protect minority learners from actual 
discrimination in education was “tantamount to denying ‘equal educational 
treatment’”.167     
 
5.2.3.2 ARTICLE 27 OF THE ICCPR 1966 
As discussed above, the ICCPR primarily focuses on avowed civil and political 
rights and does not recognize a right to education per se.  Its rights, in general, are 
                                                          
162 Though there is still some debate about whether the rights to differentiated education recognized 
by the PCIJ could be claimed by that group as a whole or only by individual members: Steiner and 
Alston, above n 27, at 102-103. 
163 References from cases 
164 CADE, art 5(c). 
165 Charles Ammoun, former Director-General of UNESCO, quoted in Daudet and Eisemann, above 
n 108, at 28-29. 
166 Ibid, at 29. 
167 Ibid. 
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universal in nature and prioritize non-discrimination.  However, the ICCPR does 
include the right of “peoples” to self-determination.  “By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development”.168  It also provides some protection for minorities.  Article 
27 states: 
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the 
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise 
their own religion, or to use their own language.169 
The wording of Article 27 is reminiscent of the League Declarations and Article 
5(1) of CADE.  Importantly, it is to be exercised collectively.  Logically, the right 
of minorities to enjoy their culture and use their language, in particular, would 
include indigenous education rights.  Indigenous communities constitute cultural, 
linguistic and even religious minorities.  Indigenous institutions such as 
Kamehameha Schools enable and protect the enjoyment of those rights.   
In fact, the travaux préparatoires of the ICCPR on Article 27 show that drafters 
included the provision because: 
…while…the draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contained a general 
prohibition of discrimination, differential treatment might be granted to minorities 
in order to ensure them real equality of status with the other elements of the 
population.170 
Drafters considered the right so important that early versions of the article actually 
required public funding of such rights.171  With similar urgency, the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC)—mandated to monitor and make recommendations on ICCPR 
rights implementation172—has described Article 27 as “directed towards ensuring 
the survival and continued development of the cultural, religious and social identity 
                                                          
168 ICCPR, art 1(10). 
169 ICCPR, art 27. 
170 Bossuyt, Travaux Preparatoires, above n 72, at 493. 
171 Ibid.   
172 Under ICCPR, art 28. 
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of the minorities concerned”. 173   Thus, some commentators have summarized 
minority rights as rights to identity.174 
Moreover, a violation of Article 27 can trigger the Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR175 which gives the HRC: 
…the competence to receive and consider communications from individuals 
subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party 
of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.176 
While the Optional Protocol is accessible to individuals, members of indigenous 
communities have collectively submitted communications to the HRC under Article 
27. 177   Indigenous rights enjoyed collectively, associated with preserving 
indigenous identity have been recognized in the decisions of the HRC in those 
cases.  At least one of these complaints also claimed that the right of the indigenous 
parties to self-determination had been violated.178   
In terms not unlike Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism, the Human Rights 
Committee has commented that: “Although the rights protected under Article 27 
are individual rights, they depend in turn on the ability of the minority group to 
                                                          
173  Human Rights Committee [HRC] CCPR General Comment No. 23: Article 27 (Rights of 
Minorities) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 (1994) at para 9. 
174 Patrick Thornberry “The UN Declaration in the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities: Background, Analysis, Observations and an Update” in 
Alan Philips and Alan Rosas (eds) Unviersal Minority Rights (Turku/Åbo, Insititute for Human 
Rights, 1995).  Also see Kristin Henrard Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: 
Individual Human Rights, Minority rights and the Right to Self-Determination (The Hague, Kluwer 
Law, 2000) at 12. 
175 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 
(opened for signature 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) [OP1-ICCPR], 
preamble and art 1 
176 OP-ICCPR, art 1. 
177 See, for instance, Kitok v. Sweden, Communication No 197/1985 (1985); Bernard Ominayak, 
Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v Canada Communication No 167/1984 (1984); and Lansman et al 
v Finland, Communication No 511/1992 (1992).  The rights at issue in each were, respectively, right 
to reintegrate into Saami community and herd reindeer, Cree hunting and trapping rights and Saami 
herding rights as essential part of minority culture.  While the Human Rights Committee has made 
it clear that rights claimed under Article 27 are individual rights, both the Lubicon Lake Band and 
Lansman et al communications seem to represent a blurring of the lines between individual and 
group rights.  The complainants were actually groups in fact if not exactly in law, though, in Lubicon 
Lake Band, the Committee described them as “a group of individuals, who claim to be similarly 
affected”.  In Lubicon Lake Band, the Committee sidestepped the related issue of self-determination 
under Article 1 by pointing out that the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR provides only an individual 
complaints mechanism: see HRC CCPR General Comment No. 23, at para 3.1 and 9; and Lubicon 
Lake Band, at 122, para 32.1.   
178 Lubicon Lake Band, ibid.  This claim was not addressed on a technicality.   
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maintain its culture, language or religion”.179  The nature of this provision has led 
some commentators to conclude that: “as the rights protected under Article 27 apply 
to members of a minority, they may be equally thought of in part as collective rights, 
exercisable individually”.180   
Thus, while the majority of the provisions of the ICCPR are framed in terms of 
universality and non-discrimination, Article 27 echoes both the purpose and 
wording of earlier Minorities Declarations and PCIJ jurisprudence.  Under the 
ICCPR, minority group members have inalienable and common everyone and no-
one rights and freedoms which are to operate free of discrimination, and be 
distributed according to a standard of sameness but also cultural, religious and 
linguistic someone—even indigenous—rights designed to protect group identity.   
 
5.2.3.3 THE MINORITIES DECLARATION 1992 
Article 27 of the ICCPR “inspired” the Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities 1992 
(‘Minorities Declaration’).181   
Beginning with a standard statement of non-discrimination, 182  the Minorities 
Declaration nonetheless espouses differential equality.  Under Article 1, States 
Parties are to “protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious 
and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories” and must 
even encourage “the promotion of that identity”.183  Article 2 expands on Article 27 
of the ICCPR confirming the right to separate institutions where culture and 
language are taught.  Article 2 remains consistent with the everyone personality 
development principle in the ICESCR’s Article 13, as it elaborates on effective 
participation in public life, effective participation in the political process, rights of 
                                                          
179 HRC, CCPR General Comment 23, at para 6.2. 
180 Sara Joseph, Jenny Schults and Melissa Castan The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (2nd ed, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004) at 753. 
181 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities A/RES/48/138 (1993) [Minorities Declaration]. 
182 Minorities Declaration, preamble, para 1. 
183 Minorities Declaration, art 1(1) (emphasis added).   
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association with fellow minority members as well as with other minorities, even 
across international borders.184  Significantly, Article 3 recognizes that minorities, 
such as indigenous peoples, “may exercise their rights…individually as well as in 
community with other members of their group”.185 
The Minorities Declaration also recognizes the rights of minority members to be 
taught in their own language.  Under Article 4(3), States are to take positive, 
“appropriate measures” to provide “adequate opportunities” for minority members 
to ‘learn”, or be taught in, their “mother tongue”.  Similar to the Hawaiʻi state 
constitution, 186  Article 4(4) requires that state-wide education incorporate 
“knowledge of the history, traditions, language and culture of the minorities 
existing within the[] territory” in question.187   
Many of these provisions seemed aimed at countering the effects of nation-building 
and supporting Albania-like differential equality.  Consistent with Kymlicka, 
Article 8 prioritizes individual “human rights and fundamental freedoms” but also 
provides that “[m]easures taken by States to ensure the effective enjoyment of the 
rights” in the Minorities Declaration “shall not prima facie be considered contrary 
to the principle of equality” found in the UDHR.  It also requires States Parties to 
act in “good faith” to similar obligations made in other treaties.188 
Within the Minorities Declaration, individualized universality and non-
discrimination coexist with a group-differentiated right to education.  The measure 
of equality is substantive, effective realization.  And the rights accrue to members 
of communities in common, almost blurring the line between individual and 
collective rights. 
 
                                                          
184 See Minorities Declaration, art 2.  Compare with ICESCR, art 13. 
185 Minorities Declaration, art 3(1)(emphasis added). 
186 See Constitution of the State of Hawaiʻi, Article X, s 4, discussed in Chapter Three at 3.3.2. 
187 Minorities Declaration, art 4. 
188 Minorities Declaration, art 8(1-3). 
218   
 
5.2.4 COMPLEX SOMEONE: THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN AND PERSONS WITH 
DISABILITIES 
Most recently, education rights relating to children and persons with disabilities 
apparently incorporate all previous narratives but also expand on those narratives 
in recognizing a complex and highly identified human being as a rightsholder in 
education.  The complexity of this multi-narrative exceeds any comparison in 
American federal jurisprudence but is best explained, again, by a Kymlickan buffer-
and-access function consistent with equality of outcomes rather than merely 
formalized equality.  However, the right remains consistent with an expanded 
Plyler-like right to human personality development, Rawls’ rational revision 
project, as well as fundamental everyone/no-one principles of equality and non-
discrimination.   
The Convention on the Rights of the Children 1989 189  starts by reciting 
fundamental principles of “dignity”, “equality”, universality and non-
discrimination.190   As a descendant of the UDHR, it also affirms that childhood and 
the family are entitled to special care and protection.191  The basic, universal right 
to education under the Convention is stated in ICESCR-like terms in Articles 28 
and 29.  “States Parties recognize the right of the child to education…on the basis 
of equal opportunity”.192  The right again includes free and compulsory education, 
available and accessible secondary education, personality development, and 
participation.193  Like the constitutive commitment in Plyler, the right presumably 
prepares the child for a “responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of 
understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of the sexes, and friendship among all 
peoples”.194 
The Children’s Convention also depends on the principle of non-discrimination.  
Article 2 recites a familiar list of identifying characteristics which the universal 
right to education will not be based on as if by rote: “race, colour, sex, language, 
                                                          
189 Convention on the Rights of the Child 1577 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 20 November 1989, 
entered into force 2 September 1990) [UNCROC]. 
190 UNCROC, preamble. 
191 See above at section 5.2.1.1. 
192 UNCROC, art 28. 
193 UNCROC, art 28(1)(a) and (b). 
194 UNCROC, art 29(1)(d) (emphasis added). 
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religion” et cetera.  According to the same article, States Parties are to protect the 
child “against all forms of discrimination or punishments on the basis of status, 
activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child’s parents, legal guardians, or 
family members.”195 
Article 29(2) recognizes the right to parallel educational institutions acknowledged 
in CADE: “No part of the present article or article 28 shall be construed so as to 
interfere with the liberty of individuals to establish and direct educational 
institutions…”196  Article 30 also reiterates Article 27 of the ICCPR and associated 
provisions of the Minorities Declaration in respect to minority children.197   
However, the Children’s Convention’s right to education goes further.  Contrary to 
a veil of ignorance, rights under the Children’s Convention are age-specific.  Article 
1 states that “a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years”.198  
The Preamble explains that children require special protection “by reason of [their] 
physical and mental immaturity”199 and “[r]ecogniz[es] that, in all countries in the 
world, there are children living in exceptionally difficult conditions”.200   
The Children’s Convention is outcomes-focused.  Despite its legal genealogy, one 
of five guiding principles in the Children’s Convention is not universality, equality 
or non-discrimination but “the best interests of the child”,201 a standard subject to 
the individual needs and situation of a particular child rather than same treatment.  
Similarly, Article 5 depends on the “evolving capacities” of the child in question.202  
Significantly, the child is viewed as a child.  An adult-like access to and grasp of 
rights is not taken for granted.  Instead of uniformity, there is flexibility and even 
adaptability. 
                                                          
195 UNCROC, art 2(2). 
196 UNCROC, art 29(2). 
197 UNCROC, art 30. 
198 UNCROC, art 1.  “...unless under the law…majority is attained earlier “.  The Preamble suggests 
that this includes children in the womb. 
199 UNCROC, preamble. 
200 UNCROC, preamble. 
201 UNCROC, art 3, para 1.  Also see Committee on the Rights of the Child [CRC] General comment 
No. 14 (2013) on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary 
consideration (art. 3, para. 1)* CRC/C/GC/14 (2013). 
202 UNCROC, art 5. 
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The Children’s Convention is also family-aware.  In a twist on suspicion of 
ancestry—and consistent with the good of cultural membership—the treaty almost 
sentimentally concludes that a family “atmosphere” characterized by “happiness, 
love and understanding” is necessary for the “full and harmonious development” of 
a child’s human personality.203  Consistent with Native Hawaiian culture, “family” 
indicates ‘parents’ but also “members of the extended family or community as 
provided for by local custom”.204  This family relationship becomes almost sacred 
in Article 5 which recognizes the “right of the child to preserve his or her identity, 
including nationality, name and family relations”.205   
The Children’s Convention seems to recognize family and community as both 
buffering the child against inequality and helping them access rational revision 
space and context.  However, the treaty recognizes the child’s individual rights, too.  
Article 12 recognizes rights of the child to form and express her own opinions 
separately from the universal rights to expression affirmed in Article 13 and to 
“thought, conscience and religion” found in Article 14. 206   This principle of 
“participation” is another guiding principle or “general requirement[] for all rights” 
in the Children’s Convention.207 
Importantly, the Children’s Convention connects minority identity with indigenous 
identity and indigenous identity with fundamental human rights principles. Article 
29(1)(a) requires that State parties agree that education shall be directed to “[t]he 
development of respect for the child’s parents, his or her own cultural identity, 
language and values,” as well as those of the majority culture and other 
“civilizations different from his or her own”.208  Unlike CEDAW, the Children’s 
Convention recognizes “the importance of the traditions and cultural values of each 
people for the protection and harmonious development of the child”.209  Under 
Article 29(1)(d), education prepares the child for “tolerance” and “friendship 
                                                          
203 UNCROC, Preamble. 
204 UNCROC, art 5.  Also see wording in art 2. 
205 As well as “the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents and the right to “not be 
separated from his or her parents against their will, except” where “necessary for the best interests 
of the child”: See UNCROC, arts 7(1), 8(1) and 9(1) respectively.   
206 UNCROC, art 12-14. 
207 UNICEF “The Convention on the Rights of the Child, Guiding Principles: General Requirements 
for All Rights” UNICEF <www.unicef.org>. 
208 UNCROC, art 29(1)(a). 
209 UNCROC, preamble. 
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among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of indigenous 
origin”.210  Article 30 specifically refers to the indigenous child, guaranteeing the 
ICCPR and Minorities Declaration right “to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess 
and practise his or her own religion, or to use his or her own language” with other 
members of their community.211 
The “first human rights convention of the twentieth-first century”, 212  the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006 (CRPD) 213  is also 
characterized by a multi-narrative.  The CRPD is largely aimed at everyone/no-one 
inclusion and is driven by fundamental principles of equality and non-
discrimination, but its goal is the “full and effective participation in society” and 
“full enjoyment of all human rights” by a specific group of human beings 
particularly identified by disparities and discrimination attracted to disability.214  
Like the Children’s Convention, Art 3 also requires “respect for difference” and 
“…respect for the evolving capacity of children with disabilities and respect for the 
right of children with disabilities to preserve their identities.”215 
Article 5 begins like a standard statement of equality and non-discrimination, even 
using words like “all”, but requires States parties to provide “effective legal 
protection” and take “all appropriate steps to ensure…reasonable accommodation” 
of their disabilities. Special measures which are necessary to accelerate or achieve 
de facto equality” are not discriminatory.216  Article 4’s States’ obligations include 
an ICESCR-like commitment to positive action to prevent and remedy 
discrimination both administrative and de facto, 217 having particular regard for 
                                                          
210 UNCROC, art 29(1)(c) (emphasis added). 
211 See UNCROC, art 30.  Article 17(d) “[e]ncourages the mass media to have particular regard to 
the linguistic needs of the child who belongs to a minority group or who is indigenous”. 
212 “Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities” United Nations <www.un.org>. 
213 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities A/RES/61/106, Annex I (opened for 
signature 30 March 2007, entered into force 3 May 2008) [CRPD]. 
214 Article 2, “Discrimination on basis of disability”. 
215 Article 3(d), (g) and (h).  See also arts 22 and 23 with regard to rights relating to respect for the 
family. 
216 CRPD, art 5(4).  Also see art 12(3) on “appropriate measures”. 
217 CRPD, art 4(1). 
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ESCRs. 218   Incorporating several narratives, the CRPD specifically recognizes 
“women with disabilities” and “children with disabilities”.219   
Article 24’s right to education is similarly aimed at “equal opportunity”, non-
discrimination and effective participation and inclusion in the “education system at 
all levels”, as well as human personality development, but allows for different 
treatment including "appropriate measures” , “environments that maximize 
academic and social development”, “facilitating” the use and teaching of 
“augmentative and alternative modes, means and formats of communication”, 
increasing disability awareness, and otherwise adapting educations to ensure the 
realization of this right”. 220   A 4-A Scheme-like “access” to all CRPD rights, 
including Article 24, is crucial.221 
Given its current status as “the most rapidly and widely ratified international human 
rights treaty in history”, 222  the Children’s Convention apparently represents a 
significant consensus among States on the rights it contains. The availability of 
complaints mechanisms for both the Children’s Convention and the CRPD 
emphasizes the legality and justiciability of the rights they guarantee223—including 
a highly-identity aware, multi-narrative right to education.  
 
                                                          
218 CRPD, art 4(2): “With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, each States Party undertakes 
to take measures to the maximum of its available resources and where needed, within the framework 
of international cooperation, with the view to achieving progressively the full realization of these 
rights, without prejudice to those obligations contained in the present convention that are 
immediately applicable according to international law”. 
219 See CRPD, arts 6 and 7.  Not coincidentally, these groups are often targets of intersectional or 
multiple discrimination: see discussion below at section 5.3. 
220 Article 24(4). 
221  Article 9 expands on ‘access’ which seems to incorporate all 4-A principles: availability, 
accessibility, acceptability, and adaptability.  Article 24’s disability-aware right to education 
similarly includes considerations relating to physical facilities, disability awareness or a kind of  
human rights education, teaching methods, conduciveness of learning environment to learning by 
persons with disabilities, et cetera.   
222 See “A World of Difference: 25 CRC /Achievements” UNICEF <www.unicef.org>. 
223 See further discussion on the emphasized legality transcendence of such rights below at 5.3. 
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5.2.5 MULTI-NARRATIVE: THE INTERNATIONAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION TODAY 
Basic education is more than an end in itself.224 
The evolution of the international human right to education shows that it has 
evolved from an anonymous, flatly universal right to an identity-responsive bundle 
of rights through three main strands of development since World War II.  To 
summarize, the right to education which appears in the Charter, the UDHR and 
International Covenants is universal and purposively non-discriminatory—even 
anonymous—reflecting the determination of the international community to 
maintain global peace and security through the affirmation of fundamental human 
rights.  The foundational right guarantees free and compulsory primary education 
directed towards the development of the human personality and including the prior 
right of parents to choose the kind of education their children receive.  In everyone 
terms, it is informed by the principles of universality, equality and non-
discrimination. 
By the Children’s Convention and CRPD, the ‘right’ to education has become a 
highly identity-aware bundle of rights options.  In addition to everyone/on-one 
standards, this rights toolbox now includes: available and accessible secondary 
education; specific standards and quality; gender-, minority- and child-specific 
provisions; parallel institutions; familial and community rights; and specific 
reference to the indigenous child.  In addition to equality and non-discrimination, 
the UNCROC’s right to education is premised on substantial and differential 
equality, accessibility, availability, acceptability and adaptability, the best interests 
of the child, and participation. 
While a homogenous or anonymous conception remains the ideal, an adamant 
prioritization or insistence on homogeneity or anonymity in distribution is not 
consistent with the international human rights framework today.  Examining the 
right to education over decades, it is clear that while principles such as equality and 
non-discrimination remain constant, their substantial interpretation—including an 
awareness of complex discrimination and disparities drawn to specific identities—
                                                          
224 UNESCO, World Declaration on Education for All and Framework for Action to Meet Basic 
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have led to an expansion of equality narratives, even a multi-narrative of equality.  
Those foundational principles have driven and created consistency in the 
subsequent evolution, but the universal right to education no longer presumes that 
all people have the same access to or enjoyment of the right.  Rather, it is assumed 
that the right must speak to the vulnerable so that the right can be realized 
universally.  The right now emphasizes substantial equality because circumstances 
of inequality such as poverty and language barriers are real-time obstacles to the 
enjoyment of the right on an equal basis with other human beings.  Likewise, non-
discrimination, once wilfully blind to difference, requires greater identification of 
the rights-holder in order to buffer and protect them.  The fundamental principles 
themselves have demanded this.  In response, international law has been innovative 
but also consistent, recognizing a bundle of rights in the plural which can be utilized 
to both create a buffer and access for all children in education.   
Ultimately, there is far more discussion on the realities 225  of health, security, 
education and other circumstances in these instruments than there is of traditional 
civil and political rights—though the principles of the Charter, the Universal 
Declaration and other core human rights instruments ground these instruments.  
This recent law reflects a repugnance for the horrors of poverty, disease, civil war, 
child trafficking and other human rights violations as emphatic as that in the Charter 
and UDHR for world war and genocide.  Within such law, the right to education 
has become, likewise, urgently important.226   
 
5.3 REVENGE OF THE SINGULAR NARRATIVE? 
Despite the consistency of the evolution of the human right to education in 
international law, the threads of equality and non-discrimination which flow 
through it, and its seemingly innocuous 227  nature, it has engendered no small 
amount of debate and continues to face significant challenges.  The most prominent 
opposition dispute the nature, legality, justiciability, and enforceability of the right.  
                                                          
225 See United Nations Millennium Declaration A/RES/55/2 (2000), art 11.   
226 The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action A/CONF.157/23 (1993) is another example 
of the urgency of the realization of rights and substantial equality. 
227 Tomasevski, 4-A Scheme, above n 79. 
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Relevant to this thesis, these concerns appear to reveal the continuing intrusion of 
an outdated, American-like singular narrative of equality into the human rights 
discourse. 
 
5.3.1 REAL RIGHTS? 
…The fate of the right to education, as an economic, social and cultural right, 
hinges on that of economic, social and cultural rights as a category.228   
A certain amount of skepticism has been directed at all human rights.  For instance, 
from its inception, the UDHR has been criticized as “a product of Western 
ethnocentricism”, or expression of Western liberal democratic values and 
philosophy.229   Such criticism has led to ongoing debates on the validity and 
legitimacy of any supposedly ‘human’ rights, including that between so-called 
universalists and relativists.230  Above all, such claims reveal a distrust and rejection 
of the fundamental conception of the universal everyone as the fundamental rights-
holder and even the concept of ‘human’ rights. 
Rights such as education face further skepticism among those who do accept the 
universality of human rights.  In fact, the Western liberal approach to human rights 
“has tended to emphasise the basic civil and political rights of individuals, that is 
those rights that take the form of claims limiting the power of government over the 
governed.”231  Consistent with Rawls’ first principle of justice, civil and political 
rights (CPRs) have been viewed by countries such as the United States as rights 
                                                          
228 Klaus Dieter Beiter The protection of the right to education by international law: including a 
systematic analysis of Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (Leiden, Martinus Niljoff Publishers, 2006) at 47 
229 Morsink, above n 35, at ix-xi.  See Cassese, above n 28, at 358.  Victorious Western Allies were 
instrumental in the drafting and creation of the post-World War II international framework of human 
rights and the International Covenants were deliberately modelled after Western constitutions. 
230 One of the more vehement debates associated with the Western accusation akin to the liberal-
communitarian debate based on the idea that human rights are not universally applicable or at least 
that there may be local variations and exceptions to supposedly universal human rights standards.  
See, for instance, R Pannikar “Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?” in Steiner and 
Alston, above n 27, 383 at 385; and Shelley Wright International Human Rights, Decolonisation 
and Globalisation: Becoming Human (Routledge: New York, 2001) at 12.   
231 Shaw, above n 52, at 249-250. The Western approach has everything to do with liberal democratic 
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necessary “to guarantee the free development of the individual...”232  The rights 
contained in the ICCPR, including rights to life, liberty, equality before the law, fair 
hearing and appeal, 233  freedom of thought, conscience and religion, 234  and 
freedoms from torture and slavery235 are typical of accepted CPRs.  Such rights 
emphasize restrictions on state behaviour in relation to the individual and are meant 
to protect and facilitate their autonomy as rights-holders. 
The opposite approach, espoused most famously by the Soviet Union during the 
drafting of the International Covenants,236 has been to emphasize “the importance 
of basic rights and freedoms for international peace and security”—rights relating 
to the socio-economic well-being and advancement of states as a whole—and to 
emphasize the role of the state—rather than the individual—in the provision and 
protection of human rights. 237 
During drafting, such categorization split UN Members along the ideological, 
political borders of the ‘Cold War’.238  Where economic, social and cultural rights 
(ESCRs) clashed with the capitalist ideals of liberal democracy, civil and political 
rights (CPRs) were at odds with socialist visions of a state-dominated society.239  
At issue then was whether ESCRs were legal rights which could be upheld against 
the state and immediately implemented or merely “programme” rights States were 
to take progressive positive action on.240   Since the Cold War, ICESCR rights have 
                                                          
232 Beiter, above 228, at 51.  This kind of rights distribution prioritizes individual autonomy as liberal 
theorists such as Rawls and Dworkin would.  In fact, the inclusion of prior parental choice in art 13 
of the ICESCR follows liberal traditions going back to the 19th Century.  According to Sital Kalantry, 
Jocelyn E Getgen and Steven A Koh “Enhancing Enforcement of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights Using indicators: A Focus on the Right to Education in the ICESCR” (2010) 32(2) Hum Rts 
Q 253 at 262, parental choice and minimal standards in the 19th century reflected liberal “fear of 
excessive state involvement in the educational system”. 
233 ICCPR, arts 6, 9 and 14 respectively. 
234 ICCPR, art 18. 
235 ICCPR, art 7 and 8, respectively 
236 See Steiner and Alston, above n 27, at 249. 
237 Shaw, above n 51, at 250-251.  As Beiter, above n 228, describes at 51, the Soviets “perceived 
the realisation of human rights to be an essentially domestic affair...” and pushed for an all-inclusive 
instrument with limited implementation standards.  Ironically, as Katarina Tomasevski points out in 
“Has the Right to Education a Future within the United Nations? A Behind-the-Scenes Account by 
the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education 1998–2004” (2005) 5(2) Hum Rts L Rev 205 at 
216, what passed for the right to education within the Soviet Union during that time was hardly 
consistent with the right in the International Bill of Rights. 
238 Katarina Tomasevski Education Denied: Costs and Remedies (London, Zed Books, 2003) at 52-
53. 
239 Discussed in Beiter, above n 228, at 50-51. 
240 See Steiner and Alston, above n 27, 245. 
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commonly been referred to as “new”241 or “second-generation”242  human rights, 
suggesting that such rights are innovations or novelties rather than inalienable or 
indispensable legal protections.  In contrast, ICCPR rights are considered “natural”, 
“classical” 243  rights akin to those emerging from the Enlightenment and the 
American and French Revolutions.244 
Such distinction, and even “hierarchy”, lingers in textual differences between them.  
As oft-noted, while ICCPR rights, for instance, are generally stated within the text 
as rights, the ICESCR most often speaks in indirect terms of State party obligations 
regarding rights.245   In such critiques, there seems to be “little doubt that the ICCPR 
is the stronger of the two”.246 
Ultimately, the ICESCR—the authoritative statement of the human right to 
education in international law247—does not apparently entail immediate guarantees 
of the right to education.  Under Article 2(1): 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant 
by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures.248 
Critics have observed:  
The progressive realization benchmark assumes that valid expectations and 
concomitant obligations of State parties under the Covenant are not uniform or 
universal, but are relative to levels of development and available resources.249 
                                                          
241 “Despite its widespread acceptance and fundamental importance, the right to education was not 
directly nor specifically declared an international human right until the post-World War II era,” 
Kalantry, Getgen and Koh, above n 232, at 263.  
242 Kalantry, Getgen, and Koh, ibid, at 255.  Kalantry, Getgen and Koh argue that ESCRs are no 
longer viewed this way and that there is a consensus on the necessity of linking ESCRs with CPRs 
within the international community. 
243 Joseph, Schultz and Castan, above n 180, at 7. 
244 See Declaration of Independence (US 1776), discussed in Chapter Two at 2.2. 
245 See, for instance, Steiner and Alston, above n 27, at 246. 
246 Joseph, Schultz and Castan, above n 180, at 7. 
247 CESCR, General Comment No. 13, above n 76, para 2. 
248 ICESCR, art 2(1). 
249 Audrey Chapman and Sage Russell “Introduction” in Audrey Chapman and Sage Russell (eds) 
Core Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, Social and Cutlural Rights (Antwerp, 
Intersentia, 2002) at 4. 
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Prima facie, terms such as “take steps” and “maximum of available resources”, are 
undefined in the ICESCR and raise questions about how progressive realization is 
to be measured.  Thus, critics claim the ICESCR leaves a “loophole” allowing states 
to use insufficient resources as an excuse for non-realization. 250    
These differences feed skepticism about the conceptual and legal nature of ESCRs 
like education.  Conceptually, some critics have argued that ESCRs lack the “moral 
significance”, “paramount importance” and urgency of CPRs.251  They claim that 
ESCRs are not genuinely universal but merely positive law, the stuff of legislation 
and policy, while CPRs are the natural, inherent rights of all human beings—which 
is why, some claim, they do not vary much between domestic jurisdictions.252   
Other critics admit that ESCRs are morally compelling but argue that they have 
limited legality—or justiciability—and enforceability.  Such critics claim that 
ESCRs require state interference or welfare and are dependent on available 
resources where CPRs only require negative protections against state interference.  
As such, ESCRs may be viewed as having variable and unfair applicability, being 
only afforded to certain individuals or groups of individuals in need of those 
resources.253 Others claim that ESCRs can only be legal rights where they are made 
enforceable through competent judicial and legal terms.254 
The presumption underlying such claims is that ESCRs—if they are human rights 
at all—are lesser, or even optional, rights.  This is a conception which, if justified, 
must undermine the first premise of human rights—universality—as well as the 
legality of such rights and thus the legitimacy of the right to education as a human 
right.   
 
                                                          
250 Ibid, at 4. 
251 Maurice Cranston What Are Human Rights?  (London, Bodley Head, 1973).  Compare with the 
constitutive commitment discussed in Plyler: see Chapter Two at 2.5.   
252  Marc Bossuyt “La distinction juridique entre les droits civils et politiques et les droits 
économiques, sociaux et culturels” [The legal distinction between civil and political rights and 
economic, social and cultural rights] (1975) 8 Revue des Droits de l’Homme 783. 
253 See description of this line of criticism and a defence of ESCRs in David Beetham “What Future 
for Economic and Social Rights?” in McCorquodale, above n 6, 215. 
254 EW Vierdag “The legal nature of rights granted by the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights” (1978) 9 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 69. 
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5.3.2 JUSTICIABILITY  
As Martin Scheinin notes, the more contentious issue raised in regards to ESCRs is 
not their validity but their “applicability”.  Even if the right to education has the 
moral importance and urgency of CPRs, is it “capable of being invoked in courts of 
law and applied by judges”?255 
Rights under the ICCPR have historically been viewed as largely negative in nature, 
“actively recognized and accepted” but requiring “little more…than legislation and 
a decision not to engage in certain illegal practices…”256  In contrast, ICESCR 
rights are popularly viewed as requiring substantial effort from States for 
implementation as “they cannot be fully ensured without economic and technical 
resources, education and planning, the gradual reordering of societal priorities and, 
in many cases, international cooperation.”257  Some have likened ICESCR rights to 
“welfare”, 258or simply as being too “onerous”—too practically impossible—to 
actually implement.259   
Because of the persistence of such views, Tomasevski once called the right to 
education “an Orphan of the Cold War” 260  and wrote that one of the greatest 
challenges in her UN role over six years was to convince states and individuals that 
the right to education was a legally enforceable human right.261  Such experiences 
led her to the conclusion that the universal right to education was “uncertain” and 
“fragile” 262  and its future endangered.  Domestic developments support 
Tomasevski’s concern.  As recently as 2003, the United States openly opposed 
                                                          
255 Martin Scheinin “Economic and Social Rights as Legal Rights” in Asbjørn Eide “Economic, 
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230   
 
ESCRs in the UN, categorized such rights as “goals” rather than “guarantees” and 
flatly denied that education is a human right.263   
Generational or other categorization of ESCRs presumes an everyone/no-one 
narrative of equality.  Like Rawls’ fair distribution and first principle of justice, 
CPRs represent a minimum number of basic rights judged as rights from a 
formalized, individualized, intellectual distance.  Described so often in unequivocal 
terms of everyone and no-one, these rights must also represent both the original 
position and veil of ignorance.  Echoing Waldron’s projects, CPRs lacking further 
explanation inherently presume a level playing field and imply a seemingly 
cosmopolitan homogeneity which lumps all human beings into a common melting 
pot of rights capacities and rational revision contexts and pays little heed to socio-
economic realities affecting exercise and enjoyment of the right.  Like Posner, the 
line between perceived human rights and unfair subsidizations or welfare is a 
fundamentally economic, even utilitarian one.  Special measures in no-one 
instruments such as CADE, the Race Convention and CEDAW which recall 
Dworkin’s limits, Weber-Johnson criteria and a someone narrative are a possible 
exception.  However, consistent with Dworkin’s equal concern and respect, such 
measures are seeming exceptions to the general rule of homogeneity and anonymity 
valid only until parity. 
 
5.4 THE MULTI-NARRATIVE AS EQUALITY 
Cynicism about education and ESCRs’ status, however, is inconsistent with the 
actual evolution of the right to education in international law.  Importantly, it is 
inconsistent with the organic value placed on education, its emphasized legality, the 
increasingly concrete states parties’ obligations which it entails, its justiciability 
and enforceability but also the complex nature of the discrimination it targets. 
 
                                                          
263 Ibid, at 217 and 230, referring to report submitted by Katarina Tomasevski, Special Rapporteur 
on the right to education: “Mission to the United States of America, 24 September-10 October 2001”, 
17 January 2002, E/CN.4/2002/60/Add.1, cited at 226. 
  231 
 
5.4.1 INDIVISIBILITY, MULTIPLICATION AND OTHER ORGANIC PHENOMENA 
Any differentiation between the right to education and other rights because it is an 
ESCR appears misguided.  ESCRs have been consistently associated with CPRs on 
equal terms from the origins of the modern framework—even by the United 
States—and are largely considered interdependent on—and indivisible from—one 
another.   
For instance, American President Franklin D. Roosevelt included “freedom from 
fear and want” among a list of basic human rights in his 1941 State of the Union 
Address which noted: 
We have come to the clear realization of the fact that true individual freedom 
cannot exist without economic security and independence.  ‘Necessitous men are 
not free men’.  People who are hungry and out of a job are the stuff which 
dictatorships are made of.264 
Where fear conjures CPR violations—or restrictions on and protection from the 
state and other individuals—want is clearly an economic and social concern.  
Eleanor Roosevelt was integral to the formation of the UN and President Roosevelt 
suggested many of the economic, social and cultural rights which were to become 
part of the UDHR and ICESCR.265  Several domestic ESCRs formed what he called 
a “Second Bill of Rights”.  This list of rights included “[t]he right to a good 
education” he believed Americans had come to accept as a constitutional right.266   
As described earlier, ESCRs were included with CPRs as explicit concerns of both 
the Charter and the Universal Declaration and are currently linked UN goals in 
terms of peace and security.267  Education was also included in the UDHR’s list of 
basic human rights.268  While education in the ICESCR is textually separated from 
the civil rights contained in the ICCPR, their preambles make it clear that the rights 
                                                          
264 See Cass Sunstein “We Need to Reclaim the Second Bill of Rights” (2004) 50(4) Chronicle of 
Higher Education B9.   
265 See Asbjørn Eide “Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights” in Eide, Krause and 
Rosas above n 255, at 15.  Also see Krasnov, above n 24, at 743. 
266 See Cass Sunstein “The Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s Unfinished Revolution and Why We Need 
It More than Ever (New York, Basic Books, 2004).  Compare with the fundamental right to 
education recognized in Brown, Plyler and Kamehameha. 
267 See Claire M Breen “The edges of extraterritorial jurisdiction: The integration of economic, 
social and cultural rights into peace support operations” (2012) 16(2) J Int’l Peacekeeping 47. 
268 Article 26, UDHR 
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contained in both are rights belonging to all human beings universally, without 
discrimination and on equal terms.269  Borrowing President Roosevelt’s very words, 
both preambles importantly recognize that “freedom from want can only be 
achieved” where ESCRs and CPRs are realized.  Article 18(4) of the ICCPR 
actually contains a parental educational right270 which virtually echoes the parental 
right to choose the type of education a child receives recognized in Article 13 of the 
ICESCR 271  while connecting it with the freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion guaranteed by Article 18.  
Matthew Craven, while acknowledging the prevalence of separatist opinion, calls 
generational categorization “monolithic”,272 and blames it on Cold War politics 
rather than any true legal status.  Evgeny Krasnov has similarly described how the 
US’ failure to ratify the ICESCR has been linked to inaccurate conceptions of 
ESCRs as positive rights requiring significant public expenditure and the creation 
of a welfare state which would interfere with liberalistic individual rights to liberty 
and freedom. 273   Similarly, various commentators have noted that the right to 
education appears to have features of all three so-called generations of rights, 
making any division unreasonable. 274 
                                                          
269 See preambles of ICCPR and ICESCR. 
270 It recognizes the prior right of parents “to ensure the religious and moral education of their 
children in conformity with their own convictions”: ICCPR, art 18(4). 
271 See discussion on ICESCR in section 2.1.2.  Also see US Supreme Court cases including Meyers 
and Pearce, discussed in Chapter 2 at 2.5. 
272 Matthew CR Craven The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A 
Perspective on it Development (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995) at 9. 
273 Krasnov, above n 24, at 746-747.  So-called CPRs also require significant public expenditure.  
The costs of maintaining court systems is just one example.  Equal protection, due process and any 
other CPRs would, of course, be meaningless without judicial avenues of recourse but courts require 
significant public expenditure of money, staffing, construction, maintenance, education and other 
considerations.  
274 See Manfred Nowak “The Right to Education” in Eide, Krause and Rosas, above n 255, 245 at 
252-255.  The right to education is certainly a second-generation economic, social and cultural right 
with “specific duties assigned to States to ensure it to everybody without discrimination and to 
combat existing inequalities in the access to and enjoyment of education by legislative and other 
means” but it is also clearly aimed at equality of opportunity, a first-generation perception of rights, 
as education provides institutions, for instance, which act as vehicles for freedom of thought vis a 
vis “interference by the States and the Church” and also rest on non-discrimination—no one is to be 
denied the right to education under the Protocol 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ETS 9 (opened for signature 20 March 1952, entered 
into force 18 May 1954) art 2, for instance, while protecting equal access and parental rights, self-
government and participatory rights.  Finally, education can also be considered a third-generation 
“solidarity” right in terms of a global collective good given education’s role in scientific 
development, and educated citizenry, et cetera. 
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Strict categories bear little resemblance to current international law.  Both the UN 
General Assembly—representing a consensus of nations—and CESCR have 
interpreted ESCRs as being interdependent and indivisible from CPRs.  The Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action 1993275 (‘the Vienna Declaration’), a UN 
General Assembly recommendation, affirms that “[a]ll human rights are universal, 
indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.”  Likewise, both the Limburg 
Principles and Maastricht Guidelines flatly state that “human rights and 
fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent”.276   
Under General Comment 13, the CESCR has affirmed that education is “a human 
right in itself and an indispensable means of realizing other rights”.277  Craig Scott 
has similarly argued that CPRs and ESCRs are interdependent because of the 
intimate relationship between specific rights.278  For example, it seems obvious that 
a child’s right to life will be severely threatened without a corresponding right to 
food and clean water.  In such a scenario it is difficult to differentiate between the 
prospective rights: one is so intrinsic to the other that they are as one.  In other 
instances, one right may be of such benefit to another that they must be viewed as 
interdependent—because of the support the former gives to the latter.  This is what 
he calls “related” or “organic” interdependence.279   
Both forms of organic interdependence apply to the right to education.  Katarina 
Tomasevski, former UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education (1998-
2004), described the right as: 
…a bridge to all human rights: education is indispensable for effective political 
participation and for enabling individuals to sustain themselves; it is the key to 
preserving languages and religions; it is the foundation for eliminating 
discrimination.  It is the key to unlocking other human rights...280 
Beiter has similarly argued that:  
                                                          
275 UNGA, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action A/CONF.157/23 (1993) para 6. 
276 See general observation 3 at 3 regarding Limburg Principles, above n 92; and point 4 at 17 in 
terms of Maastricht Guidelines, above n 91. 
277 CESCR, General Comment No. 13, above n 48, para 1. 
278 Craig Scott “The Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights Norms: Towards a Partial 
Fusion of the International Covenants on Human Rights” 27(4) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 769. 
279 Ibid, at 779-786. 
280 Tomasevski Education Denied, above n 238, at 172.  Tomasevski was pivotal in the development 
of 4-A Scheme: see CESCR General Comment No. 13, above n 76.  
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...where a person is denied the right to education [as an ESCR], freedom of 
information, expression, assembly and association or the right to vote [CPRs] 
amount to nothing as they all depend on a minimum level of education.281 
As such, UNESCO has said that education “enhances individual freedom” and 
“occupies a central place in Human Rights”.282 
Contrary to homogeneity or anonymity, education is crucial not least because it is 
“ground[ed] in social experiences”.283  UNESCO, for instance, almost echoing the 
Supreme Court in Brown, has stated: 
Some benefits of education are less tangible and harder to quantify than others. 
Schools are not just institutions for imparting information. They are a place where 
children can acquire social skills and self-confidence, where they learn about their 
countries, their cultures and the world they live in, and where they gain the tools 
they need to broaden their horizons and ask questions. People denied an 
opportunity for achieving literacy and wider education skills are less equipped to 
participate in societies and influence decisions that affect their lives.284 
In fact, while many CPRs protect an individual’s participation and decision-making 
rights, such rights may be virtually useless without the ability to read or write—
things a child learns in primary school.285  Given such causal relationships, “all 
human rights in some way or another mutually reinforce each other”.286   
However, CESCR has concluded: 
Education is both a human right in itself and an indispensable means of realizing 
other human rights. As an empowerment right, education is the primary vehicle by 
which economically and socially marginalized adults and children can lift 
themselves out of poverty and obtain the means to participate fully in their 
communities. Education has a vital role in empowering women, safeguarding 
children from exploitative and hazardous labour and sexual exploitation, 
promoting human rights and democracy, protecting the environment, and 
controlling population growth. Increasingly, education is recognized as one of the 
                                                          
281 Beiter, above n 228, at 67.   
282 “Mission” UNESCO <http:portal.unesco.org>. 
283 Beiter, above n 228, at 66. 
284 Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2009 UNESCO <http://unesdoc.unesco.org>, at 24-
25.   
285 Obviously, knowing how to read and write, knowing how one’s government makes decisions, 
how to register to vote, how to balance a checking account, how to obtain a driver’s license or 
resource consent, or file your taxes—even how to read the money in your hand at the cash register—
is crucial to surviving and thriving in any society, but particularly in a liberal democracy.  Ignorance 
of such matters must result in some degree of marginalization, disenfranchisement, and non-
citizenship particularly given the current emphasis on information technology in Western liberal 
democracies. 
286 This sounds like what Scott calls the “permeability” of human rights, or the legal force of CPRs 
imbuing ESCRs with legal force due to the phenomenon of interdependence. 
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best financial investments States can make. But the importance of education is not 
just practical: a well-educated, enlightened and active mind, able to wander freely 
and widely, is one of the joys and rewards of human existence.287 
Similarly, Tomasevski stated, “The right to education operates as a multiplier.  It 
enhances all other human rights when guaranteed and forecloses the enjoyment of 
most, if not all, when denied.”288 
The multiplying and empowering nature of the right to education was seemingly 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Brown where it opined that “it is 
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied 
the opportunity of an education”.289  Ultimately, it is clear that any earnest narrative 
of equality will realize that education is crucial to the realization of most or all other 
human rights including liberally cherished CPRs. 
 
5.4.2 NOT IF BUT HOW AND WHEN 
Objections to the right to education based on supposed non-legality or non-
justiciability are also inconsistent with the current international legal commitment 
to the right—including the United States’ own treaty commitments. 
While ICESCR rights initially appear to require only progressive implementation 
under Article 2(1), CESCR has defined “taking steps”: 
…while the full realization of the relevant rights may be achieved progressively, 
steps towards that goal must be taken within a reasonably short time after the 
Covenant’s entry into force for the States concerned.  Such steps should be 
deliberate, concrete, targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the obligations 
recognized in the Covenant.290 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has also interpreted 
“appropriate measures” to include not only legislation but also “administrative, 
financial, educational and social measures”.291  States parties must also “strive to 
                                                          
287 CESCR, General Comment No. 13, above n 76, at para 1. 
288 Tomasevski, Education Denied, above n 238, 1. 
289 Brown v Board of Education 347 US 483 (1954) (Brown I), at 493.  
290 CESCR, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties' Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of 
the Covenant) E/1991/23 (1990) para 2. 
291 Ibid, paras 3-4, 7. 
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ensure the widest possible enjoyment of the relevant rights” where their “available 
resources are demonstrably inadequate”.292  Accordingly, States have a “minimum 
core obligation” to realize ESCRs, at the very least, at “minimum essential 
levels”.293   
Mentioned previously, the Limburg Principles294 and Maastricht Guidelines295—
incorporating CESCR’s General Comment No. 3—are authoritative statements on 
state obligations regarding all ESCRs in international law.  Where the Limburg 
Principles require States to act “in good faith”, in accordance with the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969),296 the Maastricht Guidelines take a 
violations approach to State obligations and interpret State obligations in regard to 
ESCRs as responsibilities to respect, to protect and to fulfill: 
Like civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights impose three 
different types of obligations on States: the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil.  
Failure to perform any one of these three obligations constitutes a violation of such 
rights.  The obligation to respect requires States to refrain from interfering with the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights…the obligation to protect 
requires State to prevent violations of such rights by third parties…The obligation 
to fulfil requires States to take appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, 
judicial and other measures towards the full realization of such rights…297  
In turn these obligations imply further duties of both conduct and result by which 
States are bound “to achieve specific targets to satisfy a detailed substantive 
standard”.298   
While States may wish otherwise, these increasingly detailed and unambiguous 
standards leave little room for an optional or loophole view of ESCRs.  They also 
obliterate the CPR/ESCR categorization since, as Philip Alston submitted in 1984, 
most human rights show two or more aspects of the respect, protect and fulfill 
model.299  Given this commonality the question becomes not if a State party will 
                                                          
292 Ibid, para 11. 
293 Ibid, para 10.  This has been summarized as the minimal level at which the right still contains its 
fundamental and essential components, the level at which it is still the right in question.  For 
education this may be the level at which most children in a State enjoy free and compulsory primary 
education.  Also see,  
294 Limburg Principles, above n 92. 
295 Maastricht Guidelines, above n 91. 
296 Limburg Principles, paras 4 and 7. 
297 Maastricht Guidelines, para 6. 
298 Maastricht Guidelines, para 7. 
299 Philip Alston “International Law and the Human Right to Food” in Philip Alston and Katarina 
Tomasevski (eds) The Right to Food (The Hague, Martinus Niljoff Publishers, 1984) 9. 
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fulfill its obligations but how and when it will fulfill its obligations.300    This 
violations approach has become “even more salient” 301 since the adoption of the 
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR in 2008 whose operation would seem to require 
even greater clarification in the form of a set of indicators that can be used as 
benchmarks for realization and to “clearly identify[] violations”.302 
Similar obligations are recognized in various regional human rights treaties 303 
including the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) signed and 
ratified by the United States. 304   The Charter recognizes the human right to 
                                                          
300 Chapman and Russell, above n 249, at 9. 
301 Kalantry, Getgen and Koh, above n 232, at 254. 
302 Ibid.  Also see Michael J Dennis and David P Stewart “Justiciability of Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights: Should There Be an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights 
to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?” (2004) 98(3) American J Int’l Law 462 at 464: “It is often 
difficult to discern the real—world relevance of this discussion. The immediate and consequential 
challenge for all proponents of economic, social, and cultural rights is how to improve the lives of 
the vast majority of people on this planet, who suffer daily from ruinous privations. According to 
the UN Development Programme, half the human race—3 billion people—live on less than two 
dollars a day, and 20 percent of the world's population—more than 1.2 billion people—live on less 
than one dollar per day. 
“Many go without adequate food, water, clothing, shelter, or health care. For all human rights 
advocates and activists, the critically important question must be whether (and how) economic, 
social, and cultural rights can be given meaningful content and application in individual 
circumstances…The debate over the need for an individual--complaints mechanism for economic, 
social, and cultural rights has not yet seemed to contribute to the resolution of this fundamental 
problem. The current situation results in no small part, we believe, from the fact that such discussions 
typically focus on the abstract "nature, status, and characteristics" of economic, social, and cultural 
rights. The issue that needs to be confronted, instead, is that these rights present genuinely different 
and, in many respects, far more difficult challenges than do civil and political rights. However 
arduous it may be to determine in practice when certain rights—for example, freedom of expression, 
or freedom of thought, conscience, and religion—are sufficiently protected, it is a much more 
complex undertaking to ascertain what constitutes an adequate standard of living, or whether a state 
fully respects and implements its population's right to education or right to work. 
“Vexing questions of content, criteria, and measurement lie at the heart of the debate over 
‘justiciability’, yet are seldom raised or addressed with any degree of precision”. 
303 Including the Protocol No 1 to the ECHR, above n 274; European Social Charter (Revised) ETS 
163 (opened for signature 3 May 1996, entered into force 1 July 1999); Charter of the Organization 
of American States (opened for signature 30 April 1948, entered into force 13 December 1951) 
(amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires of February 27, 1967; amended by the Protocol of 
Cartagena de Indias of November 16, 1985 and amended by the Protocol of Managua of October 6, 
1993 which entered into force on January 29, 1996); the Additional Protocol to the American 
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("Protocol of 
San Salvador") A-52 (16 November 1999); African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ("Banjul 
Charter") CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5, 21 ILM 58 (opened for 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 
1986); and  African Charter on Rights and Welfare of the Child CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (opened for 
signature 11 July 1990, entered into force 29 November 1999). 
304 The United States signed the Charter 30 April 1948 and ratified 29 June 1951.  The only 
reservation from the United States was that the Charter did not expand on any powers of federal or 
state governments contrary to the Constitution: see reservation 2.  Also see the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
(1948) art XIII which recognizes the right to education.  There is no separation between ESCRs and 
CPRs in the Declaration which like the Charter recognizes many ESCRs and lists CPRs and ESCRs 
together. 
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education and speaks in ICESCR-like language of State obligations to “devote their 
utmost efforts to …achiev[ing]…goals”305 including “rapid eradication of illiteracy 
and expansion of educational opportunities for all”,306 as well as “to ensure the 
effective exercise of the right to education” which like Article 13 of the ICESCR 
includes free, compulsory elementary education, “progressively” available 
“middle-level education” and available higher education.307   
Given the sheer volume of international law addressing the right to education and 
other ESCRs—reiterating, expounding and emphasizing them—ESCRs almost 
seem to be more legal than CPRs.  Thus, the more “[v]exing question[]” may be not 
whether the right to education is a legal right but how to address the “genuinely 
different” and “far more difficult challenges”308 that ESCR realization presents.   
 
5.4.3 RECOURSE 
Despite widespread international commitment to the right to education, the current 
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, Kishore Singh (‘the Special 
Rapporteur’), has recognized that the right to education would fail the justiciability 
test without legal recourse in the case of violation.309   
Admittedly, the United States seems to have displayed a ‘pick-and-choose’ attitude 
in its own proverbial backyard.  While the United States has signed both the Charter 
of the OAS and the Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man 1948310 where it 
freely commits to protect and realize ESCRs including education, it has not signed 
                                                          
305 Art 34, OAS Charter.  Art 45 similarly commits OAS states to “dedicate every effort to the 
application of…principles and mechanisms including: rights to “material well-being”, “work”, 
“health” and other ICESCR rights. 
306 Art 34(h), OAS Charter. 
307 Art 49, OAS Charter.  Also see art 45(a) on “right to material well-being and “economic security” 
and arts 30, 31, 33, 34, and 45 on economic, social and cultural rights generally and including rights 
to development, social justice, work, fair wages and working conditions, food, housing, and health 
among other ESCRs.  Also see the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human 
Rights in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (San Salvador Protocol, 1999) which has 
not been signed or ratified by the United States yet despite their earlier endorsement of similar rights 
in the OAS Charter. 
308 Dennis and Stewart, above n 302, 464.   
309 HRC, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to education: Justiciability 
and the right to education A/HRC/23/35 (2012) para 27. 
310 Cited above at n 304.  See Art XIII which recognizes the right to education. 
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the San Salvador Protocol which provides a complaints mechanism for violations 
of ESCRs protected by the Declaration.311  It has, nevertheless, signed and ratified 
the ICCPR.  Under Article 2(1), the rights contained in the ICCPR are immediately 
binding312 and justiciable through the first Optional Protocol to the ICCPR which 
provides a complaints mechanism for individuals and recommendatory response 
from the HRC.313  The ICCPR, as mentioned previously, protects educational rights 
in both Article 18(4) and Article 27 which recognizes minority rights in education.  
Given this recourse to a third party judicial body, these education rights are 
immediately legal and justiciable.  The adoption of the Optional Protocol to the 
ICESCR means that Articles 13 and 14 are similarly buttressed by an individual 
complaints mechanism314—and justiciable.   
As mentioned previously, Article 2(2) of the ICESCR also commits “States Parties 
to the present Covenant [to] undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the 
present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination”. 315   Unlike the 
education rights in Article 13 and 14, Article 2(2) is not qualified by progressive 
realization but must be guaranteed immediately and applies to Article 13 and 14 as 
it does to all the rights contained in the ICESCR—as does the right to equality 
embodied in Article 3.316  Thus, “elements” 317 of the right—which transcend the 
ICESCR and apply to all other instruments which trace their legal genealogy back 
to the UDHR—are also immediately justiciable. Ultimately, the increasing 
availability of complaints mechanisms in various conventions guaranteeing 
education demonstrates a transcendent nature and emphasized legality.318 
                                                          
311 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights ("Protocol of San Salvador"), cited above n 303. 
312 ICCPR, Art 2(1). 
313 OP1-ICCPR, above n 175. 
314Discussed in Joseph, Schultz and Castan, above 180, at 8-9.   The General Assembly adopted the 
OP-IESCR, above n 89, in 2008.  The ICCPR has had an Optional Protocol individual complaints 
mechanism since 1966: see OP1-ICCPR, above n 175. 
315 ICESCR, art 2(2) (emphasis added). 
316 ICESCR, art 3: “The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right 
of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the present 
Covenant”.  
317 As noted by Audrey Chapman and Sage Russell (eds) Core Obligations: Building a Framework 
for Economic, Social and Cutlural Rights (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2002), at 5. 
318  While the complaints mechanisms for the ICESCR and ICCPR represent the singular 
everyone/no-one narrative, the recently signed and increasingly ratified Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (13 Dec 2006) and Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on a Communications Procedure (19 Dec 2011), as argued, 
represent the complex someone multi-narrative.  Optional Protocols make such rights transcendent 
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Article 26 of the ICCPR is also immediately binding and justiciable through its 
Optional Protocol.  While Article 2(1) prohibits discrimination and Article 3 
specifically prohibits sex discrimination,319 “Article 26 extends” the right to non-
discrimination “considerably further than Articles 2(1) and 3”.320  In Broeks v the 
Netherlands (172/84), 321  the HRC determined that there is “a considerable 
overlapping of the provisions of Article 26 with the provisions of Article 2 of the 
[ICESCR]”322 and that Article 26 “entails obligations with regard to” virtually any 
“legislation in the economic, social and cultural field”.323  Thus, like Article 2(2) of 
the ICESCR, the scope of Article 26 transcends its convention, “apply[ing] even if 
a particular subject-matter is referred to or covered in other international 
instruments”324 such as the ICESCR.  In the wake of Broeks and other cases325, 
Article 2’s non-discrimination provision “is not limited to those rights which are 
provided for in the” ICCPR326 and appears to be “’a principle above the law’, 
circumscribing the legitimacy of laws themselves”.327   
Commentators have said that the greatest challenge to the justiciability of ESCRs 
may be their dependence on the “interplay” between international and domestic 
orders.328  While ESCRs may be subject to “detailed jurisprudential scrutiny at the 
international level”, for instance, such examination may be unlikely at the domestic 
level.  As illustrated by American exceptionalism,329 justiciability at the domestic 
level is “dependent on the constitutional framework into which the treaty provisions 
                                                          
by reiterating, reemphasizing the legality of such rights across various conventions and various 
narratives and by providing legal recourse for violations of such rights.  The increasing number of 
them argues for a growing consensus on the nature and justiciability of ESCRs. 
319 See earlier discussion at 5.2.1. 
320 Joseph, Schults and Castan, above n 180, at 764, para 23.13. 
321 HRC, SWM Broeks v The Netherlands Communication No 172/1984, CCPR/C/OP/2 (1990) at 
196, a complaint regarding discrimination on the basis of marital status in terms of unemployment 
benefits. 
322 Ibid, at para 8.3.  The complainant brought the complaint after being denied social security 
benefits by the government on the basis of gendered criteria—that is, because she was not a 
‘breadwinner’.  She was not, therefore, on “an equal footing with men”.  The HRC delivered its 
merits decision in her favor. 
323 Ibid, at para 12.1. 
324 Ibid, at para 12.1. 
325  For instance, Carl Henrik Blom v Sweden, Communication No191/85, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/32/D/191/1985, 4 April 1988, on education subsidies. 
326 CESCR General Comment No. 18: The Right to Work (Art. 6 of the Covenant) E/C.12/GC/18 
(2006) at para 12 discussed in Joseph, Schultz and Castan, above n 180, at 768, para 23.15 
327 Ibid, at para 23.16. 
328 Scheinin, above n 255, at 30. 
329 See discussion in Chapter Two at 2.5. 
  241 
 
are incorporated”.330  And yet, the importation of education may not be as legally 
challenging as one might think. 
The Limburg Principles recognize that some rights are immediately justiciable.331  
According to the CESCR, the rights to education contained in Articles 13(2)(a) (on 
free and compulsory education) and (3)—prior parental choice of schools—and 
(4)—right to parallel institutions—“would seem to be capable of immediate 
application by judicial and other organs in many national legal systems”.332    
Equal protection itself may act as a vehicle for the right to education and other 
ESCRs.  Non-discrimination and equality are protected in the European Charter of 
Human Rights,333 and a number of cases before the European Court of Human 
Rights have shown that ESCRs such as rights to housing, government benefits, 
family life and legal aid334 are justiciable through civil rights acting as procedural 
safeguards.  For instance, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Airey v 
Ireland335 found that the plaintiff’s right to a fair trial was compromised by a denial 
of legal aid—an essentially economic consideration.  Dispelling the myth that civil 
and political rights do not entail positive action, the Court opined: 
...fulfilment of a duty under the Convention on occasion necessitates some positive 
action on the part of the State; in such circumstances, the State cannot simply 
remain passive…"there is ... no room to distinguish between acts and 
omissions"...The obligation to secure an effective right of access to the courts falls 
into this category of duty.336 
Having not provided “effective accessibility”337 to a fair trial, the Irish government 
had discriminated against the plaintiff and failed to “safeguard the individual in a 
                                                          
330 See Martin Scheinin “Domestic Implementation of International Human Rights Treaties: Nordic 
and Baltic Experiences” in Philip Alston and James Crawford (eds) The Future of UN Human Rights 
Monitoring (Cambridge UK, New York and Melbourne, Cambridge University Press, 2000) 229, at 
237. 
331 Limburg Principles, above n 92, para 8. 
332 CESCR General Comment No. 3, above n 290, at para 5.  Compare with education rights in 
Constitution of the State of Hawaiʻi despite lack of federal acknowledgment of right to education: 
See Chapter Three at 3.3.2.  The United States ranks behind other countries which do recognize a 
right to education.  “Every country that outperforms the U.S. has constitutional or statutory 
commitment to this right.”: Stephen Lurie “Why Doesn’t the Constitution Guarantee the Right to 
Education?” The Atlantic (online ed, Washington DC, 16 October 2013). 
333 ECHR, above n 274. 
334 Described and discussed in Scheinin, above n 255. 
335 Airey v Ireland [1979] 2 EHRR 305 (ECHR). 
336 Ibid, para 25. 
337 Ibid, para 33. 
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real and practical way”.  Thus, the ECHR also held that “there is no water-tight 
division separating” ESCRs and CPRs.338  
The United States Supreme Court has adopted Airey-like reasoning on several 
occasions to protect apparent ESCRs.339  Ironically, Brown itself is often cited by 
international sources as an authority for domestic adjudication of education 
rights.340  Legal claims easily understood as human rights at the international level 
including human personality development and more substantial considerations 
comparable to availability, acceptability and adaptability were ultimately justified 
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause.341  The Brown Court 
actually called education a “right”.342  The majority also appeared to approve a 
positive state obligation to provide education not unlike that in Article 13 of the 
ICESCR when it stated that “[p]roviding public schools ranks at the very apex of 
the function of a State” and that “education is perhaps the most important function 
of State and local governments”.343  A similar duty is recognized in various state 
constitutions incorporating the right to education.344 
                                                          
338 Ibid, para 26. 
339 Krasnov, above n 24, has identified several cases where the Supreme Court has apparently read 
economic and social rights into the US Constitution including Griffin v Illinois 351 US 12 (1956) 
where trials transcripts had to be provided to poor people at no cost, Boddie v Connecticut 401 US 
371 (1971) at 374 where the poorer party was entitled to legal aid in a divorce case, and Memorial 
Hospital v Maricopa County 415 US 250 (1974) where “the Court struck down an Arizona law that 
required one-year residency to receive emergency medical treatment”: Krasnov, at 752-753.  The 
halt to this trend was due more apparently to changes in the composition of the Supreme Court, 
particularly the appointment by Richard Nixon of more conservative elements and retirement of 
others, rather than any overruling of principles in those cases: Krasnov, at 753.  “It should be noted, 
however, that none of the core principles in the Supreme Court’s decisions dealing with economic 
entitlements have been expressly overruled.  Thus, ‘[a]s the law now stands, it would be much too 
simple to say that the American Constitution does not recognize social and economic rights.’  It is 
possible that one day this line of decisions will experience a revival; the U.S. Constitution is, after 
all, a ‘flexible instrument, one that allows for a great deal of change over time.’  With perceived 
economic injustices becoming widespread, perhaps another wave of change is not too far off’”: 
Krasnov, at 753-754, footnotes excluded. 
340 For instance, HRC, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to education: 
Justiciability and the right to education, above n 309.  Also see CESCR, General Comment No. 13, 
above n 76. 
341 See discussion in Chapter Two on Brown and its progeny at 2.3.1.     
342 Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas 347 US 483 (1954) [Brown I], at 493.   
343 Ibid.  Discussed in HRC, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to 
education: Justiciability and the right to education, para 17 
344 Roger Levesque “The Right to Education in the United States: Beyond the Limits of the Lore and 
Lure of the Law” (1997) 4 Annual Survey of International and Comparative Law 205 at 217-218.  
As Krasnov points out, “Many state constitutions recognize economic rights, and state courts are 
frequently called on to enforce them”: Krasnov, above n 24, at 749. 
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Domestic courts might also protect the right to education in the process of ensuring 
other ESCRs.  In 1993, the Supreme Court of India actually held that a 
constitutionally recognized right to life implied a right to education—particularly 
in light of the constitution’s commitment to provide free, compulsory primary 
education. 345    
 
5.4.4 THE COMMITMENT/REALITY GAP 
Increasingly at the international level, the real question is not the legitimacy of the 
right to education, nor its justiciability but the gap between a clear legal 
commitment to and current denial of the right, particularly among the most 
vulnerable of rightsholders inevitably identified by gender, ethnicity, poverty, 
disability and other socioeconomic factors, often simultaneously.  Like the complex 
discrimination and disparities which caused the Ninth Circuit to wrestle with the 
appropriate narrative of equality in the Kamehameha case, this identity-specific gap 
is increasingly seen as inconsistent with everyone/no-one guarantees in 
international law.   
The current Special Rapporteur on the right to education has addressed several 
pressing concerns in relation to the right to education since taking up his post in 
2010.  These include the promotion of equal opportunity in education,346 normative 
action for quality education,347 justiciability of the right to education,348 and “the 
need to preserve education as a public good”.349  In each one of these areas the 
Special Rapporteur has identified gaps between the guarantee of the right to 
education and universal realization, and Brown- and Kamehameha-like disparities 
affecting certain socioeconomic groups.  The gap is marked by: “physical”, 
                                                          
345 Unni Krishnan v State of Andhra Pradesh 1993 AIR 217, 1993 SCR (1) 594, 1993 SCC (1) 645, 
JT 1993 (1) 474, 1993 SCALE (1)290.   
346 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to education, Kishore Singh, “The promotion 
of equality of opportunity in education A/HRC/17/29 (2011). 
347 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to education, Kishore Singh, “Normative 
action for quality education A/HRC/20/21 (2012).  
348 HRC Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to education, Kishore Singh, “Justiciability 
of the right to education” A.HRC/23/25 (2013). 
349 Ironically, the Special Rapporteur’s 2014 report focused on the need for States parties to monitor 
the quality and accessibility of private education given the collective value of education and the 
state’s fundamental duties to provide public education: see HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the right to education, "Privatization and the right to education" A/69/402 (2014). 
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“financial”, and “linguistic and cultural barriers” to equal opportunity;350 “physical 
environment”, “class-size and pupil-teacher ratio”, and teacher qualifications 
affecting the overall quality of education; 351  and “legal” and “procedural 
barriers”.352  The “phenomenon of marginalization and exclusion” is assumed to 
disproportionately affect certain groups, namely the poor,353 “members of certain 
target groups, such as indigenous peoples, cultural and linguistic minorities…those 
who suffer from disabilities”,354 and girls.355  Moreover, such disparities “mutually 
reinforce[e] layers of disadvantage” and “create extreme and persistent deprivation 
that undermine equal opportunities in education”.356 
Given the organic relationship between education and other human rights and its 
potential to multiply either realization or inequalities, education disparities 
inevitably impact the enjoyment of most if not all other human rights.  Statistics 
discussed in Chapter Three reveal that discrimination and disparities cluster around 
Native Hawaiian identity not just in education but also in health, housing, social 
services, employment, and more extreme statistics on, for instance, incarceration 
rates and trends. 357  Similarly, global statistics show that a denial of education will 
result in denials of other basic human rights.  Maternal and newborn health directly 
correlates to the level of education a mother receives.358  Educational attainment is 
predictive of health outcomes, income earning, political participation and other 
indicators of well-being. 359   Lack of education leads to social and political 
exclusion.  The world’s most excluded children are also usually the least 
educated.360   In contrast, education “safeguard[s] children from exploitative and 
hazardous labour and sexual exploitation”. 361  Poverty reduction and development 
strategies considered crucial to international peace and security depend on 
                                                          
350 HRC, above n 346, paras 45-64. 
351 HRC, above n 347, paras 51-67. 
352 HRC above n 348, paras 76 and 78.  
353 HRC, above n 346, para 14. 
354 HRC, ibid, para 17.   
355 HRC, ibid, para 24. 
356 HRC, ibid, para 16. 
357 Discussion at 3.2.2. 
358 See UNICEF The State of the World’s Children 2009 (Executive Summary): Maternal and 
Newborn Health (New York, UNICEF, 2009) at 6-9. 
359 OECD Education at a Glance 2014: OECD Indicators (OECD, 2014) at 14-15. 
360 UNICEF The State of the World’s Children 2006: Excluded and Invisible (New York, UNICEF, 
2006) at 12-14.   
361 Including CESCR General Comment No. 13, above n 76.   
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education.362  On a global scale, education denial is, again, predictive of not just 
future education denials but pervasive rights denial across multiple areas of human 
well-being. 
Ultimately, the gap is obvious both within nations, between nations and between 
genders.  This gap is widely recognized 363  and getting wider particularly in 
developed countries, marking “educational ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’” and creating 
wider social “risks” and “penalities”.364   
Education denial is also clearly linked with a highly complex species of 
discrimination which fundamentally exceeds the capacity of a singular 
everyone/no-one narrative, the Rawlsian original position, level playing fields, and 
the most basic liberal sensibilities.  In terms reminiscent of Kymlicka’s nation-
building thesis, international law clearly differentiates between direct and indirect 
discrimination.  CESCR has commented that direct discrimination occurs when a 
person “is treated “less favourably than another person in a similar situation for a 
reason related to a prohibited ground”, for instance, race or gender.  According to 
CESCR, indirect discrimination is subtler.  It: 
…refers to laws, policies or practices which appear neutral at face value, but have 
a disproportionate impact on the exercise of Covenant rights as distinguished by 
prohibited grounds of discrimination…365 
As the PCIJ described in the Albania case, CESCR also recognizes systemic 
discrimination.  This form of indirect discrimination is “pervasive and persistent 
and deeply entrenched in social behavior and organization” and 
“often…unchallenged”.  It manifests itself in “legal rules, policies, practices or 
                                                          
362 See “Education and the Millennium Development Goals” UNESCO <www.unesco.org>. 
363 For example, in UNICEF’s The State of the World’s Children annual reports on the most pressing 
human rights issues in terms of children: UNICEF The State of the World’s Children 2004 Girls, 
education and development (New York, UNICEF, 2004); UNICEF The State of the World’s 
Children 2006: Excluded and invisible (New York, UNICEF, 2006); UNICEF The State of the 
World’s Children 2007: Women and children – the double dividend of gender equality (New York, 
UNICEF, 2007); UNICEF The State of the World’s Children 2013: Children with Disabilities (New 
York, UNICEF, 2013) found at <www.unicef.org/sowc>. 
364 See OECD Education at a Glance 2014: OECD Indicators found at <www.oecd.org> at 13. 
365 CESCR General Comment No. 20: Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights 
(art. 2, para. 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) 
E/C.12/GC/20 (2009). 
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predominant cultural attitudes in either the public or private sector which create 
relative disadvantages for some groups, and privileges for other groups.”366 
In addition to substantive and indirect discrimination, CESCR has recognized that: 
Some individuals or groups of individuals face discrimination on more than one of 
the prohibited grounds, for example women belonging to an ethnic or religious 
minority.  Such cumulative discrimination has a unique and specific impact on 
individuals...367 
In terms echoing descriptions of Native Hawaiian statistics, CESCR has described 
this phenomenon as “multiple” 368  and “intersectional discrimination.369  Prohibited 
grounds identified by CESCR as potentially combining, compounding or 
intersecting to create this particularly invidious species of discrimination include 
“membership of a group”, “race and colour”, “sex”, “language”, and “national or 
social origin”. 370   Other statuses which tend to create intersections include 
“disability”, “age”, “health status” and “economic and social status”. 371   As 
education’s evolution demonstrates, international law recognizes that childhood 
alone appears to draw this more complex discrimination and require special legal 
protection.  As Tomasevski noted, children are extremely vulnerable to 
discrimination simply because of age in a way other human. 372    Access and 
participation rights are vital to their rights realization because they allow vulnerable 
voices be heard.   
And yet, this vulnerable learner might best validate ESCRs including education and 
define substantial equality.  David Beetham has argued that “the language of rights 
only makes sense at all in a context where basic requirements”—that is, the real-
life concerns typically considered within the ambit of ESCRs—“are vulnerable to 
                                                          
366 Ibid, para 12. 
367 Ibid, para 17. 
368 Ibid, para 17. 
369 Ibid, footnote 9 at page 6. 
370 Ibid, paras 16, 17, 20-22, and 24 respectively.  Their list also included “religion”, “political or 
other opinion”, “real property…personal property…or lack of”, and “those…born out of wedlock”: 
see paras 22-23, 25-26 respectively. 
371 Ibid, paras 28-30, 32 and 35, respectively.  Vulnerability created by disability actually drove the 
drafting of the CRPD. This “first human rights treaty of the twenty-first century has, in turn, caused 
a rethink of human rights monitoring generally: Michael Stein, Michael and Janet Lord “Monitoring 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Innovations, Lost Opportunities, and 
Future Potential” (2010) 32 Hum Rts Q 689 at 690. 
372 Elizabeth Reichert Understanding Human Rights: An Exercise Book (London, Sage Publications, 
2007) at 82. 
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standard threats”.  Speaking on the ICESCR, he has argued that such rights are not 
just a reference for state behaviour but a “legitimation for the deprived in their 
struggles to realize their rights”.373  That is, education becomes most relevant when 
it reflects the situation of the least advantaged and most vulnerable rights-holders.   
Similar to the idea of the canary in the mine, Beetham would turn the question of 
what constitutes a human right into what constitutes a human wrong.  Then “infant 
mortality rates, life expectancy rates, literacy rates, school attendance rates, etc.,” 
are easily identifiable “as evidence of rights denials”.374  Amartya Sen similarly 
argues that we should look at the “totality of the human predicament” as an 
“undiscriminating basis for the social analysis of needs” in regards to “miseries and 
deprivations of various kinds” 375  rather than categorizing and distinguishing 
between different kinds of human rights.    
Where such discrimination clusters around a particular identity, an everyone/no-one 
guarantee alone will be undermined.  In contrast, rights which account for such 
rights deprivations have greater resonance. 
 
5.4.5 SUBSTANTIAL EQUALITY AND SPECIAL MEASURES  
Awareness of complex discrimination and vulnerable rightsholders has 
undoubtedly driven international interpretation of the purposes of special measures 
even those associated with everyone/no-one instruments.  CESCR has approved 
differential treatment where such rights: 
represent reasonable, objective and proportional means to redress de facto 
discrimination and are discontinued when substantive equality has been 
sustainably achieved.  Such positive measures may exceptionably, however, need 
to be of a permanent nature….376   
                                                          
373 Beetham, in Steiner and Alston, above n 253, at 255-256.  Also see Upendra Baxi “Voices of 
Suffering, Fragmented Universality, and the Future of Human Rights” in Robert McCorquedale 
Robert, International Library of Essays in Law and Theory, Second Series: Human Rights (Hants, 
Eng UK, Ashgate Dartmouth, 2003) 159. 
374 Beetham, in Steiner and Alston, above n 253, at 255-256. 
375 Amartya Sen “Freedoms and Needs” in Steiner and Alston, above n 27, at 269-270. 
376 CESCR, General Comment No. 20, above n 366, para 13.  Provided that such differentiation: is 
“reasonable and objective”, has “legitimate” aims, is “compatible with the nature of Covenant rights 
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Although the ICESCR does not provide for special measures, it recognizes that 
gender attracts discrimination, and its obligation to fulfill has been interpreted to 
include “design[ing] and implement[ing] policies and programmes to give long-
term effect to the economic, social and cultural rights of both men and women”.  
Such action may include “the adoption of special measures to accelerate women’s 
equal enjoyment of their rights…and gender-specific allocation of resources”.377   
Even in dichotomous, no-one instruments like CADE, identity-aware special 
measures are appropriate given the “notion of intersectionality” and easily 
distinguished from invidious discrimination.378  They may also be seen as state 
obligations “required to reduce structural disadvantages…in order to achieve the 
objectives of full participation and equality within in society” and entail “additional 
resources”.379  CERD’s General Recommendation No. 23 similarly recognizes the 
context of complex discrimination and that “enjoyment” of ICESCR rights “on an 
equal footing” is integral to non-discrimination.380   
However, like Kymlicka, CERD and other bodies differentiate between special 
temporary measures and the “permanent human rights” of minorities and 
indigenous peoples: 
Special measures should not be confused with specific rights pertaining to certain 
categories of rights pertaining to certain categories of person or community, such 
as, for example the rights of persons belonging to minorities to enjoy their own 
culture, profess and practice their own religion and use their own language, the 
rights of indigenous peoples…and rights of women to non-identical treatment with 
men…on account of biological differences from men.  Such rights are permanent 
rights…states parties should carefully observe distinctions between special 
measures and permanent human rights in their law and practices.  The distinction 
                                                          
and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society”, and 
proportional to the degree of indirect discrimination faced.  Compare with the trammelling and 
temporary criteria for the Johnson test in Kamehameha in Chapter Three at 3.5.1. 
377 CESCR, General Comment No 16, above n 70, para 21. 
378 CERD, General Recommendation No. 32, The meaning and scope of special measures in the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms [of] Racial Discrimination 
CERD/C/GC/32 (2009) para 7.   
379 CESCR General Comment No. 5: Persons with Disabilities E/1995/22 (1994) para 9. 
380  CERD, General Recommendation No. 32, above n 378, para 7: “Discrimination under the 
Convention includes purposive or intentional discrimination and discrimination in effect.  
Discrimination is constituted not simply by an unjustifiable ‘distinction, exclusion or restriction’ but 
by an unjustifiable ‘preference’, making it especially important that States parties distinguish 
‘special measures’ from unjustifiable preferences”. 
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between special measures and permanent rights implies that those entitled to 
permanent rights may also enjoy the benefits of special measures”.381 
Special measures are appropriate when “undertaken for the sole purpose of securing 
adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups” as long as they do not lead 
to permanent differentiated rights382 and address:  
…persistent or structural disparities and de facto inequalities resulting from the 
circumstances of history that continue to deny to vulnerable groups and individuals 
the advantages essential for the full development of the human personality.  It is 
not necessary to prove ‘historic’ discrimination in order to validate a programme 
of special measures; the emphasis should be placed on correcting present 
disparities and on preventing further imbalances from rising.383 
While these special measures are temporary 384  and aimed at parity, they 
ideologically contrast with the Weber-Johnson test given their goal of substantive 
equality, the space they leave for permanent minority and indigenous rights and 
their status as rights in and of themselves.   
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
International law clearly recognizes a strong right to education.  Beyond the single, 
somewhat amorphous constitutive commitment recognized in Plyler, education 
refers to a multi-narrative toolbox of rights options including: fundamental 
guarantees to primary and secondary education; temporary special measures; 
minority rights including parallel institutions and commonly held cultural and 
language rights; and the complex multi-narrative rights of children and persons with 
disabilities including the above rights and participation and access rights.   
Education is considered organically crucial to the realization of most if not all other 
human rights—including everyone/no-one civil and political rights comparable to 
                                                          
381 Ibid, para 15 (emphasis added).  The availability of both temporary special measures aimed at 
no-one and slim someone objectives and permanent rights attached to indigenous group membership, 
for instance, suggests a harmony between narratives which are at odds in American federal 
jurisprudence where substantive equality is the goal. 
382 Ibid, para 19. 
383 Ibid, para 22. 
384  UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Comprehensive 
Examination of Thematic Issues Relating to Racial Discrimination: The Concept and Practice of 
Affirmative Action E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/11/Corr.1 (2000) at 66-83.  
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those in the American Constitution.  It is legal and justiciable, a strong standalone 
right entailing increasingly identity-specific, positive states parties’ obligations, 
effective implementation and the 4-A Scheme.  Contrary to homogenous or 
anonymous trends in federal jurisprudence in recent decades, the international right 
is increasingly identity- and content-specific in an apparent attempt to buffer 
particular groups against complex discrimination and disparities but also to provide 
a richer rational revision context in the form of organic multiplication. 
Rather than wilfully ignoring the way that complex discrimination and disparities 
are unrelentingly attracted to certain group identities—and de facto inequalities—
international equality narratives recognize multiple rightsholders in education 
because a more substantive, even Brown-like equality demands it, as does non-
discrimination.  Most importantly, the human right to education has the capacity to 
liberally account for vulnerable rightsholders whose plight would otherwise 
undermine the narrative legitimacy of everyone/no-one guarantees.  In fact, prior to 
an indigenous identity, the Native Hawaiian learner is entitled to special temporary 
measures in education and also minority rights to attend a parallel educational 
institution, be taught in Hawaiian and learn with other Native Hawaiians.  These 
are not exceptions to equality but required by it.  
Although this multi-narrative toolbox of rights increasingly recognizes the complex 
nature of discrimination and disparities, the human right to education has not yet 
accounted for the unique historical context of the admission policy—for the legal 
fact of prior sovereignty, historical wrongs linked to the illegal overthrow of the 
Hawaiian Kingdom, deep ongoing harm, or the historical continuum of Native 
Hawaiian law.  These facts raise questions of self-determination and the collective 
rights of a nation or people rather than an individual.  The next chapter explores the 
further evolution of the right to education in international law to recognize a truly 
collective, specifically indigenous right to education which displays buffer-and-
access features but also affirms historical self-determination. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
AN INDIGENOUS RIGHT TO 
EDUCATION 
6 CHAPTER SIX: AN INDIGENOUS RIGHT TO EDUCATION 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
After being hidden, we were seen.1 
The evolution of the international human right to education described in Chapter 
Five clearly displays Kymlickan buffer-and-access features.  Importantly, the right 
has intentionally become more identity-specific in an effort to counter or buffer 
against complex discrimination and disparities and allow disadvantaged groups 
access to a richer rational revision context, even organic multiplication.  Thus, this 
strong right has evolved from a formalized, universalized, everyone/no-one right to 
a complex, highly identity-aware, multi-narrative toolbox of rights options entailing 
everyone/no-one guarantees, minority and other complex someone rights.  The 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities especially illustrated flexibility and complementarity in terms of 
the same equality narratives which have been wrestled over in American federal 
courts.  Versus everyone/no-one critiques, the right further displayed organic 
multiplication and indivisibility, emphasized legality and justiciability, demanded 
positive state parties’ obligations and was buttressed by non-discrimination. 
Chapter Six presents Article 14 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) as the earnest culmination of the evolution of the 
international human right to education displaying buffer-and-access features but 
also, importantly, remedial self-determination projects.  It describes how and why 
this rational and remedial indigenous learner right remains consistent with the 
                                                          
1 Wiremu Ratana, a Maori church leader from New Zealand, who was one of the first indigenous 
persons to petition the young League of Nations to recognize indigenous rights and rights-holders 
in the early 20th century, quoted in Keith Newman Ratana Revisited: An Unfinished Legacy 
(Auckland, Reed, 2006) at 140. 
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previous multi-narrative while enshrining specifically indigenous, collective rights 
in education.  In response to the same kind of adamant everyone/no-one critiques 
advanced by the dissent in Kamehameha, Article 14 is presented as an organic 
multiplier of other indigenous and human rights, a legally emphasized, justiciable, 
and enforceable right.  Moreover, Article 14 demonstrates the capacity of 
specifically indigenous rights to reconcile Kymlicka’s theory with itself, and 
account for ongoing harm, actual prior sovereignty and a historical continuum of 
rights.  Importantly, rather than being submerged in a racial minority or more 
complex someone narrative, the most vulnerable of vulnerable rightsholders in 
education are identified as indigenous learners in UNDRIP’s highly responsive 
right to education because both an earnest equality and unique historico-legal 
context demand it. 
 
6.2 THE MOST VULNERABLE 
While both States and indigenous peoples resisted a singular definition of the term 
during the drafting of UNDRIP,2 James Anaya, former UN Special Rapporteur on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, has described “indigenous peoples” as:  
…living descendants of pre-invasion inhabitants of lands now dominated by 
others. They are culturally distinct groups that find themselves engulfed by other 
settler societies born of forces of empire and conquest.3   
                                                          
2 Consistent with Article 33 in the final draft of UNDRIP which reserves the right of indigenous 
peoples to determine their own membership, indigenous delegates adopted a common position and 
rejected the idea of a formal definition.  States also did not want such a definition.  However, there 
was significant debate on such a definition: see Albert K Barume “Responding to the Concerns of 
the African States”, in Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (eds) Making the Declaration Work: 
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Copenhagen, IWGIA, 2009) 
170.  Benedict Kingsbury has described two broad approaches to the definition of indigenous 
peoples.  The “positivist approach treats ‘indigenous peoples’ as a legal category requiring precise 
definition” making the determination of legal status a straightforward exercise.  Kingsbury, however 
argues “that it is impossible…to formulate a single globally viable definition that is workable and 
not grossly under- or overinclusive.  Any strict definition is likely to incorporate justifications and 
referents that make sense in some societies but not in others.”:  Benedict Kingsbury “‘Indigenous 
Peoples’ in International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy” (1998) 92(3) 
Am J Int’l Law 414 at 414.   
3 S James Anaya Indigenous Peoples in International Law (2nd ed, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2004) at 3.  Kinsgbury fears that a “global concept is unworkable and dangerously incoherent” but 
recognizes its “normative power for many relatively powerless groups that have suffered grievous 
abuses”: Kingsbury, at 415.  In fact, the most consistent characteristic of indigenous claims seems 
to be that these groups share eerily similar experiences of ‘grievous abuses’. 
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In fact, the Native Hawaiian moʻolelo echoes one that has been told many times.  
Colonialism—including colonization4—was a global phenomenon which impacted 
the indigenous peoples of the Americas, Africa, Asia and Australia but also Europe 
itself, for instance the Saami.  At a global level—as in Hawaiʻi—“the doctrine of 
discovery, the doctrine of domination, ‘conquest’”:5  
…without question…had a detrimental effect on all indigenous peoples.  Its 
implementation was used as an instrument to alienate indigenous peoples from 
their lands, resources and culture, a process that continues today.6 
As in Hawaiʻi, indigenous peoples around the world: 
were constructed as “savages”, “barbarians”, “backward” and “inferior and 
uncivilized” by the colonizers, who used such constructs to subjugate, dominate 
and exploit indigenous peoples and their lands, territories and resources.7 
Historically, these overtly racist narratives justified the denial of “indigenous 
peoples’ human rights”.8   However, the same narratives are manifest today in 
various areas of human well-being and thriving9 regarding indigenous peoples and 
continue to be used to deny even “extinguish” their human rights.10 
Today, the same peoples historically impacted by colonization appear to share a 
common identity of complex discrimination and disparities.  As John-Andrew 
McNeish and Robyn Eversole have asked: 
Where is poverty...always more prevalent?  In what kinds of situations, in what 
places, in what roles, are people around the world most likely to be poor?  Clearly 
there are patterns... 
This book acknowledges and explores one key pattern of poverty: the fact that 
around the world, in vastly different cultures and settings, indigenous peoples are 
nearly always disadvantaged relative to their non-indigenous counterparts.  Their 
material standard of living is lower; their risk of disease and early death is higher.  
                                                          
4 “Colonization” is commonly understood as the migration of settlers into an area who maintain ties 
to mother country but it also often refers to the larger phenomenon whereby those settlers supersede 
the original inhabitants who become a minority in their own country.  The term is closely associated 
with “empire” whose Latin root imperium translates as “domination”: Stephen Howe Empire: A 
Very Short Introduction (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002) at 9-34. 
5 UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues [UNPFII] Report of the Eleventh Session of the UN 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues E/C.19/2012/13 (2012) para 4; and Valmaine Toki Study 
on the decolonisation of the Pacific region E/C.19/2013/1 (2013) at para 1. 
6 Toki, at para 1. 
7 UNPFII, Report of the Eleventh Session, above n 5, para 4. 
8 Ibid, para 4. 
9 Ibid, para 5. 
11 Ibid, para 6. 
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Their educational opportunities are more limited, their political participation and 
voice more constrained, and the lifestyles and livelihoods they would choose are 
very often out of reach.11 
Compounding, multiplication and intersectionality appear to be globally attracted 
to indigenous identity.  In fact, the indigenous child has been classified among the 
most “excluded and invisible”12 in the world, by the United Nations Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF)13: 
Indigenous children can face multiple barriers to full participation in society... 
Indigenous children can suffer cultural discrimination and economic and political 
marginalization.  They are often less likely to be registered at birth and more prone 
to poor health, to low participation in education and to abuse, violence and 
exploitation...Many of them are still denied their rights under the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, especially with regard to birth registration, access to 
education and health-care services.14 
Global educational statistics on the indigenous child not only echo those of Native 
Hawaiians but may be even more concerning15 and consistently reveal a “critical”16 
“gap” in educational achievement between indigenous children and other students, 
including other minorities. 17  Despite increasingly identity-aware, complex rights 
to education, extreme discrimination and disparate impact continue to cluster 
around the indigenous learner: 
In most countries, indigenous children have low school enrolment rates.  Scarce 
educational facilities, governments’ failure to attract qualified teachers prepared to 
work in the remote areas where many indigenous people live and the perceived 
                                                          
11 Robin Eversole and John-Andrew McNeish “Introduction: indigenous peoples and poverty”, in 
Robin Eversole, John-Andrew McNeish and Alberto D Cimadore (eds) Indigenous Peoples & 
Poverty: An International Perspective (London, Zed Books, 2005) 1 at 2. 
12 UNICEF, The State of the World’s Children 2006: Excluded and Invisible (New York, UNICEF, 
2006) at 24-28. 
13  UNICEF was established by the UN General Assembly on 11 December 1946 to provide 
humanitarian relief to children in the wake of World War II, became a permanent part of the UN 
system in 1953 and operates under the auspices of ECOSOC as part of the United Nations 
Development Group: see UNICEF “Our History” United Nations Children’s Fund at 
<www.unicef.org.nz>.  “All UNICEF-supported activities are guided by and aim at realising the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCROC) and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)”: UNICEF “Our Mission” 
United Nations Children’s Fund at <www.unicef.org.nz>. 
14 UNICEF, The State of the World’s Children 2006: Excluded and Invisible, above n 12,at 25. 
15 UNICEF, The State of the World’s Children 2009 (Executive Summary): Maternal and Newborn 
Health (New York, UNICEF, 2009) at 132. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
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irrelevance of much of the school curriculum for the local community—all act as 
disincentives to school participation.18 
Likewise, the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (PFII) has stated that 
educational exclusion takes “the form of poor access, low funding, culturally and 
linguistically inadequate education and ill-equipped instructors”. 19   Despite 
emphasized legality, 4-A Scheme standards and States obligations, the global 
indigenous child—like the Native Hawaiian learner—is less likely to be enrolled in 
school, stay in school and be literate.20 
As an essential pre-prerequisite of learning, language is a particular area where 
indigenous children may be “severely disadvantaged” in education.  Comparable to 
historical discrimination experienced by Native Hawaiian learners, “[s]peaking an 
indigenous or non-official language is a clear marker of disadvantage in terms of 
schooling”21 for indigenous children globally:   
When they attend school, indigenous children often begin their formal education 
at a disadvantage to other children because they are unfamiliar with the language 
of instruction.  Research indicates that it takes until the third grade before their 
comprehension begins to match that of children who speak the dominant 
language.22 
Among other forms of discrimination, indigenous children have been—and 
continue to be—denied education, abused and indoctrinated for speaking 
indigenous languages.  Because language constitutes an essential element of 
community identity, well-being and survival, some commentators believe that such 
attacks on language constitute “genocide”.23 
                                                          
18 UNICEF, The State of the World’s Children 2006: Excluded and Invisible, above n 12, at 28.  Also 
see UNPFII State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples 2009, above n 15, at 132. 
19 UNPFII State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples 2009, ibid. 
20 Ibid, at 133.   
21 Ibid.   
22 UNICEF The State of the World’s Children 2006: Excluded and Invisible, at 28.  Also see UNPFII 
State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples 2009, ibid, at 132. 
23  Tove Skutnabb-Kangas and Robert Dunbar “Indigenous Children’s Education as Linguistic 
Genocide and a Crime against Humanity?  A Global View” (2010) (1) Gáldu Čála: Journal of 
Indigenous Peoples Rights 53.   
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Like language, culturally inappropriate curriculum and pedagogy and lack of 
indigenous control of institutions creates discrimination.  The Expert Mechanism 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (EMPRIP)24 found that:  
...deprivation of access to quality education is a major factor contributing to social 
marginalization, poverty and dispossession of indigenous peoples.  The content 
and objective of education to indigenous peoples in some instances contributes to 
the assimilation of indigenous peoples into mainstream society and the eradication 
of their cultures, languages and ways of life.25 
Again, for many indigenous children, education is not available, accessible, 
acceptable or adaptable.26  
At the intersection of gender, age and indigeneity27, the indigenous girl might be 
the poster child for complex discrimination.  Generally, women are typically more 
susceptible to exclusion in education than their male counterparts.28 Indigenous 
women have been described as “third class citizen[s]” because they frequently 
exhibit greater disadvantage than both indigenous males and non-indigenous males 
and females.29  Generally, “[i]ndigenous girls tend to be more disadvantaged than 
indigenous boys”.30  For instance, the indigenous girl is less likely to be enrolled in 
school, to stay in school and be literate than an indigenous boy—who themselves 
                                                          
24 “The Expert Mechanism provides the Human Rights Council with thematic advice, in the form of 
studies and research, on the rights of Indigenous peoples as directed by the Council. The Expert 
Mechanism may also suggest proposals to the Council for its consideration and approval.”: “Expert 
Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” Office of the High Commissioner on Human 
Rights <www.ohchr.org>. 
25 UN Human Rights Council, Human Rights Bodies and Mechanisms: Study on Lessons Learned 
and challenges to Achieve the Implementation of the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Education, 
Report of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples A/HRC/12/33 (2009) 
[EMPRIP 2009] at 2. 
26 Ibid, at 16-26. 
27 On gender and discrimination see: UN Millennium Project Task Force on  Education and Gender 
Equality Taking Action: Achieving Gender Equality and Empowering Women (London, Earthscan, 
2005); Sandra Fredman Women and the Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997); Cass 
Sunstein “Gender, Caste and Law” in Martha Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover (eds.) Women, Culture 
and Development: A Study in Human Capabilities (New York, Oxford University Press, 1995) at 
332; and Katarina Tomasevski  Women and Human Rights (London, Zed Books, 1993). Also see 
United Nations Children’s Fund The State of the World’s Children 2004: Girls, Education and 
Development (New York, UNICEF, 2004); and The State of the World’s Children 2007: Women 
and Children—the Double Dividend of Gender Equality (New York, UNICEF, 2007).  This thesis 
has delved deeply into feminist legal theory or anti-discrimination law but the indigenous girl-child 
well illustrates extreme intersectionality and multiplication. 
28 Sen, at 259. 
29 United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women and 
the Secretariat of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues Gender and Indigenous 
People: Briefing Note 1 <www.un.org>. 
30 UNPFII State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples, at 133. 
  257 
 
are already less likely than other sectors of society to achieve in education31 .  
Ironically, the indigenous girl’s enjoyment of education rights or lack thereof will 
certainly impact the educational achievement and wider socio-economic 
development and physical health of her children, family and community.32   For 
these reasons, the indigenous girl-child appears to be the personification of complex 
discrimination and disparities and the quintessential canary in the coalmine. 
Generally, statistics on indigenous learners show that disadvantage and inequality 
chronically cluster around the indigenous child, creating “striking disparities”33 in 
educational achievement and realization.  In such statistics, it is not merely a racial 
or minority identity that is repeatedly defined by extreme discrimination and 
disadvantage but an indigenous identity impacted by colonialism.  As demonstrated 
by language denial and the indigenous girl-child, generations will inherit this 
extreme form of once-and-future discrimination.  “[N]otwithstanding progress in 
legal protection and recognition through national legislation and international 
norms”,34 indigenous people experience “discrimination in health, employment and 
education”, “persistent marginalization”, “stigmatization”, “gap[s] in life 
opportunities and “dual discrimination”35 on a pandemic scale.   
In contrast to John Rawls’ just savings36  principle, this inheritance of a priori 
disadvantage compounds and distorts disparate impact further despite international 
borders, geographic distance, and actual diversity of cultures and languages.37  The 
global moʻolelo clearly defies Waldron’s supersession thesis38 since the connection 
between the event of colonialism and present disparities and discrimination is 
unquestionable.  In fact, resulting unchosen, multi-generational disadvantage 
                                                          
31 UNPFII State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples, at 133. 
32 State of the World’s Children 2007: Women and Children: The Double Dividend of Gender 
Equality, Executive Summary.  For instance, at 2: “Healthy, educated and empowered women have 
healthy, educated and confident daughters and sons”.   
33 UNPFII State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples, 133.  Also see: EMPRIP 2009, above n 25. 
34 Human Rights Council (HRC) Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 
March 2006 Entitled “Human Rights Council”; Report of the United Nations Commissioner for 
Human Rights on indigenous issues A/HRC/4/77 (2006) [Implementation report 2006] at 1. 
35 Ibid, paras 8-11. 
36 See Chapter Four at 4.2.2. 
37 Despite Jeremy Waldron’s arguments that indigenous identity is liberally irrelevant or can be 
historically superseded. See Waldron’s cosmopolitan thesis equating indigenous rights claims with 
living in Disneyland and occasionally putting on traditional costumes or using mother tongues to 
celebrate dying cultures: Chapter Four, at 4.3.2. 
38 See discussion in Chapter Four at 4.2.2.  Waldron equates any addressing of that history with 
placing unfair burdens on present individuals while the opposite appears to play out in the statistics. 
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apparently represents a neo-colonialism which plays out—as if on a loop—over and 
over.  The existence of such extreme, supra-insidious discrimination and disparities 
which are consistently and repeatedly attracted to a particular identity must be 
highly offensive to any earnest liberal.   
 
6.3 CULMINATION: THE EVOLUTION OF AN INDIGENOUS RIGHT TO 
EDUCATION 
In response, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
2007 39  (UNDRIP or ‘the Declaration’) specifically addresses the complex 
discrimination and disparities particularly attracted to the indigenous identity.  It 
demonstrates a repugnance for the global human wrong of colonization as urgent 
as the avoidance of conflict, genocide and other horrors post-WWII.  It upholds and 
reiterates the universal individual human rights of the indigenous learner but also 
recognizes collective peoples’ rights based on a more historical right to self-
determination held by the learner and his community.  Among these, Article 14 
emphasizes the universal human right to education held by the indigenous learner—
their everyone/no-one and someone rights to equality and non-discrimination—but 
also recognizes the right of indigenous peoples to establish and control educational 
institutions and systems which fundamentally prioritize the indigenous learner not 
only in admissions but in all aspects of education.   
The Declaration also represents the agency, resistance and persistence of 
indigenous peoples in seeking justice for historic and ongoing injustices—even 
gross human rights violations.  Like the admission policy, global efforts can be seen 
as real-time exercises of self-determination and self-generated remedies for those 
injustices.  Likewise, UNDRIP does not create any new indigenous rights but rather 
recognizes historic and ongoing denials and protects surviving pre-contact rights 
which precede liberalism altogether—or a historical continuum of rights. 
                                                          
39 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples GA Res 61/295, A/Res/61/295 
(2007) [UNDRIP]. 
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6.3.1 INDIGENOUS RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS 
The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2007 was long awaited and 
anticipated. 
In the mid-sixteenth century, with the Conquest of the Americas underway and 
holocaust-level population decimation40 unfolding across the Western Hemisphere, 
Spanish theologians argued that the ‘New World’s’ indigenous inhabitants were 
human beings with associated rights.  Francisco de Vitoria, recognized that the 
“Indian aborigines” were “true owners in public and in private law before” the 
Conquest and should not be forced to put themselves into “the power” of European 
sovereigns. 41  More vehemently, Bartolomé de las Casas criticized the violence and 
genocide of the Conquistadors, arguing that “Indians” were entitled to the same 
rights as other human beings. 42   Their arguments foreshadow principles of 
universality, equality and non-discrimination—even the Enlightenment liberalism43 
and Vitoria especially is recognized as a father of international law.44  Importantly, 
Vitoria and de las Casas stressed that indigenous people were human beings 
because they had already been discriminated against as supposed non-humans. 
Post-World War II, the International Labour Organization (ILO)45 drew attention 
to inequalities afflicting indigenous peoples in reports such as Indigenous Peoples: 
Living and Working Conditions of Aboriginal Populations in Independent 
Countries (1953) 46  which included global educational statistics from various 
                                                          
40 Mirroring developments in Hawaiʻi, a 2011 study indicates that European diseases may have 
killed as much as 50 percent of the indigenous population of the Americas within a few years of 
Columbus’ arrival: Ker Than “Massive Population Drop Found for Native Americans, DNA Shows” 
National Geographic News (online ed, 5 December 2011). 
41 Francisco DeVitoria De indis et De jure belli relectiones, Vol 7 (Buffalo NY, WS Hein, 1995) at 
336.   
42 Bartolomé de las Casas A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies/Brevísima relación de la 
destrucción de las Indias. (London, Penguin Classics, 1992). 
43 DeVitoria is often recognised with the Dutchman Grotius as a father of international law: see S 
James Anaya “Introduction” in S James Anaya (ed) International Law and Indigenous Peoples 
(Hants Eng, Dartmouth Publishing, 2003) at xi.  Also see GC Marks “Indigenous Peoples in 
International Law: The Significance of Francisco de Vitoria and Bartolome de las Casas” 13 
Australian Year Book of International Law 1. 
44 See discussion in previous chapter in section 5.2. 
45 A specialized agency of the United Nations. 
46 International Labour Organization [ILO] Indigenous Peoples: Living and Working Conditions of 
Aboriginal Populations in Independent Countries (Geneva, ILO, 1953).  See Chapter VII, “Illiteracy 
and Education”. Under the heading of the United States only “Indians” are mentioned.  Native 
Hawaiians are not.  The study was focused on very general markers of educational achievement such 
as literacy rates and school attendance.  
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regions and countries showing significant gaps between indigenous and non-
indigenous learners.47   The ILO later drafted Convention No 107, Convention 
Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and 
Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries (1957),48 “the first attempt to 
codify international obligations of States in respect indigenous and tribal 
populations”.49   More recently, No 169, Convention on Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples in Independent Countries (1989) 50   attempted to define indigenous 
peoples, 51  recognizes the need for “measures” and stresses the importance of 
indigenous peoples participation “on an equal footing” 52  with other citizens, 
including in education.53  Article 27(3) “recognise[d] the right of [indigenous] 
people to establish their own educational institutions and facilities”.54 
Such developments can be viewed against the “nascent international indigenous 
movement” “growing rapidly” at that time “throughout the Americas, the 
Caribbean, the Arctic, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Bangladesh and 
elsewhere”55 as “talking circle[s]” of educated, indigenous people shared eerily 
similar moʻolelo and: 
…sought to understand why the Labour Conventions, the Human Rights 
Covenants or the [Universal] Declaration and Conventions of UNESCO had never 
                                                          
47 Though Maori fared better than many other indigenous peoples included in the study: see New 
Zealand section in Chapter VII “Illiteracy and Education” at 195-196. 
48 ILO, Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, C107 (opened for signature 26 June 1957, 
entered into force 2 June 1959). 
49 See ILO, “Convention No 107” International Labour Organization <www.ilo.org>. 
50 ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention C169 (opened for signature 27 June 1989, entered 
into force 5 September 1991) art 1(1) defines indigenous peoples in tribal terms and by “descent 
from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country 
belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and 
who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and 
political institutions.” The Convention makes self-identification the fundamental criterion in 
determining membership. 
51 In terms of tribes, pre-contact inhabitation of a country and retention of institutions. Convention 
No 169 has only been ratified by 22 countries.  It also lacks any reference to political status or real 
rights to self-determination merely stating, in the preamble, indigenous peoples have 
“aspirations …to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life and economic 
development and to maintain and develop their identities, languages and religions, within the 
framework of the States in which they live”.  Importantly, while using the term peoples, the treaty 
specifically denies “any implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under 
international law—that is, the kind of self-determination claimed by native Hawaiians and other 
indigenous peoples.   
52 Both phrases repeated throughout the Convention.  For instance, see arts 26 and 27 on education.  
Unfortunately, the standard is parity. 
53 See art 26. 
54 “[P]rovided that such institutions meet minimum standards established by the competent authority 
in consultation with these peoples”: art 27(3). 
55 UNPFII State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples 2009, above n 15, 2. 
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been used to protect us.  In these international systems we found we were invisible; 
we were neither minorities nor peoples.  We were ghost peoples, hidden, like our 
languages and cultures, by the concept of the nation-state.56 
Another commentator traces Native American awareness back to US events 
including the Pine Ridge Reservation occupation by Native American protesters in 
1973 and “disappointing litigation outcomes” in domestic courts.57   
Such awareness gave rise to diplomatic alliances and strategies aimed at 
illuminating “what constitutes the Indigenous humanness of human rights”.58  In 
such strategies, the UDHR was seen as “an important tool” for overcoming 
discrimination.  As predicted by Kymlicka, gaining a voice in international fora was 
prioritized as were the issues of collective rights and self-determination. 59  
International law was to be the vehicle for domestic rights issues, though there was 
an understanding that international law was currently insufficient to address 
indigenous rights. 60   
The ground-breaking Martinez Cobo Study submitted to the UN Commission on 
Human Rights in 1981 after almost a decade of study, attempted to define 
indigenous peoples in order to specify them as rights-holders in regards to 
discrimination. 61    More importantly, it repeatedly concluded that, while the right 
                                                          
56  James (Sákéj) Youngblood Henderson Indigenous Diplomacy and the Rights of Peoples: 
Achieving UN Recognition (Saskatoon, Purich Publishing, 2008) at 35.  Henderson speaks from the 
experience of Canadian First Nations people.    
57 Robert Coulter “The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A Historic Change in 
International Law” (2008-2009) 45 Idaho L Rev 539 at 543.   
58 Henderson at 29.  Also see discussion in Chapter Two on the erosion of Native American rights 
in US federal courts, at 2.4.2. 
59 Henderson, ibid, at 30.  Coulter, above n 57, at 543-544. 
60 Coulter, at 544.  Communications by indigenous people to the UN Commission on Human Rights 
(CHR) under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR represent early attempts at such strategies.  
Indigenous peoples were unsuccessful in attempts to claim the right to self-determination generally, 
under Article 1 of the ICCPR, via the complaints mechanism of Optional Protocol I.  In Bernard 
Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v Canada Communication No 167/1984 (1984), for 
instance, the Human Rights Committee found that a claim under Article 1 was inadmissible because 
the Lubicon Lake Band was not a “people” within the meaning of Article 1 since the band was only 
one of many Indian bands throughout Canada and only a “smaller portion” of a larger Cree group, 
and because the Optional Protocol is an individual complaints mechanism while self-determination 
was a collective right: see Lubicon Lake Band at 106 and 109. The following year, in Ivan Kitok v 
Sweden Communication No 197/1985 (1985), the HRC dismissed a similar complaint on individual 
grounds.  However, these cases said little about what the right actually entailed. See description of 
events from Canadian perspective in Henderson, at 37-40. 
61 José Martínez Cobo Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, 
Final report submitted to Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. José Martínez Cobo 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/476, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21. 
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to education was universally guaranteed in countries including the United States, 
indigenous persons faced many obstacles to actual enjoyment of the right.62  With 
other forces, the Study created a “momentum”63 that led to the establishment of a 
UN body dedicated to indigenous human rights issues: the UN Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations (WGIP) established by ECOSOC and, ultimately, the 
drafting of a document beginning in 1985 which would respond to the moʻolelo.     
On an “extraordinary” level, indigenous peoples were allowed to participate in the 
proceedings of the WGIP.  During drafting, over 1,000 representatives participated 
annually in the WGIP and later UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 
(UNPFII).64   Such participation ranged from “issue setting and agenda creation”—
as in the Indigenous Peoples Decade—to “influence on institutional procedures”— 
to “influence on policy change in ‘target actors’”. 65  Crucially, “[f]or the first time, 
the victim population, indigenous peoples, were permitted to actively participate in 
the drafting and debate”. 66  The human rights focus also shifted “from integration 
to self-determination”.67 
The result of these rightsholder-driven developments—and the persistence of the 
global moʻolelo itself—has been a “mainstreaming” of indigenous rights within the 
UN system. 68   During the decades of drafting, the Special Rapporteur on the 
Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People 
                                                          
62 See Martinz Cobo Study, Chapter XIII, “Education”: E/CN.4 Sub.2 /1983/21/Add.2. 
63 UNPFII State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples, above n 17, at 2. 
64 See Augusto Willensen Diaz “How Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Reached the UN” in charters and 
Stavenhagen, above n 2, 16 at 27-28. 
65 For instance, the unprecedented openness of the WGIP to indigenous participation.  Influence on 
institutional procedures and policy change in target actors are two evaluative benchmarks discussed 
by Jeff Corntassel “Partnership in Action?  Indigenous Political Mobilization and Co-optation 
During the First UN Indigenous Peoples Decade (1995-2004)” (2007) 29(1) Hum Rts Q 137 at 137.  
The other three are “influence on discursive positions of states and international organizations”, 
“influence on state behavior”, and what he calls “co-optation”.  While Corntassel is ultimately 
pessimistic about the lasting impact of such participation especially given the effect of co-optation—
or the “blunting” or “channelling” of such participation for the benefit of a state’s legitimacy—he 
also provides several specific examples, at least prima facie, of unprecedented participation. 
66 “Hundreds of indigenous participants from all over the world began to participate every year at 
the meetings in Geneva, Switzerland.  Many countries bitterly opposed our efforts...Work and 
negotiations continued, often painfully, for many years as we educated the delegations of countries 
from all over the world.  As we negotiated, we found that many of these countries were indeed 
implementing some of these rights—bringing these rights into reality...”: Coulter above n 60, at 545.   
67 Asbjørn Eide “”The Indigenous Peoples, the Working Group on Indigenous Populations and the 
Adoption of the UIN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” in Charters and Stavenhagen, 
above n 7, 32. 
68 Corntassel, at 137. 
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(‘Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples’) 69  was established and two UN 
International Decades of the World’s Indigenous Peoples (1995-2004) and 2005-
2015) were proclaimed, developments meant to focus the world’s attention on the 
acute rights-situations of indigenous peoples. 70   Most recently, an Expert 
Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples71 to provide thematic expertise on 
indigenous rights issues for the Commission on Human Rights was created.72   
Most remarkably, however, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples was endorsed by a significant majority73 of the UN General 
Assembly on September 7, 2007 after some 22 years of discussion, debate, 
negotiation and compromise.  International indigenous rights expert and former UN 
Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya wrote at the time:  
The UN General Assembly’s adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples ...marked the end of a long journey, a milestone in the long and 
arduous march of what have come to be known as “indigenous peoples” through 
the major institution of organized intergovernmental society: the United Nations.  
It is a day of celebration for indigenous leaders and their rank and file scattered 
around the globe, united in a common fate of conquest, dispossession, 
marginalization and neglect, but also in the joy of rising again.74 
 
                                                          
69 Given their mandate by Human rights and indigenous peoples: mandate of the Special Rapporteur 
on the rights of indigenous peoples HRC Res A/HRC/Res/15/14 (2010).  Also see OHCHR “Special 
Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples” Office of the High Commissioner for the United 
Nations on Human Rights <www.ohchr.org>. 
70  OHCHR “International Decades of the World’s Indigenous People” Office of the High 
Commissioner for the United Nations on Human Rights <www.ohchr.org>. 
71 Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples HRC Res A/HRC/Res/ 6/36 (2007). Also 
see OHCHR “Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” Office of the High 
Commissioner for the United Nations on Human Rights <www.ohchr.org>. 
The development of such machinery is consistent with the aim of instruments such as the Vienna 
Programme of Action and the Millennium Development Goals discussed at the end of section 2.1 
72 Only two months after the adoption of UNDRIP.  For a useful discussion on how all of these 
bodies and mechanisms work together see S James Anaya Coordination with United Nations 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues and the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples of the Human Rights Council; Analysis of the duty of States to consult with indigenous 
peoples on matters affecting them: insight into how duty to consult may be addressed by 
Governments, indigenous peoples, the United Nations system, and other stakeholders A/HRC/12/34 
(2009); and Alexandra Xanthaki “Indigenous Rights in International Law Over the Law 10 Years 
and Future Developments” (2009) 10 Melbourne J Int’l Law 27. 
73 It was adopted by 143 countries out of approximately 190 UN member states. 
74 S James Anaya and Siegfried Wiessner “The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
Towards Re-empowerment” Jurist (online ed, 3 October 2007). 
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6.3.2 INDIGENOUS EVERYONE, NO-ONE AND SOMEONE 
The long-awaited, resulting Declaration, consistent with the previous evolution of 
the right of education, recognizes a substantive everyone/no-one and complex 
someone multi-narrative but is even more specific about who is a universal 
rightsholder—while recognizing a more rational and remedial indigenous learner 
than Mancari anticipates.   
The Declaration continues to display buffer-and-access features.  From the outset, 
UNDRIP’s rights are linked to the Charter of the United Nations,75 the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (ICESCR) 76  and 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 196677 (ICCPR).  As those 
instruments and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 78  (UDHR) 
recognized post-WWII, UNDRIP responds to human wrongs, even assimilative and 
“racist” “doctrines, policies and practices”79 and other “historic injustices” arising 
from “colonization”80 and recognizes the “urgent need to respect and promote” 
human rights81 and to “bring an end to all forms of discrimination and oppression 
wherever they occur”.82   
With greater identity-specificity, the Declaration reaffirms that “indigenous 
individuals are entitled without discrimination to all human rights recognized in 
international law”.83  Article 1 formally recognizes that universal guarantee,84 while 
Article 2 recognizes that indigenous individuals are “free and equal to all 
other…individuals and have the right to be free from any kind of discrimination” 
in the exercise of their rights.85  Eleven other articles recognize the indigenous 
                                                          
75 UNDRIP, preamble, first para. 
76  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 993 UNTS 3 (opened for 
signature 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) [ICESCR]. 
77 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (opened for signature 16 
December 1966, entered into force 13 March 1976) [ICCPR].  See UNDRIP, Preamble, sixteenth 
para. 
78 Universal Declaration on Human Rights GA Res 217A (III), A/810 (adopted 10 December 1948) 
[UDHR]. 
79 Preamble, fourth para. 
80 Preamble, sixth para. 
81 Preamble, seventh and eight paras. 
82 Preamble, ninth para.  
83 Preamble, twenty-second para.  Emphasis added. 
84 Article 1. 
85 Article 2. 
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individual as a rightsholder 86  while eight other articles reiterate non-
discrimination. 87    Besides general rights to equality and non-discrimination, 
familiar everyone rights protected in UNDRIP include rights to “life”, “liberty”, 
integrity of person, “peace and security”, 88  name or identity, 89 , education, 90 
employment, 91  participation, 92  health, 93  and religion. 94   Like previous no-one 
instruments, UNDRIP also recognizes the special vulnerability of indigenous 
women to discrimination by virtue of being women95 and re-emphasizes that they 
are universal rightsholders.96 
The Declaration is also keenly aware of the complex someone narrative evident in 
instruments such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 97  (‘the 
Children’s Convention’) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities 200698 (CRPD).  Like those instruments, UNDRIP incorporates the 
right to be included99 but also to be different.100  Indigenous children are specified 
as rightsholders in at least five articles.101  Their vulnerability to rights violations 
because of their age and other factors is recognized in Articles 21(2) and 22.  Both 
require that “particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of 
indigenous…youth, children and persons with disabilities”. 102   Similarly, the 
Preamble recognizes the special role which families and communities play in the 
                                                          
86 Including arts 6-9, 14, 17, 21-22, 24, and 33 
87 Including arts, 9, 14(2), 15(2), 16 (1-2), 17(3), 22(2), 24, and 29(1). 
88 Article 7.   
89 Articles 13(1) and 33. 
90 Articles 14, 15 and 17. 
91 Article 17. 
92 Articles 18-19 
93 Articles 23 and 24. 
94 Articles 11, 25, 34, 36(1),  
95 Articles 21(2) and 22 (1) and (2). 
96 Article 44: “All the rights and freedoms recognized herein are equally guaranteed to male and 
female indigenous individuals”.  Compare with no-one narrative in CEDAW, discussed in previous 
chapter at 5.2.2. 
97 Convention on the Rights of the Child 1577 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 20 November 1989, 
entered into force 2 September 1990) [CRC]. 
98  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities A/RES/61/106, Annex I (opened for 
signature 30 March 2007, entered into force 3 May 2008) [CRPD]. 
99 Including arts 14(2) and 33.  The CRPD is heavily premised on inclusion but requires effective 
measures aimed at different rights needs of those with disabilities included innovative approaches 
to access. 
100 Preamble, second para, and arts 5 and 33.  Article 5 recognizes “the right to maintain and 
strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining 
the right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of 
the State.” 
101 Articles 7(2), 14(2) and (3), 17(2), 21(2), and 22(1) and (2). 
102 UNDRIP, art 21(2) and 22(1) and (2).   
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realization of rights for the indigenous child103 and, again, the child’s right to a 
name and identity. 104  UNDRIP also recognizes the dangerous intersection of age, 
gender and disability105 and requires awareness-raising human rights education on 
the part of States to counter discrimination.106   
Other provisions are clearly aimed at protecting indigenous individuals as members 
of racial, ethnic minorities.  As in the Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities 1992107 (‘the 
Minorities Declaration’), States are to prevent, among other forms of 
discrimination, “[a]ny action which has the aim or effect of depriving” indigenous 
individuals “of their cultural values or ethnic identities”, “[a]ny form of forced 
assimilation or integration” and “[a]ny form of propaganda designed to promote or 
incite racial or ethnic discrimination directed against them”. 108   Indigenous 
communities similarly retain rights to “practise and revitalize their cultural 
traditions and customs”,109 “manifest, practise, develop and teach their spiritual and 
religious traditions, customs and ceremonies”110 and “revitalize, use, develop and 
transmit to future generations” community “history… languages, oral traditions, 
philosophies, writing systems and literatures”. 111   Participation by indigenous 
peoples in local and regional decision-making in which they have a stake is also 
consistent with the Minorities Declaration.112 
As with the previous multi-narrative, the focus and driver of the Declaration is 
clearly substantial equality.  More than half of UNDRIP’s rights either directly or 
indirectly protect economic, social and cultural rights113 (ESCRs).  There is no 
formal categorization between UNDRIP’s civil and political rights (CPRs) and its 
                                                          
103 Preamble, thirteenth para. 
104 Articles 13(1) and 33. 
105 UNDRIP, art 21(2) and 22.  Compare with CRPD, arts 6 and 7. 
106 UNDRIP, arts 15 and 16.  Compare with CRPD, art 8. 
107 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities GA Res 48/138, A/RES/48/138 (1993) [Minorities Declaration]. 
108 Article 8(2)(a), (d) and (e).  Compare with rights to enjoy culture and preserve identity with 
Minorities Declaration art 2 (1), discussed in Chapter Five at 5.2.3. 
109 Article 11(1).   
110 Article 12(1). 
111 UNDRIP, art 13(1).  In addition to the education rights discussed below at…, other apparent 
minority-based rights include appropriate reflection of indigenous culture and identity in public 
information (art 15) and the media (art 6).  Compare with art 27, ICCPR. 
112 Compare art 18 of UNDRIP with Article 2(3) of the Minorities Declaration, for instance. 
113 Including arts, 3-5, 10-15, 17, 20-21, 23-28, 31-36, and 39.  Compare with similar rights in the 
ICESCR. 
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ESCRs, nor any hierarchy prioritizing CPRs.  Rather the various rights are 
intermingled throughout the Declaration.  As Article 43 recognizes, UNDRIP’s 
ESCRs and CPRs together constitute the minimum standards for the survival, 
dignity and well-being of the indigenous peoples of the world”.114   
States are directed to take positive steps in regards to at least twenty UNDRIP 
rights, with most entailing the familiar “effective measures”115 found in previous 
ESCR instruments.116  The ESCRs recognized in UNDRIP are clearly linked with 
those documents.  The Preamble encourages “States to comply with and effectively 
implement all their obligations as they apply to indigenous peoples under 
international instruments, in particular those related to human rights”.117 
Special measures, once again, are specifically approved under Article 21 in relation 
to especially vulnerable groups including “indigenous elders, women, youth, 
children and persons with disabilities”.118  Article 22 similarly requires “[p]articular 
attention…be paid to” those groups but reemphasizes two groups especially 
vulnerable to intersectionality, compounding and multiplication, namely women 
and children.119 
Thus, from the outset, the Declaration resembles the previous multi-narrative’s 
reconciliation of the guarantee/reality gap, identity-specificity, flexibility and States 
obligations.   
 
                                                          
114 UNDRIP, art 43. 
115 See arts 8(2), 11(2), 12(2), 13(2), 14(3), 15(2), 16(2), 17(2), 19, 21(2), 22(2), 24(2), 26(3), 27, 
29(1-3), 3(2), 31(2), and 32(2-3).  The nineteenth paragraph of the preamble “[e]ncourag[es] States 
to comply with and effectively implement all their obligations as they apply to indigenous peoples 
under international instruments, in particular those related to human rights…” 
116 See arts 8(2), 11(2), 12(2), 13(2), 14(3), 15(2), 16(2), 17(2), 19, 21(2), 22(2), 24(2), 26(3), 27, 
29(1-3), 3(2), 31(2), and 32(2-3).  The nineteenth paragraph of the preamble “[e]ncourag[es] States 
to comply with and effectively implement all their obligations as they apply to indigenous peoples 
under international instruments, in particular those related to human rights…”: see similar 
obligations in regards to the ICESCR, Maastricht Guidelines and Limburg Principles, discussed in 
previous chapter at 5.4.2. 
117 Preamble, nineteenth para.  Emphasis added. 
118 Articles 21(2).  Also see Article 22. 
119 Article 22.  
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6.3.3 ANOTHER NARRATIVE: HISTORICAL SELF-DETERMINATION 
The specifically indigenous human rights guaranteed by Declaration are the 
seeming culmination of the evolution of international law.  The bigger story of 
UNDRIP, however, might not be how consistent these specifically indigenous 
rights are with previous equality- and non-discrimination-driven human rights 
statements but rather its affirmation of collective, remedial, self-determination-
based rights.  Crucially, these rights recognize ongoing harm, prior sovereignty and 
a historical continuum of timeless rights.  
In the language of justice and self-determination, UNDRIP directly responds to 
historic and ongoing human wrongs, even assimilative and “racist” “doctrines, 
policies and practices” 120  and other “historic injustices” arising from 
“colonization”121 and recognizes the “urgent need to respect and promote” human 
rights 122  and to “bring an end to all forms of discrimination and oppression 
wherever they occur”. 123   Many of its provisions address indigenous-specific 
human rights violations commonly associated with colonialism including 
deprivation of identity, “forced assimilation or integration”, and “any form of 
propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic discrimination directed 
against” indigenous people, 124  as well as the forcible removal of indigenous 
children from their families. 125    In contrast to an irrelevant history, UNDRIP 
recognizes that such wrongs continue to be perpetrated against indigenous peoples. 
Thus, UNDRIP displays a keen awareness of both historic and ongoing aspects of 
the global moʻolelo and the causal connection between colonialism and present 
rights denials.  Rather than an arbitrary circumstance of the indigenous 
rightsholder’s veiled identity to be excluded by historical supersession, addressing 
and remedying the effects of colonialism is organically connected to the enjoyment 
of all other human rights. 
                                                          
120 Preamble, fourth para. 
121 Preamble, sixth para. 
122 Preamble, seventh and eight paras. 
123 Preamble, ninth para.  
124 Article 8(2)(a), (d)-(e).   
125 Article 7(2).  Encompasses, for instance, the “Stolen Generations” of Australian. 
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The Declaration also recognizes the residual political status of indigenous 
peoples—even their prior sovereignty.  In contrast to previous instruments,126 most 
of UNDRIP’s rights are held, not by indigenous individuals or members of minority 
groups but by indigenous peoples.   The prioritization of the indigenous 
collectivities as UNDRIP’s primary rightsholders is unmistakable.  The term 
“peoples” is used at least 98 times in UNDRIP while “individual” or “individuals” 
are only used eleven times.  Out of a total of 46 articles, 30 relate to indigenous 
peoples alone,127 while only 2 can be claimed by indigenous individuals alone.128  
Another 12—including Articles 1 and 2 which guarantee equality and non-
discrimination—recognize both “peoples” and “individuals” 129  as UNDRIP’s 
rightsholders.  These collective and individual rights sit side-by-side without ready 
categorization or hierarchy.  Ultimately, the term ‘indigenous’ preceding both 
‘peoples’ and ‘individuals’ itself references a specific collective identity—and 
history.  As described further below,130 the term ‘people’ is usually reserved for 
collectivities possessing an expanded degree of self-determination.   
More than liberal equality, self-determination underwrites UNDRIP.  Placed 
immediately after Articles 1 and 2’s equality and non-discrimination, UNDRIP’s 
Article 3 changes “All” to “Indigenous” but otherwise repeats core human rights 
treaties, including the UN Charter, ICCPR and ICESCR, verbatim: “Indigenous 
peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.”131  The Article 3132 right to self-determination is the “fundamental 
underlying principle” 133  of the Declaration, and the Preamble “affirm[s] the 
                                                          
126 For instance, ILO Convention No 169 uses the term “peoples” liberally but limits rights to an 
everyone/no-one parity, specifically excluding international understandings of ‘self-determination’: 
see comments in previous footnotes 51 and 52.  The Minorities Declaration 1992 emphasizes ethnic 
minorities which may or may not have adjacent political rights including self-determination. 
127 UNDRIP, arts 3-5, 10-13,15-16, 18-20, 23, 25-32, 34-39, 41, 43 and 45. 
128 UNDRIP, art 6 on the right to a nationality and Article 44 which reiterates the dichotomized no-
one emphasis on women as rightsholders found in the Preamble of the UDHR, Article 3 ICESCR 
and CEDAW generally: see previous chapter at 5.1.2. 
129 Articles 1-2, 7-9, 14, 17, 21-22, 24, 33, and 40. 
130 At 6.6.1. 
131 Article 3 repeats almost verbatim Article 1 of the ICESCR and ICCPR, as well as para 2 of Part 
I of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action A/CONF.157/23 (1993).  All three declare: 
“All peoples have the right to self-determination.  By virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”. 
132 CHR Report of the working group established in accordance with the Commission on Human 
rights resolution 1995/32 E /CN.4/2001/85 (2001) [WGIP report 2001], para 58. 
133 As described by the Working Group on Indigenous Populations during drafting: WGIP Report 
2001, para 56. 
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fundamental importance of the right to self-determination of all peoples” consistent 
with the UN Charter, ICESCR, ICCPR and the Vienna Declaration and Programme 
of Action 1993 (‘the Vienna Declaration’). 134   
Closely related, Article 4 recognizes “the right to autonomy or self-government in 
matters relating to their internal and local affairs”.135  This internal aspect resembles 
certain features of Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism and the Mancari exception 
recognized in American federal Indian law.  In the spirit of dual citizenship 
discussed in Chapter Two, this internal self-determination seems to embody the 
right to ‘opt out’ as it were.  Article 5 recognizes:  
...the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social 
and cultural institutions, while retaining the right to participate fully, if they so 
choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State.136 
It goes much farther, however, appearing to entail a measure of the “belated nation-
building” described by Erica-Irene Daes.137  
                                                          
134 UNDRIP, sixteenth para.  The Vienna Declaration was the product of the second global human 
rights conference held since World War II held in 1993.  It was adopted at the conference by 
consensus by the 171 nations represented at the conference, on 25 June 1993.  It was late endorsed 
by the UN General Assembly as part of Resolution 48/121. 
135 UNDRIP, Articles 3-4. Article 3 repeats almost verbatim Article 1 of the ICESCR and ICCPR, 
as well as para 2 of Part I of the Vienna Declaration.  All three declare: “All peoples have the right 
to self-determination.  By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development”. 
136 Article 5.  Emphasis added.   
137 State-building is usually a post-conflict process which can be either internally (from within the 
country) or externally (by other nations) driven.  It follows in the wake of “state failure”, where 
weak states fail to provide the basic infrastructure of a state, including “security”, a “legal system” 
and “economic and communication infrastructures”: Armin von Bogdandy et al “State-Building, 
Nation-Building, and Constitutional Politics in Post-Conflict Situations: Conceptual Clarifications 
and an Appraisal of Different Approaches” in Armin von Bogdandy and R Wolfrum (eds) (2005) 9 
Max Planck Yearbook on United Nations Law 579, at 580.  State-building means that such structures 
are created, strengthened or rebuilt in order to sustain long-term development.    
“Belated nation-building” is a phrase coined by Erica-Irene Daes in “Some Consideration on the 
Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination” (1993) 3 Transnat’l L & Contemp Probs 1, to 
describe a post-colonial process by which “[i]ndigenous peoples [who] were never a part of State-
building… have the opportunity to participate in designing the modern constitution of the State in 
which they live, or share, in any meaningful way, in national decision-making.”: Daes, at 9. Belated 
State-building is a “peaceful” and internal  form of self-determination exercised by indigenous 
peoples “within existing State structures and orders” through which historical injustices are 
addressed “by imposing obligations on States to accommodate Indigenous Peoples through 
constitutional means in order to share power democratically”: John Buick-Constable “A Contractual 
Approach to Indigenous Self-Determination in Aotearoa/New Zealand (2002) 20(1) Pacific Basin 
Law Journal 113, at 113-114.  This internal form is similar to the options explored by S James Anaya 
and Robert A Williams Jr in their Study on the International Law and Policy relating to the Situation 
of the Native Hawaiian People (Indigenous Peoples Law and Policy Program, The Unviersity of 
Arizona, James E Rogers College of Law, June 2015).  Anaya has previously discussed what this 
internal form of self-determination might require: see S James Anaya “Indian Givers: What 
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Beyond Mancari and the whims of federal recognition, the Declaration also 
seemingly recognizes a historical continuum of virtually timeless, permanent 
indigenous rights.  In view of numerous articles on the preservation, protection and 
transmission of indigenous identity and culture, the rights-holder under UNDRIP is 
part of a once-and-future community of rightsholders. 138   For instance, Article 11 
protects “the right to maintain, protect and develop the past, present and future 
manifestations of culture”.139  Article 45 likewise looks forward to assure us that 
nothing in the Declaration is meant to diminish or extinguish existing indigenous 
rights now or in the future.140   Thus, the Declaration recognizes pre-existing rights 
rather than merely prescribing or imposing liberal rights to address present 
disparities. 
 
6.3.4 THE RATIONAL AND REMEDIAL INDIGENOUS LEARNER: ARTICLE 14 
Article 14 of UNDRIP is consistent with the previous multi-narrative but premised 
on self-determination.  It recognizes that: 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to establish and control their educational 
systems and institutions providing education in their own languages, in a manner 
appropriate to their cultural methods of teaching and learning. 
                                                          
Indigenous Peoples Have Contributed to International Human Rights Law” (2006) 22 Wash U J L 
& Pol’y 107, at 116-117.  Also see his example of the Miskito Indians in S James Anaya “Indigenous 
Peoples in International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004), at 114.   
In terms of the current situation of Native Hawaiians, the internal aspect could recognize what the 
Kamehameha Schools are already doing—that is, operating as an indigenous educational system 
which provides financial backing, research know-how, and community access to indigenous 
resources.  Regardless of whether recognized in the law or not, this is already a significant measure 
of internal self-determination.  However, in the spirit of belated state-building or even the notion of 
nation-building, the Schools’ right to perform and participate must be legally recognized as the rights 
of a people albeit within an existing state.  The degree to which this might be possible may depend 
on the shape of the self-determination which emerges from the current federal-Native Hawaiian 
dialogue.  At some stage, the right to self-determination may be weakened without a recognizable 
face and form of this nation but also without greater education for Native Hawaiian constituents on 
the process and what might be at stake..  For example, an attempt to have Kau Inoa roll members 
vote for candidates to represent them at a hui to discuss these kinds of matters earlier this year failed 
because of some of these issues with many constituents refusing to vote because they did not know 
any of the candidates, for instance. 
138 See arts 5-6, 11-13, 15-16, 20, 24-25, 31, and 33-34. 
139 Article 11.  Emphasis addded.  Obviously, culture itself is a right which only makes sense in 
collective terms.  In terms of future manifestations of the right, Article 25 recognizes both traditional 
guardianship and caretaker roles over the environment as well as “responsibilities to future 
generations”.    
140 Article 45. 
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2.  Indigenous individuals, particularly children, have the right to all levels and 
forms of education of the State without discrimination.   
3.  States shall, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, take effective measures, in 
order for indigenous individuals, particularly those living outside their 
communities, to have access, when possible, to an education in their own culture 
and provided in their own language.141  
Article 14(2) references everyone142 (“all”), no-one143 (“without discrimination”) 
and the complex someone144—“particularly children”.  This learner is specifically 
guaranteed previously promised universal individual rights to a public education 
but also the Mancari-like option145  to attend a parallel indigenous educational 
institution such as Kamehameha Schools, as well as rights to an education in their 
own culture and language where they constitute a minority.146   
In name 147  and substance, however, all Article 14 rights are owned by the 
indigenous learner.  Under Article 14, the rights-holder is both the indigenous 
learner and their community.  Preference for the indigenous learner in admissions 
is implicit and emphasized by the repeated use of the possessive pronoun ‘their’.  
While all children have a universal right to education and while Article 14 is 
consistent with the previous everyone/no-one instruments, the right to attend and 
institution like the Kamehameha Schools—and to establish and control it—is 
owned by collective indigenous learners. 148     Significantly, the right actually 
precedes Article 14’s non-discrimination and minority-like provisions which also 
belong to indigenous peoples. 
                                                          
141 Article 14.  Emphasis added. 
142 Terms including ‘all’ and ‘everyone’ are used frequently in human rights instruments which 
primarily recognise the homogenous, universal human being as a rightsholder.  Examples include 
the UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR: see discussion in previous chapter at 5.2.2. 
143 Although not using the term ‘no one’, the inclusion of a statement on non-discrimination is 
consistent with instruments which frequently do including CADE, Race Convention and CEDAW: 
see discussion in previous chapter at 5.2.2. 
144 As in the Children’s Convention and CRPD. 
145 See dual citizenship discussed in Chapter Two at 2.3.2. 
146 See minority education rights discussed in Chapter Five at 5.2.3. 
147 I do not suggest here a homogenous global indigenous community.  As frequently emphasized in 
UNDRIP’s drafting and elsewhere, indigenous communities share similar and common histories and 
ongoing experiences of discrimination and disparities in the wake of colonialism but are actually 
quite diverse in language, culture, religion, geography and other aspects.  The common experience 
of such diverse peoples speaks to the significance of the impact of colonialism and the inherent 
unfairness of dismissing it as an irrelevant consideration in terms of equality and non-discrimination.  
Rather than an “arbitrary” circumstance of the indigenous individual it constitutes a significant 
obstacle to actual enjoyment of human rights. 
148 Article 14(1). 
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Article 14 and related rights reveal the positive value UNDRIP places on 
indigenous cultural membership.  Contextually, Article 14 is preceded by rights: to 
“revitalize...cultural traditions and customs”149; to “teach...spiritual and religious 
traditions, customs and ceremonies”150; and “to revitalize, use, develop and transmit 
to future generations their histories, language, oral traditions, philosophies, writing 
systems and literatures...”151  Like the public good of educating all learners in 
Native Hawaiian history and culture envisioned by the Hawaiʻi State 
Constitution,152 Article 14 is followed by the “right to the dignity and diversity of 
indigenous cultures, traditions, histories and aspirations which shall be 
appropriately reflected in education”.153  With Article 14, these rights form a list of 
identity-specific primary goods for the indigenous human being in education—or, 
again, “the minimum standards for the survival, dignity and well-being of” the 
indigenous learner specifically.154   
Other rights also address indigenous-specific human wrongs in education, even the 
disadvantage of cultural membership.  In its specificity, UNDRIP clearly and 
directly responds to specific injustices historically and currently suffered by 
indigenous children—including Native Hawaiian children—such as legal 
prohibitions on the use of indigenous languages, 155  majority-biased texts, 
curriculum and pedagogy, the abuses associated with the boarding school 
experience of indigenous peoples globally.156   
The right to establish and control such schools expresses the more general right of 
indigenous peoples to self-determination—or the collective right of peoples.  
During drafting, attempts by States to insert the word “individuals” instead of 
“peoples” and make the right to establish and control parallel indigenous 
institutions subject to some degree to “competent authorities of the State, and in 
accordance with applicable education laws and standards” were rejected.  The same 
                                                          
149 Article 11(1).   
150 Article 12(1). 
151 Article 13(1). 
152 Compare with Hawaii State Constitution, Art X discussed in Chapter Four at 3.2.2. 
153 Article 15(1).  Emphasis added.  Art 15(2) clearly refers to previous instruments on the purpose 
of education in its aim of “combat[ting] prejudice and eliminate[ing] discrimination 
and...promot[ing] tolerance”. 
154 Article 43. 
155 Such as that against the use of Native Hawaiian in education from 1897 in the State of Hawai’i . 
156 For global picture of boarding school experiences, see Andrea Smith Indigenous Peoples and 
Boarding Schools: A comparative study E/C.19/2009/CRP.1 (2009). 
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draft would have made the universal right of indigenous individuals to “all levels 
and forms of education of the State” the “same” as other individuals and placed it 
before the collective right. 157  This wording was also rejected. 
Ultimately, Article 14 is comprehensive and flexible in narrative.  As described in 
Chapter 5,158  the international human rights framework has shown itself to be 
narratively flexible where substantial equality is at stake.  Article 14’s flexibility of 
narrative is consistent with complex someone instruments such as the Children’s 
Convention and the CRPD.  Where the Children’s Convention and CRPD are highly 
flexible and subjective in approach, Article 14 recognizes the right of the 
indigenous learner to claim a public education in association with other universal 
rightsholders but also their identity-specific right to attend a parallel institution 
tailored to their identity and both the good and disadvantage it draws. The 
indigenous-specific right to education is considered so important States are to “take 
effective measures”, including special measures, to realize it. 159   
 
6.4 TENSION 
Despite its consistency with the previous evolution of the right to education and 
with fundamental principles of equality and non-discrimination, UNDRIP’s 
specifically-indigenous rights have raised several concerns relative to equality 
narratives.   
Megan Davis has identified several “key themes emerging from the somewhat 
discursive multi-disciplinary commentary” on UNDRIP,160 including “sovereignty, 
collective rights versus individual rights…and the right to self-determination and 
                                                          
157 See WGIP report 2001, above n 131, Annex I, “Amendments Proposed by Governments for 
Future Discussion”, at 30. 
158 See discussion at Chapter Five at 5.1. 
159 Article 14(3). 
160  Megan Davis “To Bind or Not to Bind: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples Five Years ON” (2012) A U Int Law Jl 3 at 17. 
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democracy and participation”.161  Similar concerns plagued drafting where former 
settler states:162  
claimed that the provisions on lands, territories and resources were particularly 
unworkable and unacceptable, “by appearing to require the recognition of 
indigenous rights to lands now lawfully owned by other citizens, both indigenous 
and non-indigenous (Article 26).19 Such provisions would be both arbitrary and 
impossible to implement”. The three states also claimed that other provisions in 
the declaration were potentially discriminatory. “The intent of the Working Group 
was not that collective rights prevail over the human rights of individuals, as could 
be misinterpreted in Article 34 of the text and elsewhere”.163 
These everyone/no-one fears were later apparent in the ‘no’ votes of Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand and the United States (together, the ‘CANZUS’ states) 
upon the adoption of UNDRIP in 2007.164   In their respective explanations of vote, 
each state claimed to be a historical champion of indigenous rights domestically but 
struggled to reconcile UNDRIP with its present law.  Echoing Waldron’s 
supersession,165 Canada’s representative expressed concerns about provisions on 
land and resources being “broad” and “capable of variety of interpretations” and 
the requirement of “free, prior and informed consent” being “unduly restrictive”.  
Canada considered this a veto power.166  New Zealand also considered provisions 
on lands and resources, redress and “the right to veto” to be “fundamentally 
incompatible with [its] constitutional and legal arrangements” including the Treaty 
of Waitangi which was “unique”.167   It also claimed that such rights “implied 
                                                          
161  Davis’ list includes “lands territories and resources, sovereignty, collective rights versus 
individual rights, cultural heritage, free prior and informed consent, and the right to self-
determination and democracy and participation.  Another distinguishing feature of this literature is 
a curious over-emphasis or authority afforded to the four original dissenters—Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand and the United States”: ibid, at 25.  Footnotes excluded. 
162 Asbjørn Eide “”The Indigenous Peoples, the Working Group on Indigenous Populations and the 
Adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” in Charters and Stavenhagen, 
above n 7, 32.  “Opposition to the declaration came from two quite different quarters: from four 
countries outside Europe which, at some stage, had been British colonies and which now had an 
English-speaking majority (Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States), along with 
substantial numbers of indigenous peoples on their territories, and from African countries. The 
Russian Federation, which has indigenous peoples on its territory, though fewer in number, also 
opposed the draft declaration.”: Eide at 39. 
163 Ibid, at 40. 
164 143 nations in favour, 4 against and 11 abstentions: see “UN Adopts Declaration on Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples” (13 September 2007) United Nations <www.un.org>. 
165 For instance, in Jeremy Waldron “Superseding Historic Injustice” (1992) Ethics 103 4. 
166  See General Assembly Adopts Declaration on Rights of Indigenous peoples; ‘Major Step 
Forward’ towards Human Rights for ALL, Says President” (13 September 2007) United Nations 
<www.un.org>. 
167  See General Assembly Adopts Declaration on Rights of Indigenous peoples; ‘Major Step 
Forward’ towards Human Rights for ALL, Says President” (13 September 2007) United Nations 
<www.un.org>.  Compare with arguments in Chapter 7 that Treaty of Waitangi is compatible with 
UNDRIP and part of NZ’s constitutional arrangements. 
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different classes of citizenship” to the unfair advantage of indigenous peoples.  
While the United States largely criticized the drafting process and product,168 it also 
expressed fears of “endless conflicting interpretations and debate about its 
application” and self-determination.169   
Australia unequivocally opposed self-determination, officially stating: 
The Australian Government has long expressed dissatisfaction with the references 
to self-determination in the Declaration, [its representative] said.  Self-
determination applied to situations of decolonisation and the break-up of States 
into smaller states with clearly defined population groups.  It also applied where a 
particular group with a defined territory was disenfranchised and was denied 
political or civil rights.  The government supported and encouraged the full 
engagement of indigenous peoples in the democratic decision-making process, but 
did not support a concept that could be construed as encouraging action that would 
impair, even in part, the territorial and political integrity of a State with a system 
of democratic Government.170 
The subsequent acceptance of UNDRIP by the CANZUS states remained reluctant.  
Both New Zealand and the United States, for instance, emphasized that UNDRIP 
was only “aspirational” and not legally binding.  Although affirming indigenous 
rights, New Zealand Prime Minister John Key claimed the Declaration “will have 
no impact on New Zealand law and no impact on the constitutional framework”.171  
The US State Department sounded terse as it “proudly len[t] its support” to 
UNDRIP with the proviso that its right to self-determination was not that 
recognized traditionally but “a new and distinct international concept of self-
                                                          
168 Claiming, for instance, that the drafting process and final provisions were not transparent despite 
the unprecedented inclusion of participants in the drafting process and the lengthy, pedantic process 
of drafting, and also that, despite such a process and the adoption by a vote of 143 states to 4, that 
UNDRIP was not a “consensus text”. 
169 (USUN) Press Release 204(07) “Explanation of Vote, by Robert Hagen, U.S. Advisor, on the 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, statement to the UN General Assembly” (13 
September 2007) United States Mission to the United Nations <www.usunnewyork.usmission.gov>. 
170  See General Assembly Adopts Declaration on Rights of Indigenous peoples; ‘Major Step 
Forward’ towards Human Rights for ALL, Says President” (13 September 2007) United Nations 
<www.un.org>. 
171 Rt Hon John Key “UN Declaration on the Rights to Indigenous Peoples” (20 April 2010) 662 
NZPD 10238.  Even while Dr Pita Sharples, Maori Affairs Minister, claimed that the Declaration 
was “entirely consistent” with the Treaty of Waitangi: Ninth session of the United Nations 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 19 - 30 April 2010 “Statement by Hon Dr Pita Sharples, 
Minister of Maori Affairs, 19 April 2010” New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
<www.mfat.govt.nz>. 
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determination specific to indigenous peoples” which, to be even clearer, “is 
different from the existing right of self-determination in international law”.172   
All CANZUS states have also downplayed UNDRIP’s rights as expressing rights 
already recognized within domestic law, further minimizing them. 
Such tension may be manifest in UNDRIP itself.  Article 46 reads: 
1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, 
group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary 
to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging 
any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial 
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States. 
2. In the exercise of the rights enunciated in the present Declaration, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms of all shall be respected. The exercise of the rights set 
forth in this Declaration shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined 
by law and in accordance with international human rights obligations. Any such 
limitations shall be non-discriminatory and strictly necessary solely for the purpose 
of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and 
for meeting the just and most compelling requirements of a democratic society.173 
Article 46(1) seems to distinguish indigenous self-determination from the 
unqualified right of peoples recognized in the Charter, ICCPR and ICESCR, casting 
some doubt on what the right really guarantees.  Article 46(1) also seems to presume 
that indigenous peoples are seeking complete decolonisation-era secession, echoing 
Waldron’s cultural stasis.  Conversely, Article 46(1) precludes decolonisation rights 
consistent with the unique history of a democratic nation which never relinquished 
its sovereignty and its later status as a non-self-governing territory.174   
Article 46(2) could seemingly be used to validate the kind of individual trumping 
of collective rights Kymlicka would use to curb internal majority oppression in a 
Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez175  scenario where admissions-like membership 
rights were at stake.  As Chapter Two and Three describe, democratic limits have 
also most often meant the imposition of a singular everyone/no-one narrative 
                                                          
172 “Announcement of U.S. Support for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples: Initiatives to Promote the Government-to-Government Relationship & Improve the Lives 
of Indigenous Peoples.” US State Department <www.state.gov>.  Though, in the same 
announcement, it went on to detail all the efforts it was already making within domestic legal 
frameworks to assist indigenous peoples. 
173 UNDRIP, Article 46.  Emphasis added. 
174 See discussion in Chapter Three at 3.2.1. 
175 Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez 436 US 49 (1978), discussed in Chapter Two at 2.3.2. 
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masking majoritarian bias and justifying assimilation and discrimination on 
indigenous Americans. 
 
6.5 BEYOND TECHNICALITIES 
Despite the tension between individual and collective rights in UNDRIP, many of 
the above concerns feel, to some extent, like technicalities in the face of the global 
mo’olelo of multigenerational trauma, chronic stress, extreme allostatic load, 
cyclical, cumulative and otherwise complex discrimination and disparities 
unrelentingly attracted to indigenous identity.  States’ objections seemingly 
sidestep the real issue: the gap between clear legal commitment to the rights and 
the ongoing reality of complex discrimination and disparities for indigenous 
peoples and individuals.  Critics, particularly States, appear to cling to technicalities 
which favor a singular everyone/no-one narrative and ignore the substantive 
content of Article 14 and other indigenous human rights.  As Davis’ work shows, a 
significant number of scholars also remain fixated on everyone/no-one 
interpretations of the Declaration.  
Consistent with the overall project of this thesis, it is vital to move beyond 
technicalities to address the substantive content of these rights and the drivers 
behind them—though the technicalities will be addressed shortly.  Article 14, 
particularly, seemingly defies technicalities in both its innocuousness and potential 
in terms of the realization of most if not all other human rights and freedoms.  It 
appears to be, like its multi-narrative predecessor, a human rights multiplier and 
also legal and justiciable.  The right to self-determination which underwrites it is 
itself a multiplier, legal and justiciable.  As such Article 14 and associated rights 
have a significant narrative capacity to reconcile guarantee/reality gaps and unique 
historico-legal context.   
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6.5.1 ORGANIC MULTIPLICATION 
Article 14(1) appears to be organically crucial to the enjoyment of most if not all 
other indigenous rights in UNDRIP—but also to the enjoyment of most if not all 
other human rights, including both CPRs and ESCRs.  Self-determination itself 
complements the project of the earnest liberal given its organic potential.  
Importantly, a denial of the indigenous right must seemingly foreclose both 
indigenous and everyone/no-one human rights. 
The Declaration reiterates the Vienna Declaration’s unequivocal statement that “All 
human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated”.176  So-
called ESCRs and CPRs are intermingled throughout UNDRIP without 
categorization or hierarchy.  However, many express Article 4’s right to economic, 
social and cultural development.  The indivisibility of these indigenous rights is 
consistent with the previous multi-narrative which prioritized substantial equality 
and displayed buffer-and-access features.  These provisions leave little doubt that 
the realization of the fundamental human rights of indigenous peoples depends to a 
great extent on economic, social and cultural development which, in turn, relies on 
the realization of individual rights such as education.177  The emphasis on ESCRs 
speaks to the rights situation of the most vulnerable human beings, even the 
indigenous learner and, particularly, to the cumulative, intersectional and 
compounding nature of complex discrimination and disparities.   
The right to self-determination itself is an organic multiplier and vital buffer-and-
access mechanism in terms of indigenous peoples.  The Declaration cites the 
ICESCR, ICCPR and Vienna Declaration as authorities for the right to self-
determination.178  The everyone/no-one features and substantive focus of ICESCR 
and ICCPR rights were discussed at length in the previous chapter,179  and the 
                                                          
176  Vienna Declaration, part I, para 5.  Again, the Vienna Declaration represents a persuasive 
international consensus on human rights. 
177 This is supported in the drafting history of UNDRIP, reports of Special Rapporteur...This focus 
on development of course, is most apparent in the Millennium Declaration and the resulting 
Millennium Development Goals, as discussed.  Also see Birgitte Feiring “Including indigenous 
peoples in Poverty Reduction Strategies: A Practical Guide Based on experiences from Cambodia, 
Cameroon and Nepal” (ILO, 2008). 
178 Preamble sixteenth para. 
179 See discussion in Chapter Five at 5.2.1. 
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Vienna Declaration180  similarly views the “human person” as the primary subject 
of human rights.181  However, each of these important human rights statements also 
recognizes the right of peoples to self-determination.  The Vienna Declaration, 
representing an overwhelming consensus of the international community, 182 
seemingly recognizes the right of peoples like Native Hawaiians to self-
determination and considers its denial a human rights “violation”: 
Taking into account the particular situation of peoples under colonial or other 
forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, the World Conference on Human 
Rights recognizes the right of peoples to take any legitimate action, in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations, to realize their inalienable right of self-
determination. The World Conference on Human Rights considers the denial of the 
right of self-determination as a violation of human rights and underlines the 
importance of the effective realization of this right.183 
In similar terms, the Human Rights Committee has stated that:  
...The right to self-determination is of particular importance because its realisation 
is an essential condition for the effective guarantee and observance of individual 
human rights and for the promotion and strengthening of those rights.  It is for that 
reason that States set forth the right of self-determination in a provision of positive 
law in both Covenants and placed this provision as article 1 apart from and before 
all the other rights in the two Covenants.184 
The norm of self-determination can be seen as promoting a kind of collective 
rational revision—essentially, the legal space for peoples to determine their own 
destinies without undue interference from other nations.185  Though traditionally 
associated with the sovereignty of the nation-state in international law, it is 
nonetheless justified as a protection for the individual rights within those states.186  
Fundamentally, de facto equality between peoples—even between distinct ethnic 
                                                          
180  These were important statements which put the CPR/ESCR division beyond debate and 
emphasized the need for States to take effective steps to promote and protect human rights and 
freedoms particularly for some of the most vulnerable groups in society including minorities, women 
and the girl-child, indigenous peoples, refugees and those in war zones.  
181 Vienna Declaration, preamble.  
182 There were 171 Nations at the Conference.  It was later adopted by the UN General Assembly. 
183 Vienna Declaration, Part I, para 2.  Thus there is a consistency with decolonisation instruments 
without the questions of territorial integrity. 
184 HRC, General Comment 12, para 1. 
185 Contrast with Rawls’ conditions for individual rational revision, for instance, his exclusion of 
arbitrary advantages through the first principle of justice, the veil itself and original position all 
aimed at minimizing interference with an individual’s capacity to choose the path of their life: see 
Chapter Four at 4.2.2. 
186 S James Anaya “The Native Hawaiian People and International Human Rights Law: A Remedy 
for Past and Continuing Wrongs” (1994) 28 Georgia Law Review 309.  Though States may fail to 
fulfil this role, particularly where indigenous peoples are concerned. 
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groups—will result in equality between individuals.  This reasoning recalls early 
Permanent Court of International Justice minority rights cases.187 
The Declaration also affirms the organic relationship between Article 3’s right to 
self-determination and the enjoyment of all other UNDRIP rights—as well as all 
other human rights and freedoms.  The Preamble “affirm[s] the fundamental 
importance of the right to self-determination of all peoples” to “political status” and 
“economic, social and cultural development”188—or both the external and internal 
aspects affirmed in Articles 3 and 4.   Given the reach of Articles 3 and 4—
particularly, the right to economic, social and cultural development—self-
determination underwrites almost every article in UNDRIP.189   
Throughout UNDRIP’s drafting, indigenous participants adamantly and 
consistently opposed any ‘watering down’ of the Article 3 right as a violation of 
equality, non-discrimination and other fundamental human rights and freedoms.  In 
collective terms, any distinction between indigenous peoples and other peoples in 
the scope of the right to self-determination was seen as a violation of those rights 
and norms. 190  Indeed, the proposition sounds suspiciously like withholding human 
rights on the basis of indigenous identity or racial characteristics.  As discussed in 
the previous chapter, there is significant precedent in international law for increased 
identification of rightsholders—where the goal is ensuring the enjoyment of 
rights191—but none for negative discrimination which would withhold rights.  To 
the contrary, the latter is inconsistent with the fundamental homogeneity and 
anonymity of supposedly universal human rights.    
During drafting, self-determination was viewed as a “fundamental condition for the 
enjoyment of other human rights and fundamental freedoms”.  More than mere 
social justice, the very survival of indigenous peoples was seen as dependent on 
“full control, politically, economically, socially and culturally, over their lives”.192  
                                                          
187 Previous chapter at 4.2.3. 
188 UNDRIP, preamble, sixteenth para citing the Charter, the ICCPR, ICESCR and the Vienna 
Declaration as authority. 
189 As discussed above, arts 6 and 44 are the only provisions which address individual rights alone, 
while art 46 addresses democratic and other limits on the right. 
190 See for instance, WGIP Report 2001, above n 131, at 56-84.   
191 So-called positive discrimination like that distinguished in United States v Carolene Products 
304 US 144 (1938) Footnote Four: see Chapter Two discussion on demise of affirmative action at 
2.4.1. 
192 WGIP Report 2001, above n 131, para 56. 
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Again, self-determination was never a matter of creating special advantages but 
rather about remedying disadvantage.193  For example, during the later stages of 
drafting, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) 
responded to the concerns of African nations: 
...In Africa, the terms ‘indigenous peoples or communities’ is not aimed at 
protecting the rights of the ‘first inhabitants that were invaded by foreigners’.  Nor 
does the concept aim to create hierarchy among national communities or set aside 
special rights for certain people.  On the contrary, within the African context the 
term ‘indigenous peoples’ aims to guarantee equal enjoyment of rights and 
freedoms to some communities that have been left behind...194 
The culmination of such organic indivisibility is clear in Article 14 and associated 
rights.  As discussed extensively in the previous chapter, the right to education is 
fundamentally a multiplier of other rights whose denial must result in the denial of 
most, if not all, other human rights.  The right to self-determination, which 
underwrites Article 14(1), is a multiplier itself, whose enjoyment enhances the 
realization of—and whose denial shuts down—most, if not all, other human rights.  
Article 14(1)’s self-determination-based education rights must represent both 
multipliers, while an educational system like the Kamehameha Schools is the very 
incarnation of those organic relationships. 
 
6.5.2 MORE EMPHASIZED LEGALITY 
Not unlike the previous evolution of the right to education, the organic nature of 
Article 14 and associated rights also points to the emphasized nature of these rights. 
One of the main criticisms of UNDRIP generally is that it is only an ‘aspirational’ 
document which may or may not recognize existing legal arrangements but does 
not necessarily add any new legally enforceable rights.  Such rhetoric apparently 
reiterates previous everyone/no-one justiciability arguments in terms of the broader 
human right to education and echoes US exceptionalism in terms of ESCRs and a 
                                                          
193 S James Anaya “The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination in the Post-Declaration 
Era” in Charters and Stavenhagen, above n 7, at 196. 
194 African Group of Experts “Response Note the Draft Aide Memoire of the African Group on the 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (21 March 2007) Indigenous Working Group for 
Indigenous Affairs <www.iwgia.org>.  Also discussed in Barume, above n 2, at 174. 
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strong right to education.195  Certainly, a lack of legal mechanisms which can 
enforce the right at the domestic level may also make implementation and 
realization impossible.196 
Such arguments, however, are based on the presumption that Article 14 and 
adjacent rights are less legal than homogenous or anonymous everyone/no-one 
guarantees.  Article 14 is the seeming epitome of an emphasized rather than 
diminished legality given its consistency with everyone/no-one guarantees.  
Importantly, it also linked to the legal and normative status of UNDRIP itself and 
the broader right to education.  This emphasized legality once again signals its 
genealogy as the culmination of the evolution of the previous right to education 
driven by considerations of substantive equality and non-discrimination. 
 
6.5.2.1 LEGAL AND NORMATIVE STATUS OF THE DECLARATION 
The Declaration itself is not, technically, binding and has no current complaints 
mechanism.  However, several human rights conventions have been preceded by 
“standard-setting” 197  declarations, including the International Covenants, 198 
CERD, 199  CEDAW, 200  and the Children’s Convention. 201   In each case, the 
declarations in question were drafted as forerunners of binding treaties.   During 
UNDRIP’s drafting, a declaration rather than a convention was ultimately preferred 
because the rights situation of indigenous peoples was so urgent.  Thus, it may only 
be a matter of time before such a binding treaty is drafted. 
                                                          
195 See discussion in Chapter Two, section 2.5. 
196 Katarina Tomsevski Right to Education Project “Justiciability” at <www.right-to-education.org> 
197 Dalee Sambo Dorough and Megan Davis Study on an optional protocol to the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous peoples focusing on a voluntary mechanism E/C.19/2014/7 
(2014) para 27. 
198 The UDHR. 
199  See “International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimiation: 
Introductory Note” Audiovisual Library of International Law < http://legal.un.org>.  
200 See “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: Short 
History of CEDAW Convention” found at UN Women <www.un.org>. 
201 See “The Convention on the Rights of the Child: The Beginnings of the Convention” Humanium 
<www.humanium.org>. 
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Although described as “soft law”,202 the UDHR has arguably attained the status of 
common international law and jus cogens despite its technical status as a General 
Assembly resolution. 203   Again, given the consistency of present UNDRIP 
education rights with the UDHR but especially with its norms of equality and non-
discrimination, UNDRIP itself may reinforce such conclusions.  Similarly, Anaya 
has argued that at least some of UNDRIP’s ‘indigenous’ rights—particularly 
Article 2 equality and Article 3 self-determination which both underwrite Article 
14—are, individually, already human rights and peremptory norms of the highest 
order as customary international law—or jus cogens—making them legal and 
justiciable with or without a treaty that spells out States parties obligations.204   
Thus, Dalee Sambo Dorough and Megan Davis have noted that, while the 
Declaration is technically ‘non-binding’, it has “normative weight” and “reflects 
legal commitments”.  The term “declaration” is “usually reserved for standard-
setting resolutions of profound significance”. 205  In addition to the urgency of 
indigenous peoples’ rights situation and evidence of customary law,206 Dorough 
and Davis have recognized UNDRIP’s equality and non-discrimination as 
peremptory norms important enough to justify an optional protocol. 207   A 
complaints mechanism would allow monitoring of “both the content and the weight 
of the Declaration” and also help to clarify its perceived “diminished status”, as 
well as any “diminished commitment ot its terms”.208 
At a more fundamental level, UNDRIP and all of its rights also represent an 
international consensus.  As Ken Coates states, “[t]he United Nations, after all, has 
spoken.  Clearly, national governments must respond”.209  In fact, the Declaration 
has been endorsed by a majority of the world’s nations who, presumably, signed 
                                                          
202 See Mauro Barelli “The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System: The Case of the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (2009) 58 ICLQ 957. 
203 As I have noted in section 2.1.1. 
204 S James Anaya “The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination in the Post-Declaration 
Era” in Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (eds) Making the Declaration Work: The United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Copenhagen, IWGIA, 2009) 184.  Also 
see author’s discussion in section 2.3.2. 
205 Dorough and Davis, above n 197, para 27. 
206 That is, rights evidenced by widespread state practice combined with state belief that such 
standards are legal: ibid, at paras 31-32. 
207 Ibid, paras 31-34. 
208 Ibid, at paras 26-33. 
209  Ken Coates “From aspiration to inspiration: UNDRIP finding deep traction in Indigenous 
communities” (18 September 2013) The Rise of the Fourth World <www.cigionline.org>. 
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the Declaration in good faith210 and not just as “window dressing”.211  Indigenous 
peoples have cited the Declaration as an authority for their rights since its adoption, 
and domestic courts in Africa have already begun to use the Declaration.212  It has 
also been incorporated into Bolivian law. 213   Despite exceptionalism, “the 
Declaration is now part of United States domestic and foreign policy”, even “an 
extension of its international human rights commitments”.214   
 
6.5.2.2 NO NEW RIGHTS 
Education, as described in the previous chapter, has been a fundamental human 
right in international law since the UDHR and retains elements of universality, 
human personality development, equality and non-discrimination.  As described 
earlier, Article 14(2), in very language, reiterates the universal right to education 
found in Article 26 of the UDHR later cemented in Articles 13 and 14 of the 
ICESCR.215  All three subsections remain true to the spirit of those earlier rights 
statements—namely, their focus on substantive equality.  Similarly, differences in 
the text of UNDRIP are consistent with the 4-A Scheme’s requirement that 
education be not only available but accessible, acceptable and adaptable,216 for 
instance, Article 14(3) which recognizes that an indigenous-aware education may 
not be available in the community in which an indigenous child lives.  
Certainly, “[t]he Declaration...did not create any new rights”. 217    As Special 
Rapporteur, Anaya wrote: 
                                                          
210 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331 (opened for signature 23 May 1969, 
entered into force 27 January 1980) art 26’s principle of “Pacta sunt servanda”. 
211 Tavita v Minister of Immigration (1993) 1 HRNZ 30 (CA) at 40 per Cooke P. 
212 See Willem Van Genugten “Protection of Indigenous Peoples on the African Continent: Concepts, 
Position Seeking, and the Interaction of Legal Systems” (2010) 104(1) Amer J Int’l Law 29. 
213 Bolivia was the first country in the world to make the Declaration part of its domestic law when 
it passed Law No 3760 on 7 November 2007. 
214 S James Anaya Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James 
Anaya” Addendum, “The situation of indigenous peoples in the United States of America” 
A/HRC/21/47/Add.1 (2012) paras 83 and 83. 
215 See discussion in section 2.2.3.  
216  See CESCR General Comment No 13: The Right to Education (Art. 13 of the Covenant) 
E/C.12/1999/10 (1999). 
217 Report on the adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 107 th and 108th 
Meetings (AM & PM) GA/10612 (2007). 
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[t]he Declaration does not attempt to bestow Indigenous peoples with a set of 
special or new human rights, but rather provides a contextualized elaboration of 
general human rights principles and rights as they relate to the specific historical, 
cultural and social circumstances of Indigenous peoples.218 
Similarly, one of UNDRIP’s purposes is to “encourag[e] States to comply with and 
effectively implement all their” human rights obligations219 in the wake of previous 
failures to protect the universally guaranteed rights of indigenous peoples.  Rather 
than mere aspiration, the close link between UNDRIP and previous ESCRs argues 
for the same kind of emphasized legality evident in previous identity-specific 
instruments.220  In contrast to a diminished legality, the repetition, reiteration and 
identity specification evident in Article 14 is consistent with the previous evolution 
of the human right to education in international law.  As before, this emphatic 
punctuation of human rights and who holds them is driven by the demands of 
substantive equality and non-discrimination.  
Article 14’s emphasized character is further demonstrated by potential legal 
recourse.  The Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, for instance, provides a complaints 
mechanism which can be utilized by “individuals or groups” where any of the 
ICESCR’s rights, including education, are violated.221   Article 14 may also be 
clarified through other everyone/no-one and someone instruments.  As discussed in 
the previous chapter, Article 26, a non-discrimination clause in the everyone/no-
one ICCPR, has allowed individuals to pursue violations of other ESCRs—
regardless of whether the right involved is guaranteed in the ICCPR—where such 
violations also constitute substantively judged non-discrimination.222 As a result, 
the reach of Article 26 must be seen as substantial enough to potentially capture 
Article 14 as well. Other instruments such as the Children’s and Disabilities 
Conventions which reiterate the right to education and other ESCRs in complex 
                                                          
218  James Anaya, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People UN Doc A/HRC/9/9 (2008) para 86. 
219 UNDRIP, preamble, 19th para. 
220 See discussion in previous chapter at 5.5.2. 
221 Arts 1 and 2, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights GA Res 63/117, A/RES/63/117 (2008) [OP-ICESCR]. 
222 SWM Broeks v The Netherlands Communication No 172/1984, CCPR/C/OP/2 (1990), discussed 
in previous chapter at 5.5.2. 
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someone terms also have their own complaints mechanisms223 through which the 
right might be buttressed where it is narrated as a children’s right to education.     
Where Article 14 is considered to be consistent with the non-discrimination clauses 
and substantively interpreted rights to education in these treaties, states would 
simply be violating straightforward obligations.  Very little in terms of the 
proverbial leap would be required to utilize these complaints mechanisms in terms 
of an Article 14 violation.  Current international equality narratives would seem to 
demand this type of equation and translation—particularly, where substantive 
equality and non-discrimination is at stake. 
 
6.5.2.3 POTENTIAL DOMESTIC EMPHASIS 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, legal recourse in terms of the human right 
to education may already be available in domestic law even where ESCRs are not 
formally recognized in a national constitution.  Given their narrative consistency 
with the previous complex human right to education in international law, Article 14 
and associated rights may be similarly meaningful and potentially enforceable at 
the domestic level as well. 
The federal courts in Brown, Plyler and KS all recognized a fundamental right to 
education.  Various state constitutions and legislation protect education rights224 
and other ESCRs—if only in the name of equality and non-discrimination as in 
Brown.225 Despite its reliance on a perhaps mistaken narrative, the Ninth Circuit in 
the Kamehameha case nonetheless protected what would be understood in 
international law as Native Hawaiians’ indigenous human right under Article 14(1) 
to establish and control their own educational system—albeit in the name of 
affirmative action—just as the Supreme Court had protected apparent everyone/no-
                                                          
223  See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications 
procedure 2014 A/RES/66/138 (opened for signature 28 February 2012, entered into force 14 April 
2014); and Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities GA Res 
61/610, A/RES/61/106, Annex II (2006) [OP-CRD]. 
224 See discussion in previous chapter at 5.4.3.  Hawaii state law, as discussed in Chapter Three 
recognizes specifically indigenous education rights. 
225 See discussion in Chapter Three at 3.3.2 and Johanna Kalb “The Persistence of Dualism in 
Human Rights Treaty Implementation” (2011) 30(1) Yale L & Pol’y Rev 71.   
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one rights to human personality development and substantial equality in education 
in the Brown and Plyler decisions in the name of equal protection.  And as 
described, a significant minority of the Ninth Circuit was convinced that a Mancari-
like, self-determination-based exception should apply to the admissions policy.226  
As described in Chapter Three at 3.3.2, various UNDRIP rights are already 
seemingly protected under Hawai̒i’s constitution and in its legislation, including 
indigenous education, language, ahupua’a and other Native Hawaiian customary 
rights.  The Office of Hawaiian Affairs is already recognized as a vehicle of self–
government under Hawaii state law.227  A certain amount of internal autonomy and 
an indigenous education system are also recognized under the federal Native 
Hawaiian Education Act.228   As discussed in Chapter Three, Hawaiʻi Act 195 
incorporates Article 3 of UNDRIP.  Thus, the most debated right in UNDRIP is 
already blackletter law in the United States, though case law on this right is still 
scarce. 
 
6.5.3 NOT IF BUT WHEN: STATES’ OBLIGATIONS 
Ultimately, the biggest challenge to Article 14 and associated rights may not be 
their lack of legality or moral force but a lack of earnest compliance with obligations 
by states.  In their recent discussions on an optional protocol to UNDRIP the PFII 
have noted that there is an “implementation gap” between international 
commitment and national implementation, often due to “rights ritualism” which 
“means that Member States accede to treaties and optional protocols, yet, beyond 
signing, demonstrate very little commitment to implementing obligations’. 229  
Besides other monitoring mechanisms not being “sufficiently engaged in analysis 
of the right to self-determination”, closing the gap would seemingly require reform 
at the domestic level including executive and legislative action, as well as 
consistency between “judicial decision-making” with UNDRIP.230  Similarly, the 
                                                          
226 Chapter Three on concurrence at 3.5.4. 
227 See Chapter Three at 3.3.1. 
228 Part of the No Child Left Behind Act: see discussion in Chapter Three at 2.4.3. 
229 UNPFII Expert group meeting on the theme “dialogue on an optional protocol to the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” E/C.19/2015/8 (2015) para 20. 
230 Ibid, paras 20 and 54. 
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UNPFII has also noted the “increasingly important role of national and regional 
human rights institutions in…achieving the ends of the Declaration”.231 
Nevertheless, the Declaration openly affirms previously recognized States 
obligations in regards to education.  The Preamble “[e]ncourage[s] States to comply 
with and effectively implement all their obligations as they apply to indigenous 
peoples under international instruments, in particular those related to human 
rights”.232  Thirteen articles233 echo the requirement of effective implementation 
with regard to UNDRIP rights while at least eleven234 otherwise require positive 
action and four235 prohibit certain State behaviour.   
These provisions further imply Maastricht Guidelines-like obligations to respect, 
protect and fulfil.236  Article 14 itself seems to imply all three aspects.  Duties of 
respect ensue from Article 14(1) and Article 14(2)’s non-discrimination 
requirement—that is, the State must recognize the right of indigenous communities 
to establish and control institutions such as Kamehameha Schools and must not 
itself discriminate against the right of the indigenous child to such an education.  
Protection from third parties is also entailed: through legislation and other effective 
measures, the state is to protect the indigenous child against third parties who might 
discriminate against the indigenous child.  Hypothetically, it also protects the right 
of the indigenous child to a Kamehameha Schools education in federal courts.  
Positive, even special measures meant to ensure and fulfil the right are also 
approved: the State is to “take effective measures”, implying an obligation of not 
only conduct but result.  Where necessary, the State is to provide “financial and 
technical assistance” to fulfil the rights of the indigenous child.237  Obligations to 
respect, protect and fulfil again blur the lines between ESCRs and CPRs, overcome 
the supposed obstacle of justiciability and focus the debate not on if but on how and 
when.   
                                                          
231 Ibid, para 47.  
232 UNDRIP, preamble, nineteenth para. 
233 UNDRIP, Arts 8(2), 11(2), 13(20, 14(3), 15(2), 16(2), 21(2), 29(2-3), 30(2), 31, 32(3), 36 and 38. 
234 UNDRIP, Arts 12(2), 17(2), 19, 24(2), 22, 26-28, 32(2), 39-40. 
235 UNDRIP, Arts 7(2), 8(2), 9-10. 
236 See discussion in previous chapter 5.4.2. 
237 UNDRIP, arts 14(3) and 39.  
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The language referring to States’ obligations in UNDRIP echoes the “minimum 
core obligations” and “minimum essential levels” terminology of the Maastricht 
Guidelines.  As in the previous evolution of the right to education, Article 43 
emphasizes that the rights affirmed in UNDRIP—including Article 1—represent 
“minimum standards” of human rights.238  In response to an underwhelming US 
House of Representatives resolution239 which urged adoption of UNDRIP by the 
United Nations with several reservations, a Yaqui Nation representative asked, 
“What is it that they feel is more minimum than minimum?” 240   Even in a 
supposedly ‘aspirational” declaration, however, minimum standards recall the 
universal guarantees which UNDRIP reemphasizes and place pressure on would-
be human rights defenders.241 
As indicated in the previous section, Article 14 may also trigger States’ obligations 
via non-discrimination.  Though it reluctantly signed UNDRIP, the United States 
has for decades been a party to the ICCPR242—which, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, recognizes rights to non-discrimination under Articles 2 and 26 which may 
offer some legal recourse in case of violation.  It has also signed and ratified the 
Race Convention. 243   In interpreting State party obligations under the Race 
Convention, CERD has unequivocally stated that discrimination against indigenous 
people constitutes discrimination in international law. 244   Positive steps which 
States parties are to take in regards to non-discrimination seemingly include 
recognizing self-determination:  
                                                          
238 Emphasis added. 
239  H.R. 1551, introduced 22/7/2010 by Faleomavaenga Eni Hunkin, member of House of 
Representatives for American Samoa and chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs’ 
subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment. 
240 Gale Courtney Toensing “House Resolution Falls Short of Unqualified UN Declaration adoption” 
(30 July 2010) <www.indiancountrytoday.com>. 
241 As demonstrated by UNDRIP’s eventual acceptance by all four CANZUS states, modern liberal 
democracies want to be seen as champions and models of human rights internationally as well as 
domestically.  Representatives of Australia, New Zealand and the United States have all cited their 
reputation as “leader[s]” in the protection of indigenous rights and peoples: see previous discussion 
above at 6.5. 
242 The US signed the ICCPR on 5 Oct 1977 and ratified it on 8 Jun 1992.  It signed the ICESCR on 
5 Oct 1977 also but has not ratified it. 
243 The US signed the ICERD on 28 Sep 1966 and ratified it on 21 Oct 1994. 
244 CERD, General Comment No. 23: Indigenous Peoples UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (2003) para 
4. 
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(a) Recognize and respect indigenous distinct culture, history, language and way 
of life as an enrichment of the State's cultural identity and to promote its 
preservation;  
(b) Ensure that members of indigenous peoples are free and equal in dignity and 
rights and free from any discrimination, in particular that based on indigenous 
origin or identity;  
(c) Provide indigenous peoples with conditions allowing for a sustainable 
economic and social development compatible with their cultural characteristics...  
(d) Ensure that members of indigenous peoples have equal rights in respect of 
effective participation in public life and that no decisions directly relating to their 
rights and interests are taken without their informed consent;  
(e) Ensure that indigenous communities can exercise their rights to practise and 
revitalize their cultural traditions and customs and to preserve and to practise their 
languages.245 
These measures not only fall into overlapping categories of obligations to respect, 
protect and fulfil246 but seem to encompass the right to education found in Article 
14, since indigenous-specific education is a means to achieve all steps.  Importantly, 
in paragraph 4(c) “economic and social development” is seen as a measure for 
achieving non-discrimination for indigenous peoples. 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has similarly concluded that “the 
obligation of non-discrimination” guaranteed in Article 2 of the Children’s 
Convention requires states to take “positive steps” and employ “effective remedies” 
to address disparities affecting vulnerable groups of indigenous children.247  The 
Committee recognizes that, despite the universal guarantee of primary education 
recognized in Article 28, indigenous children are likely to face various 
discrimination and disparities which result in a denial of the right.  Thus, the 
Committee has included the recognition of “the right of indigenous peoples to 
establish their own educational institutions and facilities” 248  in a list of state 
obligations in regards to the right including special measures aimed at “indigenous 
children [enjoying] their right to education on an equal footing with non-indigenous 
children” 249 as well as the allocation of “targeted financial, material and human 
                                                          
245 Ibid, para 4. 
246 As discussed in the previous chapter, most ESCRs display all three aspects. 
247 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 11: Indigenous children and their 
rights under the Convention CRC/C/GC/11 (2009) paras 23-29.  
248 Ibid, para 60. 
249 Ibid, para 60. 
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resources in order to implement policies and programmes which specifically seek 
to improve access to education for indigenous children.”250 
 
6.5.4 AN INDIGENOUS TOOLBOX OF RIGHTS OPTIONS 
In legal terms, Article 14 and other UNDRIP rights demonstrate how the 
international human right to education continues to evolve from an anonymous, 
flatly universal right to a more identity-responsive bundle of rights as demanded by 
substantial equality.  While these rights largely invoke previous principles and 
rights—especially equality and non-discrimination—and are consistent with 
expressions of the right to education elsewhere, they form a “universe of human 
rights”251 and a “developing constellation of indigenous rights norms”252 including 
crucial rights of self-determination to which the world’s most vulnerable 
rightsholders can appeal in the face of complex discrimination and disparities. 
As argued thus far in the thesis, this universe is consistent with the project of the 
earnest liberal.  Article 14 and associated UNDRIP rights resemble the buffer-and-
access features of Kymlicka’s reconciliation of Rawls and Dworkin, are consistent 
with the previous evolution of the human right to education in international law and 
also recognize that self-determination itself is not only an organic multiplier and 
buffer-and-access mechanism but a proportionate remedy for ongoing harm.   
 
6.6 TRUMPING 
Article 14 and UNDRIP possess a greater narrative capacity to begin to account for 
both the guarantee/reality gap and unique historico-legal context which justify the 
admission policy.  This capacity will be diminished, however, if a singular 
                                                          
250 Ibid, para 60. 
251  HRC Report by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of indigenous people, James Anaya. Addendum: Cases examined by the Special 
Rapporteur (June 2009 – July 2010) A/HRC/15/37/Add.1 (2010) para 217. 
252 Anaya “Native Hawaiian People and International Human Rights Law”, above n 186. 
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everyone/no-one narrative has the power to trump Article 14’s collective rights or 
the broader right to self-determination which underwrites them. 
While arguments thus far have attempted to avoid being caught up in technicalities, 
this section examines two more closely—namely, the territorial integrity limit of 
Article 46(1) and the apparent individual rights check of Article 14(2)—as potential 
trumping mechanisms, in the context of the current human rights framework.  
Ultimately, UNDRIP appears to be generally consistent with Kymlicka’s buffer-
and-access features but emphasizes remedial self-determination held collectively.  
Instead of Doe-like trumping, both Article 46(1) and (2) appear to have limits of 
their own imposed by the fundamental principles of equality and non-
discrimination.  Ironically, these features may also facilitate a kind of reconciliation 
between Kymlicka’s theory and itself. 
 
6.6.1 REMEDY 
Article 46(1)’s territorial integrity requirement must be contextualized within the 
broader framework of international human rights and within the spirit of UNDRIP 
itself.  Rather than secession, UNDRIP’s right to self-determination is largely 
remedial, aimed at rational revision and upholding fundamental human rights and 
freedoms.  However, its external aspects also display a proportional remediation 
which recalls Hawaii’s unique history. 
Prior to World War II, the right to self-determination was evident in conceptions of 
the nation-state. 253    From the end of the war it was associated with the 
decolonisation agenda of the UN already apparent in Article 73 of the Charter which 
spells out States obligations in regard to “Non Self-Governing Territories”,254  and 
applies to States “who have or assume responsibilities for the administration of 
                                                          
253 The external is associated with the traditional nation-state and with newer decolonized states.  It 
encompasses the rights of states to deal with other states in matters of foreign policy: see Malcolm 
Shaw International Law (5th ed, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 272.   It 
presupposes a state entity recognized as such and the sovereignty of that state: Steiner and Alston at 
1257-1260, at 1258. 
254 Resolutions 1514, 1541 and 2625 all stem from state obligations in Charter of the United Nations, 
art 73. 
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territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-
government”.255  It describes the “interests of the inhabitants of these territories” as 
“paramount” and State obligations as “a sacred trust”.  Obligations include: 
(A)  to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their 
political, economic, social and educational advancement, their just treatments, and 
their protection against abuses; 
(B)  to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of 
the peoples, and to assist then in progressive development of their free political 
institutions, according to the particular circumstance of each territory and its 
peoples and their varying stages of advancements...256 
Article 73 recognized the right of colonized ‘peoples’ and not only ‘states’ to self-
determination and thus decolonisation.  Under Article 73(E), States were to report 
on their progress in relation to such territories.257 
Subsequent UN resolutions elaborated on Article 73.  The Declaration on the 
granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (‘Resolution 1514’)258, 
1960, recognized “the passionate yearning for freedom in all dependent peoples and 
the decisive role of such people in the attainment of their independence”.259  Prior 
to the International Covenants, Resolution 1514 also recognized that the “denial” 
of fundamental human rights and freedoms common to the experience of the 
colonized and that colonization was antithetical to “universal peace”.260  It also 
recognized self-determination as a means for ending “[t]he subjection of peoples to 
alien subjugation, domination and exploitation” which “constitutes a denial of 
fundamental human rights” and for achieving “complete freedom” and the 
“exercise of sovereignty” by colonized peoples.261   
Admittedly, Resolution 1514’s right to self-determination was not to be applied to 
“[a]ny attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the 
                                                          
255 See Charter of the United Nations, art 73. 
256 Article 73 (A)-(B). 
257 Article 73(E). 
258 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples GA Res 1514 
(XV) (1960). 
259 Ibid, preamble. 
260 Ibid, preamble. 
261 Ibid, art 2. 
  295 
 
territorial integrity of a country”.262  Soon after, UN Resolution 1541, 1960,263 
established the so-called “Saltwater Thesis” by which states only had “an obligation 
to transmit information in respect of a territory which is geographically separate 
and is distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it.”264  
This requirement seemed to preclude most indigenous peoples as such communities 
were usually minority cultures dominated by another within their own homelands 
even where they had continuous territorial association. The later UN Resolution 
2625, 1970, reiterated the sanctity of “territorial integrity” and “political unity”. 265  
Like the rhetoric of the African Group and settler nations late in the drafting stages 
of UNDRIP, the text is replete with fears of conflict arising from secession.266 
In terms of prior sovereignty, Hawaii was listed on the General Assembly’s list of 
Non-Self-Governing Territories until 1959 when it became a state, at which time 
the United States stopped sending information.  However, as noted by Anaya, 
statehood did not “remedy the historical injustices suffered by Native Hawaiians” 
nor provide “the accommodations necessary to exercise and freely develop their 
culture, including religious practices and traditional governance, or allow[] them to 
exercise their fair share of political power”267—that is, it did not provide the 
collective rational revision which is the “birthright” of all peoples. 268   Again, the 
statehood plebiscite may have been yet another illegal act in a series of historical 
injustices and ongoing harm.269  Despite these challenges, Native Hawaiians have 
remained a distinct people. 
                                                          
262 Ibid, art 6.   
263 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: Principles 
which should guide Members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the 
information called for under Article 73e of the Charter GA Res 1541 (XV) (1960).  In the case of 
Hawaii despite its geographic isolation, the United States stopped transmitting such information 
after statehood.  Non-application to indigenous peoples was questioned by states like Belgium who 
argued that indigenous peoples should be included in decolonisation: see Robert Joseph “The 
government of themselves: Indigenous peoples' internal self-determination, effective self-
governance and authentic representation: Waikato-Tainui, Ngāi Tahu and Nisga'a” (PhD Thesis, 
University of Waikato, 2005) at 92-94. 
264 Ibid, Principle IV. 
265 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations UN Resolution 2625 (XXV)  
(1970). 
266 See, for instance, Principle I on refraining from force and Principle II on peaceful settlement of 
disputes. 
267 Anaya “Native Hawaiian People and International Human Rights Law”, above n 186, at 335-336. 
268 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action A/CONF.157/23 (1993), preamble. 
269 See Julian Aguon “Native Hawaiians and International Law” in Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie 
(ed) with Susan Serrano and Kapua Sproat Native Hawaiian Law: A Treatise (Honolulu, Native 
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From decolonisation, self-determination has been justified by the inability of a 
dependent but distinct people to develop within the existing institutional order.  
Correspondingly, its components include cultural integrity enabling indigenous 
peoples to maintain their identity, social welfare and the right to development which 
counter the impact of “progressive plundering” and “patterns of discrimination”, 
and self-government constituting the political aspect of ongoing self-determination 
justified by both democracy and cultural integrity. 270   
The question posed endlessly during UNDRIP’s drafting was whether Article 3 
encompassed this external, decolonisation version of the right or an internal version.  
This is not dissimilar to questions now being posed in the US regarding the shape 
of Native Hawaiian self-government.271 
The internal has been explained by Steiner and Alston as “forms of self-government 
and separateness within a state rather than separation...from the state” and 
“autonomy regimes—political systems or subsystems organized within a state for 
purposes of political participation and self-government by ethnic minorities”.272  
These are rights exercised within the universe of the state and directed at “their own 
peoples”.273  The internal envisions minorities as rights-holders focusing on basic 
rights to determine their political status and the right to meaningful political 
participation.274  In many ways, the right overlaps with Articles 25 and 27 of the 
ICCPR.275  As CERD has stated: 
…The right to self-determination of peoples has an internal aspect, i.e., the rights 
of all peoples to pursue freely their economic, social and cultural development 
without outside interference.  In that respect, there exists a link with the right of 
every citizen to take a part in the conduct of public affairs at any level [under the 
principle of non-discrimination].  In consequence, governments are to represent the 
                                                          
Hawaiian Legal Corporation, Ka Huli Ao Center for Excellence in Native Hawaiian Law at the 
William S. Richardson School of Law and University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa, 2015) (advance copy). 
270 Anaya, above n 186, at 342-346 and 350-360. 
271 See discussion in Chapter Three on current federal overtures regarding federal recognition at 3.6. 
272 Steiner and Alston, above n 27, at 1249. 
273 See Shaw’s discussion, above n 253, at 272. As the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has 
emphasized, self-determination is exercised “through the free and genuine expression of the will of 
the peoples of the Territory”: Summary of the Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975, WESTERN 
SAHARA Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975.   
274 Robert McCorquodale “Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach” (1994) 43 ICLQ 857 at 
866. 
275 On rights to political participation and minority rights repsectively: see Sara Joseph, Jenny 
Schults and Melissa Castan The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, 
Materials, and Commentary (2nd ed, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004) at 148. 
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whole population without distinction as to race, colour, descent, national, or ethnic 
origins. 
…Governments should be sensitive towards the rights of persons of ethnic groups, 
particularly their right to lead lives of dignity, to preserve their culture, to share 
equitably in the fruits of national growth, and to play their part in the government 
of the country in which its members are citizens.  Also, governments should 
consider, within their respective constitutional frameworks, vesting persons of 
ethnic or linguistic groups comprised of their citizens, where appropriate, with the 
right to engage in such activities which are particularly relevant to the preservation 
of the identity of such persons or groups.276 
Clearly, the external exists as a collective right against the world and other 
recognized nation-states while the internal is also collective but regulates the 
relation between a state and a minority group within its population. 
The Declaration is usually limited to internal self-determination.277  The majority 
of UNDRIP’s provisions are descriptions of day-to-day incarnations of autonomy 
and self-government in the five institutional areas—that is, civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights.278  Similarly, Article 14(1)’s operative terms, 
“establish” and “control”, are fairly plain in meaning.   In terms of the former, 
education is “set up” by and fixed in the community,279 while, according to the 
latter, the same community “determine[s] the behaviour” of, “supervise[s] the 
running of” and “maintain[s] influence or authority over” 280  the educational 
institutions or systems it has established.  Within the community there is no higher 
authority in terms of the right to education in UNDRIP except for the considerations 
of “fundamental human rights and freedoms” and the “just and most compelling” 
democratic arguments which are to act as limits on all of the rights in UNDRIP 
according to Article 46.281  The use of indigenous language as the medium of 
instruction and instruction in a culturally-appropriate manner282 also seems to be an 
                                                          
276  CERD, General Recommendation No. 21, The right to self-determination, UN Doc 
HRI\GEN\1\Rev.6 at 209 (2003) paras 4-5. 
277  See Alexandra Xanthaki “The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and 
Collective Rights: What’s the Future for Indigenous Women” in Stephen Allen and Alexandra 
Xanthaki (eds) Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2011) 413. 
278 Indigenous education rights seem to fall within all five, as they are clearly economic, social and 
cultural rights but also form the foundation of an individual’s basic ability to participate politically 
—and as education rears lawyers, judges, legislators and other participants in legal institutions from 
a tender age.   
279 See first and second definitions for the verb “establish” in Catherine Soanes and Angus Stevenson 
(eds) Oxford Dictionary of English (2nd ed, revised) (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005), at 593. 
280 See first definition for the verb “control” in Soanes and Stevenson, ibid, at 377. 
281 UNDRIP, art 46.  Territorial integrity and political unity are also mentioned in the same article. 
282 UNDRIP, art 14(1). 
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internally-driven, internally-defined measure of self-determination as the 
community itself frames the very terms of what will constitute education.   
Similarly, Article 14(3) echoes previous minority instruments and partially 
indicates a state/minority relationship.   
The internal aspects of self-determination, however, are also buttressed by 
seemingly external protections flowing from an expanded, even historical self-
determination.  Anaya notes that Article 2 specifies that indigenous peoples are 
“equal to all other peoples”283 and that Article 3’s text mirrors other instruments 
including General Resolution 1514.  While states clearly did not endorse a right to 
independent statehood, Article 3 has the same decolonisation context as instruments 
which have284 while the Declaration is essentially “a self-determination remedial 
regime”.285  “The Declaration…[is] based effectively on the identification of a 
longstanding sui generis violation of self-determination” 286  which “[p]rojected 
back in time” has been “massively and systematically denied to groups within the 
indigenous rubric”. 287    Article 14 and other rights may not imply automatic 
recourse to secession288 or other specific remedies but are nonetheless aimed at 
substantive self-determination and “grounded in freedom and equality”. 289  
Ultimately, consistent with the evolution of the right to education: 
The purpose of the Declaration is to remedy the historic denial of the right to self-
determination and related human rights so that indigenous peoples may overcome 
systemic disadvantage and achieve a position of equality vis-à-vis heretofore 
dominant sectors.290 
Given its remedial nature, Article 3’s self-determination may have the greatest 
capacity to address complex discrimination and disparities.  As such, it may also 
constitute the greatest Kymlickan buffer for indigenous peoples and individuals. 
Within UNDRIP, indigenous peoples have “the collective right to live in freedom, 
peace and security as distinct peoples”.291    Again, indigenous peoples as a whole 
                                                          
283 Emphasis added. 
284 Anaya in Charters and Stavenhagen, above n 201, 184-198, at 185 
285 Ibid, at 190. 
286 Ibid. 
287 Ibid, at 191. 
288 However, see Anaya’s arguments, above n 201. 
289 Anaya, above n 201, at 189. 
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are not to be subjected to “assimilation”, “integration” or the destruction of their 
culture or cultural identities.292  In contrast to minority rights which largely accrue 
to members of ethnic, linguistic and other minorities on an individual basis, 
indigenous peoples collectively have the “right to belong to an indigenous 
community or nation”293 and not just to a traditional nation-state.294  Under that 
right, membership is to be determined internally according to the custom and 
tradition of the community. 295  Nor can indigenous peoples be “forcibly removed” 
or relocated from their homes and territories.296  These provisions sound like the 
integrity rights of a people.  Other important externally protective provisions 
include rights of consultation and free, prior and informed consent in matters which 
particularly affect the community in question suggesting political behaviour unlike 
that of, for instance, a racial minority.297   
Proposed amendments to the predecessor of Article 14 which would have 
specifically required indigenous institutions to “consult[] with competent 
authorities in the State…in accordance with applicable education laws and 
standards” in exercising their rights were rejected,298 lending substance to external 
arguments.  Thus, under the current Article 14(1), internally-determined pedagogy, 
curriculum and administration clearly function as a Kymlickan buffer against 
majority interference and bias.  However, these factors are also inconsistent with 
the imposition of national standards such as the No Child Left Behind Act on 
indigenous peoples within the United States, as if such self-determination is held 
against all comers, the right of unqualified ‘peoples’.  Such a wide latitude of self-
determination in education resembles the right to “full control”299 and unqualified 
self-determination which indigenous participants claimed during drafting.  The 
specifically indigenous nature of the rights—the unequivocal prioritization of and 
preference for the indigenous learner—underwritten by self-determination—also 
defies the mere minority status most associated with the internal aspect.  Consistent 
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with Article 33,300 Article 14(1) actually resembles citizenship and passport control, 
an essentially external power.   
Prior to overthrow and annexation, the Hawaiian Kingdom constituted what the 
thesis has called a fledgling democracy and fully-fledged nation which never ceded 
or otherwise relinquished its sovereignty and was later recognized to fit all the UN 
criteria for a non-self-governing territory including the right to decolonisation, even 
secession, until the Statehood vote.301  In fact, Hawaiʻi and other Pacific states buck 
decolonisation trends apparent in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean.  Reasons why 
Pacific states remain colonized when others do not appear less legal and more 
practical including “[t]iming, size, remoteness and economic vulnerability” but also 
“the determination of some colonial powers to remain, irrespective of the wishes of 
the indigenous peoples”.302   
As Partick Macklem might observe, Native Hawaiians currently appear to “exist 
themselves in international law—not as States, but as international legal actors in 
their own right”.  According to Macklem, “What constitutes indigenous peoples as 
international legal actors…is the structure and operation of international law 
itself”.303   Thus, Native Hawaiians seemingly retain a significant claim to at least 
an expanded self-determination which exhibits both internal and external aspects.  
We are clearly not a mere minority 304  but have been treated historically and 
presently as distinct peoples with rights exceeding those of minorities.  Ironically, 
given its concerns about territorial integrity, the United States itself has 
acknowledged the unique situation of Native Hawaiians, particularly the fact that 
Native Hawaiians have never ceded the sovereignty once widely recognized by 
other nation-states.  The oft-noted geographic isolation of the Islands is unchanged, 
making territorial integrity less daunting as do plans of the State of Hawaiʻi to turn 
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302 Toki, above n 7, para 22. 
303 Patrick Macklem “Indigenous Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations” 30 
Michigan J Int’l Law 177 at 178 and 179. 
304 For an alternative view, see Will Kymlicka “Beyond the Indigenous/Minority Dichotomy” in 
Stephen Allen and Alexandra Xanthaki (eds) Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (Oxford, Hart, 2011) at 183-208.  Although Kymlicka has previously 
differentiated between indigenous peoples and “national minorities (see liberal multiculturalism) on 
the basis of the inconsistency of their right claims—for instance to self-determination rather than 
integration—he argues that minorities including African-Americans should be able to claim 
UNDRIP-like rights 
  301 
 
over “management and control of the island of Kahoʻolawe and its waters to” a 
“sovereign” “reorganized Native Hawaiian governing entity” upon federal 
recognition.305   
However, territorial integrity concerns miss the proverbial mark in many ways.  
Most commentators306 recognize that the majority of indigenous claims to self-
determination are not demands for secession, but instead claims for a kind of 
rational revision and not a particular remedy.307  Ironically, criticism of Article 14 
is scarce, and yet, Article 14 and other substantive rights really define and animate 
Article 3’s self-determination.  Plainly, there is little to fear by way of secession 
from the existence of identity-specific, parallel educational institutions and systems, 
such as the Kamehameha Schools, which appear to be the epitome of human rights 
enjoyment, of substantial equality itself.  By contrast, as Chris Iijima might 
contend,308 a denial of this more external, historical right to self-determination 
would seemingly constitute “[a]nother ongoing manifestation” of residual racist 
narratives and violate the peremptory norm of non-discrimination.309 
Consistent with historical self-determination and restorative justice scholarship, the 
PFII has concluded that: 
International human rights law, including norms on equality and non-
discrimination such as those affirmed in the International Convention on the 
                                                          
305 See Hawaii Act 195 on the potential return of the Hawaiian island of Kahoʻolawe to the future 
“sovereign” “reorganized Native Hawaiian governing entity” as a territory for “nation-building”.  
306 In terms of sovereignty claims regarding a Native Hawaiian nation: see Noelle M Kahanu and 
Jon M Van Dyke “Native Hawaiian Entitlement to Sovereignty: An Overview” (1995) 17 U Haw L 
Rev 427; and Mililani Trask “Historical and Contemporary Hawaiian Self-Determination: A Native 
Hawaiian Perspective” (1991) 8(2) Ariz J Int’l & Comp L 77.   
307 A similar remedy may flow from the violation of that right but is not automatically implied and 
may not be the only possible remedy.  Even where complete independence is inevitable, the shape 
that independence takes can be varied: see Anaya in Charters and Stavenhagen, above n 2; and James 
Anaya and Robert Williams “International Recognition” (Part of panel discussion at “Kāmau a Ea 
5: Keeping the Breath of Life”, Hawaiian Governance Symposium, Honolulu, November 2014). 
308 Chris K Iijima “New Rice Recipes: The Legitimization of Continued Overthrow” (2002) 3 Asian-
Pacific L & Pol'y J 385.  
309 UNPFII, Report of the Eleventh Session of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 
E/C.19/2012/13, para 6. The PFII has noted, for instance, that “recognition” which distinguishes 
between indigenous groups who may and may not claim self-determination—as well as court 
decisions which purport to extinguish indigenous rights to self-determination and “even their 
identities and existence” are discriminatory because “[n]o other peoples in the world are pressured 
to have their rights ‘extinguished’”. 
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Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and [UNDRIP], demand that 
States rectify past wrongs….310 
 
6.6.2 RECONCILIATION  
Article 46(2) raises greater concerns in terms of Article 14, particularly in terms of 
the issues raised in the Kamehameha case.  It, too, might trump UNDRIP’s rights, 
particularly the collective nature of substantive rights including Article 14, and 
prioritize a singular everyone/no-one narrative.  In fact, in the vote on UNDRIP, 
the United States denied that UNDRIP entailed collective rights.311  Ultimately, 
however, Article 46(2) appears to have limits of its own which preserve the capacity 
of Article 14 to address the global moʻolelo. 
As discussed in Chapter Four,312 Kymlicka’s limits and, particularly, his individual 
trumping of collective self-determination and distance from historical remediation 
must discomfort the earnest liberal given the global mo’olelo of complex 
discrimination and disparities as well as the local.  Again, trumping is reminiscent 
of historical and ongoing assimilationist education policy based on the imposition 
of a singular everyone/no-one narrative which has and does result in complex 
discrimination and disparities for the indigenous learner and their community.  It is 
the historic face of the nation-building which Kymlicka seeks to defend indigenous 
individuals against.  Any singularly homogenous and anonymous narrative is also 
at odds with the actual evolution of the right to education in international law where 
greater identification of multiple rightsholder identities, not less, is associated with 
rights insurance and enjoyment, even substantial equality and de facto non-
discrimination.  Ultimately, trumping might also represent a familiar but 
unfortunate mistaking of identity, particularly the equation of Native Hawaiians and 
                                                          
310  PFII, Report of the Eleventh Session of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 
E/C.19/2012/13, para 6. 
311 Discussed in Mattias Ahrens “The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous peoples—How 
it was adopted and why it is significant?” in Henry Minde, Asbjørn Eide and Mattias Åhrén “The 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: What made it possible?  The work and process 
beyond final adoption” (2007) 4 Gáldu Čála, Journal of Indigenous Peoples Rights 84 at 118. 
312 Chapter Four at 4.6.1. 
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other indigenous peoples with racial minority groups seeking inclusion and same 
treatment. 
Similarly, Kymlicka’s flat rejection of historical remediation seems inconsistent 
with the project of the earnest liberal—or with his own buffer-and-access project—
given the unmistakeable link between colonization and ensuing discrimination and 
present, ongoing inequities.  Given the repetition of those facts on global scale—
the singular narrative, as intuitively sensed by the Ninth Circuit in the Kamehameha 
case, cannot sufficiently account for or address the plight of the most vulnerable.  
The current impact of historical events presents the kind of arbitrary disadvantages 
which Rawls tried to eliminate because it can interfere with an individual’s exercise 
of ration revision.  It also undermines Dworkin’s equal concern and respect.  
Fundamentally, it ignores the historic source of discrimination, its complex nature 
and, particularly, the way it is inherently attracted to collective indigenous groups 
impacted by colonization. 
At first glance, Article 46(2)’s limits must appear similarly disquieting in regards 
to Article 14(1) and the issues raised in the Kamehameha Schools case.  The 
provision is drafted in everyone/no-one language including “all” and dichotomous 
“others”.  It makes the exercise of UNDRIP rights subject to an indiscriminate 
category of “law” which conceivably might be domestic or international or include 
singular narrative American federal jurisprudence like Kamehameha but also Rice, 
Bakke and the University of Michigan cases.  The provision also fundamentally 
requires a weighing of presumably conflicting rights—individual versus 
collective—reminiscent of the Weber-Johnson test, particularly its non-
trammelling requirement.  
Moreover, Article 46(2) and possibly Article 14 itself highlight a seeming tension 
in UNDRIP between individual human rights, quasi-collective minority member 
rights and truly collective indigenous rights.313  The consistency of, for instance, a 
collective right to education with an individual right to education can undermine 
the collective where collective rights are seen as reducible to the individual rights 
                                                          
313 Alexandra Xanthaki “The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Collective 
Rights: What’s the Future for Indigenous Women” in Alexandra Xanthaki and Stephen Allen (eds) 
Reflections on the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011)  
at 418. 
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of members or lacking moral standing as opposed to individual rights. Given their 
collective nature, there is a certain amount of debate about whether Article 14 and 
other UNDRIP rights really affirm previously recognized human rights and 
freedoms or whether such rights are sui generis.314  But how uncomfortable should 
this provision make the earnest liberal? 
Individual trumping on the level demanded by the dissent in Kamehameha and the 
majority in Rice is fundamentally inconsistent with the norm and right of self-
determination which dominates UNDRIP.  While UNDRIP places “democratic”315 
limits on its indigenous education rights, the norm of self-determination 
underwrites those rights.  The buffer-and-access features of Article 14 and other 
UNDRIP rights make little sense without the right to self-determination being held 
by a rights-bearing people.  Interpreted as a collective form of Rawlsian rational 
revision which enables individual autonomy, self-determination is consistent with 
the project of the earnest liberal and a norm of international law of the highest order.  
Importantly, Article 46(2) requires: 
Any such limitations shall be non-discriminatory and strictly necessary solely for 
the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of 
others and for meeting the just and most compelling requirements of a democratic 
society. 
Similarly, Article 46(3) requires that “principles of justice, democracy, respect for 
human rights, equality, non-discrimination, good governance and good faith” guide 
interpretation of UNDRIP’s provisions.  Given the mention of uman rights, equality 
and non-discrimination, these requirements would appear to require any limitations 
on Article 14 to be consistent with the previous evolution of right to education in 
international law.  This returns the conversation to the multi-narrative which has 
specifically evolved to addresses complex discrimination and effect substantial 
equality.  As discussed in terms of drafting, any legal or normative distinction in 
rights because they are ‘indigenous’ amounts to discrimination itself.316  Drafting 
made it clear that: 
                                                          
314 Described by Xanthaki, ibid, at 416. 
315 Article 46(2). 
316 See discussion above on distinction in regard to right of indigenous peoples to the same right to 
self-determination as any other peoples: WGIP Report 2001, above n 131, para 23. 
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…providing indigenous peoples with a system of individual rights would fail to 
protect them from the main violations of their human rights, because these include 
violations of a collective nature, towards indigenous communities as a group.317 
The collective nature of the right to self-determination and other UNDRIP rights 
can mask individual rights issues.  As Peter Jones argues, collective rights are 
consistent with individual rights where the moral standing of the group reflects the 
moral standing of individuals as rights-holders: 
...The idea of collective rights functions with the same fundamental moral units as 
the idea of human rights: individual persons.  An argument for a collective right 
must appeal to the good of the individuals who make up the collectivity, and 
individuals will figure in a right-holding collectivity only if they share in the 
interest that grounds its right.  There is, therefore, a continuity and 
complementarity between individual and collective rights: respect and concern for 
the individual drive both.  The difference between the two sorts of rights simply 
reflects the fact that they share with others and in relation to which they hold shared, 
rather than independent claims.318 
Jones argues that rather than see these rights as group-versus-individual it is correct 
to view them as individual-versus-individual.  The moral standing of the group 
relies upon the moral standing of the individual rights-holder.  The indigenous 
learner becomes the member of a group with moral standing when the joint interests 
of that group in the realization of human rights reflect her interest or moral standing 
as a rights-holder in education, for instance. 319   This is consistent with an 
understanding that indigenous peoples as a group attract complex discrimination 
and disparities which result in individual rights denials. 
As discussed, self-determination itself is a human right organically connected to the 
insurance and enjoyment of all other human rights and freedoms, especially given 
its remedial capacity.  As discussed throughout the thesis, the link between the 
history and presently complex discrimination and disparities is unquestionable and 
widely accepted —as is the link between such discrimination and wider disparities.  
These realities appear to demand historical remediation as they flow from historical 
injustice and evidence ongoing harm.   
                                                          
317 Xanthaki, ibid, at 417. 
318 Peter Jones “Human Rights, Group Rights, and Peoples’ Rights” (1999) 21 Hum Rts Q 80 at 90. 
319 Ibid, at 84-85, 88 and 93-94. 
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Although the Declaration is able to buffer the indigenous learner against 
majoritarian bias and oppression, it also retains the capacity to address genuine 
instances of internal oppression as anticipated by Kymlicka.  He was willing to 
allow individual rights to trump admission-like rights to control membership where 
everyone/no-one civil or political rights were at stake.320  Instead, UNDRIP reserves 
that right for indigenous peoples under Article 33.   However, Article 46(2) and (3), 
in concert with Article 22, also require special attention to groups who are 
particularly vulnerable to internal oppression, including indigenous women and 
children.   
The Declaration does not exhibit the same presumed suspicion as, for instance, 
CEDAW, in terms of cultural practices,321 majority bias and other by-products of 
nation-building. 322  However, Article 46(2) and (3) possess the capacity to 
distinguish between fairly innocuous education rights consistent with substantial 
equality and human rights violations perpetrated against indigenous women and 
children which has no part in the human rights universe.  In practice, admittedly, 
these rights present complex issues of implementation.323   However, given the 
consistency of UNDRIP with previous statements on rights of equality and non-
discrimination in regards to women and children, the Declaration, once again, 
appears to argue for their moral force, normative value and legality rather than 
compete with them.   
Ultimately, rather than a “pre-determined triumph of individual rights over 
collective rights”, UNDRIP follows the pattern of previous human rights law in 
which, besides non-derogable rights, there is no hierarchy of rights.324  In regards 
to the nature of UNDRIP rights, Erica-Irene Daes, former Chairperson of the WGIP, 
has said:  
                                                          
320 In terms of a Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez scenario: see discussion in Chapter Four at 4.6.1. 
321 See discussion in previous chapter at 5.2.2. 
322 See Xanthaki, above n 318, at 420-421. 
323 See, for instance, Xanthaki, above n 318; Celeste McKay and Craig Benjamin “A Vision for 
Fulfilling the Indivisible Rights of Indigenous Women” in Jackie Hartley and Jennifer Preston (eds) 
Realizing the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Triumph, Hope, and Action 
(Saskatoon, Purich Publishing, 2010) at 156-168; and Mary-Ellen Turpel-Lafond “More than Words: 
Promoting and Protecting the Rights of Indigenous Children with International Human Rights 
instruments” in Hartley and Preston, at 169-188. 
324 Xanthaki, above n 318, at 429. 
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The Declaration now constitutes a normative instrument of the UN that 
memorialises, and simultaneously extends, international consensus regarding the 
individual and collective rights of indigenous peoples as set out in previous 
instruments.325   
Thus, UNDRIP is fundamentally concerned with ensuring the human rights of the 
most vulnerable of rightsholders—those it recognizes as being particularly 
susceptible to complex discrimination and rights denial.  Collective rights to self-
determination complement this priority given its organic capacity but also as a 
significant buffer-and-access mechanism itself. 
 
6.7 CONCLUSION 
…When Indigenous Peoples WIN, the whole world WINS.326 
Earlier in this chapter, the global indigenous learner was described as the ultimate 
canary in the coalmine.  From this perspective, the sweep of the global moʻolelo, 
the magnitude of historic injustices and ongoing, deep harm serially attracted to 
indigenous identity is staggering and almost incomprehensible.  Colonization can 
be viewed as having multiplied the Native Hawaiian—and also Native American—
experience exponentially over geography and centuries.  The effect of such human 
rights violations has been logarithmic, with human rights deprivations and 
‘penalties’ pervading the enjoyment of all other human rights and being passed 
down as a cruel inheritance to the next generation of learners, a legacy further 
distorted and exaggerated over time.  This is both the mirroring and magnifying 
effect which unfortunately connects the Native Hawaiian moʻolelo with the global.   
The global moʻolelo is recognized as undermining universality, homogeneity, 
anonymity and the transcendent premise of human rights.  Again, the above realities 
invalidate any Rawlsian assumptions that such inequalities will be evened out over 
generations by homogenous and anonymous distributions of rights and any 
lingering assumptions of a level playing field for all.  Given its once-and-present 
                                                          
325 Erica-Irene Daes “The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Background and 
Appraisal”, in Xanthaki and Allen, above n 318, 11 at 39. 
326 Chief Wilton Littlechild “When Indigenous Peoples Win, the Whole World Wins” in Charters 
and Stavenhagen, above n 2, at 375. 
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nature, the moʻolelo disproves historical supersession and defies the temporariness 
of special measures.  As such it must be grotesquely offensive to any earnest liberal.  
As human rights violations, these indigenous rights violations must offend 
humanity as a whole. 
However, with the unprecedented participation and persistence of indigenous 
peoples, international law has narratively responded with repugnance and 
earnestness.  Article 14 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples appears to be an earnest culmination of the international human 
right to education providing both buffer-and-access and remedial historical self-
determination—applied specifically to indigenous peoples.  This rational and 
remedial indigenous learner right remains consistent with the previous multi-
narrative given its reconciliatory nature, organic multiplication, and potential for 
emphasized legality.  But it also enshrines specifically indigenous, collective rights 
in education underwritten by self-determination, itself an organic multiplier.  Such 
self-determination may be the ultimate buffer-and-access right while also 
accounting for ongoing harm, prior sovereignty and a historical continuum of rights.  
In this way, Article 14 demonstrates the capacity of specifically indigenous rights 
to reconcile Kymlicka’s theory with itself. 
In terms of proportionality, Article 14 and UNDRIP provide an enhanced multi-
narrative toolbox of rights options which is both consistent with and exceeds 
previous instruments from the UDHR to the Children’s Convention and CRPD.  
Instead of less, this toolbox recognizes more: increased, multiple, simultaneous 
rightsholder identities; collective peoples’ rights; internal and external aspects of 
self-determination; and once-and-future rights.  Beyond federal recognition, Article 
14 is more than just an indigenous right to indigenous education.  It is a supra-
domestic human right to historical self-determination with the multi-narrative 
capacity to account for ongoing harm, prior sovereignty and a historical continuum 
of rights.  Given its consistency with the previous evolution of education and 
account of the most vulnerable, it also carries significant moral force. 
In terms of this evolution, it is clear that the long-standing policy of a private school 
established to help indigenous children overcome discrimination and disparities 
which prefers those children in admissions does not violate either equality or 
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discrimination.  Rather, it is consistent with the equality multi-narrative of human 
rights which is highly aware of complex discrimination and demand substantial 
rather than merely formal equality.  The self-determination-based, specifically 
indigenous right to education contained within the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples 2007 is both a culmination and extension of this multi-
narrative, under which the admissions policy may be recognized as the expression 
of a supra-domestic human right.   
Unless such rights are capable of narration at the domestic level, however, all may 
be in vain.  Chapter Seven examines the greater narrative capacity of New Zealand 
law to account for unique historico-legal context and guarantee/reality gaps because 
of its interface between human, constitutional and indigenous rights and the 
presence of both buffer-and-access and self-determination projects in regards to 
education.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE ADMISSION POLICY IN 
AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND 
7 CHAPTER SEVEN: THE ADMISSION POLICY IN AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Dignity and self-determination required responsible action and participation from 
the colonized—from us.  We had to comprehend the depth of our oppression, but 
we also had to imagine the possibilities of transformation by our legal traditions 
and diplomacy.  Once we began to believe in our traditions and our ability, we 
realized the source of our transformation.  Hope and action returned.1 
As this chapter will describe, Aotearoa New Zealand is a liberal democracy which 
has wrestled, like the United States, with a similar history of colonization, 
assimilation, discrimination and present disparities.   Its history and law are marked 
by aggressive nation-building projects and residual majoritarian bias.  While not 
identical to the American experience of slavery, this history has also created and 
perpetuated historic injustices, ongoing harm, settler/indigenous dichotomies and 
often conflicting equality narratives.  For much of its modern history, the 
everyone/no-one narrative has been adamantly prioritized and indigenous rights 
denied in New Zealand as in the Kamehameha dissent.  Like the United States, its 
government failed to endorse UNDRIP originally and later adopted an aspirational 
stance.   
Article 14-like indigenously controlled education systems and schools have been 
widely established in New Zealand specifically to educate Māori children as the 
result of significant grassroots efforts by Māori.  As in Hawaiʻi, preferring even 
prioritizing the Māori learner in admissions has, in fact, resulted in significantly 
improved real-life outcomes for another group of indigenous learners historically 
and continuously associated with striking discrimination and disparities.  These 
                                                          
1 Statement made in regards to indigenous achievements in terms of UNDRIP by James (Sákéj) 
Youngblood Henderson in Indigenous Diplomacy and the Rights of Peoples: Achieving UN 
Recognition (Saskatoon SK Canada, Purich Publishing, 2008) at 35-36, yet also an appropriate 
description of the efforts of indigenous peoples within domestic law. 
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schools are not sued for discrimination nor merely tolerated as private exeptions to 
equality but publically funded and legally protected as a collective good.   While 
the overall thesis originally has asked why the Kamehameha Schools were sued for 
discrimination, this chapter asks why they would not be sued in New Zealand.   
It begins by touching on another eerily similar historico-legal context including 
prior sovereignty, ongoing harm, a historical continuum of rights, nation-building, 
and in-built bias and discrimination.  A critical analysis of domestic jurisprudence 
and legislation reveals an expanded domestic multi-narrative of equality.  Persistent 
adamant everyone/no-one criticisms, including trumping, ESCR and indigenous 
rights denial, are noted as possibly undermining the idea of the multi-narrative.  
Ultimately, however, the chapter recognizes crucial differences between the 
Kamehameha and New Zealand equality narratives including: scarce reverse 
discrimination; interpretation consistent with human rights obligations; legal 
indivisibility; emphasized legality; the ascendancy of non-discrimination; and 
positive government obligations in terms of Kamehameha-like schools.  
Importantly, New Zealand equality narratives demonstrate intentional human rights 
incorporation, an organic interface between human, constitutional and indigenous 
rights, and an unapologetically remedial self-determination. 
At the outset, it is important to note that this chapter will not portray New Zealand 
as a utopian example of how the expanded multi-narrative might work in practice 
at the domestic level.  New Zealand remains a nation struggling with the burdens 
of its own history, even ongoing harm, identity-attracted complex discrimination 
and disparities.   However, this very wrestle allows us to get underneath the so-
called ‘text of the debate swirling through’ 2 the Kamehameha case at the domestic 
level.   This history cannot compare with slavery; in fact, no history can.  But it 
does illustrate how, as in Brown, group-specific historico-legal context will drive 
an expansion of equality narratives where substantial equality and non-
discrimination are at stake and an earnest reconciliation of guarantee/reality gaps 
attempted.  This is particularly true in the case of indigenous peoples who retain 
residual political rights to self-determination and a historical continuum of rights.  
Unfortunately, the history once more illustrates how a less than earnest liberalism 
                                                          
2 See methodology in Chapter One, at 1.5. 
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will mask discrimination and inequalities and adopt an adamant everyone/no-one 
narrative which ignores legitimate indigenous legal claims. 
As noted in the Introduction, the chapter postpones questions of implementation 
and practice and simply asks what the law is saying about rightsholder identity as a 
possible starting point for similar conversations in the United States.   
 
7.2 KŌRERO PONO3: THE BURDENS OF NEW ZEALAND HISTORY 
One of the mistakes of scholars…looking at this particular area of law [that is, 
indigenous issues] is to decontextualize it, decouple it from its history.  And in this 
game, in law particularly…in Māori issues in particular, history is everything.4  
Aotearoa New Zealand lies some 4,606 miles across the Pacific Ocean from 
Hawaiʻi, which together constitute two points of the rough ethno-cultural triangle 
of Polynesia.5  New Zealand’s indigenous people are homogenously referred to as 
the Māori—which literally means the “normal, usual, natural, common” 6 
inhabitants of the land7—but are comprised of various waka, iwi, and hapu.8  These 
two points of Polynesia share an eerily similar history of colonization causally 
linked to ongoing complex discrimination and disparities insidiously attracted to 
Māori identity.   Such disadvantage is particularly evident in education. 
 
                                                          
3 Translated as either a verb meaning “to tell the truth, be honest, be truthful, speak the truth” or a 
noun meaning a “true story, non-fiction writing, factual text”: Te Aka Māori-English, English-Māori 
Dictionary (Online)  <www.maoridictionary.co.nz>. 
4 Justice Joe Williams “Lex Aotearoa: A heroic attempt at mapping the Māori dimension in modern 
New Zealand law”, 22nd Annual Harkness Henry Lecture, University of Waikato, 7 November 2013.  
Justice Williams is former President of the Māori Land Court and current Judge of the New Zealand 
High Court. 
5 Rapa Nui Easter Island being the third. 
6 See Te Aka Māori-English, English-Māori Dictionary (Online)  <www.maoridictionary.co.nz>. 
7 As in other Pacific indigenous cultures. A similar term kanaka maoli is used by Native Hawaiians 
to refer to ourselves. 
8 Waka refers to a socio-political grouping based on ancestral descent from the same original canoe 
which brought the Māori to Aotearoa from other parts of Polynesia.  An iwi is a tribe also sharing 
common ancestry.  A hapu is a sub-tribe.  All refer to socio-political units recognized historically in 
Māori society but also in current law and society. 
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7.2.1 ‘A COMPLEX PEOPLE’ AND HISTORICAL CONTINUUM OF RIGHTS 
Anthropologically, Māori share common ancestral and historical origins with 
Native Hawaiians as East Polynesian peoples who developed complex societies 
including culture, arts, sciences,9 language, religion, political systems—and law—
in remote parts of the Pacific prior to its ‘discovery’ by Europeans.  Māori are “a 
complex people who [have] lived in New Zealand for more than 1,000 years”.10  
Many claim descent from the intrepid navigators who arrived on the ‘Great Fleet’ 
of waka or Polynesian voyaging canoes around 1350 AD.11  Forbearers of the Māori 
came from multiple island groups but recalled a place called Hawaiki—the 
legendary Polynesian homeland with which Hawaiʻi shares its name—in their 
chants and genealogies.12  They brought with them a language13 and world view 
like Native Hawaiians’ including a familiar creation story, cosmology of gods and 
folklore.14  The Māori also believed that they were literally descended from these 
deities who played an ever-present role in their daily lives.15   
As in ancient Hawaiʻi, the principle of whanaungatanga, or kinship, ordered Māori 
society and bound an individual to the descendants of his ancestral waka, iwi and 
hapu but also to the land and other living things.16  Whakapapa17 was a fundamental 
aspect of who a person was, their standing in the community and the mana or 
                                                          
9 The ancestors of the Māori and Native Hawaiians were unrivalled in navigation and seamanship at 
the time and possessed substantial knowledge of astronomy as well as biology and oceanography: 
see KR Howe Vaka Moana: Voyages of the Ancestors Auckland, David Bateman, 2006); and Peter 
Henry Buck Vikings of the Sunrise Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1938).  Such navigation is particularly 
remarkable considering that the Pacific is “995 parts water to five parts land”: Ranginui Walker Ka 
Whawhai Tonu Matou: Struggle Without End (Rev ed, Auckland, Penguin Books, 2004) at 24.   
10 Claudia Orange The Treaty of Waitangi (2nd ed, Wellington, Bridget Williams Books, 2011) at 17. 
11 See Walker, at Chapter 2.  For a more conservative date of 1250 AD, see Patrick Kirch “Peopling 
of the Pacific: A Holistic Anthropological Perspective” (2010) 39 Annu Rev Ant 131.   
12 For mythology see Walker, at Chapter 1.  For anthropology and archaeology, see Patrick Kirch 
and RC Green Hawaiki, Ancestral Polynesia: An Essay in Historical Anthropology (New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
13 “New Zealand Māori is most closely related to languages such as Cook Islands Māori, Tahitian 
and Hawaiian, and forms with them a language grouping known by linguists as Eastern Polynesian”: 
Māori Language Commission “Te Reo Māori” <www.tetaurawhiri.govt.nz>.   
14  See Walker, Chapter 1.  Compare with Martha Beckwith Hawaiian Mythology (Honolulu, 
University Press of Hawaii, 1970) and Martha Beckwith The Kumulipo: A Hawaiian Creation Chant 
(Honolulu, University Of Hawaii Press, 1981).  Including the pan-Polynesian ancestor and hero 
Maui. 
15 Justice Williams, above n 4.     
16 Kinship ties and responsibilities. 
17 Genealogy. 
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spiritual, social and political authority one possessed.18  “The basic social unit in 
Māori society was the whanau, an extended family which included three 
generations”.19  In terms of education, the whanau was “the cognitive framework 
whereby things were known and ordered, stored and transmitted”.20 Whakapapa 
and other knowledge were taonga, or treasures, whose transmission was sometimes 
guarded21   
Ancestry determined social and political standing. “Migrants, conquerors and 
strangers came into the land by marrying into the local people”22 who possessed 
mana whenua, an authority to possess the land only accorded to descendants of the 
locale’s original inhabitants.  Rather than a thing or an inanimate object, the land 
“was part of them by direct descent from the earth mother”.23  As in Hawaiʻi, 
customary usage entailed reciprocal responsibility for land and mutual benefits 
under the auspices of the rangatira—or persons of chiefly status.24 
Despite later claims,25 Māori possessed an identifiable legal system based on “an 
established usage which by long continuance has acquired the force of a law or a 
right”, or, rather, “a reasonable rule, followed consistently and continuously by the 
people from time immemorial”.26    This historical continuum of “indigenous or 
aboriginal laws and customs” which even today “have met particular legal tests and 
                                                          
18 “…Prestige, authority, control, power, influence, status, spiritual power, charisma - mana is a 
supernatural force in a person, place or object. Mana goes hand in hand with tapu, one affecting the 
other. The more prestigious the event, person or object, the more it is surrounded by tapu and mana. 
Mana is the enduring, indestructible power of the atua and is inherited at birth, the more senior the 
descent, the greater the mana. The authority of mana and tapu is inherited and delegated through the 
senior line from the atua as their human agent to act on revealed will. Since authority is a spiritual 
gift delegated by the atua, man remains the agent, never the source of mana.”: Te Aka Māori-English, 
English-Māori Dictionary (Online)  <www.maoridictionary.co.nz>.  
19 Walker, at 63.  Emphasis added. 
20 Mere Roberts “Revisiting ‘The Natural World of the Māori’” Danny Keenan Huia Histories of 
the Māori: Nga Tahuhu Korero (Wellington, Huia, 2012) at 46. 
21 And usually “intimate[ly] and interdependent[ly]” tied to land: Roberts, at 46. 
22 Eddie Durie “Ancestral Laws of the Māori” in Keenan at 7. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Durie, at 8-9. 
25 Such as the now infamous claims of Chief Justice William Prendergast In Wi Parata v The Bishop 
of Wellington (1877) 3 Jur (NS) 72, 77-78, 79. 
26 See Richard Benton, Alex Frame and Paul Edward Meredith Te Matapunenga: A Compendium of 
Refrences to the Concepts and Institutions of Māori Customary Law (Wellington, Victoria 
University Press, 2013).   
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thus are enforceable in courts” 27  is still known as tikanga. 28   Like the Native 
Hawaiian continuum, tikanga recognizes principles such as tapu/noa29 and utu, a 
kind of reciprocal, restorative justice.30   These principles allowed Māori to connect 
to their past, “the ancestors, their knowledge base and to their wisdom”.31  Despite 
its oral nature, this body of law was complex and detailed.32   Rather than archaic 
or “primitive” 33  traditions lacking legal substantiality, this system formed a 
“constitutional order”34 which was a “dynamic” “complex framework of distinctive 
customary norms and values”,35 even “the first law of Aotearoa”.36 
The Māori body politic has been described as a “network” of tribes and iwi each 
having legitimate authority. 37   These political units were “democratic” as the 
“power and authority” of the rangatira or chiefs to govern their people—or 
rangatiratanga—was sourced in the authority of the people.38  As in Hawaiʻi, a chief 
                                                          
27 New Zealand Law Commission, Study Paper 9: Māori Custom and Values in New Zealand Law 
(Wellington, Law Commission, March 2001) at 1. 
28  Tika being the root word meaning to “be correct, true, upright, right, just, fair, accurate, 
appropriate, lawful, proper.”: Te Aka Māori-English, English-Māori Dictionary (Online)  
<www.maoridictionary.co.nz>.  
29 The dualized sacred/profane system of prohibitions on places, activities and roles within the 
community based on spiritual rightness as in Hawaiʻi. 
30 Utu was not about punishment as much as it was about restoring spiritual balance between 
individuals and families since relatives of an offender were collectively responsible for the acts of 
the offender: Walker, at 68-70. 
31 Professor Hirini Mead quoted in Law Commission, above n 27, at 3. 
32 As evident in early works such as Norman Smith Native Custom and Law Affecting Native Land 
(Wellington, Māori Purposes Fund Board, 1942); and, more recently, the compendium complied by 
Benton, Frame, and Meredith, above n 26.    
33  Victorian notions which utilized scales of sophistication to identify supposed legal orders 
discussed in Benton, Frame and Meredith, ibid, at 16. 
34 FM Brookfield Waitangi & Indigenous Rights: Revolution, Law and Legitimation (Updated ed, 
Auckland, Auckland University Press, 2006) at 86.  Brookfield identify constitutional features 
corresponding with Kelsen’s grundnorms and Hart’s primary obligation in the pre-European Māori 
legal order: at 86-87. 
35 As former president of the Māori Land Court, Sir Eddie Durie, explains, 
“In fact, a complex framework of distinctive customary norms and values exists that collectively 
constitute the Māori legal order. Further, from the concepts of whanaungatanga or kinship came 
additional principles that assumed the primacy of kinship bonds in determining personal action, 
responsibility, mana (or status or self-esteem) and social rights, including the right of individuals to 
validate their identity within the chosen descent group.  From the law of utu came responsibilities 
for the regular performance of social obligations; and from the principles of manaakitanga came the 
need to respect and care for others, or conversely not to advantage oneself to others’ detriment: 
Durie, “Ancestral laws”, above n 27, at 10.     
36 Ani Mikaere “Tikanga as the First Law of Aotearoa” in Linda Te Aho (ed) “Tikanga Māori me te 
Mana I Waitangi: Māori Laws and Values, Te Tiriti o Waitangi, and Human Rights” (2007) 
Yearbook of New Zealand Jurisprudence 24 at 24.  For more on tikanga, see Hirini Moko Mead 
Tikanga: Māori Living by Māori Values (Wellington, Huia, 2003); and Cleve Barlow Tikanga 
Whakaaro: Key Concepts in Māori Culture (Auckland, Oxford University Press, 1994). 
37 Jessica Orsman “The Treaty of Waitangi as an exercise of Māori constituent power” (2012) 43(2) 
VULWR 345. 
38 Rangatiratanga was even thought to be non-transferrable as it was not necessarily the rangatira’s 
to transfer.  As a central principle of the Māori legal order and governance, “[t]he office and authority 
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who failed in his duties to the people could be deposed in favour of another.  
Rangatiratanga often acted like a centralized authority.  Thus, “the highly structured 
classical Māori society of the late eighteenth century” “form[ed] political alliances 
and confederations” before the British.39   
 
7.2.2 PRIOR SOVEREIGNTY AND CONSTITUENT PARTIES 
New Zealand, like North America, was colonized by the British.40  Both settler 
experiences were marked, initially, by mutual advantage and peaceful 
cohabitation.41   
In 1835, James Busby, British Resident in New Zealand, helped draft and then 
secure the signatures of 35 hereditary chiefs from various parts of Aotearoa on A 
Declaration of Independence of New Zealand which declared New Zealand “to be 
an Independent State” under the jurisdiction of the “Confederation of United 
Tribes”.42  The Declaration reserved “sovereign power and authority” within New 
Zealand and the exercise of government including legislative capacity to the 
“hereditary chiefs and heads of tribes in their collective capacity”43 while asking 
the British king to “continue to be the parent of their infant state, and…its Protector 
from all attempts upon its independence”. 44   
                                                          
of a rangatira was obviously of first constitutional importance in Māori legal orders”.  Thus, Māori 
society can be viewed as “a democracy, limited by a certain amount of patriarchal influence” where 
“[i]ndividuals, other than slaves, ‘possessed many political freedoms’”: Brookfield and 
Baragwanath, above n 34, at 88-89.  Emphasis added. 
39  Caren Fox “Change, Past and Present” in Malcolm Mulholland and Veronica Tawhai (eds) 
Weeping Waters: The Treaty of Waitangi and Constitutional Change (Wellington, Huia Publishers, 
2010) 41 at 42. 
40  The United States was colonized by the ‘English’ from the 16th Century on, while British 
settlement began in the late 18th century in New Zealand. 
41 In Aotearoa, whalers, traders, sailors, and missionaries lived among the Māori mainly in coastal 
areas for some seventy years prior to 1840.  While some inland tribes were somewhat unaffected by 
the newcomers, others enjoyed the “mutually advantageous” benefits of trade in resources such as 
timber”. Orange, above n 10, at 17. 
42 See A Declaration of the Independence of New Zealand (English text) found in Orange, Appendix 
I, at 269 
43 Article 1. 
44 Article 4.  Emphasis added.  From both the British and Māori perspectives, the Declaration was 
strategic.  The chiefs realized from the experience of other Pacific peoples that they needed to form 
some alliance but were not ceding their sovereignty. “The Confederation [itself] was similar to 
tactics being used with other indigenous peoples in the Pacific where foreign powers were vying 
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By 1840, the British had significant economic interests in New Zealand.45   In this 
climate, several hundred Māori chiefs signed the Treaty of Waitangi/Te Tiriti o 
Waitangi 1840. Given translation issues,46 Jacinta Ruru has summarized the Treaty 
thus: 
 According to the English version, Māori ceded to the Crown absolutely and 
without reservation all the rights and powers of sovereignty (article 1), but retained 
full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their lands and estates, forests, 
fisheries and other properties (article 2).  In contrast, in the Māori version, Māori 
ceded to the Crown governance only (article 1), and retained tino rangatiratanga 
(sovereignty) over their taonga (treasures).  Article 2 granted the Crown a pre-
emptive right to purchase property from the Māori, and article 3 granted Māori the 
same rights and privileges as British citizens living in Aotearoa/New Zealand.47 
Although constituting a treaty of cession, the Treaty nonetheless shows that “[t]he 
Crown recognized the Māori tribes as enjoying juridical status sufficient for the 
purpose of such cession”48 and state-like independence49 prior to signing.  Judged 
                                                          
with each other”: Orange, above n 10, 31.  However, see Fox, above n 39, at 42, regarding Māori 
formation of “political alliances and confederations” before the British. 
45 As in Hawai’i, these “interests were advanced [initially] through non-governmental agents of 
empire—the traders, missionaries, explorers and adventurers”—at least initially.  Three statutes 
passed in 1817, 1823 and 1828 show that the British recognized “the country as independent territory” 
even as it assumed a hesitant quasi-jurisdiction over it through the governor of New South Wales: 
Orange, ibid, at 18.   
46 In addition to willfully blind interpretation in courts, translation issues have generally plagued the 
Treaty historically and must not be overlooked.  These issues have largely centred on the fact that 
the parties signed two versions of the Treaty—one in English and one in Māori—which are in some 
cases significantly inconsistent in meaning.  For example, the difference between the rangatiratanga 
or sovereignty in the Māori version versus the surrender of all the rights and powers of sovereignty 
in the English, a seeming mistranslation of the term kawanatanga.  However, such issues exceed the 
limit of this thesis, being the stuff of many a thesis of its own.  I have focused on aspects of the 
Treaty most relevant to this thesis.  The debate is well-addressed in various sources including Orange, 
above n 10; Paul McHugh The Māori Magna Carta: New Zealand Law and the Treaty of Waitangi 
(Auckland, Oxford University Press, 1991); and Sir Hugh Kawharu’s work generally.   
47 Jacinta Ruru Brookers Māori Legislation Handbook 2012 (Wellington, Brookers, 2012) at 2. 
48 McHugh, Māori Magna Carta, above n 46, at 145-146. 
49 As such, the Treaty does not bear all the hallmarks of the series of friendship and free trade treaties 
between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States prior to annexation.  However, as in the case 
of the United States and Hawai’i, other nations of the age noted that Great Britain had itself 
recognized New Zealand’s independence—in effect, the rangatira’s independence and their 
legitimate right to govern New Zealand.  ‘Independence’ is itself a word which at that time and in 
the present has been most often used in international law to refer to nation-states rather than tribal 
peoples.  Again, the previous Declaration used the word “State” rather than people or tribe: see less 
debated Declaration of Independence….  The British had themselves seriously considered either 
establishing a Māori governance body over the territory or getting the chiefs to cede some territory 
and sovereignty but leaving the bulk of Māori governance and sovereignty intact in order to lend 
legitimacy to their economic enterprises in New Zealand.  While it is true that the British may have 
promoted this view of New Zealand for their own ends, ultimately, economic interests rather than 
any change in the actual political status of the Māori chiefs drove the decision to favor the Treaty 
option, essentially, because it made a public show of a legitimate transfer of sovereignty once British 
economic interests were too threatened: Orange, above n 10, at 35-39 and 40-41.   
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against events prior to signing50 and tikanga, it is clear that Māori signed believing 
that they retained self-determination via rangatiratanga and that tikanga would 
continue to govern their society and legal system.51    
Consistent with self-determination and UNDRIP-like rights, ‘taonga’ would, in 
generations to come, be interpreted to include Māori language preservation and 
promotion, legal protection of Māori traditional knowledge systems, as well as 
other aspects of Māori culture and identity.52  Interestingly, in the English and 
Māori texts, these rights accrue to both individuals and Māori collectively53 on a 
permanent basis—or “so long as it is their wish and desire to retain the same”.54  
However, Article 3 guarantees everyone rights to equal protection, or “all the Rights 
and Privileges of British subjects”55— that is, the same rights as other British 
citizens.   
                                                          
50 The retention of rangatiratanga was also consistent with the historical context of the treaty, in 
particular, the hui and whaikorero debates which took place prior to the chiefs’ signing of the Treaty 
during the nine months in which it was circulated throughout the country.  Interestingly, chiefs were 
in many cases persuaded to sign only after express verbal or written guarantees by British envoys 
and by Governor Hobson himself that Māori custom would be protected under British law.  
Sometimes called “the fourth article” (Māori Custom and Values in New Zealand Law, above n 27, 
at 73-74), this preservation and protection of Māori customary law was to apply in all cases except 
where they “were opposed to the principles of humanity and morals”: See George Clark, Protector 
of Aborigines, quoted in Māori Custom Law and Values, above n 27, at 73. The effect of such 
guarantees is that: “It cannot then be said, as a matter of fact, that the Treaty introduced the law of 
England if the corollary is that Māori laws then ceased to be applicable.  The Treaty is rather 
authority for the proposition that the law of the country would have its source in two streams”: Sir 
Eddie Durie, quoted in NZ Law Commission, Māori Custom and Values in New Zealand Law, above 
n 27, at 74.  At the time, the common law doctrine of contra proferendum required treaties to be 
read in favour of indigenous peoples where there were translational issues.  Compare with Cherokee 
Cases described in Chapter Two at 2.3.2. 
51 A 2014 Waitangi Tribunal Report which rigorously analyzed the historical, social and legal 
context of the Treaty—particularly against the signing of the Declaration of Independence—put 
such conclusions beyond doubt.  Among other findings, the Tribunal concluded that Māori did not 
“cede authority to make and enforce law over their people or territories”, “agreed to share power 
and authority with Britain”, and “consented to the treaty on the basis that they and the Governor 
were to be equals”: Waitangi Tribunal, He Whakaputanga me te Tiriti—The Declaration and the 
Treaty: the report on stage 1 of the Paparahi o Te Raki Inquiry, no.1040 (Lower Hutt NZ, 
Legislation Direct, 2014) at 528. 
52 See New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General [1991] 2 NZLR 129 (CA); and New Zealand 
Maori Council v Attorney-General [1994] 1 NZLR 513 (PC) [Broadcasting Assets case (PC)]; New 
Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1996] 3 NZLR 140 (CA) [Commercial Radio 
Assets case]. 
53 Art I recognizes the right of “Chiefs”, Tribes”, “families and individuals” to “full exclusive and 
undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other properties which they 
may collectively or individually possess so long as it is their wish and desire to retain the same in 
their possession” 
54 See Art II, English version. Though Crown retains ability to extinguish various rights via specific 
legislation. 
55 The Treaty of Waitangi—the Text in English, included in WT He Whakaputanga me te Tiriti, 
above  
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Thus, the “foundation” 56  document of New Zealand recognized a collective, 
specifically indigenous right to self-determination and a seemingly everyone/no-
one right to equal protection.  The same document is increasingly recognized as a 
constitutional document which outlines the ongoing relationship between two 
“constituent” parties.57   The late Sir Hugh Kawharu wrote that this “covenant 
(‘kawenata’) for relations between all Māori and the British Crown…has ever since 
meant relations between Māori and all non-Māori in New Zealand”.58  The nature 
of the relationship resembles that between Native American tribes and the federal 
government but also seems to display an expanded self-determination.  It entails 
fiduciary duties but also active protection, and partnership—as opposed to 
dependent nation status—and preserves Māori rights to self-determination.  
Importantly, the Crown is viewed as having a duty to remedy past breaches of the 
Treaty.59   
Immediately following the Treaty, “[p]ragmatism prevailed”, 60   and a dual or 
parallel legal system, incorporating both British and Māori law, accommodated 
“both races” in New Zealand.  However, when “these measures caused a negative 
backlash among the settlers over the perceived inequalities of law”61 legislation 
                                                          
56 According to Orsman, above n 37, at 352-353, the Treaty is constitutional, thought “not the 
embodiment of a typical written constitution.  It does not really set out “central rules and higher 
procedure” for a newly constituted New Zealand State.  Nor does it constitute specific institutions 
of government.  Although art 3 gives New Zealanders the same rights and duties as British citizens, 
it does not specify how the Crown will protect them, or entrench the rights as supreme 
law…However, what the Treaty does arguably contain is an agreement on the authority to be held 
respectively by Māori and the Crown in New Zealand”. 
57 The Treaty appears to be an example of indigenous agency not unlike that in Hawai‘i.  It was 
negotiated and debated.  The debate focused on the retention of self-government.  Rather than a 
completely one-sided affair, “Māori were autonomous” in that process.  The Māori version was 
“strategically” crafted to meet Māori expectations and concerns: Orsman, above n 37, at 356-357.  
The Treaty can be viewed as a “fundamental political decision by Māori exercising constituent 
power”—that is, acting as one of two legitimate constitutional actors and giving their duly 
recognized “assent” as the indigenous people of the country to a new constitution which defined a 
power-sharing arrangement: Orsman, above n 37, at 355-356.  Of course, only five years earlier 
Māori chiefs had tried to protect their “independence” via the Declaration.   
58 IH Kawharu in “Foreword” in Michael Belgrave, Merata Kawharu and David V Williams (eds) 
Waitangi Revisited: Perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi (Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 
2005) at v.  Emphasis added. 
59 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 [Lands Case]. 
60 With the British realizing that temporarily recognizing Māori customary law would expedite 
justice and ease eventual legal transition: See Māori Custom and Values in New Zealand Law, above 
n 27, at 19.   
61 Ibid. 
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limited the application of Māori customary law to cases involving only Māori.62  
Subsequent legislation would further limit the parallel court system.63   
Judicial recognition of the Treaty and tikanga roughly follows a similar pattern.  In 
1847, the Treaty was upheld in R v Symonds.64  In 1877, Chief Justice Prendergast 
of the New Zealand Supreme Court infamously declared it “a simple nullity” sgned 
by “primitive barbarians” in Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington65, a case involving 
the donation of Ngāti Toa land to a church for the purpose of establishing a school 
which never eventuated.66  The Prendergast Court also denied the existence of 
Māori customary law in Rira Peti v Ngaraihi Te Paku (1888).67  While the British 
Privy Council—the highest court of appeal then—consistently recognized the 
existence of Māori customary law,68 New Zealand courts limited Treaty recognition 
to incorporation into municipal law until recently.69 
Ultimately, this history exhibits a pattern of “express denial…overt suppression”, 
and assimilation through institutions and “re-interpretation”.  During fluctuations 
in federal-Indian and federal-Native Hawaiian policy between self-determination 
and assimilation, the imposed individualization of land and people in New Zealand 
drove land alienation and the fragmentation of social structures intricately 
connected with the land. 70   Similar to Native Hawaiians, “Māori customary law 
                                                          
62  For instance, the Native Exemption Ordinance of 1844 allowed Māori to practice muru or 
traditional compensation as an alternative to the standard punishment for theft.  It was replaced by 
the Resident Magistrates Courts Ordinance of 1846 which Magistrates courts included two chiefs as 
“Native Assessors” in a panel of three judges when judging Māori cases.  For a regional history of 
the scheme see Hillary Mitchell and John Mitchell Te Tau Ihu o te Waka: A History of Māori of 
Nelson and Marlborough, Volume II: Te Ara Hou—The New Society (Wellington, Huia and Wakatu 
Incorporation, 2007) at 363-367.   
63 The Resident Magistrates Act 1867 again recognized Māori customary principles such as muru.  
In 1893, however, the Magistrates Court Act repealed the Resident Magistrates Act 1867, ended the 
role of Native Assessors and replaced the Resident Magistrate with a Stipendiary Magistrate who 
filled a “strictly judicial function[]”: Māori Law and Values in New Zealand Law, above n 27, at 20. 
64 See R v Symonds (1847) NZPCC 387, a New Zealand Supreme Court case. 
65 Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington [1877] 3 NZ Jur (NS) 72. 
66 See discussion on separate requirements on Māori educational Institutions as the result of the 
Native Schools Act 1876 at 7.1.3. 
67 Rira Peti v Ngaraihi Te Paku (1888) 7 NZLR 235. 
68 In Nireaha Tamakai v Baker (1900) NZ PCC 1; [1901] AC 561 (PC); and later the validity of 
funeral customs in Public Trustee v Loasby (1908) 27 NZLR 801 (SC); and traditional adoptions in 
Hineiti Rirerire Arani v Public Trust (1919) {1840-1932] NZPCC 1 (PC). 
69 In the case of Hoani Te Heuheu Tukino v Aotea District Māori Land Board [1941] AC 308.  For 
change, see Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority [1987] 2 NZLR 188.   
70 Māori Custom and Values in New Zealand Law, above n 27, at 22-26.  Quote at 26.  Compare 
with land Westernization in Hawai’i resulting from the Mahele discussed in Chapter Three at 3.2.2. 
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was denied, acknowledged, defined, modified and extinguished according to non-
Māori agenda”.71   
 
7.2.3 AGGRESSIVE NATION-BUILDING AND IN-BUILT MAJORITY BIAS AND 
DISCRIMINATION 
As in Hawaii, the attempted “eclipse of Māori custom law” had moral and racist 
overtones,72 particularly in education.  Over generations, legal and educational 
systems displayed nation-building, including in-built majority bias and structural, 
systemic and institutionalized discrimination. 
Prior to the Treaty, Western-style education was largely provided by mission 
schools with a Christianizing mission.  Early observers recognized Māori’s 
“…great thirst for knowledge, intense desire to acquire literacy skills, and quick … 
intelligence … and the value that Māori placed on books and writing paper.”73  In 
the tradition of wananga and valuing knowledge, indigenously run schools were 
also established during this period.74  The Crown provided the same education to 
Māori and non-Māori children. Proximity to home and family was considered 
conducive to positive education outcomes. 75   This Treaty-friendly approach 
changed once “a settler government ruled New Zealand”.76 Legislation such as the 
Native Schools Act of 1858, subsidized boarding schools for Māori intended to 
separate indigenous learners from family and home, “acculturate them in the ways 
of the Pākehā [European] and hasten the assimilation process”.77   
                                                          
71 Michael Belgrave quoted in Māori Custom and Values in New Zealand Law, above n 27, at 22-
23, para 98. 
72 Māori Custom and Values in New Zealand Law, ibid, at 22, para 97. 
73 Māori children were “very adept” at acquiring English, possessed “great natural intelligence” and 
“quickness of perception”: various sources quoted in Mitchell and Mitchell, above n 62, at 329. 
74 Though usually in conjunction with mission boarding schools Peter Caccioppoli and Rhys Cullen 
Māori Education (Papakura NZ, Kotahi Media, 2006) at 59. 
75 Including: “religious education, industrial training, and instruction in the English language”: ibid, 
at 59. 
76 Ibid, 60. 
77 Huia Tomlins-Jahnke and Te Rina Warren “Full, exclusive and undisturbed possession: Māori 
education and the Treaty” in Veronica MH Tawhai and Katarina Gray-Sharp (eds) 'Always Speaking': 
The Treaty of Waitangi and Public Policy (Wellington, New Zealand: Huia Publishers, 2011) 21 at 
22.  Compare with Hawaiian mo’olelo described in Chapter Three at 3.2.2. 
322   
 
The Native Schools Act 1867 (1867 Act) 78 was seen as an assimilative alternative 
“to marginaliz[ing] “the natives”. 79   New Zealand’s version of ‘separate but 
equal’80 was a separate education system for Māori designed to civilize them.81  
Māori children who spoke Māori and practiced tikanga were regarded as the “bad 
child” versus the “good” Māori child who had been Europeanized.82  Conceived of 
as the ‘Other’, Maori children were to be separated from other children and from 
their families83  and bombarded with cultural and identity denigration84 as structure, 
curriculum and pedagogy reflected theories of “inherited and immutable biological 
inferiority and biological superiority.85 
The 1867 Act provided limited annual funding for these separate schools 86 
requiring Māori communities to pay costs and to leap over bureaucratic hurdles 
which communities in the mainstream system did not.87  As a result of this “self-
help” approach88, “few new schools” were built during the early years of the Act in 
                                                          
78 An Act to Regulate and Provide Subsidies for Māori Schools, 10 October 1867.  It was cemented 
in the Native Schools Code 1879. 
79  JM Barrington Separate but Equal? Māori Schools and the Crown 1867-1969 (Wellington, 
Victoria University Press, 2008) at 20. 
80 Barrington recognizes that a few non-Māori children attended the Native Schools but notes that 
that number never rose above 10 per cent and that such children were often, for instance, the children 
of the teacher: at 15.  The system was administered by a central government department rather than 
either provincial or local authorities as in the non-Māori case. 
81 Authorities sometimes even used blood quantum to decide which school children would attend: 
Judith A Simon and Linda Tuhiwai Smith The Native Schools System 1867-1969: Ngā Kura Māori 
(Auckland, Auckland University Press, 1998) at 259.   
82 Ibid. 
83 Maxine Stephenson “Closing the Doors on the Maori Schools in New Zealand” (2006) 9(3) Race 
Ethnicity and Education 307 at 309-310. 
84 For instance, textbooks and other materials bore the urgent message that the Māori’s health, 
happiness and prosperity, if not their very survival, depended on forsaking traditional practices for 
European ones: Colin McGeorge “James Pope’s textbooks for New Zealand native schools” found 
at: http://faculty.education.illinois.edu/westbury/paradigm/mcgeorge.pdf, dated 6/5/14. 
85 Barrington, above n 79, at 21. 
86 Established “for the education of ‘children of the aboriginal race and of half-castes being orphans 
or being the children of indigent persons’”: ibid, at 21.  Interestingly, non-Māori children “of 
indigent persons”—that is, poor children—were included in this group and also needed to be 
separated from the Pakeha children. 
87 The Act required Māori communities to donate at least one acre of land to the Crown to establish 
a school as well as donate to the teacher’s salary, their accommodation, building and repair costs, 
books, and other supplies Caccioppoli and Cullen, at 60.  In the case of several schools in the Nelson-
Marlborough area, the government portion of the funding actually failed to materialize at all causing 
local Māori communities to have to fund building and running costs over decades from the already 
meagre and inconsistent South Island Tenths Benefit Fund which was also supposed to pay for 
crucial medical services, pensioner income and other government costs and church donations: See 
Mitchell and Mitchell, above n 62, at 457-461. 
88 Barrington, above n 79, at 15. 
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poorer Māori communities.89  When they were, they were “underfunded and under-
resourced”.90   
Despite such treatment, contemporary Māori valued education and pushed for 
equality.  A petition91 written by Wi Te Hakiro of Tai Tokerau and 336 others in 
1876 expresses a desire that their children be educated but also frustration with 
discriminatory costs, loss of land, and the one-size-fits-all approach to Māori 
education.  Their pleas to amend the 1867 Act recognize the value of gaining “all 
the knowledge you Europeans possess” but also an identity-responsive education.92  
At one point, the petitioner laments prophetically, “had our children received a good 
sound education, it would have been for the benefit of both races”.93   
In the early 1930s observers recognized that there was nothing Māori about the 
curriculum.94  The 1880 Native Schools Code had required teachers to discourage 
“Māori beliefs and practices” among Māori children and to replace them with 
European “belief systems and manners”.  The Tohunga Suppression Act 1908 
actually made the expression of cultural and spiritual beliefs at school criminal and 
prohibited the speaking of the indigenous language, 95  a decade after a settler 
government did the same in Hawaiʻi.96  To receive government funding schools had 
to teach in English.97   
The Māori curriculum was inherently unequal to the mainstream.  When 
mainstream schools had six standards in their curriculum, Māori had only four until 
1890.  When mainstream schools provided both primary and secondary education, 
Native Schools offered only primary.98 As Stephen May notes: 
                                                          
89 Caccioppoli and Cullen, above n 74, at 60. 
90 Barrington, above n 79, at 21. 
91 Petition of Wi Te Hakiro and 336 others (part of) [Translation.] — 7. "Native Schools Act, 1867.", 
found at http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-BIM873TeHa-t1-g1-t2.html, dated 6/5/14. 
92 The petitioners recognized that the Māori learner will not retain education unless the approach is 
changed, unless children that speak only Māori are educated in Māori and young children are taught 
English early: ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
94 According to an inspector in 1931: quoted in Barrington, above n 79, at 17.  See Simon and Smith, 
above n 81, at 72. 
95 Barrington, above n 79, at 116. 
96 See Chapter Three discussion at 3.2.2. 
97 Caccioppoli and Cullen, above n 74, at 60.  Despite some concession for younger children, funding 
depended on English proficiency until the 1950s: Barrington, above n 79, at 20.   
98 Barrington, ibid, at 21. 
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Ironically, in this process, Pākeha were not only to repudiate and replace Māori 
language and knowledge structures within education but were also to deny Māori 
full access to European knowledge and learning. 99 
As in Hawaiʻi, the use of Māori at school or failure to learn English often resulted 
in corporal punishment.100  The psychological effects of these policies had “long-
term and intergenerational” effects.101 
Ultimately, as Linda Smith explains: 
[T]he major agency for imposing … positional superiority over knowledge, 
language and culture was colonial education…Numerous accounts across nations 
now attest to the critical role played by schools in assimilating colonized peoples, 
and the systematic, frequently brutal, forms of denial of indigenous languages, 
knowledges and cultures.102 
Schools symbolized “civilization” and replicated the colonizers’ message of 
Western superiority.103  Even in 1961, the influential Hunn Report104 retained a 
Waldronian depiction of Māori culture and identity as “relics” or backwardness105 
and Pākeha culture as “civilisation” necessarily “brought to bear on” the Māori 
child.106   The Native Schools system was incorporated into mainstream education 
in 1969 but continued to preach racial superiority.107   
Thus, during the same period that American federal-Indian and federal-Native 
Hawaiian policy was characterized by fluctuations between assimilation, 
integration and self-determination, the Crown’s Māori educational policy was 
dominated by some degree of assimilation and contrasting segregation.  Practices 
of this period are at odds with earnest liberal sensibilities and substantial Brown v 
                                                          
99 Stephen May “Language and Education Rights for Indigenous Peoples“ in Stephen May (ed), 
Indigenous Community-Based Education (Clevedon, Multilingual Matters Ltd, 1999) 42 at 54. 
100 “[S]evere disciplinary measures including “cuts”, straps and caning occurred for offenses as 
minor as not being able to pronounce an English word: See Barrington, above n 79, at 118-119. 
101 Tomlins-Jahnke and Warren, above n77, at 23.   
102 “By the nineteenth century colonialism not only meant the imposition of Western authority over 
indigenous lands, indigenous modes of production and indigenous law and government, but the 
imposition of Western authority over all aspects of indigenous knowledges, languages and cultures”: 
Linda Tuhiwai Smith Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (2nd ed, 
London, Zed Books, 2012) at 67. 
103 Ibid, at 68. 
104 Sir Jack Hunn served in many government posts including Minister of Maori Affairs.  His 1961 
report was meant to be a review of the Ministry of Maori Affairs but recommended, among other 
things, the integration of Maori, particularly the urbanization of rural Maori. 
105 Compare with Waldron’s “cosmopolitan advantage” discussed in Chapter Three at 4.3.2. 
106 May, above n 99, at 55. 
107 Simon and Smith, above n 81, at 258.   
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Board of Education intuitions.  This was both de jure and de facto, direct and 
indirect, straightforward and complex discrimination constituting a “a sad 
indictment of the Government’s responsibility to Māori, and clear breaches of 
Article III rights of Māori to equal treatment”.108  
 
7.2.4 ONGOING HARM 
As in Hawaiʻi, nation-building had far-reaching effects on Māori.  Language loss, 
for instance, led to “capability deprivation”.109  In 1930, 96 per cent of Māori 
children spoke only Māori at home, but only 26 per cent spoke Māori in 1960.  The 
‘death’ of the Māori language was predicted in 1979.110  Rather than substantial 
integration, loss of language produced “Māori educational underachievement for 
decades to come”111 as well as “culture murder” as Māori language remains “the 
only appropriate means of transmitting Māori cultural knowledge”.112  Cultural loss 
also led to children “los[ing] touch” with their turangawaewae—or ancestral 
places.113   
Physically, the “focus was now on surviving”.114  In 1769, Captain James Cook 
estimated a population of 100,000 Māori in Aotearoa.  In 1858—despite previously 
prolific birth rates—the first official census of Māori recorded a population of only 
60,000.  By 1896 that number had dropped to 42,000.115  Dropping fertility rates 
                                                          
108 Mitchell and Mitchell, above n 62, at 461. 
109 Tove Skutnabb-Kangas has said that “Linguistic capital is convertible to other types of capital 
and resources including formal education and life chances.  Capability deprivation…leads to 
poverty”: Tove Skutnabb-Kangas “Series Editor’s Note” in Vaughan Rapatahana and Pauline Bunce 
(eds) English Language as Hydra: Its Impacts on Non-English Cultures (Bristol, Multilingual 
Matters, 2012) xv at xv. 
110 May, above n 99, at 55. 
111 Tomlins-Jahnke and Warren, above n 77, at 23. 
112 Despite many initiatives, language loss continues.  Interestingly, speakers of Māori language 
have dropped since the 2006 census in every age group except those over 65.  Te reo speakers 
currently represent only 21.3 per cent of Māori, a figure not much higher than the 20 per cent who 
could speak it in 1960:  Statistics New Zealand 2013 Census 2013 QuikStats About Culture and 
Identity (Statistics NZ, April 2014) at 23.  Also see Tove Skutnabb-Kangas and Robert Dunbar 
“Indigenous Children’s Education as Linguistic Genocide and a Crime against Humanity?  A Global 
View” (2010) (1) Gáldu Čála: Journal of Indigenous Peoples Rights 53. 
113 Graham Hingangaroa Smith and Vaughn Rapatahana “English language as Nemesis for Māori” 
in Rapatahana and Bunce, above n 109, 76 at 83 and 86.  
114 Simon and Smith, above n 83, at 165. 
115  “Story: Taupori—Maori population change” Te Ara Encyclopedia of New Zealand 
<www.teara.govt.nz>. 
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are directly linked to the introduction of communicable diseases including influenza 
and smallpox, malnutrition and new sexually transmitted diseases, while the huge 
influx of European settlers after 1840 had the effect of “swamping Māori” and 
creating “demographic marginalization”. 116   By 1900, Māori had become a 
minority in their own country.117 
With resilience, Māori have survived, with 598,605 identifying themselves as of 
Māori ethnicity and an overall total of 668,724 claiming they are of Māori descent 
in the 2013 New Zealand Census.118  Like Pacific Islanders in the United States, 
Māori are currently the fastest growing ethnic group in New Zealand.119 
Resiliency and population growth120  have not been enough alone to overcome 
complex discrimination and disparities.   A Human Rights Commission (HRC) 
discussion paper published in 2012 recognized the continued existence of 
“structural discrimination, systemic discrimination or institutional racism” 121 
against Māori in education, health and justice systems, and the public service 
impacting various outcomes.  For instance, Māori men and women have a life 
expectancy of 8.6 years and 7.9 years, respectively, less than their Pākeha 
counterparts.  Unemployment rates for Māori are almost three times that of Pākeha.  
While only constituting about 15 per cent of the population, Māori account for 49 
per cent of prisoners in New Zealand.122  A 2007 Report by the Department of 
Corrections123 and a 2011 Ministry of Justice discussion paper124 similarly linked 
                                                          
116 James Belich Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 
2000 (Auckland, Allen Lane/Penguin, 2001) at 466. 
117 Ibid, at 466. 
118 The more conservative figure represents 14.9 per cent of the population—or one in seven New 
Zealanders: Statistics New Zealand, infra n 119, at 5. 
119 See Statistics New Zealand “National Ethnic Population Projections: 2006(base)–2026 update” 
(22 April 2010) <www.stats.govt.nz>.   
120 From a onetime low of 42,000 representing 5 per cent of the population to present figures 
representing an almost 40 per cent increase in the last 22 years alone.   
121 Human Rights Commission A fair go for all? Rite tahi tātou katoa? Addressing Structural 
Discrimination in Public Services (Human Rights Commission Discussion Paper, July 2012) at 2. 
122 Ibid, at 6.  Moana Jackson’s ground-breaking 1988 report The Maori and the Criminal Justice 
System: A New Perspective—He Whaipaanga Hou (Wellington, Policy and Research Division, 
Department of Justice, 1988) famously connected such statistics systemic discrimination.  Compare 
with figures for Native Hawaiians and similar systemic discrimination discussed in Chapter Three 
at 3.2.2. 
123 Department of Corrections Over-representation of Māori in the Criminal Justice System: An 
Exploratory Report (Wellington, Department of Corrections, 2007). 
124 Kim Workman Māori Over-representation in the Criminal Justice System—Does Structural 
Discrimination Have Anything to Do With It? (Wellington, Ministry of Justice, 2011). 
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the overrepresentation of Māori in the criminal justice system with structural 
discrimination. 
A 2006 medical study also found that “[i]nequalities in health between different 
ethnic groups in New Zealand are most pronounced between Māori and Europeans”.  
The same study found that “the [Māori] experience of racial discrimination and 
deprivation” in various areas of life and not just healthcare had a direct impact on 
“ethnic inequalities for various health outcomes” such as “low physical 
functioning”, “low mental health” and “cardiovascular disease”. 125   Similar to 
Native Hawaiians, Māori have the lowest life expectancy at birth, highest suicide 
rates, and second highest infant mortality rates in New Zealand.126   
In education, the HRC paper recognized significant “gaps in the educational 
achievement between Māori” and other ethnic groups in mainstream education 
correlating with socio-economic factors including poverty.127   Current Ministry of 
Education figures show that Māori are half as likely to qualify for university 
entrance, a third less likely to leave school with National Certificate Educational 
Achievement (NCEA) Level 2 or above,128 a third less likely to stay for Year 13,129 
and more than three times more likely to be truant.130  Māori are also three times 
more likely to be suspended.131   
                                                          
125 Rici Harris and others “Effects of self-reported racial discrimination and deprivation on Māori 
health and inequalities in New Zealand: cross-sectional study” (2006) 17 The Lancet 367.  A follow-
up 2012 study recognized a “dose-response relationship” between racial discrimination and poor 
health outcomes in almost every area: Rici Harris and others “The pervasive effects of racism: 
experiences of racial discrimination in New Zealand over time and associations with multiple health 
domains” (2012) 74(3) Soc Sci Med 408. 
126 Lisa Marriott and Dalice Sim Indicators of Inequality for Māori and Pacific People (Working 
Paper 09/2014, Working Papers in Public Finance, Victoria University, August 2014) at 8 and 11-
12. 
127 HRC, above n 121, at 50. 
128 “NCEA is the main secondary school qualification for students in years 11-13. NCEA stands for 
the National Certificate of Educational Achievement, and can be gained at three levels – usually 
level 1 in year 11, level 2 in year 12, and level 3 in year 13” New Zealand Ministry of Education 
<www.minedu.govt.nz>.  It measures progress in high school but also performs an SAT-like 
function as university entrance usually requires a certain amount of credits at Level 3 or above. 
129 Comparable to twelfth grade/senior year in US high schools and vital for university entrance 
qualification. 
130  See Ministry of Education “Progress against Māori Education Plan Targets: Ka Hikitia—
Managing for Success” Ministry of Education <www.educationcounts.govt.nz>,  Tables 2, 4, 5. 
131 HRC, above n 121, at 50, 53 and 54.  Māori learners aged 15-19 illustrate this.  In terms of 
participation in education, Māori youth have a 96.3 per cent rate at age 15, 73.7 per cent rate at age 
16, a 50.6 per cent rate at age 17 and a 10.6per cent rate at age 19 compared with Non-Māori figures 
of 98.5 per cent, 91.8 per cent, 75.4 per cent, and 17.9 per cent for the same ages.  In regards to 
qualifications, Māori learners “lag behind” in Level 3 NCEA achievement, only 20 per cent of Māori 
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Such statistics appear to reveal not only a “gap” between ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ 
but real poverty measured against minimum standards.132  Once again, pervasive 
inequalities cluster around an indigenous identity. 133   Defying Rawlsian just 
savings,134 the gap has remained, even during times of relative economic prosperity 
in New Zealand when other ethnic groups have fared well.135  And it continues to 
grow.136    
The nature of this gap is reminiscent of global intersectionality, compounding and 
multiplication, with Māori experiencing inequalities on the basis of multiple 
identities including gender, age, family situation, economic status, educational 
attainment and other supposedly arbitrary characteristics. 137   Over time, such 
disparities have become “entrenched”, “intergenerational”138 and closely associated 
                                                          
School leavers achieve University Entrance compared with more than two-fifths of Non-Māori, and 
Māori have a higher rate of learners leaving with no qualification at all (13 per cent) compared with 
Non-Māori (5 per cent): Te Puni Kokiri “Ko Nga Rungatahi Māori i te Rangai Matauranga me te 
Whiwhi Mahi: Māori Youth in Education and Employment” (2012) Te Puni Kokiri/Ministry of 
Māori Development <www.tpk.govt.nz> at 6-8.  In other words, Māori tend to stay in mainstream 
education for a shorter time than their non-Māori counterparts and achieve fewer qualifications.  
This underachievement tends to spill over into under-participation in and under-qualification for 
tertiary education. 
132 That is, they seem to reveal a “gap between the better off and those that are not so well off” but 
also “resources being too low to meet basic needs…‘not having enough’ when assessed against a 
benchmark of ‘minimum acceptable standards”, or the distinction between inequalities and poverty 
used by Bryan Perry in Household incomes in New Zealand: Trends in indicators of inequality and 
hardship 1982 to 2013, Ministry of Social Development, Wellington, July 2014, at 18. 
133 With Pacific Islanders who also usually rank very low. 
134 Evan Te Ahu Poata-Smith “Inequality and Māori” in Max Rashbrooke (ed) Inequality: A New 
Zealand Crisis (Auckland, Bridget Williams Books, 2013) 148 at 149-150.   
135 In the post-World War II “long boom”, for instance, there was a shortage of manpower but Māori 
were unemployed at a higher rate than other ethnic groups: ibid, at 149. 
136 See Marriott and Sim, above n 126, at 27-28. 
137 See Perry, above n 132, for instance.  While Perry’s study is admittedly focused on one area of 
inequalities—income—his findings illustrate not only a consistent gap between statistics for 
European New Zealanders and Māori but the matrix between indigenous identity and complex 
someone identities.  See, for instance, Table B.5, “Distribution of Individuals across income 
quintiles (BHC) by various households and individual characteristics (per cent)” which shows that 
53 per cent of Māori fall into the two quintiles which most correspond with the largest percentages 
of children and older people, as well as single-parent families, government transfer as main source 
of income (under 65s), and rented, even government subsidized accommodation: Perry, at 68.  
Similarly, throughout the study, Māori and children are repeatedly identified as the most susceptible 
to various inequalities and poverty: see, for instance, para 23 in “Overview and Summary” at 27, 
Figure D.10 at 99, “Children in low-income households by ethnicity” at 155, and “Children in 
income-poor households: composition by their ethnicity and by selected household characteristics” 
and Table H.5 at 159.  Other studies show similar correlations in factors including “health”, 
“knowledge and skills”, “paid work”, “cultural identity” and social connectedness”: see Marriott 
and Sim.   
138 Poata-Smith, above n 134, at 153 and 157. 
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with socio-economic immobility, “poverty persistence and ‘chronic’” 
disadvantage139—much like those attracted to Native Hawaiian identity.   
 
7.3 AN EXPANDED DOMESTIC MULTI-NARRATIVE OF EQUALITY 
Similar to international and Hawaiʻi state law, multiple equality narratives are 
available to address the Māori moʻolelo.  This multi-narrative approves substantial 
everyone/no-one, complex someone and specifically indigenous rights which have 
been influenced by both human rights and homegrown indigenous rights. 
 
7.3.1 INTENTIONALLY HUMAN  
Prior to the end of World War II, “many of [the UDHR’s] provisions were regarded 
as right, if not ‘rights’, and some were established in practice.140  Later, the “rise of 
constitutionalism” in New Zealand coincided with international human rights.141  
Since then, human rights have often coincided with constitutional rights in New 
Zealand.142   
Constitutional expert Phillip Joseph has said that human rights have a “special 
status” where incorporated into New Zealand law and that “[h]uman rights statutes 
                                                          
139 Perry, above n 132, at 26-35.  “…Income inequality experienced early in life, result[s] in reduced 
social mobility later in life”: Marriott and Sim, above n 126, at 3.   
140 N Taylor “Human Rights in World War II in New Zealand” (1989) 23(2) New Zealand Journal 
of History 109 at 109.  During World War II, women’s and workers’ rights flourished in New 
Zealand and others such as freedom of conscience--as in the case of conscientious objectors--would 
be tested. 
141 Otherwise described as the emergence of a supranational concept of the rule of law: Philip Joseph 
Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (Wellington, Thomson Brookers, 2007), at 
179. 
142 This is unsurprising given the overlap between the content of what are considered fundamental 
constitutional rights and the legal claims we call human rights, particularly in describing the basic 
rights an individual is seen to hold against the state: Duncan Webb, Katherine Sanders and Paul 
Scott The New Zeland Legal System: Structures and Processes (5th ed) (Wellington, LexisNexis, 
2010) at 53.  This is one of the ironies of the resistance of various liberal jurisdictions to human 
rights integration.  This is also unsurprising in view of the common post-Enlightenment and liberal 
individualist origins shared by human rights and constitutional rights: See discussion in Chapter 
Five at 5.2. 
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are constitutional statutes” and “no ordinary statute[s]”.143  The Race Relations Act 
1971 (RRA)144  and the Human Rights Commission Act 1977 145  were the first 
formal protections against discrimination in New Zealand but also intentional 
efforts to incorporate its human rights treaty obligations.146  Later, the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990147 (BoRA) rejected the adoption of an American-style 
written constitution148 instead codifying international human rights as part of New 
Zealand’s ‘unwritten’ constitution.  
The BoRA has “acquired special status as a result of the rights it protects” and fills 
a fundamental constitutional role as it “is principally directed at public-sector 
activity, including actions of the legislature, the executive and judiciary”.149  In fact, 
the BoRA was drafted to “affirm New Zealand’s commitment to the [ICCPR]” but 
also “[t]o affirm, protect, and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
New Zealand” generally.150  The BoRA appears to affirm the Article 3 human right 
to equality.151  Similarly, as noted by the Court of Appeal:  
                                                          
143  Joseph, above n 141, at 269.  His emphasis.  As described in Chapter 1, New Zealand’s 
Westminsterian constitution is characterized as “unwritten”, meaning that it is contained in a variety 
of sources including legislation.  Although almost none of these are entrenched and none constitute 
supreme law comparable to the US Constitution, all legislation enjoys a certain degree of supremacy 
under the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.  Parliamentary sovereignty is the apparent 
counterpart of the plenary power doctrine in the US which governs so much of the federal-Indian 
and federal-Native Hawaiian relationships.  In New Zealand, “What the statute itself enacts cannot 
be unlawful, because [it] is the highest form of law that is known to this country.  It is the law which 
prevails over every other form of law, and it is not for the court to say that a parliamentary 
enactment…is illegal”: Cheney v Conn [1968] 1 WLR.242 at 247.  Thus, without being entrenched 
in a written constitution, legislature-made law cannot be changed by any other person or body.  
144 Race Relations Act 1971 [RRA]. 
145 Human Rights Commission Act 1977. See discussion in Lorraine Skiffington “Human Rights 
Act” Mazengarb’s Employment Law (NZ) (online ed) para 4000.1. 
146 For instance, the RRA was specifically enacted to meet New Zealand’s obligations under the 
United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.  In 1971, the 
Marshall government wanted to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination which required enacting consistent domestic law: Former Race 
Relations Commissioner Joris de Bres, “Race relations law marks its 40th anniversary” (1 April 2012) 
Human Rights Commission  <www.hrc.co.nz>.  As the twin International Covenants were only 
adopted in 1966, these responses were relatively rapid.   
147  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 [BoRA]. 
148 A document which would have incorporated the Treaty of Waitangi as supreme, entrenched, 
undoubtedly constitutional law: see Geoffrey Palmer A Bill Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper 
[1985] 1 AJHR A6. 
149  New Zealand Human Rights Commission Human Rights in New Zealand 2010—Nga Tika 
Tangata O Aotearoa 2010 at 29. 
150 BoRA, Title. 
151 ICCPR, Article 3 reads: “The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal 
right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present 
Covenant.” 
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The long title of the HRA [Human Rights Act 1993] states that the Act is intended 
“to provide better protection of human rights” in New Zealand “in general 
accordance with the United Nations Covenants or Conventions on Human 
Rights”.152 
The plurality of these terms suggests affirmation of both Covenants’—the CPR-
based ICCPR and ESCR-protecting ICESCR—and also, potentially, an unspecified 
group of UN ‘Conventions’. New Zealand legislation also directly incorporates 
several other international treaties.153  Where the United States has not yet adopted 
the ICESCR, has demonstrated a ‘pick-and-choose’ attitude towards its ICCPR 
commitments and failed to adopt or ratify other key instruments guaranteeing 
equality in education such as CEDAW and the Children’s Convention,154 New 
Zealand has adopted and ratified all these instruments with few reservations.155   
 
7.3.2 A SUBSTANTIVE EVERYONE/NO-ONE AND COMPLEX SOMEONE  
Influenced by human rights, New Zealand law initially suggests a Rawlsian veil of 
ignorance and American jurisprudence including Bakke and Rice but displays 
greater awareness of complex discrimination and is aimed at substantive equality.   
While not guaranteeing equal protection per se, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 (BoRA) usually references “no one”, “everyone”, “every person”, or “every 
New Zealand citizen”.156 As Paul Rishworth and others describe, such language 
conveys the idea that “individuals have rights because each individual matters, and 
matters equally”.157   
                                                          
152 In the case of Ministry of Health v Atkinson [2012] NZCA 184, para 33.  The Court of Appeal 
is New Zealand’s second highest court of appeal.  Emphasis added. 
153 Including the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, the Paris Convention, the TRIPS 
Agreement, and Kyoto Protocol. 
154 See discussion in Chapter 2 at 2.5. 
155 Race Convention 1966 signed 25 Oct 1966, ratified 22 Nov 1972; ICESCR 1966 signed 12 Nov 
1968, ratified 28 Dec 1978; ICCPR 1966 signed 12 Nov 1968, ratified 28 Dec 1978; CEDAW 1979 
signed 17 Jul 1980, ratified 10 Jan 1985 with reservations specific to Niue and Cook Islands; 
Children’s Convention 1989 signed 1 Oct 1990, ratified 6 Apr 1993, with one reservation over 
provision of benefits for overstayer children.   
156 The exception is s 20 which recognizes, like the Minorities Declaration 1990 and Article 27 of 
the ICCPR,  the “[r]ights of minorities” and while referencing the individual, that is “[a] person who 
belongs to an ethnic, religious, or linguistic minority in New Zealand”. 
157 Paul Rishworth and others The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 
2003). 
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More importantly, section 19(1) of the BoRA affirms “[f]reedom from 
discrimination”. 158   The Human Rights Act 1993 (HRA)—as in antebellum 
American constitutional amendments—speaks in no-one terms recognizing various 
identities as prohibited grounds for unlawful discrimination including: “sex”, 
“marital status”, religion, “ethical belief”, “disability”, “age”, “political opinion”, 
“employment status”, “family status” and “sexual orientation”.  “[C]olour”, “race” 
and “ethnic or national origins”159 are just a few prohibited grounds.    
New Zealand courts and tribunals have, like American federal courts, interpreted 
equality in terms of identical treatment.  In the Court of Appeal,160 plaintiffs in 
Quilter v Attorney-General [1998]161 argued that a failure to treat same-sex couples 
the same as heterosexual couples in terms of marriage constituted discrimination 
on the grounds of sexual orientation.  The plaintiffs were unsuccessful but later 
courts approved Thomas J’s dissenting interpretation of equality as same 
treatment.162   In An Jian v Residence Review Board (2006), the High Court of New 
Zealand recognized “unjustifiably different treatment… assessed by reference to an 
appropriate comparator group” as discrimination163 —a definition not unlike the 
trammelling step of the Weber-Johnson test.  In Claymore Management Ltd v 
Anderson [2003], the High Court also suggested that the effect of differential 
treatment on an appropriate comparator person or group will reveal the 
discrimination.164   
In addition to these everyone narratives, however, New Zealand law is also fairly 
comfortable with a complex someone narrative which approves both special 
measures and minority rights. 
                                                          
158 NZ Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 19. 
159 See HRA 1993, s 21 “Prohibited grounds of discrimination”. 
160 At the time, the highest court of appeal within New Zealand itself.   
161 Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523 (CA). 
162 Thomas J’s reasoning was also persuasive with Parliamentarians in 2013 when the Marriage 
(Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act 2013 (making same-sex marriage legal in New Zealand) 
passed 19 August 2013 based largely on arguments which interpreted equality as same treatment. 
163 An Jian v Residence Review Board 3/8/06, Glendall J, HC Wellington CIV-2005-485-1600. 
164 Claymore Management Ltd v. Anderson [2003] 2 NZLR 537 (HC).  In Quilter, Justice Tipping 
in the majority had asked—not unlike the intermediate scrutiny test in Kamehameha—whether the 
“distinction or differentiation had the effect of imposing burdens, obligations or disadvantages on 
some individual or group not imposed on others”: Quilter at 575. Justice Thomas in dissent 
considered the Marriage Act discriminatory at the outset because it treated homosexual couples 
differently: Quilter, above n 161, at 540. 
  333 
 
As discussed in previous chapters, international human rights treaties recognize the 
difference between de jure and de facto, direct and indirect, formal and systematic 
or structural discrimination.165  Section 65 of the HRA recognizes: 
Where any conduct, practice, requirement, or condition that is not apparently in 
contravention of any provision of this Part has the effect of treating a person or 
group of persons differently on 1 of the prohibited grounds of discrimination in a 
situation where such treatment would be unlawful under any provision of this Part 
other than this section, that conduct, practice, condition, or requirement shall be 
unlawful under that provision unless the person whose conduct or practice is in 
issue, or who imposes the condition or requirement, establishes good reason for 
it.166 
Similarly, the High Court has recognized167 that discrimination can be indirect or 
“neutral on its face but ha[ve] a disproportionate effect on an identifiable group 
because of a particular characteristic of that group”.168 
The Human Rights Commission (HRC) was established by the HRA and is charged 
with promoting and protecting human rights in New Zealand.  It receives 
complaints regarding human rights and can make declaratory judgments. 169  
Echoing early Permanent Court of Justice minority education cases, 170 the HRC 
has said: 
Formal equality is equal treatment before the law.  It reflects the Aristotelian notion 
that, to ensure consistent treatment, like should be treated alike.  However, equal 
treatment does not always ensure equal outcomes, because past or ongoing 
discrimination can mean that equal treatment simply reinforces existing 
inequalities.  To achieve substantive equality—that is, equality of outcomes—
some groups will need to be treated differently.  It follows that not all different 
treatment will be considered discriminatory…171 
The constitutional/human rights interface in the BoRA and HRA approves several 
identity-aware exceptions to the everyone/no-one narrative.  While some twenty 
                                                          
165 See Chapters 5 and 6. 
166 HRA, s 65.  Emphasis added.  The HRCA had previously made “discrimination by subterfuge” 
unlawful: Human Rights Commission Act 1977, s 27.  Also see Proceedings Commissioner v Air 
New Zealand (1989) 2 NZLEC 96, 614; (1988) 7 NZAR 462. 
167 An Jian and Talley’s Fisheries Ltd v Lewis (2007) 14/06/07 Sinion France J, HC Wellington CIV-
2005-485-1750 
168 See commentary in Joseph,above n 141, at 73-74.  Also compare An Jian, para 24, and Talley’s, 
para 52. 
169 See Human Rights Act 1993, especially sections 5-6.  It does not hear complaints regarding the 
BoRA which is dealt with by the High Court, Court of Appeals and Supreme Court. 
170 For instance, Minority Schools in Albania (Advisory Opinion) (1935) PCIJ (series A/B) No 64 
discussed in Chapter Five at 5.2.3. 
171 HRC, “Human Rights in New Zealand 2010”, at 27. 
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sections of the HRA identify prohibited grounds, 31 recognize exceptions.  Other 
provisions justify different treatment in terms of identity relative to religion, privacy, 
age, politics, family status or where certain employment172 is concerned.  Rather 
than a weakened standard, these exceptions display pragmatic flexibility driven by 
substantial equality.173   
Importantly, section 73 of the HRA recognizes: 
Measures to ensure equality  
(1) Anything done or omitted which would otherwise constitute a breach of any of the 
provisions of this Part shall not constitute such a breach if— 
(a) it is done or omitted in good faith for the purpose of assisting or advancing persons 
or groups of persons, being in each case persons against whom discrimination is 
unlawful by virtue of this Part; and 
(b) those persons or groups need or may reasonably be supposed to need assistance or 
advancement in order to achieve an equal place with other members of the 
community.174 
Section 19(2) of the BoRA, referencing the HRA, reiterates: 
Measures taken in good faith for the purpose of assisting or advancing persons or 
groups of persons disadvantaged because of discrimination that is unlawful by 
virtue of Part II of the Human Rights Act 1993 do not constitute discrimination.175 
When examining a complaint, the Human Rights Review Tribunal (HRRT)—a 
quasi-judicial body dealing with claims relating to breaches of the HRA176—can 
similarly approve a prima facie discriminatory practice—in effect, a practice where 
                                                          
172 See respectively, HRA, ss 27, 28, 30, 32 and 31. 
173 For example, while maternity is a specifically prohibited ground for different treatment under 
section 21(1)(a), under section 74, “preferential treatment granted by reason of…a woman's 
pregnancy or childbirth; or a person's responsibility for part-time care or full-time care of children 
or other dependents does not breach the Act.  Interestingly, such sections are intended “[f]or the 
avoidance of doubt”: see HRA 1993, s 74. 
174 Human Rights Act 1993, s 73(1). 
175 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 19(2). 
176 As well as the Privacy Act 1993 and the Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994 including 
those regarding discrimination: “Human Rights Review Tribunal”, Ministry of Justice website, 
found at http://www.justice.govt.nz/tribunals/human-rights-review-tribunal, dated 29/8/15.  The 
HRRT is an “expert forum for hearing” claims relating to breaches of human rights in NZ.  
Complaints regarding the HRA must be made to the Human Rights Commission before a claim is 
made to the HRRT.  It has the power to award compensatory damages and make a range of orders. 
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some identification takes place—if there is a “genuine occupational qualification” 
or “genuine justification”.177   
The BoRA also recognizes the complex someone human rights of individual 
members of “ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities” who have the right “in 
community with other members of that minority to enjoy the culture, to profess and 
practise the religion, or to use the language, of that minority”.178  The Ministry of 
Justice has approved a UNDRIP-like definition of ‘minority’, 179  which 
distinguishes Pacific Island communities 180  from Māori, 181  in terms of self-
determination.  As in UNDRIP Article 14, minority rights in New Zealand sit 
comfortably with everyone/no-one rights and blur the lines between individual and 
collective rights. 
 
7.3.3 THE SPECIFICALLY MĀORI LEARNER 
Prior to intentional human rights incorporation, there was already a strong 
indigenous multi-narrative of equality in New Zealand.  Rather than being 
superseded, forgotten or ignored, local narratives are aware of prior sovereignty, 
ongoing harm and a historical continuum of rights. 
                                                          
177 See Human Rights Act 1993, s 97 and Avis Rent-A-Car Ltd v Proceedings Commissioner (1998) 
5 HRNZ 501.  Immediately, this human rights-based legislation clarifies the confusion of the Ninth 
Circuit in the Kamehameha case, where it was unsure of a Carolene Products differentiation in 
outcomes provided allowed us to differentiate between discriminatory policies and those justified in 
terms of substantial equality.   In contrast to the American case law, “qualification” and justification” 
are not automatically offensive terms associated only with intentionally discriminatory practices 
such as grandfather clauses but a reasonable exception to the rule of identity-blind equal protection.   
178 Intentionally echoing Article 27 of the ICCPR, NZBoRA, s 20: “Rights of minorities--A person 
who belongs to an ethnic, religious, or linguistic minority in New Zealand shall not be denied the 
right, in community with other members of that minority, to enjoy the culture, to profess and practise 
the religion, or to use the language, of that minority”.   
179 The Ministry of Justice recognizes international definitions of minorities: see “International and 
domestic law on minorities” Ministry of Justice <www.justice.govt.nz> at 5.2. 
180 “There appears to be little doubt that Pacific people in New Zealand have the status of "minority" 
groups at international law, to whom rights flow under Article 27 of the ICCPR, as members of their 
national groups. In light of their sense of shared identity, it is also probable that Pacific people 
collectively constitute a minority group at international law.”: see “International and domestic law 
on minorities” Ministry of Justice <www.justice.govt.nz> at 5.2. 
181 As discussed in previous chapters, Māori might still be considered a minority fall into cultural, 
religious and linguistic categories.  Both Article 14(3) of UNDRIP and s 20 of the BoRA echo 
Article 27 of the ICCPR, s 20 repeating it almost verbatim.   
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As mentioned previously, the Treaty itself guarantees everyone equal protection to 
Māori under Article III, 182 “[t]he clearest statement on equality in New Zealand”.183 
Although Article III dichotomously conflates Māori with the settler citizenry, it 
displays the emphasized legality characteristic of UNDRIP and other human rights 
instruments by insisting that Māori are equal to other rightsholders.  Given Article 
III’s everyone guarantee, the Treaty has been viewed as a “human rights document”: 
With regard to universal human rights—that is those recognized in the modern 
international human rights framework including ESC rights—these are guaranteed 
to all the people of New Zealand and extended to Māori under article 3 of the 
Treaty as ‘all the Rights and Privileges of British subjects’.  This can be interpreted 
to now extend to those rights guaranteed by later processes adopted or acceded to 
by New Zealand, such as the international human rights instruments…184 
Correspondingly, the HRA requires the Human Rights Commission “to have a 
better understanding of …the Treaty of Waitangi” to better understand human rights 
in “domestic and international human rights law”. 185   
However, Article III is clearly addressed to Māori as Treaty partners and Article II, 
as discussed previously, recognizes the right of Māori to self-determination or “tino 
rangatiratanga”186—a term translated as “the unqualified exercise of chieftainship 
over their lands, villages, and all their property and ‘taonga’, or treasures”. 187  
Article II entails a specifically indigenous narrative which has little to do with 
traditional liberal aims and everything to do with a unique historico-legal context 
and political rather than racial status. 
                                                          
182 That is, “all the Rights and Privileges of British Subjects”: English version of the Treaty. 
183 “Apart from this, there is no specific reference in New Zealand law to equality”: HRC, “Human 
Rights in New Zealand 2010”, at 28. Ironically, this statement of sameness comes from the Treaty, 
a document which essentially defines the constitutional relationship between the Crown and Māori, 
between historic settler and an indigenous people into the present.  In an ironic twist on narratives, 
a settler-indigenous treaty of cession guarantees Māori the same rights enjoyed by other New 
Zealanders but is also the only direct claim that anyone can make to equal protection. 
184 Karen Meikle “Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Protection in Aotearoa New Zealand—an 
Overview” in Margaret Bedggood and Chris Gledhill (eds) Law into Action : Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in Aotearoa New Zealand (Wellington, Thomson Reuters, 2011) 39 at 45-46. 
185 Sections 5(2)(d) & 11(1)(a)(iii), respectively: establishing the purpose of the Human Rights 
Commission “to promote by research, education, and discussion a better understanding of the human 
rights dimensions of the Treaty of Waitangi and their relationship with domestic and international 
human rights law”; and criteria for selection of commissioners to include “knowledge of, or 
experience in…the Treaty of Waitangi and rights of indigenous peoples”. 
186 Article II, Treaty of Waitangi. 
187 See Ruru, above n 48, on translation issues. 
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Much like UNDRIP, Article II preserves at least an internal version of self-
determination which “affords Māori greater control over the nature of policies and 
programmes that are intended to benefit Māori lives”—that is, “tino 
rangatiratanga”.188  In terms of access to a richer rational revision context, it is 
collectively exercised and depends on improved access to resources and 
participation in development and decision-making.  At its core, this self-
determination189 implies a right to “control their own destinies” comparable to the 
human “right to freely determine social, cultural, political, and economic 
development within the State”.190  In light of modern interpretations of ‘taonga’, 
indigenous self-determination includes UNDRIP-like rights to preserve, protect and 
promote language, culture and education itself. 
This indigenous multi-narrative has been evident in crucial constitutional 
developments relating to the Treaty.  Significantly, in 1975, the government passed 
the Treaty of Waitangi Act (ToWA). 191   After generations of Treaty denial, 
customary rights suppression and extinguishment—and after an extensive, 
grassroots struggle by Māori to have their rights recognized192—the New Zealand 
government legislatively affirmed “the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi”193 and 
established “a Tribunal to make recommendations on claims relating to the practical 
application of the Treaty and to determine whether certain matters are inconsistent 
with the principles of the Treaty.”194 
The ToWA appears to narrate liberal principles including non-discrimination and 
self-determination.  First, it interprets Māori identity both by “race” and ancestry, 
the “Treaty” as both the English and Māori versions, and recognizes the possibility 
and reality of historic, ongoing and future Treaty violations.195  It binds the Crown 
outright 196  and is meant to address discrimination.  Māori, individually or 
                                                          
188 Veronica Tawhai “Citizenship and Education” in Mulholland and Tawhai, above n 39, at 294. 
189 Ibid, at 295.  See UNDRIP, art 23; and ILO 169, art 6. 
190 HRC The Right to Education: He Tāpapa Mātauranga—A Discussion Document (Nov 2003) at 
12. 
191 Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975. 
192 See, for instance, Walker, above n 9. 
193 See New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General (Lands Case) [1987] 1 NZLR 641 (CA), 
per Cooke P regarding fiduciary duty, good faith, reciprocity and active protection. 
194 Long title of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975. 
195 Section 2. 
196 Section 3. 
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collectively,197 can bring claims to the Waitangi Tribunal where “he or she, or any 
group of Māoris of which he or she is a member is or is likely to be prejudicially 
affected.”198 
The Waitangi Tribunal has the power to interpret the Treaty, to determine its 
meaning and effect, to question legislation and other parliamentary acts against the 
Treaty199 and, ultimately, recommend to the Crown that certain “action be taken to 
compensate for or remove the prejudice or to prevent other persons from being 
similarly affected in the future.”200  Thus, the ToWA is aware of discrimination in 
the past, present and future tense.  Ultimately, the Tribunal can also consider “Māori 
custom or usage” to resolve questions of fact.201   
The ToWA was followed by legislation countering the assimilative discourse of the 
Native Schools system.  Similar to the 1978 amendments to Hawaii’s constitution, 
the Māori Language Act 1987 which declared Māori an official language of New 
Zealand and established the Māori Language Commission to protect and promote—
even “effect”—the use of the language. 202   Various acts including the Local 
Government Act 2002203 and the Resource Management Act 1991204 refer to the 
principles of the Treaty, recognize Māori tikanga, and specifically identify Māori 
rights and responsibilities.  Similarly, Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993 205 
recognizes the unique relationship between Māori and the Crown and reaffirms 
retained rangatiratanga.  
As of May 2014, there were at least 138 current legislative acts passed or bills 
before Parliament206 which refer to the Treaty and/or incorporate its principles.  In 
addition to those mentioned above, the Supreme Court Act 2003207 recognizes that 
the Treaty is consistent with “important legal matters” and “an understanding of 
                                                          
197 Section 6(1)(a-d). 
198 Section 6(1). 
199 Section 6(1). 
200 Section 6(3). 
201 Or refer such question to the Māori Land Court for clarification: s 6A.   
202 Māori Language Act 1987, ss 3 and 6. 
203 Local Government Act 2002, s 4. 
204 Resource Management Act 1991, s 8. 
205 Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993, ss 7, 18, 30H and 339. 
206 A search for “treaty of waitangi” at Parliamentary Counsel Office, New Zealand Legislation 
<www.legislation.govt.nz> returns 146 results. 
207 Sections 3 and 13. 
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New Zealand conditions, history, and traditions”. 208  Under s 13(3), “a significant 
issue relating to the Treaty of Waitangi is a matter of general or public importance” 
and, therefore, appealable “in the interests of justice”.209  Thus, Treaty matters are 
justiciable not just as questions before the Waitangi Tribunal but via the common 
courts and, potentially, through other quasi-judicial bodies including the HRRT. 
The overlap between human rights and indigenous rights is obvious. 
There is a similar overlap between the Treaty and constitutional rights because, as 
in the case of human rights, the Treaty has impacted the constitutional role of the 
judiciary itself.  Matthew Palmer has written that the landmark NZ Māori Council 
v A-G (Lands Case) [1987]210, for instance, “imposed far greater obligations on the 
Crown than had been previously understood or accepted by Parliament, the 
executive government and many New Zealanders.” 211   Treaty principles bind 
Parliament regardless of incorporation but legislative incorporation binds 
Parliament by its own terms, or rather its own sovereignty.  As required, the Court 
of Appeal took a purposive, broad and liberal approach to the Treaty presuming 
good faith, active protection and other principles212 consistent with the Crown’s 
duties and Māori self-determination under the Treaty. 
Thus, Māori retain both rights to individual equal protection and collective self-
determination consistent with Articles II and III of the Treaty.  This expanded 
narrative of self-determination seems to recognize prior sovereignty, ongoing harm 
and a historical continuum of indigenous rights.  It also appears to form a nexus of 
human, indigenous and constitutional rights. 
 
                                                          
208 Sections 3 and 13. 
209 Supreme Court Act 2003, s 13: “Criteria for leave to appeal--(1) The Supreme Court must not 
give leave to appeal to it unless it is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice for the 
Court to hear and determine the proposed appeal.  (2) It is necessary in the interests of justice for 
the Supreme Court to hear and determine a proposed appeal if—(a) the appeal involves a matter of 
general or public importance; or (b) a substantial miscarriage of justice may have occurred, or may 
occur unless the appeal is heard; or (c) the appeal involves a matter of general commercial 
significance. (3) For the purposes of subsection (2), a significant issue relating to the Treaty of 
Waitangi is a matter of general or public importance”. 
210 Discussed in Matthew Palmer The Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand’s Law and Constitution 
(Wellington, Victoria University Press, 2008), at 241. 
211 Ibid. 
212 Joseph, above n 141, at 221. 
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7.3.4 AN INDIGENOUS MULTI-NARRATIVE RIGHT TO EDUCATION 
The law of Aotearoa New Zealand appears to embrace a complex right to education. 
Section 3 of the Education Act 1989 affirms the “Right to free primary and 
secondary education”: 
…Every person who is not an international student is entitled to free enrolment and 
free education at any State school or partnership school kura hourua during the 
period beginning on the person's fifth birthday and ending on 1 January after the 
person's 19th birthday.213 
In universal terms, “[e]very person” includes citizens, permanent residents and the 
children of others.  Like the early international right, education is compulsory for 
“New Zealand citizens between 6 and 16”,214  respectful of parental choice, 215 
counters child labor,216 and recognizes the potential value of private schools217 and 
gender-specific schools and parallel education systems.218 Like complex someone 
instruments it outlines age-specific rights,219 recognizes the equal right of learners 
with disabilities to primary and secondary education 220  and is prohibitive of 
corporal punishment.221  Other sections of the Education Act 1989 echo the 4-A 
Scheme of the international right as they address aspects of access,222 availability,223 
and acceptability224 at least.  Sections 8 and 9, for instance, recognize that learners 
with disabilities have the “same right” to education at public schools “as people 
who do not”.  However, upon consultation with parents, such learners may be 
                                                          
213 Education Act 1989, s 3. 
214 Education Act 1989, s 20(1). 
215 Education Act 1989, ss 25A and 25AA.  See “Parent’s right to entry under s 319A.  Compare 
with American cases recognizing traditional parental education rights including Meyer v Nebraska 
262 US 390 (1923) and Pierce v Society of Sisters 268 US 510 (1925).   
216 Education Act 1989, s 30.  
217 Education Act 1989, s 35N provides public funds for private schools. 2013 amendments to the 
Education Act 1989 have also established Kura Hourua or Partnership Schools intended to bring 
together business and struggling schools in partnership: Education Act 1989, Part 12A.  Note 
concerns over the lack of accountability of such schools expressed by the UN Special Rapporteur 
on Education: see Special Rapporteur’s report 2014 discussed in Chapter Five at 5.4.3. 
218 Education Act 1989, ss 146A & 155. 
219 See, for instance, in terms of Kohanga Reo and other Early Childhood Education provision. 
220 Section 8. 
221 Education Act 1989, s 139A. 
222 Fees cap set under s 234A. 
223 Section 20(2), for instance, dictates that a child under 7 is not required to be enrolled at a schools 
which is more than 3 kilometres away from their residence. 
224 For instance, 25A and 25AA on “Release from tuition on religious or cultural grounds”… and 
various provisions on teacher qualifications.  Also see sections on Kura Kaupapa Māori and 
character school in Part 12.  
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enrolled at special schools, or in special classes or programs.  Under s 98 of the 
Education Act 1964, the Minister of Education similarly has the flexibility to 
“[e]stablish any special school…special class, clinic, or service”.225 
Like early no-one instruments, the right is expressed elsewhere in terms of non-
discrimination.  Under the HRA, the right to non-discrimination applies to 
“[v]ocational training bodies”, 226  “educational establishments”, and—like the 
American s 1981—contractual relationships and the “[p]rovision of goods and 
services”.227  However, where the purpose of the policy has been minimized in 
United States federal jurisprudence,228 New Zealand law has long recognized that 
educational institutions which prefer a certain “sex, race, colour, or religious belief” 
in admissions do not necessarily breach the legislation where there is inequality 
between groups and where done to remedy those disparities.229   Again, this is 
consistent with various human rights instruments, including UNDRIP. 
In contrast to the judicial confusion apparent in Kamehameha, section 58 of the 
HRA currently recognizes “[e]xceptions in relation to establishments for particular 
groups”: 
An educational establishment maintained wholly or principally for students of one 
sex, race, or religious belief, or for students with a particular disability, or for 
students in a particular age group, or the authority responsible for the control of any 
such establishment, does not commit a breach of section 57 by refusing to admit 
students of a different sex, race, or religious belief, or students not having that 
disability or not being in that age group.230  
Subsection (1) anticipates a privately or publically funded school which prefers 
certain minority identities in admission, when such preference would certainly 
constitute trammelling under United States federal law and be fatal to the policy. 
                                                          
225 Education Act 1964, s 98. 
226 HRA 1993, s 40. 
227 HRA 1993, s 44.  Compare with s 1981 at stake in Kamehameha case regarding broad contractual 
rights often in employment context. 
228 See discussion of Carolene Products in the Kamehameha case, and relevant discussion in Chapter 
Three. 
229 Human Rights Commission Act 1977, s 28.  Ironically, during an era when the substantial 
equality reasoning of Brown was already beginning to be forgotten, New Zealand drew a clear line 
between outright discrimination and special measures meant to overcome discrimination.   While 
US jurisprudence has almost completely forgotten Brown since, the unwritten constitution of New 
Zealand continues to reaffirm this Carolene Products-like distinction in human rights based 
legislation. 
230 Human Rights Act 1993, s 58.  Emphasis added. 
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New Zealand law also recognizes the Māori learner specifically.  Such a right was 
only acknowledged after prolonged struggle and sustained activism and pressure on 
the government by Māori to have their Treaty rights recognized.  At the grassroots 
level, Māori autonomously established kōhanga reo—or preschool ‘language 
nests’—in the midst of the Māori language renaissance of the 1970s as a self-
generated remedy to cultural and identity loss.231  As these learners grew older, 
Māori re-established a variety of kura kaupapa Māori—or Māori philosophy-driven 
schools—to grow with them.232  These “groundswell” 233 developments, consistent 
with agency and Treaty rights to self-determination, are now publically funded and 
legally recognized.   
The Education Act 1989 requires all school boards “to acknowledge the principles 
of the Treaty of Waitangi” in carrying out their duties,234 provides for the funding 
of kōhanga reo 235  and the establishment of Kura Kaupapa Māori 236  where an 
identity-specific “approach to teaching and learning”, Te Aho Matua, governs. 237  
Law and curricula allow for various Māori-curriculum settings including bilingual 
and full-immersion education, Māori curriculum units and classrooms within 
mainstream schools and state-sponsored Māori curriculum schools, and parallel 
education systems covering a wide range of age groups from kōhanga reo to tertiary 
                                                          
231 Chapter 2: “He Kupu Onamata mō te Kōhanga Reo: The History of the Kōhanga Reo Movement”, 
in Waitangi Tribunal Report 2013, Matua Rautia: The Report on the Kōhanga Reo Claim (WAI 
2336). The Kohanga Reo movement was, of course, part of a wider movement by Maori beginning 
in the 1970s to reclaim Treaty rights amidst growing awareness of complex discrimination and 
disparities. 
232 Maori philosophy schools, as described in HRC, “Human Rights and the Treaty of Waitangi” pdf 
found at <www.hrc.co.nz> at 248.   
233 Above n 231, at 14. 
234 Education Act 1989, s 181. 
235 Literally ‘language nests’ or Māori-medium preschools.  Funding provided for in s 84 
236 Maori philosophy schools, as described in HRC, Human Rights and the Treaty of Waitangi, at 
248.  Establishment provided for via s 155 of the Education Standards Act 2001.  However, also see 
Education (Early Childhood Centres) Regulations 1998 ss 15 and 36A and Education (Early 
Childhood Services) Regulations 2008 s 44, where kōhanga reo are set apart in terms of certain 
standards and governance remains with the National Kōhanga Reo Trust, the grassroots Maori 
organisation which started the movement. 
237 Section 155A.  See ss 11H, 61, 78T, 154A, 155, 155A, 155B, 155C and 155E. This approach has 
been summarized thus: Presented in the Māori language, Te Aho Matua is the foundation document 
and driving force for Kura Kaupapa Māori. It lays down the principles by which Kura Kaupapa 
Māori identify themselves as a unified group committed to a unique schooling system which they 
regard as being vital to the education of their children… As the founding document for Kura 
Kaupapa Māori, Te Aho Matua describes a Māori world view …of education, teaching and 
learning.”:  “Te Piko o te Māhuri: The key attributes of successful Kura Kaupapa Māori” Ministry 
of Education <www.educationcounts.govt.nz>.   
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institutions.  The prioritization of Māori identity in such programmes and schools 
is straightforward. 
The Waitangi Tribunal has also interpreted the Treaty in terms of education on 
several occasions.  It has recognized various, specifically Māori, rights in education 
including: Article II rangatiratanga over taonga including te reo Māori (Māori 
language) and mātauranga (indigenous knowledge); government duties of active 
promotion and protection of such taonga, consultation and participation; 238 
partnership; kāwanatanga (governance), rangatiratanga (self-determination) and 
kaitiakitanga (guardianship), options and equity.239  In various instances, the Crown 
failed in its positive duties when it closed a bilingual rural school serving Māori 
learners, failed to provide proper support for such a school,240 did not provide 
sufficient funding, strategic policy or targeted measures to address disparities,241 
failed to develop indicators to measure implementation and progress of Māori 
students, and failed to provide an identity-specific and culturally appropriate policy 
framework for Māori-curriculum early childhood education.242 
A more substantial equality in education is also specifically guaranteed in the recent 
2013 amendments to the Education Act 1989 regarding Kura Hourua/Partnership 
Schools legislatively designed to target the needs of Māori and other at-risk 
learners.243  Those amendments also require application of the human rights-based 
BoRA to education,244 a requirement which presumably entails the operation of s 
19’s right to non-discrimination and s 20’s minority rights among others. 
Thus, the right to education in Aotearoa New Zealand clearly exhibits multi-
narrative features of the international human right to education and applies to 
                                                          
238 See Waitangi Tribunal Report 2003 The Mokai School Report (Wai 789) at 137. 
239 See extensive recent discussion on Treaty principles in terms of education in Waitangi Tribunal 
Kōhanga Reo Claim, above n 231, at 55-71. 
240 Mokai School Report, above n 238.  
241 Waitangi Tribunal Report on the Aotearoa Institute Claim Concerning Te Wananga o Aotearoa 
(Wai 1298, 2005). 
242 Kohanga Reo claim above n 242. 
243 These amendments established Kura Hourua or Partnership Schools intended to bring together 
business and private funding and struggling schools in partnership especially those with Māori and 
Pacific Island students: see Education Act 1989, Part 12A and Ministry of Education definition of 
“Kura Hourua” Ministry of Education  <www.minedu.govt.nz>.   
244 Section 158W of the Education Act 1989 specifically dictates the application of s 3(b) of the 
BoRA to Kura Hourua.  That is, the sponsors of such schools—like others—are considered to be 
public bodies to whose actions the BoRA will apply including, presumably s 19’s non-discrimination 
guarantee. 
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everyone, no-one, someone and the indigenous learner specifically. However, it 
also references a homegrown self-determination arising from a unique historico-
legal context.   
 
7.4 ADAMANT CRITICISMS 
Despite its potential to address the Māori moʻolelo, this multi-narrative may yet be 
subject to an adamant everyone/no-one narrative.  Three New Zealand cases exhibit 
all too familiar reasoning and rhetoric which seemingly ignores complex 
discrimination and disparities unrelentingly attracted to indigenous identity, as well 
as the unique historical context of Māori rights.  This section examines three 
critiques challenging the domestic multi-narrative, namely reverse discrimination, 
ESCR denial, and Treaty minimization as potentially undermining the expanded 
multi-narrative.  
 
7.4.1 REVERSE DISCRIMINATION 
As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, American federal jurisprudence currently 
prioritizes an adamant everyone/no-one narrative of equality which presumes 
something like Rawls’ original position and veil of ignorance at best but also 
perhaps a Posnerian utilitarian calculation or Waldron’s cosmopolitan conflation of 
interests. 245   This narrative appears to account for the success of reverse 
discrimination arguments in federal courts in recent decades and apparent confusion 
of the Ninth Circuit in regards to the Kamehameha admissions policy.  
Despite its human rights content, the only reverse discrimination case in New 
Zealand found a policy which prioritized Māori in admissions discriminatory upon 
application of a Weber-Johnson-like test.  Arguments in Amaltal Fishing Co v 
Nelson Polytechnic [1996] (Amaltal II)246 recall Bakke, the University of Michigan 
                                                          
245 See Chapter Four. 
246 Amaltal Fishing Co Ltd v Nelson Polytechnic [1996] NZAR 97 [Amaltal II].  Historically, the 
case spans a period of transition during which the first generation of New Zealand human rights 
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cases and Kamehameha dissent.  Ironically, the case was brought on the basis of 
human rights.   
A fishing training course was offered only twice a year with numbers limited to 14 
places in each intake.247  Following an agreement with a government body,248 the 
Polytechnic reserved a certain amount of spots in the course for Māori and Pacific 
Islanders.  Fees for “target group” members were government subsidized while 
others’ were not.  Consistent with the agreement, three spaces in the first round of 
1994 were reserved for target group members while all fourteen spots in the second 
round were reserved for the target group.   
The plaintiff, a fishing company which frequently sponsored individuals for the 
course,249 alleged discrimination under the RRA, HRCA and HRA250 when one of 
its intended sponsorees failed to secure a spot in either intake.  When its complaint 
was not upheld by the Race Relations Conciliator, Amaltal appealed to the 
Complaints Review Tribunal (CRT).251  
                                                          
legislation, namely the Race Relations Act 1971(‘RRA’) and the Human Rights Commission Act 
1977 (‘HRCA’) which had been frequently amended over the years, were repealed by the enactment 
of the Human Rights Act 1993 (‘HRA’).   The case was pre-Human Rights Tribunal, the human 
rights complaint in question brought before its forerunner, the Complaints Review Tribunal (CRT). 
247 The course taught fishing, the primary industry of the city in which it was offered—as well as in 
New Zealand—making acceptance very competitive. 
248 An agreement between the Polytechnic and a legislation- and policy-mandated government body 
called the Education and Training Support Agency (ETSA). 
249 As a procedural issue, the Tribunal found that the company fulfilled the criteria for an “aggrieved 
person” under Race Relations Act, s 17, Human Rights Commission Act 1977 s 38, and Human 
Rights Act 1193, a 38. 
250 Section 4 of the RRA, s 22 of the HRCA and s 26 of the HRA which were all active during the 
period of January to February 1994 when the advertising for the courses in question and decisions 
of acceptance were made. 
251 Which was the forerunner of the current Human Rights Review Tribunal and successor of the 
previous Equal Opportunities Tribunal. 
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Giving judgment on substantive issues in 1996,252 the Tribunal recognized a prima 
facie 253  but rebuttable presumption of unlawful racial discrimination once the 
Polytechnic’s status as a provider of services to the public254, vocational training 
institution255 or educational establishment256 had been established and the use of 
race was shown to be the factor which determined rejection or admission.257  Thus, 
the Polytechnic had discriminated against the sponsoree by failing to consider him 
for the eight spots in the first round and for any spots in the second round because 
he was not a member of the target group.258  Regarding the first round, the Tribunal, 
found that: 
In relation to each of those nine unsuccessful applicants [outside the target group] 
the reason for refusing or failing to admit the applicant to one of these three reserve 
places was race: race was the criterion on which some were admitted and others 
were rejected… 
The object of the Act[s] is to secure equality by rendering race irrelevant, and when 
that characteristic has in fact governed the decision it seems to us to be beside the 
point that the same decision might or might nor have been arrived at had other, 
relevant, factors been considered.259 
                                                          
252 Prior to substantive issues, Amaltal Fishing Co Ltd v Nelson Polytechnic [1995] (‘Amaltal I’), 
established that the CRT had the jurisdiction to review the Polytechnic in terms of human rights 
legislation.  Section 35 of the RRA stated: “Except as expressly provided in this Act, nothing in this 
Act shall limit or affect in any way the provisions of any other Act: Section 35, Race Relations Act 
1971.” As also noted in the case, s 92(2) of the HRCA was virtually identical to s 35 and almost 
identical to s 15(1) of the new HRA. Section 15(1) of the Human Rights Act 1993 states: “Except 
as expressly provided in this Act, nothing in this Act shall limit or affect the provisions of any other 
Act or Regulation which is in force in New Zealand”. As the result of these privative clauses, counsel 
for the defendant alleged that as the Polytechnic was not “expressly enumerated in the act” as an 
exception to the privative clause it was not subject to the human rights legislation: Amaltal I, at 4.  
Counsel later argued similarly that, as a body deriving its powers from the Education Act 1990 and 
as its policy was an expression of current government policy regarding Māori and resident Pacific 
Islanders, it was not subject to the human rights legislation: Amaltal II, above n 246, at 14.  While 
the Race Relations Conciliator had found this argument persuasive, the Tribunal did not.  With a 
purposive, common-sense approach, the Tribunal found that the Polytechnic was an “institution” in 
the sense of those “which the section[s] expressly prohibit[] from acting in a discriminatory manner”: 
Amaltal I, at 4.  Moreover, it opined: “…Such an interpretation is supported by the manifest purpose 
of the human rights legislation which is to prohibit discrimination on racial (and other) grounds in 
specified areas, whereas the interpretation for which Mr Nation [counsel for the defendant] argues 
would defeat that purpose and …lead to absurdity.”: Amaltal I, at 5. 
253 Amaltal II, above n 246, at 38. 
254 Human Rights Act 1993, ss 44 and 67; Human Rights Commission Act 1977, s 24; and Race 
Relations Act 1971, s 4. 
255 Human Rights Act 1993, s 40; and Human Rights Commission Act 1977, s 22. 
256 Human Rights Act 1993, s 57; and Human Rights Commission Act, s 26. 
257 Depending on a UK case James v Eastleigh Borough Council [1990] 2 All ER 607 at 618.  
258 It had also breached the almost identical provisions of s 7 of the RRA, s 32(1) of the HRCA, and 
s 67(1) of the HRA when it advertised the same course knowing that it intended to discriminate on 
the basis of race.   
259 Amaltal II, above n 246, at 238. 
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However, the Tribunal eagerly referred to the very similar provisions in section 9 
of the RRA, section 29 of the HRCA, and section 73(1) of the HRA which contained 
three elements which would justify the policy if proven by the defendant on the 
balance of probabilities: the discrimination was done “in good faith”; for the 
purpose of assisting or advancing persons or groups of a particular “colour, race, or 
ethnic or national origin”; and the persons or groups in question actually did need 
or might “reasonably be supposed to need assistance or advancement in order to 
achieve an equal place with other members of the community”.260 
Ultimately, the agreement with the government and the unlawful discrimination 
itself—aimed at a specific target group—proved the first two elements.  The 
Tribunal, however, decided in favor of the plaintiff based on the curious refusal of 
the defendant to produce any evidence to prove the third element because they 
insisted that the Polytechnic was not subject to the human rights legislation.  While 
ordering that the defendant be “[r]estrain[ed] from repeating the conduct which” 
constituted breaches of the Acts in question—namely, the reservation of places for 
members of the target group and the advertisement of such—the Tribunal left: 
…it open for the defendant to reserve places for members of the target group in 
any courses which it runs in the future providing that it complies with the 
requirements of s 73 of the Human Rights Act 1993.261 
That is, if the Polytechnic could prove all three elements of the section 73 defense.   
However, the case was precedent-setting given it was “the only decision on the 
interpretation of the affirmative provisions in the Human Rights Act 1993”.262  In 
its wake, respected legal scholars suggested following American law in terms of 
affirmative action.263 
Despite its human rights focus, the CRT’s reasoning seems dichotomous, even 
American.  As in Kamehameha and Rice, the CRT equated indigenous identity with 
                                                          
260 See current Human Rights Act 1993, s 73(1) containing all three elements. 
261 Amaltal II, above n 246, at 248. 
262 Mai Chen and Geoffrey Palmer Affirmative Action: A Discussion Paper (Ministry of Justice, 
Discussion Paper 12, 1998) at 12.1.  In the aftermath of the case, Chen and Palmer noted: “…To 
date Amaltal is the only decision on the interpretation of the affirmative action provisions of the 
Human Rights Act 1993.  This has led to the decision being given disproportionate weight and a 
corresponding lack of confidence in ss 73 and 74 as a means of justifying affirmative action 
programmes”. 
263 Ibid, at 12.8.3. 
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race. 264   A preference in admissions for the indigenous learner automatically 
triggered a presumption of unlawful racial discrimination265 where both rounds 
involved Bakke-like quotas.266  The need query recalled the ‘manifest imbalance’ 
step of the modified Weber-Johnson test and was historically abstract, ignoring the 
Treaty, prior sovereignty, ongoing harm and a continuum of rights.  Section 73 itself 
recognizes special measures and not a politically-based Mancari preference.   
Ignoring the merits of a fundamental right to education, the CRT equated 
educational and employment contexts. 267   The third element itself raised 
Kamehameha-like issues in terms of identifying the appropriate comparator 
group.268  Additionally, the third element raised questions of which purposes would 
qualify, with respected scholars suggesting following the American “narrow 
tailoring” standard consistent with strict scrutiny which would surely be fatal.269  
Finally, under section 73, the policy could only be temporary.270  Thus the only case 
                                                          
264 The actual application for the fishing courses identified the target group of the scheme as persons 
“of Māori or Pacific Island descent”, but throughout the decision, the Tribunal refers only to race. 
265 Just as in the Kamehameha case: see Chapter Three at 3.5.2. 
266  The second round is analogous to the practical effect of the Kamehameha Schools policy which 
rarely results in the admissions of non-Native Hawaiian students owing to the large numbers of 
Native Hawaiians who apply: Chapter Three at 3.5. 
267 The three main institutional categories which the Polytechnic fell into are provider of services to 
the public, vocational training establishment, and, lastly, educational institution.  The description of 
the first in s 4 of the RRA is comparable to the contractual relationship described in the American s 
1981, while the sacred heart of the definition of the second is preparation for employment.   The 
CRT has not ascribed any extra constitutional value to education as, for instance, in Plyler v Doe 
where it may have amounted to a constitutive commitment or as in Kamehameha where its 
importance prompted a modification of the Weber-Johnson factors. 
268 See Chapter Three regarding internal versus external comparator group: at 3.5.5.  Although the 
CRT did not elaborate on the requirements of the third element, Chen and Palmer predicted that it 
would give rise to some of the same finely-balanced but crucial issues in the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning in relation to the Weber-Johnson factors, including the difficulty of identifying the 
appropriate comparator group against or within which the target group was to be assessed for need.  
In regards to the issue of how to determine the size of the comparator population, the CRT’s 
suggestion in the Amaltal case was that it would have been young people outside the target group 
with aspirations of becoming fishermen, and Chen and Palmer noted post-Amaltal that it was not 
the circumstances of Māori and Pacific Islanders in the population at large where one might get a 
more accurate assessment of ‘need’.   This group of aspiring fishing cadets was not quite as limited 
as the comparator population suggested by the plaintiff in the Kamehameha Schools case, but reveals 
a similar localization or reduction of the comparator population to the point of losing the overall 
picture of discrimination, poverty and exclusion which would otherwise justify the affirmative 
action policy in question.   
269 See Chen and Palmer, above n 262, at 12.11.  As described in Chapter Two in terms of University 
of Michigan cases, Grutter and Gratz, narrow tailoring and strict scrutiny have in recent decades 
become virtually insurmountable hurdles for admissions policies to leap, especially as both remedial 
and diversity-based policies have fallen out of favour with the US Supreme Court and are only 
acceptable as submerged factors in the larger global matrix of admissions. 
270 Chen and Palmer noted that, as in the modified Weber-Johnson factors, the third element of the 
s 73 defence only protects the measure in question until equal placement with other groups is 
achieved—that is, it is temporary.  Again, looking for possible overseas guidance on how 
achievement might be measured, Chen and Palmer found the most helpful authority to be the 
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in New Zealand on reverse discrimination may not approve the Kamehameha 
admission policy. 
 
7.4.2 ESCR DENIAL 
As discussed in Chapter Two, United States law denies both constitutional and 
human rights to education, as well as other ESCRs. New Zealand law might also. 
Similar to federal jurisprudence, New Zealand courts have sometimes been hesitant 
to intrude on the executive where resource allocation is involved.271  Lawson v 
Housing New Zealand [1997]272, for instance, is held up as a “testament to the 
stance prevailing in New Zealand that ESC rights are not justiciable”.273  A 2003 
Court of Appeal decision actually denied the existence of a right to education in 
New Zealand, seemingly rejecting a complex someone narrative of equality. 
The case of Daniels v Attorney-General 274  was brought by fifteen families of 
special needs children275 affected by policy changes276 which increased funding for 
aides but resulted in the closing of special education schools, units and classes and 
the mainstreaming of their children.277  The case hinged on judicial questions about 
“the meaning of ‘education’” for these students, “the nature of their rights to 
education”, “related issues of human rights and discrimination”, 278  and, more 
importantly, whether the Crown’s failure to treat these students differently 
constituted discrimination.   
                                                          
Rehnquist Court’s Adarand Constructors v Pena where strict scrutiny was applied and the policy in 
question was ultimately found to be unlawful: see Chen and Palmer, at 12.12.  Also see Chapter 
Two discussion on the case as part of the demise of affirmative action and the judicial activism of 
of the Rehnquist Court, at 2.4.1. 
271 Claudia Geiringer and Matthew Palmer “Human Rights and Social Policy in New Zealand” (2007) 
30 Social Policy Journal of New Zealand 12 at 37. 
272 Lawson v Housing New Zealand [1997] 2 NZLR 474 (HC). 
273 Meikle, above n 184, at 45. 
274 Daniels v Attorney-General (HC Auckland, M 1615/SW99, 3 April 2002) and Attorney-General 
v Daniels [2003] 2 NZLR 742. 
275 “…Some with high intellectual potential are grievously handicapped physically, others suffer 
grossly impaired intellectual capacity; some are able with adequate assistance to achieve 
independence, others are reliant throughout their lives on continuing help”: ibid, para 1. 
276 Namely, Special Education 2000.  
277 Daniels v Attorney-General (HC), above n 274, paras 9-38. 
278 Ibid, at para 6, at 4. 
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Sections 8 and 9 of the Education Act 1989 allowed learners with disabilities the 
“same right” to education at public schools “as people who do not”.  Upon 
consultation with parents, however, section 98 of the Education Act 1964 gave the 
Minister of Education power to “[e]stablish any special school…special class, clinic, 
or service”. Under the section, the Minister could also disestablish any special 
school, unit or class if a similar facility is available nearby.279 
In the High Court, Justice Baragwanath held that, under section 3, special needs 
children had the “right to an education that is regular and systematic and clearly not 
unsuitable”,280 while under section 8 they had a right to equality with other students.  
Reading those rights together, he held that:  
the minimum content of the right…requires an individual focus on the learning 
needs of each child, and provision of extra assistance in proportion to the extent of 
the child’s particular disability.  Thus, disabled children of different learning 
abilities will require different treatment.281 
Based on individualisation, mainstream education would provide equality in some 
cases while a special school, unit or class would in other cases.  Under the BoRA 
and the HRA “differential treatment to aid the disadvantaged” was not consistent 
with discrimination but rather a measure of “equality between disabled and other 
children”.282  Ultimately, these rights gave rise to a corresponding duty on the part 
of the Minister of Education to determine whether adequate facilities were available 
for children with disabilities before disestablishing a special school, unit or class 
regardless of their statutory powers.283  The facts showed that disestablishment had 
resulted in poorer educational quality, farther driving distance and other hardships.   
Judge Baragwanath found that these hardships constituted both “a failure to meet 
minimum standards and…unequal treatment”.284  The Court of Appeal, however, 
rejected the existence of a “minimum content” of a broad right to education beyond 
specific ‘rights’ provided for in legislation. 
                                                          
279 Education Act 1989, s 98. 
280 Daniels v Attorney-General (HC), above n 274, at para 140.  Emphasis added. 
281 Ibid, at para 140.  Emphasis added. 
282 Ibid, paras 140-141. 
283 Ibid, para 139. 
284 Ibid, para 43. 
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The court’s reasoning is concerning.  Despite the removal of what could be seen as 
accessible, adaptable, appropriate and available education,285 it found no breach of 
students’ rights to special education.  The court interpreted that right only in terms 
of every other student’s section 3 right to enrol in free primary and secondary 
education: 
…While there are rights under the 1989 Act that can be enforced by Court process, 
those rights do not include generally, and abstractly, formulated rights of the kind 
stated by the Judge.  Rather, the rights are essentially those established by and 
under the legislation which, to recall the Judge’s formulation, do in themselves 
provide for regularity and system and are designed to ensure appropriate quality.  
There is no free-standing general right, held and enforceable by each individual 
student under [sections] 3 and 8, of the kind stated.286 
Quite narrowly, the court held that rights under section 8 only belonged to students 
already in a special school, unit or class who could move into mainstream education.  
Essentially, their right was only the “same” and “equal” everyone/no-one right 
enjoyed by students without disabilities,287 and it was not a “free-standing right” to 
education.288  Ultimately, the Court of Appeal found no breach of sections 3, 8 or 9 
but did uphold Justice Baragwanath judgment in regard to section 98(1).   
An adamant everyone/no-one narrative dominates the Daniels decision ignoring 
and contradicting the complex someone narrative apparent in international human 
rights instruments including the Children’s Convention and the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities.289  Ultimately, the Court of Appeal held that 
while “a failure to treat differently” in education may not constitute discrimination 
under New Zealand law, “a failure to treat the same” does.290 
Ultimately, “[w]ithout incorporation or constitutionalization into New Zealand’s 
domestic law”, 291  ESCRs may seemingly be denied.  ESCRs have also been 
rejected by respected New Zealand judges and legal scholars.  Dame Susan 
Glazebrook, Justice of the Supreme Court, seems to have reiterated Cold War 
categorizations in extra judicial conclusions that ESCRs are neither real rights or 
                                                          
285 The four pillars of the 4-A Scheme discussed in Chapter Six. 
286 Attorney-General v Daniels [2003] 2 NZLR 742, para 83. 
287 Ibid, para 63. 
288 Ibid para 97. 
289 See discussion in Chapter Five on state obligations to make education available, accessible, 
adaptable and appropriate. 
290 Daniels v Attorney-General (HC), above n 274, para 97. 
291 Meikle, above n 184, at 49. 
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justiciable. 292   Sir Geoffrey Palmer, drafter of the White Paper, former prime 
minister of New Zealand and former president of the Law Commission, has 
similarly categorized education as being a matter of “social policy” and “the stuff 
of politics in New Zealand” and courts judging educational matters as “judicial 
encroachment into key government”—that is, executive—“activity”. 293   Such 
arguments echo United States denials of ESCRs on resource allocation grounds,294 
as well as denials of a constitutional right to education.  Given the consistency of 
the Māori learner’s specifically indigenous right to education with the human right 
to education and its categorisation as an ESCR, an Article 14-like right could be 
undermined by such denial. 
 
7.4.3 INDIGENOUS RIGHTS DENIAL AND HISTORICAL ABSTRACTION 
Human and indigenous rights have thrived in New Zealand under the protection of 
legislative powers not unlike the plenary power exercised by Congress in the US 
federal-Indian trust relationship.  That same constitutional authority can also 
arbitrarily trump indigenous rights.  The 2004 Foreshore and Seabed legislation 
engendered a vehement public debate on contested narratives, namely, an 
assimilationist everyone/no-one discourse displaying identity-blindness and 
historical abstraction versus a complex indigenous learner narrative based more 
accurately on substantive equality, self-determination and historically continuous 
indigenous rights.  In the process, both human rights and indigenous rights were 
denied.  
The Kamehameha-like drama began in 1997 when a group of South Island iwi 
sought to have “certain land comprised of the foreshore and seabed” declared Māori 
customary land by the Māori Land Court. 295   By June 2003, the case of Attorney-
                                                          
292 In Susan Glazebrook “Human Rights and the Environment” (2008) 40 VULWR 293, at 18-19 
and 22-23. 
293 Sir Geoffrey Palmer “The Bill of Rights Fifteen Years On” (Keynote Speech at the Ministry of 
Justice Symposium: The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 10 February 2006) at paras 28-29.  
Noted by Meikle, above n 184, at 45. 
294 See Chapter Two at 2.5. 
295 This area was defined under section 2 of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 as “(a)…the marine 
area that is bounded,—(i) on the landward side by the line of mean high water springs; and (ii) on 
the seaward side, by the outer limits of the territorial sea; and (b) includes the beds of rivers that are 
part of the coastal marine area (within the meaning of the Resource Management Act 1991); and (c) 
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General v Ngati-Apa [2003] came before the Court of Appeal which unanimously 
held that common-law and customary rights to aboriginal title “continued until 
lawfully extinguished” by specific legislation.296  The decision of the Court of 
Appeal overturned previous Treaty-incompatible jurisprudence including Re Ninety 
Mile Beach (1963) 297  and Wi Parata, affirming the common-law doctrine of 
aboriginal title which recognized such rights as continuous until specifically 
extinguished in legislation. 
In January 2004, Dr Don Brash, National party leader, famously alleged that 
“[t]here can be no basis for special privileges for any race, no basis for government 
funding based on race”.298  In response to allegations of Māori advantage and 
privilege, the usually pro-Māori Labour government drafted legislation vesting 
ownership of the foreshore and seabed in the Crown. 
The Report on the Crown’s Foreshore and Seabed Policy299 issued in March 2004 
by the Waitangi Tribunal found that the policy breached both Articles II and III but 
also principles of the Treaty, namely reciprocity, partnership, good faith, rule of 
law, active protection, and equity and options.300 Parliament, however, disregarded 
the Waitangi Tribunal—and Treaty and common-law rights—when it passed the 
Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 (FSA) under urgency in November 2004.  Section 
3 set the tone: 
The object of this Act is to preserve the public foreshore and seabed in perpetuity 
as the common heritage of all New Zealanders in a way that enables the protection 
by the Crown of the public foreshore and seabed on behalf of all the people of New 
Zealand, including the protection of the association of whānau, hapū, and iwi with 
areas of the public foreshore and seabed.301 
The legislation immediately signalled a Māori/non-Māori dichotomy and an 
adamant everyone/no-one standard inherently incompatible with the multi-
narrative rights guaranteed by the Treaty and human rights provisions.  Sections 7 
                                                          
includes the bed of Te Whaanga Lagoon in the Chatham Islands; and (d) includes the air space and 
the water space above the areas described in paragraphs (a) to (c); and (e) includes the subsoil, 
bedrock, and other matters below the areas described in paragraphs (a) to (c)”.  
296 Attorney-General v Ngati Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 643 (CA). 
297 Re Ninety-Mile Beach [1963] NZLR 461 (CA). 
298 Don Brash “Nationhood” (Speech, Orewa Rotary Club, Orewa, 27 January 2004). 
299 Waitangi Tribunal Report on the Crown’s Foreshore and Seabed Policy (Wai 1071, 2004). 
300 Ibid, at 127-134.   
301 Section 3, Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004: repealed, on 1 April 2011, by section 5 of the Marine 
and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 (2011 No.3).  Emphasis added. 
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and 8 reiterated that “Every natural person has access rights” to the foreshore and 
seabed and that “every person has rights of navigation within the foreshore and 
seabed”. 302   Māori enjoyed a homogenous “association”, not Article II 
rangatiratanga as s 13 declared Crown ownership in “absolute” terms.303  Other 
sections made any customary title claims contingent on demanding criteria.304  
Section 13 also denied “any fiduciary obligation or any obligation of a similar 
nature, to any person in respect of the public foreshore and seabed.305 
Not unlike the breach of longstanding Native Hawaiian rights in the Kamehameha 
case, “the Crown, while arguing in favour of the interests of the general public in 
New Zealand, has breached the Treaty of Waitangi once again”306 and heightened 
“racial tensions”. 307  The debacle undoubtedly raised questions about the strength 
and “constitutional security” 308  of indigenous rights, 309  while allegations of 
privilege and advantage once again seemed to be a case of mistaken identity 
whereby a racial label was applied to Māori. 
                                                          
302 Sections 7-8.  Emphasis added. 
303 Section 13(1). 
304 Including “exclusive” and “uninterrupted” “use and occupation” since 1840. 
305 Section 13(4). Emphasis added. 
306 Rodolfo Stavenhagen Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples, Rodolfo Stavenhagen: Addendum: Mission to New 
Zealand E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.3 (2006), at 13-14. 
307 Ibid, at 13. 
308 In many respects, it is clear that the Treaty remains more exposed to the dangers of political 
discretion than human rights inspired legislation such as the BoRA and the HRA which, though not 
entrenched have some safeguards—such as sections 5 and 6 of the BoRA, for instance—built-in.  
Former UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya, has criticized the “[l]ack of 
constitutional security for Māori rights” in New Zealand, even noting a bill in 2006 which proposed 
to delete or remove all legislative references to either ‘the principles of the Treaty’ or the Treaty 
itself—a move which would have, of course, removed any legal status which the Treaty might have 
had according to the precedent in Te Heuheu.  Anaya recommended that the Treaty be given at least 
similar safeguards to those in the BoRA and HRA but that discussion should begin on the subjects 
of entrenchment and making New Zealand law more consistent with international human rights 
standards, especially UNDRIP: S James Anaya “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Iidgenous Peoples on the Situation of Maori People in New Zealand” (2015) 32 Ariz J Int’l & Comp 
L 1.  Also see The Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi Deletion Bill 2006 (Member’s Bill—R Doug 
Woolerton), date of introduction: 29 June 2006, Bill Digest No. 1392.  A similar bill had also been 
put forward in 2005.  Compare with attempted proposed amendments to the NCLB last year which 
would have removed Native Hawaiian Education and Alaskan Natives sections of the legislation: 
discussed in Chapter Three at 3.7. 
309 One commentator came to “the sobering conclusion…that the wishes of the majority might be 
the greatest obstacle to achieving greater constitutional protection for Māori rights as a 
minority…Parliament is representative of Māori and is able to negotiate compromises and solutions 
to situations that arise concerning the Treaty and Māori rights.  But, as the Foreshore and Seabed 
Act illustrated, Māori cannot rely on parliament to protect Māori rights (even as defined by the 
courts), if these are not seen to be in the interests of the majority: J Hayward “The Treaty and the 
Constitution” in Raymond Miller New Zealand Government and Politics (5th ed, South Melbourne, 
Oxford University Press, 2010) 105 at 111. 
  355 
 
Though not about education per se, the Foreshore and Seabed saga was a 
constitutional tug-of-war between equality narratives.  Its passing revealed the 
persistence of assimilationist rhetoric, denial of indigenous rights and historical 
abstraction.  The FSA’s passage—particularly under urgency—revealed 
Kamehameha-like fears of group oppression of individual rights, Waldronian 
supersession and a certain amount of Posnerian utilitarianism, given the strong 
majority flavor of the public debate.  The legislative saga was comparable to historic 
flip flops in federal-Native American and -Native Hawaiian policy, exhibiting all 
the arbitrariness of plenary power doctrine.310   In the wake of the legislation, the 
indigenous narrative appeared to come off second-best.311   
 
7.5 CRUCIAL NARRATIVE DIFFERENCES 
Despite clear evidence of an expanded domestic multi-narrative of equality in New 
Zealand, trumping, ESCR and indigenous rights denial, and historical abstraction 
seemingly represent another adamant everyone/no-one narrative.  Again, adamance 
has been historically associated with assimilation, discrimination and dramatic 
disparities in education for the indigenous learner.  Its rhetoric of identity-blindness 
often masks real-time disparities, old-fashioned, Plessy-like discrimination, and 
even callous utilitarian calculations.  Adamance is not consistent with the expanded 
multi-narrative toolbox of options observed in international law and could 
undermine the very idea of a domestic multi-narrative. 
Crucial differences between United States federal and New Zealand narratives, 
however, appear to counter adamance.  Rather than the singular prioritisation of an 
identity-blind narrative, New Zealand law demonstrates: the loneliness of Amaltal; 
interpretation consistent with human rights obligations; re-affirmation of a complex 
someone right; emphasized legality; indigenous rights as human rights; non-
                                                          
310 Given the dominance of parliamentary sovereignty in Westminsterian democracies, the latitude 
for such arbitrariness would seem to be great.  In the US, however, the courts have been as much of 
a threat to indigenous rights as the legislature and have exceeded their constitutional boundaries in 
order to do so: see Chapter Two at 2.4.2. 
311 S James Anaya Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James 
Anaya: The situation of Māori people in New Zealand A/HRC/18/XX/Add.Y (2011) Part IV, 16-18. 
356   
 
discrimination; and remediation, proportionality and positive government 
obligations. 
 
7.5.1 THE LONELINESS OF REVERSE DISCRIMINATION 
The current persuasiveness of reverse discrimination reasoning in American courts 
sharply contrasts with the scarcity of such cases in New Zealand.  Actually, Amaltal 
is most famous for its loneliness and looks less American upon closer examination. 
In retrospect, the purpose of the policy mattered to the CRT.  Where federal courts 
have rejected Carolene Products,312 the CRT differentiated between policies which 
actually discriminate against groups and individuals and those designed to help 
disadvantaged groups overcome discrimination.  In contrast to the wholesale 
denunciation of any identity-specific policy as reverse discrimination, the 
possibility that purpose-designed policies may promote equality is left open.   
In contrast to strict scrutiny tests and the intermediate Weber-Johnson criteria, the 
decision appears to allow quotas, and even total reservation may be defensible 
under New Zealand law. While any reservation of spots at a public school would 
constitute a Bakke-like quota and be fatal in federal courts given strict scrutiny, the 
CRT allows the possibility that quotas might be justified where the policy in 
question meets all elements of section 73. Even the sympathetic and flexible 
majority in Kamehameha would be seemingly unable to justify an outright total 
reservation of places in the second round at a public institution.  But the CRT noted 
that “[t]he legislation provides for special treatment for disadvantaged groups” and 
that “evidence could have been called to establish that one or both of the racial 
groups within the target groups were in need of such special treatment.”313 
This conclusion is consistent with the proportional approach to special measures 
taken by the Human Rights Commission: 
                                                          
312 US Supreme Court in Bakke and later cases, discussed in Chapter Two at 2.4.1. 
313 Amaltal II, above n 246, at 14. 
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The more entrenched the disadvantage the greater the need for measures to ensure 
equality.  Where a group, for example, has been denied access to education because 
of their race then that group may need preferential admission to redress the 
resulting disadvantage.  314 
Obviously, meeting all three elements is much more likely since the level of 
scrutiny to be applied in section 73 cases is the balance of probabilities rather than 
strict scrutiny.  The decision itself established a pragmatic approach more consistent 
with Plyler and even Mancari where the threshold for constitutionality was so much 
lower than in Bakke and similar cases.  This relaxed scrutiny itself suggests the 
potential consistency of the admissions policy with equality.315  
Both s 19(2) and section 73, legislate relatively straightforward tests for 
Kamehameha-like policies—that is, for public and private bodies—which 
contextualize the prima facie presumption of discrimination.  In New Zealand, 
impact on others will be taken into account316 but is not determinative per se of the 
policy’s lawfulness.  Paul Rishworth et al have concluded that special measures 
under section 19(2) of the BoRA will likely be lawful where the “good faith” 
requirement is met and the policy benefits “persons who have been disadvantaged 
by discrimination”.317  Under section 73(1), however, “[i]t is enough that they be 
persons or groups against whom discrimination is unlawful, who need or may 
reasonably be supposed to need assistance of advancement.”318 
Rishworth et al have also stated that, while section 19(2) “contemplates the use of 
affirmative action as a remedial measure”, section 73(1) “contemplates the use of 
affirmative action as a tool of distributive justice rather than simply a remedial 
measure”. 319   Similarly, the Human Rights Commission’s Guidelines on Measures 
to Ensure Equality recognize Kamehameha-type measures as “part of a tool kit to 
ensure equality”: 
                                                          
314 “Where the disadvantage is not widely entrenched or applicable to the group as a whole, then the 
measure should be less intrusive.  It also follows that if there is a less intrusive way of providing the 
benefit then that is preferable.”: NZ Human Rights Commission “Guidelines on Measures to Ensure 
Equality” (Auckland, Human Rights Commission, 2010). 
315 See Chapter Two discussion on Carolene Products Footnote Four: at 2.4.1. 
316 HRC, above n 314, at 5. 
317 Grant Hushcroft, “Freedom from Discrimination” in Rishworth and others, above n 157, at 390-
391.   
318 Ibid, at 390. 
319 Ibid, at 390. 
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…Measures to ensure equality are not only permitted but, at times, required to 
ensure equality for disadvantaged groups. 
Treating groups who have been discriminated against in the past the same as those 
who have not been can perpetuate existing inequalities.  As a result, to ensure 
genuine equality at times it will necessary to treat individuals or groups differently.  
Special measures should therefore not be seen as discrimination but rather as a way 
of realising equality for everyone.320 
In the wake of Amaltal, reverse discrimination cases are almost non-existent though 
discrimination cases are plentiful.  Tim McBride notes 42 cases of note on 
discrimination decided by the HRRT and the Courts between June 1996 and 
January 2010.321  Only two involved policies or practices relevant to HRA sections 
65, 73, or 74.322  In Kerr v Victoria University of Wellington,323 the CRT held that 
a university policy providing women-only space for activities including 
breastfeeding was justified under section 74 and possibly under section 73 as well.  
In Church v Hawkes Bay Regional Council,324 the complainant’s claim that having 
to listen to a Māori karakia 325  at the end of a public meeting constituted 
discrimination was not upheld given section 65.  His appeal to the High Court was 
similarly struck out.  In contrast, more than half of the remaining cases address 
gendered discrimination especially sexual harassment in the context of private 
employment, with the majority decided in favor of the traditionally disadvantaged 
group.326  Only three allege racial or national origin discrimination.327  In fact, racial 
quotas are widely used in New Zealand, particularly in university admissions.  
Although sometimes debated in the media or for political grandstanding,328 there 
are few legal challenges to such policies. 
                                                          
320 Human Rights Commission, Measures, above n 314, at 2 and 3.   
321  See list compiled by Tim McBride New Civil Rights Handbook (Nelson NZ, Craig Potton 
Publishing, 2010) at 336-344. 
322 Section 74 approves special measures related to pregnancy and motherhood. 
323 Kerr v Victoria University of Wellington (CRT Decision: 8/97; 18/3/97). 
324 Church v Hawkes Bay Council (CRT Decision 01/2001; 26/3/2001). 
325 A customary prayer delivered in the Māori language as a matter of protocol particularly at certain 
events. 
326  Like UNDRIP, the HRA appears to have the capacity to protect women as a historically 
disadvantaged group in everyone/no-one terms while retaining the flexibility to recognize special 
measures which espouse a more complex someone narrative. 
327 In terms of ss 44, 61, 62 or 65 of the HRA, see: Proceedings Commissioner v Archer (CRT 
Decision 16/96; 25/6/96); Proceedings Commissioner v Vallant Hooker & Partner (CRT Decision 
22/98); and B v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (CRT Decision 6/99; 10/3/99).  At least two case 
relate to age discrimination while another three were brought on the grounds of age discrimination. 
328 See, for instance, Martin Johnson “Students Stung by Quota Backlash”, New Zealand Herald 
(online edition, Auckland 1 March 2004). 
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Paucity is consistent with the human rights content of New Zealand’s equality 
narrative.  Again, the CRT in Amaltal adjudicated in the spirit of human rights.  It 
was the defendant’s disregard for human rights which seemed to most incense the 
otherwise generous tribunal.329  Similarly, Chen and Palmer have commented: 
Although the comments by the Tribunal in Amaltal present certain difficulties, they 
should not be taken as the final word on the law in this respect.  It is arguable that 
a wider approach is more appropriate, given the [New Zealand] courts’ acceptance 
that human rights law should be given a broad purposive interpretation as it is 
fundamental law.330   
Such broad, purposive interpretation has been approved by the High Court since 
Coburn v Human Rights Commission [1994].331  Thus, the emphasis of the CRT on 
human rights in Amaltal could unwittingly signal what the result may not have 
outright.  In contrast to American trends of adamance and historical abstraction, 
New Zealand narratives recall human rights obligations and Brown-like goals of 
substantive rather than merely formal equality.  During the same era when the 
Rehnquist Court produced Adarand Construction v Pena and JA Croson, the only 
case on affirmative action in New Zealand generously suggests that special 
measures are defensible where all elements of section 73 were met.  Where diversity 
submerged in the matrix of admissions may be the only viable ground for 
affirmative action in public schools left in federal courts332, diversity-based policies 
and programmes might not even be considered special measures in New Zealand.333 
The Amaltal decision does raise questions about the role of the Treaty of Waitangi 
where affirmative action policies are aimed at Māori.  It was argued purely on the 
basis of race and without reference to the Treaty or its principles.   
                                                          
329 “What the defendant set out to do in 1994 was to reserve more than half of those places for 
members of the target group without giving any consideration to its obligations under the human 
rights legislation and the principle of equality of treatment for all which that legislation enshrines…It 
seems to us from the evidence…that the defendant did not consider its obligations under the Human 
Rights legislation when it entered into the contract with the ETSA…the defendant’s view seems to 
be that it has no independent obligations under the Human Rights legislation.  That view is wrong”: 
Amaltal II, above n 252, at 14. 
330 Chen and Palmer, above n 262, at 8. 
331 Coburn v Human Rights Commission [1994] 3 NZLR 323. Also see earlier King-Ansell v Police 
[1979] 2 NZLR 531, where the court took a pragmatic approach to interpretation of gender 
discrimination. 
332 University of Michigan cases discussed in Chapter Two at 2.4.1. 
333  Paul Callister Special Measures to Reduce Ethnic Disadvantage in New Zealand: And 
Examination of Their Role (Wellington, Institute of Policy Studies, 2007) at 7-8. 
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7.5.2 PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN RIGHTS 
OBLIGATIONS 
Daniels might leave the impression that “the Court of Appeal did its best to quash 
any notion of students with special educational needs having innate, freestanding, 
and enforceable rights.”334  Given that students with disabilities are known to attract 
compounding, intersectionality and other forms of complex discrimination, this 
conclusion is liberally uncomfortable.   However, the outcome in Daniels itself is 
inconsistent with current judicial trends and New Zealand’s international treaty 
obligations. 
In terms of interpretation, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty fundamentally 
demands that courts look to the purposes and intents of Parliament at the time of 
drafting when interpreting legislation. 335   In contrast to the judicial activism 
increasingly evident in United States federal courts:  
From the outset, the courts settled upon a purposive approach to the interpretation 
of the Bill of Rights.  A parliamentary declaration of human rights was not to be 
construed narrowly or technically.  The Courts must look to ‘the purpose of the 
guarantee’ to ascertain the interests it protects, and apply the right ‘generously’, 
avoiding technical and arcane arguments that may detract from the parliamentary 
purpose.336 
New Zealand courts are to employ “generous interpretation, avoiding what has been 
called ‘the austerity of tabulated legislation’”.337  Similarly, while the HRA did not 
initially “distinguish between positive and negative outcomes” as the result of a 
“former emphasis on forced equality” it does “provide[] mechanisms for avoiding 
inflexible human rights responses”. 338   
New Zealand courts regularly consult international law when interpreting human 
rights legislation.  Failing to do so was famously likened to “window dressing”.339  
                                                          
334 Kate Diesfeld and John Hancock “Special Education Law in New Zealand”  in C Russo (ed) The 
Legal Rights of Students with Disabilities: International Perspectives (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishing Group, 2011) Ch7, 157-178, at 164. 
335 See Webb et al, above n 142. 
336 Joseph, above n 141, at 167. 
337 Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260, at 268 per Cooke P (CA). 
338 Joseph, above n 141, at 272. 
339 Per President Cooke (as he was then) of the Court of Appeal in the case of Tavita v Minister of 
Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257 (CA) 
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Similarly, in Northern Regional Health Authority v Human Rights Commission 
[1998],340 Justice Cartwright in the Court of Appeal wrote that: 
In interpreting human rights legislation the New Zealand Courts have resisted any 
attempt to limit their impact, noting that such legislation is to be "accorded a liberal 
and enabling interpretation"... New Zealand Courts have increasingly been 
prepared to look to international interpretations and authorities to gain a better 
understanding of our own rights-based legislation…. 
Any analysis of policy which may directly or indirectly discriminate must be done 
in the light of the international principles and experience as stated in the relevant 
conventions and covenants ...Moreover, when the ancestry of the New Zealand 
legislation is understood it is inevitable that it must be read as broadly as is 
necessary to comply with the overarching themes promoting and protecting human 
rights.341 
Statutory interpretation may have provided “[b]y far the most commonly used entry 
point for international law”342 given the judiciary’s increasing tendency to favor 
interpretations of domestic law consistent with “New Zealand’s international 
obligations”. 343   The government cannot ignore those obligations “in its 
administrative decision making”, and courts presume that legislation is to be read 
consistent with those obligations “so far as its wording allows”.344   
Purposive and consistent interpretation seemingly makes the constitution more 
constitutional. Again, human rights are premised on the idea that human beings 
universally possess inalienable rights which presuppose national law or even 
international law. 345   Logically, these rights also presuppose the would-be 
lawmaker, even Parliament.  The modern interface between human rights and 
constitutional rights in New Zealand caused the late Lord Cooke of Thornton, 
                                                          
340 Northern Regional Health Authority v Human Rights Commission [1998] 2 NZLR 218, at 234. 
341 Ibid. 
342 Treasa Dunworth “The Influence of International Law in New Zealand: Some Reflections” 
Chapter 17 in C Morris Reconstituting the Constitution (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011), 
319-335, at 329. 
343 Unless “the words of the statute rule out such an interpretation”: see B V G [2002] 1 NZLR 233 
(CA) at 243 per Glazebrook J.  Also see amenability of Gault J (CA) in Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 
NZLR 1 and endorsement of Supreme Court in Ye v Minister of Immigration [2009] NZSC 76 at 
para 24.  All three cases discussed by Dunsworth, ibdi, at 329-330.  The Supreme Court is New 
Zealand’s highest court of appeal. 
344 On government’s need to refer to treaty law, see Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 
257 (CA) and Puli’uvea v Removal Review Authority [1996] 3 NZLR 538 (CA), Elika v Minister of 
Immigration [1996] 1 NZLR 741 (HC).  On presumption in terms of statutory interpretation, see 
Rajan v Minster of Immigration [1996] 3 NZLR 543 (CA) at 551.  Cases cited and discussed in 
Meikle, above n 184, at 43-44. Meikle also notes that, based on the same presumption, “the courts 
may narrow or read down the scope of a statutory discretion in accordance with this presumption of 
interpretation.” 
345 See Chapter 5, section 1.2. 
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former President of the Court of Appeals, to argue that even without a written 
constitution some rights are so fundamental that even Parliament cannot override 
them.346   The seminal constitutional case, Moonen v Film and Literature Board of 
Review [2000], 347  suggests that statutory limitation on such rights “cannot be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”.348   
In terms of non-discrimination the court will adopt an approach consistent with the 
BoRA when interpreting statute.349  If the provision cannot be justified it will also 
be inconsistent with section 5 of the BoRA.  Justifiability will be determined 
purposively—that is, whether it has “a rational relationship with the objective” 
which the legislature was trying to achieve in its drafting. 350   An unjustified 
limitation will constitute discrimination. 
 
7.5.3 RE-AFFIRMATION OF A COMPLEX SOMEONE RIGHT TO EDUCATION 
Historically, the Daniels case was decided before New Zealand had ratified the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).351  
The Court of Appeal never had to specifically ask if the policy was consistent with 
the CRPD.  Consequently, Kate Diesfield and John Hancock have concluded that 
“[t]he government’s recent ratification of the [CRPD] will have added considerable 
weight to any post-Daniels interpretation of section 8” 352 —that is, any 
interpretation of what equality means in regards to children with special needs.  This 
is particularly true given Article 24’s requirement that State parties ensure 
“reasonable accommodation of the individual’s requirements…provision of 
support…to support their effective education”,353 a substantive interpretation of 
education implying 4-A Scheme considerations.   
                                                          
346 Robin Cooke "Fundamentals" [1988] NZLJ 158. 
347 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA).  
348  Address given by Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Zealand, Dame Sian Elias, 
“Another Spin on the Merry-Go-Round” found at https://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/speechpapers/ 
Speech19-03-2003.pdf, at 18. 
349 Moonen, above n 347, see paragraphs 27-29, at 19. 
350 Moonen, paras 18-19, at 16-17. 
351 Discussed in Chapter Six at 5.2.4. 
352 Diesfeld and Hancock, above n 334, at 160. 
353 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art 24. 
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Curiously, the Court of Appeal in Daniels investigated questions of equality relative 
to section 8 of the Education Act 1989 but failed to test the policy for discrimination 
under the HRA, despite “extensive submissions made by the Human Rights 
Commission to that effect”.354  In fact, New Zealand’s ratification of the CRPD was 
followed by an amendment to the HRA in 2008, section 60(1), which makes 
educational establishments seemingly liable for a failure to provide special services 
or facilities where they can reasonably be made available.355  Thus, post-CRPD, the 
de-establishment of special schools, classes and programs by the Ministry may 
constitute a violation of the right to non-discrimination where such de-
establishment removes:  
services or facilities that are required to enable the person to participate in the 
educational programme of an establishment referred to in that section or to enable 
the person to derive substantial benefits from that programme…356 
Given that section 60(1) is the result of intentional domestic incorporation of an 
international human rights convention, New Zealand courts will be obliged to have 
regard to the CRPD itself in future decisions.  Such reference inevitably necessitates 
the importation of other CRPD rights and principles, even the flexible inclusion 
which characterizes the convention and its 4-A provisions.  As argued in Chapter 
Five, the CRPD also exhibits a complex someone narrative aimed at substantial 
equality.  This might have been influential in Daniels given plaintiffs’ evidence of 
significantly poorer educational outcomes since the implementation of the relevant 
policy. In practice, reference to the CRPD’s principles may become as common as 
                                                          
354 Noted by Diesfield and Hancock, above n 334, at 160. 
355 Section 60(1) seems to exhibit the CRPD’s flexible inclusion: “Nothing in section 57 applies to 
a person whose disability is such that that person requires special services or facilities that in the 
circumstances cannot reasonably be made available (being services or facilities that are required to 
enable the person to participate in the educational programme of an establishment referred to in that 
section or to enable the person to derive substantial benefits from that programme).” Particularly in 
light of section 57(1) to which it applies which reads: “(1) It shall be unlawful for an educational 
establishment, or the authority responsible for the control of an educational establishment, or any 
person concerned in the management of an educational establishment or in teaching at an educational 
establishment,—(a) to refuse or fail to admit a person as a pupil or student; or (b) to admit a person 
as a pupil or a student on less favourable terms and conditions than would otherwise be made 
available; or (c) to deny or restrict access to any benefits or services provided by the establishment; 
or (d) to exclude a person as a pupil or a student or subject him or her to any other detriment,—by 
reason of any of the prohibited grounds of discrimination”: s 57, HRA.  Quote and references… and 
echoes states’ obligations under the Maastrich Guidelines.   
356 Human Rights Act 1993, s 60(1). 
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the heed the same courts now give to Children’s Convention principles such as the 
best interests of the child.357 
The issues in Daniels are unlikely to go away.  The New Zealand Society for the 
Intellectually Handicapped (IHC), a non-profit organization providing support 
services to families of children with intellectual disabilities, has filed a complaint 
with the HRRT alleging structural discrimination which violates their right to 
education.358  The organization has, of course, cited international human rights law. 
 
7.5.4 EDUCATION AS AN ESCR IN NEW ZEALAND: DOMESTIC INDIVISIBILITY 
AND EMPHASIZED LEGALITY  
The evolution of the human right to education in international law, discussed in 
Chapter Five and Six, revealed an increasing awareness of organic multiplication 
including the indivisibility of ESCRs and CPRs, and emphasized rather than 
diminished legality.  The presence of these factors at the international level 
signalled a move from an adamant everyone/no-one narrative to a complex toolbox 
of rights options in terms of education, including the specifically indigenous right 
to education found in UNDRIP’s article 14.  In contrast to the adamant 
everyone/no-one, slim someone and limited indigenous learner narratives currently 
operating in US federal courts, New Zealand law also appears to recognize the 
indivisibility of ESCRs and CPRs—as well as human and indigenous rights—and 
provides legal recourse, suggesting emphasized legality. 
Economic, social and cultural rights were almost included in the BoRA.  A select 
committee on its draft form, for instance, “recognised that effective exercise of civil 
and political rights depends on securing adequate standard of living, housing, health 
care and education” though it found it too difficult to “deal[] with such rights in a 
judicially enforceable supreme law such as the” proposed legislation.359  While 
                                                          
357 See Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257 (CA); and Ye v Minister of Immigration 
[2010] NZSC 76. 
358  See IHC website, “Campaigns”, “Education complaint” New Zealand Society for the 
Intellectually Handicapped <www.ihc.org.nz>. 
359 New Zealand, “Final Report of the Justice and Law Reform Select Committee on a White Paper 
on the Bill of Rights for New Zealand” 1988 (Bob Dillion, Chair), at 3, quoted and referenced in 
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“[ESCRs] currently receive substantially less judicial protection in New Zealand 
than do [CPRs]”,360 they are, nonetheless, recognized in legislation. 
Both the BoRA and HRA recognize ESCRs.  Section 20 of the BoRA, as discussed 
above, recognizes individual and groups rights to language and culture.  In addition 
to education, the HRA specifically addresses discrimination in various economic 
and social areas including employment generally, 361  “employment-related 
retirement benefits”, 362  “provision of goods and services”, 363  housing, 364  and 
superannuation.365  The Health and Disabilities Act, using the word “rights”, also 
prohibits discrimination in healthcare. 366   Such legislation taken together—
particularly given New Zealand’s no-one narrative—equate ESCRs with non-
discrimination. 
The Education Act itself recognizes a range of legal rights specific to education.  
As discussed, it recognizes a universal everyone right to primary and secondary 
education not unlike the UDHR and ICESCR as well as later documents.  It contains 
someone provisions which are age-, minority-, and culturally-specific, needs-based 
and even indigenous.  
New Zealand courts also regularly adjudicate on ESCR rights, particularly in terms 
of non-discrimination.  In fact, a closer look at McBride’s 42 discrimination cases367 
shows that at least 24 of them took place in the context of employment, while one 
involves housing, two goods and services, and four education.368  Notably, the 
Child Action Poverty Group369 case and Atkinson370—consistent with international 
jurisprudence on non-discrimination such as Broeks v Netherlands, 371  both 
                                                          
Joss Opie “Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in New Zealand: Their Current Legal Status and 
the Need for Change” (LLM Thesis, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 2011) at 48. 
360 Geiringer and Palmer, above n 271, at 37. 
361 Human Rights Act 1993, s 22. 
362 Section 30A. 
363 Section 44. 
364 Section 53. 
365 Section 70. 
366 For instance, see s 70A. 
367 See above n 325. 
368 Note that section 1981 at issue in the Kamehameha case similarly involved a contract for goods 
and services. 
369 Child Poverty Action Group Inc v Attorney-General (HC Wellington CIV-2009-404-273, 25 
October 2009). 
370 Minister of Health v Atkinson [2012] NZCA 184. 
371 SWM Broeks v The Netherlands Communication No 172/1984, CCPR/C/OP/2 (1990) discussed 
in Chapter Five at 5.4.3. 
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challenged the unequal provision of government benefits to families affected by 
poverty and disability respectively.  With regard to the BoRA, Frances Joychild 
notes:  
What is now evident, 12 years on from Part 1As commencement, is that the right 
to freedom from discrimination under the [BoRA] is also a gateway for the 
adjudication of economic, social and cultural rights.  Despite the [BoRA] long title 
indicating a primary intention to implement the civil and political covenant, and 
there being no positive economic and social rights enforceable in domestic law as 
there are in other countries, Part 1A has shown itself to be a significant gateway 
for their adjudication.  All Part 1A claims to date have concerned economic and 
social rights.372 
Joychild not only argues that “a constitutional obligation” is a “human right” but 
recognizes that while ESCRs—like CPRs—may face “[a]pparent obstacles to, and 
difficulties with, justiciability”, “[t]here are currently a range of possibilities for 
justiciability” in New Zealand “including the application of the prohibition of 
discrimination and the interconnectedness between [CPRs] and [ESCRs]”.373 
Though New Zealand has not yet ratified the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, it 
has endorsed the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR which allows New Zealanders to 
take complaints to the UN Human Rights Council when domestic remedies are 
exhausted.  Lord Cooke of Thornton suggested that the availability of this remedy 
made the UN Human Rights Council an extension of New Zealand’s judiciary.374  
His point about legal recourse is well-taken, particularly given the potential access 
provided by Article 26’s non-discrimination provision.   
Ultimately, while Glazebrook and Palmer have rejected the justiciability of ESCRs, 
the current Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Zealand, Dame Sian Elias, 
has said that “the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights is a 
primary duty for the legislative and executive branches of government”.375  She has 
similarly stated: 
                                                          
372 Frances Joychild “Discrimination” in Rishworth and others NZLS CLE Intensive: Using Human 
Rights in Litigation (NZLS CLE Ltd Continuing Legal Education New Zealand Law Society, June 
2014) 71 at 86. 
373 Ibid. 
374 Quoted in address by Sian Elias, Dame Silvia Cartwright Lecture 2009, Thursday 26 November 
2009, found at <https://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz>,para 18. 
375 Ibid, para 33. 
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Judges cannot avoid hard cases if they are properly brought before them…Today, 
claims which invoke human rights such as equality make it impossible to refuse to 
engage with substantive outcomes….376 
Ironically, Glazebrook seems to make a strong case for ESCRs in almost the same 
breath in which she would deny legal recourse to them.377  Notably, Glazebrook 
offered her opinion extra judicially.   
Such indivisibility and emphasized legality may be most apparent where the 
education rights of indigenous learners are at stake, given the nexus of human and 
indigenous rights.  As a human right, a right to non-discrimination in education may 
entail legal recourse through the human rights complaints process, that is, via the 
HRRT.  A Treaty right to education is also likely to be a human right.  The Human 
Rights Commission which receives human rights complaints regarding the Human 
Rights Act 1993 has in no uncertain terms equated Treaty rights with their human 
rights counterparts in international law and has called the Treaty a “human rights 
document”.378  Where the Treaty itself is invoked, violation including prejudice 
against a Māori individual or group of Māori may entail recourse through the 
Waitangi Tribunal.  As discussed above, Treaty violations and human rights 
violations can also be addressed directly through the common courts, as was the 
case in the Ngati Apa case.  Such an overlap suggests that an indigenous human 
right to education in New Zealand is marked by an emphasized rather than 
diminished legality—that is, multiple narratives potentially emphasizing the same 
complex right to education and providing multiple avenues of legal recourse.  This 
nexus of human and indigenous narratives suggests a complex multi-narrative at 
work. 
 
                                                          
376 Ibid, para 18. 
377 Glazebrook, above n 292.  Ironically, Justice Glazebrook is supportive of a right to environment 
which includes considerations of health (10), indigenous culture (10), participation rights of women 
and children (17).  She cites the right to health, an apparent ESCR as a potential vehicle for a right 
to environment (21) as well as non-discrimination and right to culture under Article 27 of the ICCPR. 
378 NZ Human Rights Commission, Human Rights in New Zealand 2010, above n 152, at 38. 
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7.5.5 INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS AND NON-DISCRIMINATION 
The same nexus appeared in the equality narratives which operated in terms of 
debate on the Foreshore and Seabed legislation.  Despite the vehemence of the 
public debate, the law was condemned and criticized, domestically and 
internationally, as a violation of indigenous and human rights almost from the 
beginning.   In its wake, Māori again struggled to have their Treaty and human 
rights recognized.379  When they did, they were backed by the judiciary and the 
international community. 
In addition to the Court of Appeal judgment in Ngati Apa which previously 
recognized common-law rights, the Waitangi Tribunal’s Report on the Crown’s 
Foreshore and Seabed Policy380 issued in March 2004 had found that the legislation: 
…clearly breaches the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.  But beyond the Treaty, 
the policy fails in wider norms of domestic and international law that underpin 
good government in a modern, democratic state.  These include the rule of law, 
and the principles of fairness and non-discrimination.381 
The Tribunal reasoned that Article III and the rule of law would be violated because 
only Māori would be disadvantaged by “cutting off their access to the courts and 
effectively expropriating their property rights” thus “put[ting] them in a class 
different from and inferior to all other citizens”.382  Essentially, the legislation 
would only disadvantage Māori in effect and was discriminatory. 
Bodies monitoring New Zealand’s international treaty obligations similarly 
condemned the legislation.  In March 2005, the UN Committee on the Elimination 
                                                          
379 Valmaine Toki wrote: “In May 2004 a hikoi (march) culminated in over 20,000 people gathering 
at Parliament to protest against the Foreshore and Seabed Bill. This was the largest form of protest 
by Maori since the Land March of 1975. Tariana Turia, a Labour Member of Parliament who could 
not support the Foreshore and Seabed Bill, resigned. A Waitangi Tribunal Report was strongly 
critical of the government policy on the foreshore and seabed. An overwhelming majority of those 
who made submissions to the Select Committee opposed the Foreshore Seabed Bill. On the 18th 
November, 2004 that Bill passed it’s third reading. Metaphorically on the same day Tim Selwyn, 
akin to Hone Heke’s action, put an axe through the electorate office of the Prime Minister, Helen 
Clarke. Nevertheless, on 24 November 2004 the Foreshore and Seabed Act was enacted vesting title 
of the foreshore and seabed into the Crown.  In October 2006, Tariana Turia, now co leader of the 
Maori Party, introduced a Private Member's Bill designed to repeal the Foreshore and Seabed Act.: 
Valmaine Toki “Can the Developing Doctrine of Aboriginal Title Assist a Claim under the 
Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004?” (2008) 34(1) Commonwelath Law Bulletin 21 (footnotes omitted).   
380 Waitangi Tribunal Report on the Crown’s Foreshore and Seabed Policy (Wai 1071, 2004). 
381 Ibid, at xiv.   
382 Ibid.   
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of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) issued their own decision on the 
FSA concluding that it was discriminatory because the act removed legal recourse 
and means of redress where Treaty rights were violated.383 
After visiting New Zealand soon after, then UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous 
Peoples, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, noted that: 
…some New Zealanders appear to approve of the view of “One law for all” (that 
is, no more special laws on Māori rights, understood as meaning Government 
should stop the alleged “pampering” of Māori).  The political media have taken up 
these arguments and have reflected the view of those who would like to see an end 
to the alleged “privileges” accorded by the Government to Māori.384 
The Special Rapporteur replied that while he had seen plentiful evidence of 
complex discrimination and disparities, he had seen none of advantage or 
privilege.385   
The divisive legislation was repealed seven years later by section 5 of the Marine 
and Coastal Areas (Takutai Moana) Act 2011.  While providing for “the protection 
of the legitimate interests of all New Zealanders in the marine and coastal area of 
New Zealand”, the purpose of the Act, under section 4, is to: 
(b) recognise the mana tuku iho exercised in the marine and coastal area by iwi, 
hapū, and whānau as tangata whenua; and (c) provide for the exercise of customary 
interests in the common marine and coastal area; and (d) acknowledge the Treaty 
of Waitangi (te Tiriti o Waitangi).386 
Consequently, the Act repealed the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, restored 
“customary interests extinguished by that Act”, recognized “the continuing exercise 
of” of historically continuous rights—“mana tuku iho387 in the marine and coastal 
                                                          
383 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination "Concluding Observations on the 
Committee's 65th Session" (20 August 2004) Press Release.  See discussion in Claire Charters and 
Andrew Erueti “Report form the Inside: The CERD Committee’s Review of the Foreshore and 
Seabed Act 2004” 36 VULWR 257. 
384 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
indigenous peoples, Rodolfo Stavenhagen: Addendum: Mission to New Zealand 
E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.3 (2006) para 54. 
385 “The Special Rapporteur was asked several times whether he agreed that Maori had received 
special privileges. He answered that he had not been presented with any evidence to that effect, but 
that, on the contrary, he had received plenty of evidence concerning the historical and institutional 
discrimination suffered by the Maori people, evidence that he is concerned with in the present 
report.”: Ibid. 
386 Marine and Coastal Areas (Takutai Moana) Act 2011, s 4(1). 
387 See definition for “mana whakaheke”: “1. (noun) inherited status, mana through descent - mana 
that originates from the atua and is handed down through the senior male line from the atua. Also 
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area”—and “[gave] legal expression to customary interests”.388  Thus, the 2011 Act 
incorporated the Treaty of Waitangi into municipal law, recognized Māori as 
“tāngata whenua”—a term denoting their unique political status, residual customary 
rights and the legality of such rights. 
While Parliament remains free to change its collective mind, the current legislation 
has immediate implications for an indigenous right to education in New Zealand.  
As the result of significant efforts on the part of Māori and international pressure, 
New Zealand equality was realigned with its unique historico-legal context.  The 
multi-narrative Treaty was reaffirmed but also emerged as a narrative symbol of 
human rights and non-discrimination.  In terms of emphasized legality, the 
historical continuum of rights was recognized by the courts as common-law rights, 
by the expert Waitangi Tribunal as Treaty rights and, eventually, by Parliament as 
both.  Where education is interpreted as an Article II taonga it must similarly be 
justified as an indigenous right, constitutional right and human right. 
 
7.5.6 REMEDIATION, PROPORTIONALITY AND POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 
Finally, Chapter Six discussed how a complex, multi-narrative human right to 
education had evolved to include temporary and permanent positive obligations and 
remedial and proportional self-determination.   In contrast to the dramatic events 
surrounding the Foreshore and Seabed legislation, there is a marked absence of a 
similar furore over a specifically indigenous right to education.  Instead, there is a 
growing body of Waitangi Tribunal interpretation which recognizes Treaty 
principles resembling features of the international right to education for Māori 
learners—but also positive obligations and self-generated, remedial and 
proportional responses to historic and ongoing harm.  Where these principles are 
violated, Māori are likely to be discriminated against in terms of Articles II and 
                                                          
called mana tūpuna or mana tuku iho.”  Found in Te Aka Māori-English, English-Māori Dictionary 
<www.maoridictionary.co.nz>. 
388 Marine and Coastal Areas (Takutai Moana) Act 2011, s 4(2).  The Foreshore and Seabed Act 
2004 was formally repealed by s 5. 
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III—that is, in terms of everyone/no-one equality and specifically Māori rights to 
self-determination.   
Ironically, while critics express pessimism about ESCRs, the same commentators 
readily recognize Treaty rights.  Palmer, for instance, advocated entrenching the 
Treaty in a written constitution in the White Paper.389  Glazebrook has recognized 
indigenous self-determination as a potential vehicle for the recognition of 
ESCRs.390   
As described previously, the Treaty is a constitutional document and a potential 
check on plenary power.391  Similar to the heed which the judiciary must give to 
human rights, Sir David Baragwanath has described how common-law principles 
of interpretation appear to require Courts “to construe law as conforming with 
[T]reaty obligations” and to “warn the decision-makers” where it does not 
conform.392 
Although its decisions are not binding, “the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 has 
afforded the Waitangi Tribunal the opportunity to play a crucial role in debating 
our constitutional past and present”.393  It has the jurisdiction to determine the 
meaning and effect of the Treaty and, ultimately, judge matters of prejudice.  
Importantly, its “Treaty principles jurisdiction” cannot be “water[ed] down”. 394  A 
deeper look at the claims alluded to earlier illustrate this point and also recall 
elements of positive States obligations, the 4-A Scheme, buffer-and-access features 
generally but also remediation and proportionality.   
In the Mokai School Report 2000,395 parents of Māori learners brought a Treaty 
claim when their bilingual primary school was closed 396  by the Ministry of 
Education.  Parents claimed that their Article II rangatiratanga right over taonga 
                                                          
389 See Geoffrey Palmer “A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper” [1984–1985] I AJHR 
A6 at 29.  
390 Glazebrook, above n 297, footnotes 117 and 188 at 22. 
391 The Treaty has been described as a “constitutional catalyst”: Tawhai, above n 39. 
392 Former Judge of the High Court, Justice of the Court of Appeal and President of the New Zealand 
Law Commission and current president of the United Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
speaking extra judicially: David Baragwanath “The Evolution of Treaty Jurisprudence” (Harkness 
Henry Lecture, University of Waikato, 24 September 2007) at 11-12. 
393 Jacinta Ruru “The Waitangi Tribunal” in Mulholland and Tawhai, above n 39, 127 at 127. 
394 Ibid, at 128. 
395 Mokai School Report , above n 238. 
396 Compare with similar closure of identity-aware school in Daniels. 
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including te reo (indigenous language) and mātauranga (indigenous knowledge) 
and other Treaty principles had been breached when the school was closed without 
adequate resource allocation and consultation with parents.  The result of the 
closure, they claimed, had meant that their children were no longer able to learn 
indigenous language and knowledge at Mokai, had to travel outside the community 
and would lose their “Mokai identity”.397 
In addition to apparent 4-A issues, the Tribunal recognized Crown duties 
resembling the respect, protect and fulfil obligations associated with the 
international human right to education.  For instance, it was satisfied that the 
Ministry had prejudicially affected Māori in failing to “actively promote and protect” 
indigenous language and knowledge, failing to consult with parents prior to the 
decision and in not allocating enough resources—human and otherwise—to the 
school when a quality review raised questions.398   These actions resulted in a 
diminishment of the community’s Article II rangatiratanga and prejudice.399 
In its Report on the Aotearoa Institute Claim Concerning Te Wānanga O Aotearoa 
2005,400 the Tribunal described an indigenous tertiary institution as “filling both an 
educative and a social justice function for all Māori, and indeed for all New 
Zealanders”.401  The institution taught Māori language and tikanga in addition to 
“literacy, numeracy, and other skills life and employment skills” and was especially 
aimed at “second chance” learners “whom the primary and secondary education 
system had failed”. 402   The claim was brought on the basis of a breach of 
rangatiratanga in regards to Crown policy on who might attend the wānanga—
namely whether the wānanga should be allowed to admit non-Māori.  Again, the 
Tribunal found that the Crown had “fail[ed] to protect the rangatiratanga of” the 
institution” with resulting prejudice to the claimants in not allowing them it to make 
that decision.403  
                                                          
397 Mokai School Report, above n 238, 137.  They also claimed that the Education Act 1989 should 
include a provision requiring consistency with the Treaty and its principles. 
398 Ibid, at 123 
399 Ibid, at 125. 
400 Wananga o Aotearoa, above n 241. 
401 Ibid, at 2. 
402 Ibid, at 2. 
403 Ibid, at 51. 
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Ko Aotearoa Tēnei: A Report into Claims Concerning New Zealand Law and Policy 
Affecting Māori Culture and Identity in 2011 404  similarly determined that 
indigenous-specific policies currently in place were praiseworthy, representing a 
certain amount of partnership and “considerable progress”. 405   In response to 
concerns about the Crown control of curriculum, however, the Tribunal noted a 
failure to consult with Māori on key policy decisions and underfunding as breaches 
of the Treaty.406  It recommended greater self-determination and responsibility, 
increased resource allocation, the development of specific indicators to measure 
Māori progress, and the successful transmission of indigenous knowledge as well 
as actual Māori achievement in mainstream education.407   
Most recently, Matua Rautia: The Report on the Kōhanga Reo Claim 2013 provided 
an expansive analysis of an indigenous right to education at the preschool level.  
Central to the claim was the Tribunal’s finding that kohanga reo—or language 
nests—are vital to the survival and revitalization of Māori language which is a 
taonga and Treaty right.408  While the principle of partnership makes both the 
Crown and Māori responsible for language survival, the Crown has a duty of active 
promotion and protection which requires it to “engag[e] in ‘especially vigorous 
action’ to protect te reo” via funding, policy, increased resource allocation, and 
other positive, identity-specific measures.409  Regarding options and equity, the 
Tribunal recognized that the right to attend a preschool was “a citizenship right” 
afforded to every child in New Zealand, but Māori children were also entitled to 
know their options and a “policy framework” tailored to protecting te reo.  Failing 
to provide such policy, promote participation, and imposing a funding regime which 
did not provide incentives for kōhanga reo teachers specifically was interpreted as 
prejudice by the Tribunal.410 
The harmony of the Tribunal’s findings with the evolution of the international 
human right to education is readily apparent.  In terms of the liberal project, 
                                                          
404 Waitangi Tribunal Ko Aotearoa Tenei: Te Taumata Tuatahi - A Report into Claims Concerning 
New Zealand Law and Policy Affecting Maori Culture and Identity (Wai 262, 2011) Volume 2. 
405 Ibid, at 559 and 560 
406 Ibid, at 542, 543 
407 Ibid, at 559, 561  
408 Repeatedly mentioned throughout the Report. 
409 Kōhanga Reo Claim, above n 231, at 231. 
410 Ibid, at 236-240. 
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resource allocation and other concrete, positive measures are consistent with a 
substantial right to education and a complex someone narrative.  The Mokai, Ko 
Aotearoa and Kōhanga Reo decisions seemed to imply 4-A principles including 
access, availability and acceptability.  The emphasis of the Tribunal on 
measurement and actual progress echo international treaty obligations requiring 
states to use maximum resources to realize the right to education.  However, 
language like “active” and “vigorous” are strong even in international terms.    Like 
international standards, resource allocation does not undermine these rights as 
legally valid claims. 
The rights remain self-determination based.  In terms of admissions, the Wānanga 
decision reveals an UNDRIP-like control over membership411—even where those 
being admitted are not indigenous.  In the Mokai, Wānanga and Kōhanga Reo 
decisions, the schools in question—rather than a greater indigenous political 
entity—were themselves recognized as holders, even trustees412 of a collective right 
to self-determination.  Diminishing even this internal self-determination constitutes 
breaches of the Treaty resulting in prejudice which seem to violate Article III as 
much as Article II.  Predictably, substantive non-discrimination links homegrown 
Treaty rights and traditional liberal projects.   
Ultimately, the Treaty appears to guarantee an UNDRIP-like, specifically 
indigenous right to education recognizing the rights of Māori to various rights 
including 4A-like access and availability, non-discrimination, positive measures, 
and Article 14-like self-determination.  In company with substantive everyone/no-
one and complex someone rights, the Treaty represents an expanded multi-narrative 
of equality.   
 
7.6 CONCLUSION 
The chapter initially asked why Kamehameha-like schools and policies are not 
challenged in New Zealand.   While Native Hawaiians never ceded sovereignty and 
                                                          
411 See discussion in Chapter Six on UNDRIP, arts 14(1) and 33 on ownership of the right and 
membership criteria. 
412 See kaitiakitanga principle discussed in Kōhanga Reo Claim, above n 231, at 66. 
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Māori ceded some, the moʻolelo of colonization, assimilation, discrimination and 
present disparities is nearly identical, as if from a common playbook.   Today, 
adamant everyone/no-one narratives continue to challenge indigenous claims and a 
strong right to education.  Events such as the Foreshore and Seabed legislation 
illustrate the power such narratives still hold in law and the popular imagination. 
In response to this moʻolelo, however, New Zealand law and Treaty interpretation 
recognizes a multi-narrative of equality—a domestic toolbox of rights options—
which, crucially, intentionally incorporates human rights, organically connects 
human, constitutional and indigenous rights, while also recognizing a remedial, 
historical self-determination.  While adamant criticisms retain some degree of the 
conflict of narratives evident in the Kamehameha case, there is certainly a greater 
flexibility and complementarity between narratives.  Features of liberal 
multiculturalism and historical self-determination theory play out in these 
narratives including buffer-and-access features, awareness of prior sovereignty and 
ongoing harm.  Key aspects of the expanded multi-narrative evident in international 
law are also present including: scarcity of reverse discrimination; interpretation 
consistent with human rights obligations; re-affirmation of a complex someone 
right; domestic legal indivisibility and justiciability; indigenous rights as human 
rights non-discrimination; and remediation, proportionality and positive 
government obligations.  Education is stated in legislation as a right with multiple, 
complex rightsholder identities acknowledged.  Non-discrimination rather than a 
formalized equality is prioritized implying a more substantive, Brown-like version 
of equality. 
Notably, New Zealand narratives have expanded with and benefitted from 
intentional human rights incorporation, the organic and legal interface between 
human, constitutional and indigenous rights, and an unapologetically remedial and 
historical self-determination.  These features have blurred the lines between the 
international and domestic, the constitutional, the human and indigenous.  Despite 
the Waitangi Tribunal’s interpretive and recommendatory jurisdiction in terms of 
indigenous rights, this nexus has also blurred the lines between the courts and the 
Tribunal.  Subsequently, New Zealand narratives are imbued with a supra-domestic 
moral force which is consonant with domestic intuitions and the unique historico-
legal context of Māori rights to education.   
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My colleagues in the trenches of indigenous education and various reports wisely 
caution that there is certainly room in New Zealand for greater municipal 
importation and implementation of human rights, as well as greater recognition of 
Treaty- and UNDRIP-based indigenous rights to education.  Obviously, UNDRIP, 
the Children’s Convention and the CRPD remain unincorporated in New Zealand 
legislation though this could clarify these matters further.   Regardless of the whims 
of Parliament or, similarly, the limits of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, however, a 
complex multi-narrative of equality—including the specifically indigenous 
learner—is obviously present and even emphasized in New Zealand. As in 
international law, the real question then is not really whether a Kamehameha-like 
admission policy is consistent with equality or a right in and of itself nor whether it 
might represent a peoples’ rights to self-determination.  Clearly, it is, and it can.  
Rather, current criticisms revolve around implementation.  In the United States, 
discussions on the implementation will remain moot points until federal law 
expands the narratives of equality wrestled with in Kamehameha. 
The thesis has examined the Kamehameha Schools case, its legal background, 
political theory, international law and the equality narratives of a sister settler nation 
in an attempt to make sense of the wrestle, intuitions and gaps in the reasoning of 
the Ninth Circuit.  The next chapter will summarize previous discussions and make 
recommendations that might clarify equality narratives in terms of the admissions 
policy in future.   
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
SUMMARY AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
8 CHAPTER EIGHT: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The thesis has argued that the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Doe v Kamehameha 
Schools1 suggests three conflicting narratives of equality reflected in the wider legal 
landscape of American federal law.  It has demonstrated how and why these 
narratives fail to account entirely for either the unique historico-legal history of the 
Native Hawaiian people or the huge gap between formal constitutional guarantees 
of equality and the persistence of actual complex discrimination and disparities 
almost unrelentingly attracted to Native Hawaiian identity.  Those narratives and 
the admissions policy itself have been weighed in terms of liberal theory, 
international law—including the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples 2007 2  (UNDRIP)—and the historico-legal experience of a 
sister settler jurisdiction—New Zealand.  Theory and law have revealed that 
elsewhere an expansion of the three narratives has been driven by substantial 
equality and non-discrimination but also rights of self-determination with 
significant narrative capacity for reconciling the guarantee/reality gap—even deep 
harm—as they exceed liberal projects.  
This chapter summarizes previous discussions and introduces seven markers of 
equality which have emerged as consistent features of the expanded multi-narrative 
in regards to the indigenous learner.  The expanded multi-narrative and seven 
markers then underwrite recommendations which might facilitate the task of the 
next federal court confronted with the admissions policy.  Good, better and best 
                                                          
1 Doe v Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate 295 F Supp 2d 1141 (D Haw 2003), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 416 F3d 1025 (9th Cir 2005), reh’g en banc granted, 441 F3d 1029 (9th 
Cir 2006) 470 F3d 827 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).  
2 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples GA Res 61/295, A/Res/61-295 
(2007). 
378   
 
recommendations include philosophical consistency with the expanded multi-
narrative, the intentional importation of the human right to education and the 
intentional incorporation of Article 14 of UNDRIP.   
 
8.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The thesis initially sought to explain and address apparent intuitions and gaps in 
Kamehameha from a theoretical perspective by exploring legal narratives evident 
in the reasoning of the dissent, majority and concurrence and evaluating them in 
terms of political theory, international law and the domestic law of a sister settler 
nation.   
In terms of current narratives, Chapter Two illustrated how Brown I and II 
responded to an identity-specific history of slavery and segregation with a 
substantially and historically aware everyone/no-one narrative of equality.  Brown 
II, however, was also consistent with the temporary, racially-specific someone 
evident in affirmative action.  A third specifically indigenous narrative grounded in 
residual self-determination had survived colonization, assimilation and 
discrimination to justify the preference in Mancari. However, someone and 
indigenous narratives have been undermined since Brown by the adamant 
everyone/no-one narrative evident in federal decisions including Bakke and the 
University of Michigan cases and legislation as the No Child Left Behind Act 2002.   
The chapter finally noted the reluctance of federal courts to recognize a 
constitutional or human—or strong—right to education despite the significant 
constitutive commitment attributed to education in cases such as Brown and 
Plyler—and persistent inequalities in education which cluster around minority 
group identity forming significant constitutional guarantee/reality gaps.     These 
features left a very slim someone narrative and a highly arbitrary indigenous 
narrative at the whim of colorblind rhetoric which ignores actual inequalities and 
may mask old-fashioned discrimination.  
Chapter Three discussed the clash of these federal narratives in Kamehameha.  It 
described the history of the Native Hawaiian people as an internationally 
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recognized nation and subsequent illegal overthrow and annexation by the US.  The 
chapter further described the overwhelming species of inequality which is causally 
linked to this particular history and fundamentally violates any level playing field 
or homogenous/anonymous guarantee.  The chapter demonstrated how the same 
history affirms both a special trust relationship with federal and state governments 
like that with Native American tribes but also residual rights of a nation which never 
ceded its sovereignty, demanding self-determination- rather than equality-based 
narratives.   The wrestle of federal courts in Kamehameha suggested that adamant 
everyone/no-one, slim someone and even the indigenous Mancari tests available to 
federal courts lacked the narrative capacity to account for the peculiarities of the 
Native Hawaiian historico-legal context and concerning constitutional 
guarantee/reality gaps.  In fact, pre-overthrow, historically continuous Native 
Hawaiian customary law, indigenous-specific Hawaiʻi state law and recent 
developments including the passing of Act 1953 and the most recent version of the 
Akaka Bill suggested the need for an alternative indigenous narrative which 
affirmed residual, homegrown indigenous rights to self-determination and one 
framed in human rights terms. 
In search of theoretical and legal tools which have been used to address the same 
conflict of narratives and possible resolution of the wrestle, intuitions and gaps, the 
thesis then turned to political theory and international law. 
Chapter Four weighed the narratives and reasoning in Kamehameha in terms of 
liberal theory.  The identity-blindness of the dissent—and its insistence on a rigid 
intermediate scrutiny with all the practical effects of strict scrutiny—were likened 
to John Rawls’ original position and veil of ignorance but also the adamant 
cosmopolitanism of Jeremy Waldron and callous utilitarian math of Richard Posner.  
The modified intermediate approach of the minority was compared with Ronald 
Dworkin’s equality of opportunity which would temporarily approve of racially 
justified affirmative action.  Like the concurrence, Will Kymlicka’s liberal 
multiculturalism justified identity-specific indigenous rights including self-
determination in liberal terms where such buffer indigenous individuals against 
majoritarian bias and discrimination built into institutions and law and provide 
                                                          
3 Act 195, Sess L Haw 2011. 
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access to substantial rather than merely formal equality.  Kymlicka’s reconciliation 
of Rawls and Dworkin’s represented the project of the earnest liberal eager to 
address the guarantee/reality gap.  However, because Kymlicka’s liberal 
multiculturalism was less amendable to historical remediation and would let 
individual everyone/no-one rights ‘trump’ indigenous group rights, it illustrated the 
limits of a purely liberal defence of the admissions policy.  Ultimately, however, 
Kymlicka’s buffer-and-access features also illustrated the overlap of liberal and 
self-determination projects where equality is measured substantially rather than 
merely formally. 
Chapter Five demonstrated how—as if Kymlicka’s buffer-and-access thesis were 
correct—the international human right to education has evolved from a formalized, 
universalized, everyone/no-one right to a complex, highly identity-aware toolbox 
of rights options.  Tracing the evolution of the right through various instruments, 
the chapter described how the dynamic human right now entails homogenous 
guarantees of a universal right, semi-anonymous race- and gender-specific 
prohibitions on discrimination in education, as well as special temporary measures 
aimed at parity—but also permanent, quasi-collective minority rights to language, 
culture and parallel institutions which buffer ethnic minority members against 
systemic, institutionalized majoritarian bias, rights of availability, access, 
adaptability and acceptability, and participation, and the rights of children 
specifically and also their families and communities.  The multi-narrative human 
right to education is expressed and emphasized as a standalone right, indivisible 
from—even demanded by—constitutional civil and political rights, justiciable and 
enforceable.  Importantly, this highly identity-aware rights toolbox entails 
increasingly specific and concrete state parties’ obligations driven by non-
discrimination itself. 
Chapter Six further explored the adoption of UNDRIP—including the Article 14(1) 
right of indigenous peoples to establish and control their own schools—as the 
earnest culmination of the international human right to education affirming both 
liberal and self-determination projects.  It described in detail how this more rational 
indigenous learner right remains consistent with substantive everyone/no-one and 
complex someone narratives as it entails identity-aware formalized guarantees, 
special measures, minority rights and indigenous rights.  Because it entails remedial 
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self-determination and liberal projects, Article 14 is an organic multiplier of other 
indigenous and human rights, justiciable, and enforceable—even demanded by 
substantial equality—and displays emphasized legality.  Moreover, Article 14 
represents the narrative capacity of specifically indigenous rights to reconcile 
Kymlicka’s theory with itself, namely to overcome the dangers of historical 
disconnection and individual trumping. 
Finally, the thesis compared current federal narratives of equality with those of a 
sister settler jurisdiction—Aotearoa New Zealand—grappling with a similar 
indigenous history of colonization, assimilation, discrimination and present 
disparities.  Chapter Seven discussed the eerily similar historico-legal context of 
Māori legal claims to the Native Hawaiian, including prior sovereignty, ongoing 
harm and a historical continuum of rights.  A critical analysis of domestic 
jurisprudence, legsialtion and Waitangi Tribunal interpretations of the Treaty 
demonstrated how domestic law could narrate equality in multi-narrative terms and, 
consequently, how human, constitutional and indigenous rights could reinforce and 
coincide with one another, The expanded domestic multi-narrative was then tested 
against familiar adamant everyone/no-one criticisms including trumping, ESCR 
categorization and self-determination denial.  These criticisms appeared to fall 
away in the face of intentional human rights incorporation, the organic 
human/constitutional/ indigenous interface, and historical self-determination 
recognition.  Ultimately, New Zealand equality narratives seemed to blur the lines 
between domestic and international law and displayed emphasized legality and 
moral force.  Not unlike the international human rights framework, the law of 
Aotearoa would also approve the admission policy on multiple grounds. 
Importantly, New Zealand law revealed both homegrown and imported aspects of 
the international multi-narrative toolbox of rights.  The presence of buffer-and-
access features and a more historical self-determination demonstrated a domestic 
jurisdiction’s potential narrative capacity to account for unique historico-legal 
context and identity-attracted de facto disparities.  
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8.3 THE EXPANDED MULTI-NARRATIVE AND ITS MARKERS 
Kymlickan multiculturalism and historical self-determination, the evolution of the 
human right to education and the human/constitutional-indigenous rights nexus in 
New Zealand law demonstrate three expanded equality narratives, namely the 
substantive everyone/no-one, complex someone and indigenous learner.  In theory, 
international and domestic law, narrratives which seem inherently at odds in 
Kamehameha have been transformed into a highly identity-aware, complex, multi-
narrative of equality recognizing an ever increasing rather than narrowing toolbox 
of rights options.   It is marked by at least seven features identified below which 
seemingly define equality in regards to indigenous people in education at the 
beginning of the 21st century and could expand and enhance federal equality 
narratives.   
 
8.3.1 EARNEST RECONCILIATION OF THE GUARANTEE/REALITY GAP 
Where current federal equality narratives prioritize a uniform distribution of rights, 
the expanded multi-narrative is fundamentally concerned with the reconciliation of 
everyone/no-one guarantees with identity-attracted disparities.  Such disparities 
defy any presumption of the level playing field, original position or a fair 
distribution of rights and signal the persistence of ongoing discrimination and 
injustice.  They also impede or disable rational revision projects essential to liberal 
equality.  Thus, the multi-narrative interprets equality in substantive rather than 
merely formal terms, in terms of effect and long-term life outcomes consistent with 
Brown I and Plyler.  It also recognizes multiple identities of rightsholders where 
necessary to ensure substantial equality.   
 
8.3.2 HISTORICAL AWARENESS 
Rather than divorcing historical context from equality narratives and from present 
disparities or racializing narratives, the expanded multi-narrative recognizes the in-
built nature of majoritarian bias and discrimination and the ongoing effect of 
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historical injustices on certain groups within liberal democracies.  Awareness 
implies that identity-specific history matters, that it shapes equality narratives, 
identifies vulnerable rightsholders and predicts future violations of equality.  
Historical awareness also distinguishes the rights claims of various minorities from 
those of indigenous peoples given the unique historico-legal context of their claims, 
including the historical fact of prior sovereignty, ongoing harm and a historical 
continuum of rights.  The multi-narrative recognizes that such groups retain special 
political status and self-determination rights which exceed traditional liberal 
projects.    
 
8.3.3 BUFFER-AND-ACCESS FEATURES 
The multi-narrative also recognizes a correlation between identity and rational 
revision context.  Responding to both the gaps and history, the multi-narrative 
recognizes that certain groups suffer disproportionate disadvantages prior to any 
chosen path or end.  In terms of indigenous peoples, the multi-narrative recognizes 
that the prioritization of everyone/no-one narratives perpetuates historic injustices 
and deep harm which pervade all aspects of human well-being and explain 
educational outcomes for indigenous learners.  Thus, the multi-narrative specifies 
the indigenous learner as a rightsholder in no uncertain terms.  It recognizes the 
disadvantage of indigenous identity where doing so may buffer the indigenous 
individual against indirect, systemic and cumulative discrimination and, conversely, 
the advantage where doing so provides access to a richer rational revision context 
and thus equality itself.   
 
8.3.4 EDUCATION AS A STRONG RIGHT 
In contrast to exceptionalist federal narratives, the multi-narrative recognizes 
education as a supra-legislative, supra-domestic guarantee, even an unalienable, 
universal fundamental human right crucial to the realization of all other human 
rights, including the civil and political rights most readily identified with the US 
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Constitution.  It is an organic multiplier, foreclosing most or all other human rights 
when denied but acting as a bridge to most or all other human rights when realized. 
In New Zealand, education is stated in legislation in human rights-like terms in the 
Education Act 1989 and protected via the non-discrimination provisions of the 
Human Rights Act 1993.  This right is potentially legal and morally and normatively 
persuasive at the international and domestic levels, both on its own and via non-
discrimination.  Its repetitive and increasing explicitness argues for an emphasized 
rather than diminished legality applicable to every human being—especially the 
most vulnerable of rightsholders given historic and ongoing rights denial. 
 
8.3.5 POSITIVE MEASURES AND MINORITY RIGHTS 
Rather than broad, formalized guarantees of equality, the multi-narrative recognizes 
that temporary but also permanent positive measures and minority rights may be 
necessary to reconcile guarantee/reality gaps.  These measures are expressed as 
human rights alongside the right to education.  They range from affirmative action 
to minority rights to language, culture and parallel educational institutions designed 
to buffer members of certain groups from majoritarian bias and discrimination.  
They are consistent with the positive duties attributed to governments to effect the 
right to education, equality and non-discrimination generally.  The 4-A Scheme 
importantly defines those rights in terms of access, availability, adaptability and 
acceptability—factors similar to the intangibles which helped to persuade the 
Supreme Court in Brown. 
 
8.3.6 PROPORTIONAL, REMEDIAL SELF-DETERMINATION 
The multi-narrative is not just historically aware but recognizes the need to remedy 
the deep harm caused by historic events like overthrow, annexation and 
discrimination as a matter of justice in a proportional manner.  Self-determination 
is best interpreted not only as the residual right of a nation or people which never 
ceded its sovereignty but also as a proportionate response to the deep harm evident 
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in the Native Hawaiian and global indigenous moʻolelo.  In terms of the indigenous 
learner, historical self-determination specifically responds to the deep harm of 
colonization, assimilation, discrimination and ongoing disparities.   In its identity-
specificity, self-determination is a buffer-and-access feature, organic multiplier and 
collective form of rational revision, a sum of its parts which translates into 
individual revision.   
 
8.3.7 INDIGENOUS SELF-DETERMINATION IN EDUCATION 
The multi-narrative recognizes the identity-explicit right of indigenous peoples to 
establish and control educational systems and institutions.  Article 14 of UNDRIP 
expresses the multi-narrative and earnest reconciliation, particularly given its 
expression of remedial self-determination and substantive everyone/no-one and 
complex someone education rights.  Article 14 apepars to be the culmination of the 
evolution of the human right to education, an organic multiplier, buffer-and-access 
mechanism and the everyday incarnation of Articles 3 and 4—that is, both internal 
and external self-determination.  Consistent with the right to self-determination 
which underwrites it, Article 14 appears to recognise a proportionate remedy to the 
deep harm experienced by indigenous peoples in education historically and on an 
ongoing basis, in terms of institutional control.  It is also consistent with 
homegrown, residual and historically continuous indigenous rights which exceed 
liberal projects.  Domestically, the right forms a potential interface or nexus 
between human rights, constitutional rights and indigenous rights which could 
enhance the organic multiplication, emphasized legality and moral force of all. 
Ultimately, the foregoing markers represent primary goods in education for the 
indigenous learner, forming a possible checklist for the expansion of federal 
equality narratives. The following good, better and best recommendations 
correspond to varying degree with the expanded multi-narrative and its markers.  
The good would seemingly ask for little departure from present narratives—though 
perhaps a re-examination of previous precedents—while the better and best would 
certainly require philosophical change and human rights importation.  The best, 
however, are most consistent with the multi-narrative and its markers—and with a 
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more earnest equality.  Consequently, the best may offer the greatest reconciliation 
of current guarantee/reality gaps affecting Native Hawaiians and be most consistent 
with the unique historico-legal context of the policy.  These recommendations are 
not an exhaustive list but those most apparent from the thesis.  Again, 
recommendations focus on expansion of the narratives rather than subsequent 
questions of implementation. 
 
8.4 GOOD: PHILOSOPHICAL CONSISTENCY WITH THE MULTI-NARRATIVE 
Federal courts should interpret the admission policy in terms which are 
philosophically consistent with the multi-narrative and reflect some of its markers.  
Consistency would largely affirm current federal narratives of equality. 
 
8.4.1 MAINTAIN PHILOSOPHICAL CONSISTENCY WITH BROWN I AND BROWN II   
Federal courts should interpret the admission policy in terms of a Brown-like 
narrative which is historically and substantially aware.  The appropriateness of an 
everyone/no-one narrative as a universal remedy for all identity-attracted 
discrimination should not be presumed.   
Brown I is most often cited in American law as the ultimate example of 
colorblindness, of sameness.  What is often underemphasized is that de facto 
inequalities within the classroom and between schools singling out certain groups 
of students really drove the Supreme Court’s rejection of the separate-but-equal 
doctrine in 1954.4   It was not just the formal existence of the schools themselves 
or their identity-aware admission policies alone but also the differences in funding, 
facilities, teaching and other resources which created de facto disparities in the 
actual educational experience of students across the nation who shared a racial 
identity.  For African-Americans—as for Native Hawaiians—group identity 
attracted de facto discrimination and disparities in education evident in the 
                                                          
4 See discussion in Chapter Two, at 2.2.3. 
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classroom, between groups and in terms of long-term life outcomes in various areas 
of human experience.  As discussed in Chapter Two, Brown I and later Lau assessed 
discrimination in terms of disparate impact.5  Both decisions recognized a real-time 
gap between formalized everyone/no-one constitutional guarantees—namely, the 
Fourteenth Amendment—and the everyday realities of complex discrimination and 
disparities insidiously drawn to a particularly minority group identity. 
The appropriateness of a deliberately formal everyone/no-one narrative which 
attempted to leave no doubt about who was a rightsholder of equality to that 
particular historico-legal context and the resulting guarantee/reality gap is also not 
as evident.   Particularly, in recent decades, the legislative histories of civil rights 
statutes provided in cases such as Rice and Kamehameha are lengthy and detailed 
but the narrative implications of the context less explored in the jurisprudence.  
There is little doubt, given the extensive historico-legal analysis in Brown, section 
1981 cases and Kamehameha itself, that Brown responds to a particular history, a 
history which demanded an emphatic statement of homogeneity and anonymity—
even inclusion.  Again, the schools in question in Brown were not chosen by 
African-American learners but rather imposed on them via de jure and de facto 
discrimination.  In the wake of the failure of formalized everyone/no-one guarantees 
to deliver on the constitutional promise of equal protection, Brown emphasized that 
everyone was a rightsholder while Brown II also recognized the appropriateness of 
someone positive measures. 
In this light, the admission policy need not be immediately suspect as demanded by 
Weber6 but actually might be demanded by the historical-legal context.  That is, 
where formalized statements of equality in everyone/no-one terms fail to account 
for the guarantee/reality gap in terms of Native Hawaiian learners, courts should 
consider the appropriateness of an alternative equality narrative, one with the 
greatest capacity for accounting for a Brown-like substantial equality, intentional 
identity-blindness notwithstanding. 
As argued, narrow federal narratives appear to lack the capacity to account for real-
time measures of substantial equality including the admission policy.  The 
                                                          
5 See discussion in Chapter Two, at 2.2.3 and 2.3.1. 
6 See discussion in Chapter Three, at 3.5.1. 
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predominance of a singular, adamant everyone/no-one narrative particularly limits 
this capacity as it undermines an already slim someone and arbitrary indigenous 
narrative.  Clearly, the earnest liberal can no longer prioritize the adamant 
everyone/no-one.  To do so is to be wilfully blind to the a priori disadvantage of 
indigenous identity and costs of cultural membership, and to condone significant 
discrimination and disparities suffered by particular groups.   
 
8.4.2 PURPOSE MATTERS 
The purpose of the policy should matter.  Following Brown II and Carolene 
Products, courts should attribute positive duties to the government to adopt special 
measures to eradicate substantial discrimination.   
Philosophical consistency with Brown I and Brown II demands a closer assessment 
of affirmative action.  While the Kamehameha majority was forced to interpret the 
admission policy within current federal equality narratives and to treat the someone 
narrative as an exception to the rule, the Brown decisions together seemingly 
espouse a more substantive narrative than Bakke and subsequent cases.  Brown I 
itself recognized the intangibles and subtle disparities as well as more appreciable 
differences in facilities, staffing and other resources.  Brown II crucially approves 
positive measures to achieve de facto equality including busing and redrawing of 
district lines in order to achieve disparities between minority groups, even 
attributing positive duties to public authorities to do so.  While current trends of 
reverse discrimination approval in federal courts are contrary to the evolution of the 
right to education in international law, Brown II’s approval of positive measures is 
completely consistent with the toolbox of rights options currently available to the 
indigenous learner under international law. 
Brown II also attributes positive duties to the government to take such measures to 
eradicate de facto discrimination.  As described in Chapter Five, the Maastricht 
Guidelines, Limburg Principles and 4-A Scheme make it clear that states are to take 
increasingly concrete steps to realize the human right to education.  Ultimately, 
greater philosophical consistency with Brown II when interpreting the admission 
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policy will also be more consistent with international multi-narrative of equality in 
regards to the indigenous learner.  Ironically, while Carolene Products Footnote 
Four seemingly permits preference for a ‘discrete and insular minority’, 
international law demands identity-specific measures where necessary to ensure 
substantial realization of equality and non-discrimination for such groups.  In 
Carolene Products and international law, the purpose of the policy matters. 
Ironically, despite the significance of the decision and its watershed effect, the 
actual reasoning in Brown exhibits little wrestle.  While deliberated over a period 
of time among a group of men with varied backgrounds and opinions, the decision 
was ultimately unanimous. 7  In contrast, the Ninth Circuit was almost evenly split 
between adamant everyone/no-one and slim someone narratives. 
    
8.4.3 RECOGNIZE THE CONSTITUTIVE COMMITMENT VALUE OF EDUCATION 
Federal courts should recognize at least a constitutive commitment value in regards 
to the fundamental right to education affirmed in Brown and Plyler v Doe.  This 
standalone right to education should be measured in terms of substantial equality, 
considered organically crucial to the realization of constitutional rights including 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause. 
As discussed, the courts in Brown, Plyler and Kamehameha all recognized that 
education is a ‘fundamental right’.  Federal jurisprudence recognizes a fundamental 
right to education which is at least a constitutive commitment.  It may not be 
entrenched in the Constitution but is supra-legislative and has been interpreted as 
crucial to the realization of all other civil and political rights—even Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection.  This constitutive commitment to education has 
several implications for future interpretation and judicial standards in terms of the 
admission policy.   
                                                          
7 Which is not to say it was an easy decision.  Various members of the Court with vastly different 
backgrounds and ideological leanings—including a former Klansman and white supremacist—were 
at first deeply conflicted about the decision: Michael J Klarman Brown v. Board of Education and 
the Civil Rights Movement: Abridged Edition of "From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme 
Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality " (Cary NC, Oxford University Press, 2007) at 71. 
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Constitutive commitment value implies interpretation in terms of de facto 
disparities and long-term effect.  What violated equal protection in Plyler was not 
a suspect classification or outright racial identification but the violation of a 
fundamental—albeit not constitutional—right to education which translated into an 
equal protection violation.  Moreover, that violation was not measured in individual 
terms but, as in Brown, in long-term, organic group outcomes—that is, the inability 
of the alien children to adapt and thrive within American society, poverty, and other 
socio-economic disparities.  To ensure that equal protection was actually universal 
to all within the territory of the United States, the Supreme Court could not allow 
this group of children identified by their political status—namely, their non-citizen 
status or that of their parents—to suffer long-term outcomes which were in their 
opinion akin to punishing those children for their parentage.8   
Allowing Native Hawaiian children to likewise suffer disparities as groups because 
their ancestral identity insidiously attracts complex discrimination and disparities 
which certainly have long-term effects on life outcomes would also seem to be 
punishing them for their parentage.  To deny that this most vulnerable of vulnerable 
groups in the state of Hawaiʻi does not possess this right would be unconscionable 
and inconsistent with Plyler. 
Given its supra-legislative status, section 1981—and perhaps any legislative 
standard—appears to be unsuitable for determining the extent or implication of any 
such right on its own.  The current application of section 1981 to so-called reverse 
discrimination is misplaced given the specific historico-legal context of the section 
and its own wording which guarantees the “same right as whites” to enter into 
contracts.  Once education is also recognized as a fundamental right which might 
be protected directly via equal protection analysis (see below) even civil rights 
legislation appears inadequate since section 1981 was severed from its historico-
legal roots in the Thirteenth Amendment by decisions such as McDonald v Santa 
Fe Trail Transportation.  It has been interpretively divorced from the historical 
African American experience of slavery, Jim Crow laws and segregation and the 
ongoing everyday reality of discrimination which it was originally purposed to 
remedy.  In becoming so homogenous and anonymous, the tests—whether 
                                                          
8 See discussion in Chapter Two, at 2.5. 
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intermediate or strict—are no longer significantly concerned with actual disparities.  
This is not philosophically consistent with either Brown or Plyler. 
Given its frequent and consistent recognition in the Supreme Court in cases 
including Meyer v Nebraska, Pierce v Society of Sisters, Wisconsin v Yoder, Brown, 
Plyler and Kamehameha, there is little doubt that federal law recognizes a 
fundamental right to education which demands greater deference than ordinary 
statute.  Given the substantial interpretation inherent to the reasoning of the Plyler 
majority—which is also consistent with Brown—the measurable effect of the policy 
itself on the guarantee/reality gap or on socio-economic disparities with long-term 
predictability would seem to provide a standard of its own which must be given a 
greater weight in judicial review than a legislative provision divorced from its 
constitutional moorings.   
 
8.4.4 APPLY RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW 
Following Plyler, federal courts should equate the admission policy with the 
fundamental right to education and apply rational basis review rather than a 
stricter level of scrutiny.  Applying the ‘insular and discreet minority’ rationale in 
Footnote Four of Carolene Products, courts should distinguish between policies 
which discriminate against a ‘discrete and insular minority’ and those aimed at 
addressing disparities attracted to such minorities.  Following Carolene Products’ 
two-tiered standard of review, the latter should draw a lower, rational basis review 
which presumes the constitutionality of admission policies designed to overcome 
discrimination. 
Plyler has been described as an “analytically muddled but ultimately ethical” 9 
decision, another seeming wrestle with narrative in a federal court where facts 
exceeded current judicial tests, namely the suspect classification requirement.  
Rather than relax intermediate standards meant for an employment context, the 
Court in Plyler recognized the fundamental right to education as vital to equal 
                                                          
9 Cathy Albisa “Drawing Lines in the Sand: Building Economic and Social Rights Norms in the 
United States” in Shareen Hertel and Kathryn Libal (eds) Human Rights in the United States: Beyond 
Exceptionalism (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2011) 68 at 73. 
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protection and applied rational basis of review to Texas’ educational policy.  That 
right constituted a legitimate purpose 
Rational basis review is also consistent with San Antonio School District v 
Rodriguez10 , as long as Native Hawaiians are not considered a suspect class.  
Significant evidence was presented in the Kamehameha case—and in this thesis—
that Native Hawaiian is not a racial classification, suspect or otherwise, which 
would automatically trigger strict or intermediate scrutiny.  In fact, given current, 
measurable and easily predicted long-term socio-economic disparities—even the 
multi-generational trauma, higher allostatic load, cyclical, accumulative and 
otherwise complex identity-attracted discrimination—Native Hawaiians more 
closely resemble the group of children in Plyler whom the Supreme Court refused 
to punish because of their ‘parentage’.   
Ultimately, Carolene Products Footnote Four would require that the level of 
judicial scrutiny be heightened where the law or policy discriminates against a 
“discrete and insular minority” but not seemingly where the disadvantage to a 
majority member is debatable.  Where not to the disadvantage of a minority, 
Carolene Products supports the application of a lower, rational basis standard of 
review which—contrary to current federal narratives and following Plyler—would 
support the constitutionality of the admission policy. 
 
8.4.5 APPLY MANCARI 
Federal courts should find that ‘Native Hawaiian’ constitutes a political 
classification and apply the Mancari exception to the admission policy.  Within 
current narratives, Mancari should be considered the most consistent with an 
expanded multi-narrative and the seven markers and therefore preferred. 
Consistency with the facts and reasoning of Brown and Plyer notwithstanding, the 
most straightforward recommendation available to federal courts within current 
                                                          
10 San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez 411 US 1 (1973).  Discussed in Chapter 
Two at 2.5. 
  393 
 
narratives is to apply the Mancari exception to the admission policy in future.  
Almost one-third of the Ninth Circuit was convinced this was appropriate.11  As the 
Schools argued and consistent with a plethora of federal legislation describing the 
trust relationship between the Native Hawaiian people and the federal government 
in no uncertain terms especially since annexation, ‘Native Hawaiian’ is not a racial 
but political classification.  The scholarship is plentiful, extremely persuasive on 
this point and seemingly impossible to dispute.  Any further dismissal of the 
relationship can only be attributed to wilful blindness to the facts and the law. 
The thesis has characterized the Mancari exception as representing an undermined 
indigenous narrative subject to arbitrary congressional will and judicial activism.  
And yet, applying Mancari to the admission policy implies some historical 
awareness and remediation.  Given these features, Mancari is the current federal 
narrative closest to the expanded multi-narrative of equality which more fully 
accounts for the admission policy in political theory, international law and New 
Zealand law. 
Ironically, Mancari provides a straightforward exception to equal protection and 
would also apply the lower, rational basis of review.  This might allow federal 
courts to give objective weight to the measurable and predictable outcomes of the 
admission policy, even its apparent de facto buffering against in-built 
discrimination and access to a level playing field including improved education 
outcomes for learners.  In fact, a Mancari-like analysis would only require the 
purposes of the policy to be consistent with remedial self-determination and special 
trust relationship, findings frequently shown to be consistent with the unique 
historico-legal context of the admission policy and the guarantee/reality gap 
affecting the Native Hawaiian learner.  Ironically, this level of scrutiny would also 
be consistent with the equal protection analysis undertaken in Plyler. 
 
                                                          
11 See discussion in Chapter Three at 2.5.4. 
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8.4.6 PREFER AN INTERPRETATION CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW   
Federal courts should refer to international law and jurisprudence when 
interpreting the admission policy. Federal courts should prefer interpretations 
which are consistent with international law.  Consistency should include greater 
deference for affirmative action and other positive measures. 
The constitutive commitment value the Brown, Plyler and Kamehameha courts 
attributed to education resembles the human right in international law, enough that 
both Plyler and Brown are regularly cited in international recommendations and 
reports as prime examples of protection of the human right12 rather than equal 
protection per se.  More than ordinary statute in international law, the human right 
is also expressed as a constitutional right in various liberal democracies and has 
been extensively interpreted in various UN recommendations and in both 
international and national courts. 13  Prior to any further adoption, ratification or 
legislation this body of law could provide an invaluable interpretive aid when 
reviewing the admission policy. 
In Roper v Simmons (2005), Justice Kennedy wrote on behalf of the majority that 
the opinion of the world community provides “respected and significant 
confirmation of our own conclusions…It does not lessen our fidelity to the [U. S.] 
Constitution,” he explained, to recognize “the express affirmation of certain 
fundamental rights by other nations and peoples”. 14   Ultimately, in Roper, ‘the 
Court acknowledged “the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the 
juvenile death penalty’” 15  finding the execution of persons under 18 
unconstitutional despite the United States’ failure to ratify the Children’s 
Convention.   
In the wake of Roper, Justice Ginsburg held the hope that:  
…the U. S. Supreme Court [would] continue to accord ‘a decent Respect to the 
Opinions of [Human]kind’ as a matter of comity and in a spirit of humility.  Comity, 
because projects vital to our well being — combating international terrorism is a 
prime example — require trust and cooperation of nations the world over.  And 
                                                          
12 See discussion in Chapter Five at 5.4.3. 
13 See discussion in Chapter Five at 5.4.3. 
14 Roper v Simmons 543 US 551 (2005), at 25, Stevens J for the majority. 
15 At 25.   
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humility because, in Justice O’Connor’s words: ‘Other legal systems continue to 
innovate, to experiment, and to find . . . solutions to the new legal problems that 
arise each day, [solutions] from which we can learn and benefit.’16 
Even the conservative, late Justice Scalia approved “reasonable consideration” of 
international treaty interpretation.17  In this spirit, earlier federal courts had gone so 
far as to pass judgment on gross human rights violations upon extra-territorial non-
citizens and awarded civil remedies in such cases.18     
In terms of the admission policy, such reference would allow federal courts to take 
“comparative sideglances” 19  at the legal experience of other jurisdictions 
attempting to situate a strong, supra-legislative right to education within domestic 
frameworks.   In fact, the multi-decade evolution of the international right to 
education from a formalized everyone/no-one narrative to a complex someone and 
rational indigenous learner narrative is basically the drawn-out version of the same 
wrestle undertaken by the Ninth Circuit and is replete with ‘lessons learned’ 
globally.  
Non-discrimination may offer the perfect opportunity for the United States to 
embrace comity given existing treaty obligations.  It has not ratified the ICESCR 
but has ratified the ICCPR, including its Article 3 right to non-discrimination.  As 
discussed in Chapters Five and Six, the right to non-discrimination has been used 
widely to protect various ESCRs and become a powerful driver behind the 
evolution of the toolbox of rights options known collectively as the right to 
education.  Special measures, permanent minority rights, autonomous indigenous 
institutions and preferential admission are all consistent with non-discrimination in 
international law and provide an alternative but still liberal narrative of the 
                                                          
16 Ruth Bader Ginsburg “‘A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]Kind’: The Value of a 
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication" (2011) 26 American University 
International Law Review 927, at 934.   
17 See Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon, 126 S Ct 2669 (2006) at 2700.  The term and the case discussed 
in Melissa Waters “The U.S. Supreme Court and the International Court of Justice: What Does 
‘Respectful Consideration’ Mean?”, in Cesare Romano (ed) The Sword and the Scales: The United 
States and International Courts and Tribunals (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2009) 112 
at 118-122.  However, Scalia J dissented in Roper.  
18 See, for instance, Filartiga v Pena-Irala 630 F 2d 876 (2d Circ 1980) discussed in Michael Ratner 
“Civil Remedies for Gross Human Rights Violations” in Richard Pierre Claude and Burns H Weston 
(eds) Human Rights in the World Community: Issues and Action (3d ed, Philadelphia, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2006) 483. 
19 Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Deborah Jones Merritt “Affirmative Action: An International Human 
Rights Dialogue” (1999-2000) 21 Cardozo Law Review 253, at 273.  The article specifically 
discusses gender-specific affirmative action. 
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admission policy.  Whether interpreted as an affirmative action policy or minority 
education right, good faith fulfilment of the United States’ treaty obligations20 
would seem to require its courts to interpret the admission policy as a measure of 
equality.   
Ironically, interpreting education as an outcomes-focused constitutive commitment 
focused on non-discrimination would also seemingly require federal courts to 
revisit Rodriguez where a very similar group of children defined by socio-economic 
disparities but also by ethnic minority identity—as one would predict given the 
clustering of socio-economic disparities around minority identity—were held not 
to be discriminated against when 4A Scheme-like disparities in educational funding 
were clear.  Where the rational level of review applied in Rodriguez failed to hold 
Texas accountable, the 4-A Scheme, state parties’ obligations, the Maastricht 
Guidelines, Limburg Principles and other interpretive aids could qualify the 
legitimate purpose step and hold public bodies accountable for de facto 
discrimination against those learners. 
 
8.4.7 THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHICAL CONSISTENCY 
The above recommendations offer at least philosophical consistency with an 
expanded multi-narrative of equality which supports a more substantial 
interpretation of the admission policy and, possibly, the application of a rational 
basis of review.  Plyler represents some reconciliation while Mancari shows 
historical awareness and some remediation. 
However, the above recommendations cannot entirely account for either the unique 
historico-legal context of the admission policy itself—that is the unique history of 
an independent people which never ceded its sovereignty and the deep harm which 
has ensued in the wake of overthrow and other historic injustices—or the 
complexity of the current guarantee/reality gap affecting educational outcomes for 
Native Hawaiian learners.  These recommendations would not necessarily imply 
                                                          
20 As required by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331 (opened for 
signature 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980). 
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buffer-and-access functions or provide a strong right to education, positive 
measures and minority rights in education as rights, proportional remedial self-
determination or indigenous self-determination in education.  Mancari, at best, only 
promises the limited self-determination associated with a domestic dependent 
nation.  Ultimately, any rights recognized in the name of philosophical consistency 
might still be undermined by the legal prioritization of the singular everyone/no-
one solely liberal narrative and the two-edged sword of plenary power and judicial 
activism.   
 
8.5 BETTER: INTENTIONAL IMPORTATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHT TO 
EDUCATION 
Philosophical consistency with a multi-narrative of equality is good but 
intentionally incorporating a substantial everyone/no-one and complex someone 
human right to education into United States federal law would be better.  
Incorporation could clarify the superficial divisions between human rights and 
constitutional rights and imply organic multiplication, indivisibility and enhanced 
constitutionality. 
 
8.5.1 EQUATE PLYLER WITH THE HUMAN RIGHT TO EDUCATION  
Federal law should equate the human right to education with the fundamental right 
to education recognized in Plyler.   
Prima facie, education is a fairly innocuous right lacking the immediate drama of, 
for instance, questions about the appropriateness of applying the death penalty to 
minors.  Rather, it is often taken for granted, even expected among Americans.21  
                                                          
21 Franklin Delano Roosevelt included it in his Second Bill of Rights for this reason: see Cass 
Sunstein The Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s Unfinished Revolution and Why We Need It More than 
Ever (New York, Basic Books, 2004).  Which is not to say that it is not debated.  As the NCLB saga 
shows, a disjuncture between the good intentions in legislation and policy and implementation 
particularly engenders fierce debate.  
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In legal terms, it would seemingly require little departure from current law and 
narratives. 
As discussed previously, education has already been recognized as a ‘fundamental 
right’ by the Supreme Court in Brown and Plyler.  This same right also partially 
validated the admission policy in the opinion of the majority in Kamehameha.  
Again, the real question since Plyler has not been whether the federal right to 
education is legal, justiciable and enforceable because it was upheld in these cases.  
The crucial inquiry is what status and weight this supra-legislative but not quite 
constitutional right should bear. 
As in international law, the Plyler right already displays organic multiplication 
value creating rights options where realized and foreclosing fundamental civil and 
political rights and long-term life outcomes where denied.  In essence, Brown and 
Plyler imply that the right can be denied collectively on the basis of group identity, 
effectively shutting down rational revision options including citizenship and long-
term life outcomes.  Although the United States has rejected international 
statements of ESCRs including the ICESCR, the Supreme Court in Brown and 
Plyler were persuaded by socio-economic factors, associating de facto disparities 
with a denial of equal protection itself.   
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s reasoning and international statements of the right 
are fundamentally consistent and certainly philosophically consistent.  There seems 
little question that the Court and international law are describing the self-same right 
and that the legal value placed on the right should correspond to its international 
counterpart.  Notwithstanding the United States’ reputation for exceptionalism, 
ascribing a similar value to education in federal law offer greater clarity to the 
wrestle of narratives in the Kamehameha case and would seemingly enhance federal 
law and narratives rather than compete with them.   
A federal human right to education would substantially clarify both the status and 
weight of the Plyler right.  It would echo a constitutive commitment in terms of 
organic indivisibility and multiplication but would also constitute a supra-domestic 
right sourced in the sacredness of each human being.  As discussed in Chapter Five, 
human rights status implies universality as such rights accrue to all human beings 
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without distinction or exception and to human beings everywhere, cross boundaries 
and borders, and cannot be refuted or taken away by domestic law because they are 
inherently attached to the human being.22   It would be not just supra-domestic in 
jurisdiction but in value.   
As an ESCR, the Plyler right was consistent with a fundamental constitutional civil 
and political right even equal protection.  Given the intuitions of federal courts 
anyway, human rights status would seemingly most provide a legitimate even 
recognizable label.  This supra-domestic right would, once again, seemingly exceed 
the capacity of legislative tests such as those applied to section 1981, particularly 
tests employed in employment or contractual contexts given its supra-domestic 
value.  Rational basis review would again appear more appropriate to this supra-
domestic right.   
 
8.5.2 RATIFY INTERNATIONAL EVERYONE/NO-ONE AND SOMEONE 
INSTRUMENTS WHICH GUARANTEE AND PROTECT THE HUMAN RIGHT TO 
EDUCATION  
The US should ratify core international human rights treaties which guarantee the 
human right to education including ICESCR, CEDAW, Children’s Convention, and 
CRPD.  It should also ratify relevant Optional Protocols to these instruments.23 
As mentioned in Chapter Seven, there is room for greater importation of, greater 
institutional support for and a need to maintain progress made in terms of human 
rights in Aotearoa New Zealand 24 and particularly in regard to ESCRs including 
                                                          
22 Chapter Five at 1.2. 
23 Including the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 2008, Doc.A/63/435, C.N.869.2009.TREATIES-34 of 11 December 2009 (opened for 
signature 24 September 2009, entered into force 5 May 2013); Optional Protocol to the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 1999, 2131 UNTS 83 (opened 
for signature 10 December 1999, entered into force 22 December 2000); Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure 2014 A/RES/66/138 (opened 
for signature 28 February 2012, entered into force 14 April 2014); and the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006, Doc.A/61/611 (opened for signature 30 
March 2007, entered into force 3 May 2008). 
24 Judy McGregor, Sylvia Bell and Margaret Wilson Fault Lines: Human Rights in New Zealand 
(New Zealand Law Foundation Research Paper, April 2015). 
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education.25   Yet, New Zealand has a clear advantage over the United States 
because it has intentionally imported human rights narratives into constitutional law, 
allowing it to begin discussions on implementation and rightsholders who have 
been ‘left behind’.  This is a crucial step which is, even at the philosophical level, 
challenging in the United States given the prioritization of an adamant everyone/no-
one narrative which asks few questions about rightsholder identity.  Conversations 
about implementing a human right to education will continue to be a moot point in 
the United States until a human right to education is actually ratified and imported. 
Given the toolbox nature of the multi-narrative human right to education, not one 
of these instruments should be disregarded or ignored in incorporation, especially 
given their individual specificity to the most vulnerable of rightsholders.  
Importation would include fundamental everyone/no-one guarantees covering all 
levels of education, complex someone special measures in education including 
identity-specific and socio-economically-aware special measures, permanent 
minority rights, age-specific education rights including participation, and disability-
aware rights focused on flexible inclusion.  Given the consistency of the right 
throughout its evolution, any imported right would likewise remain anchored by 
substantive equality and non-discrimination. 
Where the relevant Optional Protocols are also ratified the legality, justiciability 
and enforceability of the right to education will obviously be enhanced.  While 
Optional Protocols would further enhance the legitimacy and moral force of human 
rights and constitutional rights where they overlap, they would also indicate a 
degree of earnestness, even a willingness to be accountable where the right is 
violated. 
 
                                                          
25 Margaret Beddgood and Chris Gledhill (eds) Law Into Action: Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in Aotearoa New Zealand (Wellington, Thomson Reuters, 2011). 
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8.5.3 INTENTIONALLY INCORPORATE THE HUMAN RIGHT INTO FEDERAL 
LEGISLATION 
Federal lawmakers should also intentionally draft legislation which gives effect to 
its treaty obligations regarding the right to education under ICESCR, CEDAW, 
UNCROC, and CRPD, as well as relevant Optional Protocols.  Lawmakers should 
also consider intentionally drafting legislation which is consistent with the minority 
rights expressed in the Minority Rights Declaration. 
Intentional incorporation of international human rights into domestic legislation 
obviously indicates a degree of earnestness.  The New Zealand experience also 
illustrates how intentional incorporation creates an interface between human rights 
and domestic law which can actually make constitutional rights more constitutional 
as it were.  In the United States, legal scholars have argued that human rights are 
mostly consistent with the fundamental rights of the Constitution26 and with other 
domestic law. 27    The resemblance between Brown’s substantial focus, the 
fundamental Plyler right and the international right is particularly persuasive.  
Intentional incorporation would facilitate recognition of that right as both a 
constitutional right and a human right, offering greater legitimacy to the right and 
lessons learned internationally. 
Intentional incorporation into federal legislation would clarify interpretation of the 
admission policy for federal courts consistent with the positive obligations 
attributed to states in instruments from the ICESCR to UNDRIP and have reference 
to international jurisprudence as well as recommendations interpreting those 
instruments.  The Maastricht Guidelines, 4-A Scheme and other interpretations of 
state party obligations in regards to education would seemingly find little 
philosophical difference between the facts in Plyler and those in Rodriguez. 
Moreover, there would also seem to be little difference between the Kamehameha 
admission policy and the facts of Plyler, no question of whether a lower level of 
                                                          
26 See, for example, Natsu T Saito “Returning to First Principles: International Human Rights as US 
Constitutionalism” (2006) 1 Florida Int’l U L Rev 45.   
27 See, for example, Alice Farmer and Kate Stinson “Failing the Grade: How the Use of Corporal 
Punishment in U.S. Public Schools Demonstrates the Need for U.S. Ratification of the Children’s 
Rights Convention and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities” (2010) 54 NY L 
Sch L Rev 1035.   
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scrutiny should apply.  Again, international jurisprudence on the right is extensive 
and might significantly aid interpretation. 
Consistent with a ‘Second Bill of Rights’,28 a federal right to education would be 
bolstered by intentional human rights legislation modelled after the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBoRA) and Human Rights Act 1993 (HRA).   This 
domestic statement of human rights would lend moral force to education law but 
would also approve special measures, minority rights and emphasize non-
discrimination.  Although the NZBoRA does not recognize ESCRs, the HRA, as 
discussed in Chapter 7 seemingly does in terms of non-discrimination.  The 
American version could recognize both CPRs and ESCRs consistent with the 
international multi-narrative.  The moral force of this supra-domestic but 
constitutional instrument could be significant. 
 
8.5.4 INCORPORATE THE HUMAN RIGHT TO EDUCATION INTO EXISTING 
LEGISLATION 
Lawmakers should also intentionally incorporate the United States’ treaty 
obligations regarding education into existing legislation.  Legislation which is 
incompatible with the human right should be revisited. 
Where exceptionalism may actually undermine the United States’ own current 
domestic educational policy and the constitutional goals it espouses, incorporation 
might provide the moral force lacking in legislation including the oft-criticized 
NCLB or its recently passed rewrite—the Every Student Succeeds Act 201529 
(ESSA).  Angela Holland, for instance, has argued that government efforts to 
“federalize” or centralize education via the NCLB, “to address disparities” and 
“close the gap” will fail until a human right to education is recognized because only 
such a right can provide the “legal commitment”—that is, the moral force—
                                                          
28 Cass Sunstein The Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s Unfinished Revolution and Why We Need It More 
than Ever (New York, Basic Books, 2004), discussed at 1.5. 
29  S 1177 — 114th Congress: Every Student Achieves Act of 2015, a reauthorization of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 USC §6301 et seq. 
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required to implement the law. 30   Others similarly have argued that the 
centralization which drives the legislation will require at least a constitutional right 
to education.31   
Intentional incorporation of a specifically indigenous right to education would 
create a kind of duality of rights32 based on multiple jurisdictional bases of legality 
and legitimacy—that is, both domestic and international.  Though incorporated into 
federal law, the human right to education could retain its legality, justiciability, and 
enforceability as a supra-domestic universal human right originating in the 
sacredness of the human being and parallel liberal projects—particularly if the 
United States also ratifies and incorporates the relevant Optional Protocols to the 
ICESCR, Children’s Convention and CRPD.  Where directly equated with a Brown- 
or Plyler-like equal protection narrative perhaps through a human rights-informed 
principle of non-discrimination, the former constitutive commitment would become 
a constitutional right with moral force of its own with the attending justiciability, 
legality and enforceability.   
Backed by the laborious evolution of the human right to education in international 
law, however, the incorporated right would seemingly carry a moral force and 
legitimacy which transcended the sanctity of the Constitution even as it affirmed it.  
Again, the international right is not limited by borders or boundaries and represents 
a consensus of nations.  Moreover, rights such as equality and non-discrimination 
transcend ordinary human rights being considered norms of international law.  
                                                          
30 “While congressional policies make clear our political commitment to the education of America's 
children, the effective implementation of these policies will require exactly the type of legal 
commitment embodied in international treaties such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child…. 
“NCLB is intended to address disparities reflected in the academic outcomes of poor, minority, 
disabled, and limited-English proficiency students.  Its primary objective is to close the achievement 
gap…In reality, however, the goal of leaving no child behind amounts to mere fantasy without an 
underlying fundamental right to support it”: Angela Holland “Resolving the Dissonance of 
Rodriguez and the Right to Education: International Human Rights Instruments as a Source of 
Repose for the United States” (2008) 41 Vand J Transnat'l L 229 at 264-265 (footnotes excluded).  
Ironically, while the United States has not ratified more innocuous treaties such as the Children’s 
Convention and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which it is largely 
consistent with, it has ratified, for example, the Torture Convention (CAT) which it may not be: 
Johanna Kalb “The Persistence of Dualism in Human Rights Treaty Implementation” (2011) 30(1) 
Yale L & Pol’y Rev 71.   
31 See Stephen Lurie “Why Doesn’t the Constitution Guarantee the Right to Education? The Atlantic 
(online ed, Washington DC, 16 Oct 2013).   
32 Similar to arguments of Julian Aguon in regards to indigenous peoples in the United States: see 
Julian Aguon “Other Arms: The Power of a Dual Rights Legal Strategy for the Chamoru People of 
Guam Using the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in U.S. Courts” (2008) 31(1) U 
Haw L Rev 113. 
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Their normative force has driven the evolution of the right to education in 
international law and certainly entails the kind of comity described by Justice 
Ginsburg.   
The effect on legislation would be significant.  Admittedly, the ESSA would need 
some rethinking.  This legislation would need to be philosophically realigned to a 
rights approach.  At a basic level, the ire of politicians, the furore of school districts, 
educators and parents—the rewrite itself—suggest that the adamant everyone/no-
one narratives which dominated the NCLB lacked legitimacy and moral force in 
the eyes of rightsholders.  The rewrite remains preoccupied with funding and 
standardization and will undoubtedly face the same challenges without a change of 
narratives which attributes added moral force to education.  Its moral force could 
be boosted by a rights narrative. 
Special measures but also permanent minority rights—primarily accruing to ethnic, 
linguistic and religious minorities but also other disadvantaged groups—would 
need to be legislated for.  Where equated with the non-discrimination-focused 
mandate of Brown and Plyler in the courts, this toolbox of rights options could 
supply moral force and clarification for the intuitions of federal courts that positive 
measures actually constitute measures of equal protection.  The incorporation of a 
human right to education into the ECAA would also seemingly imply constitutional 
indivisibility and benefit from lessons learned in terms of a burdened history.   
 
8.5.5 A FEDERAL HUMAN RIGHT TO EDUCATION 
The supra-domestic right described above need not automatically compete with the 
jurisdiction of federal courts—and particularly the Supreme Court as supreme 
arbiter—nor seemingly require radical constitutional amendment.    Once ratified 
by Congress, the human right to education would be federal law—though 
admittedly federal law giving effect to supra-domestic treaty obligations and not 
ordinary law.   Federal courts would retain the power to interpret incorporated 
human rights within the United States jurisdiction, although they would be bound 
by treaty obligations to pay heed to international jurisprudence regarding the 
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interpretation of the rights incorporated.  Where incorporated, both courts and 
lawmakers would have good faith obligations towards those rights. 33   Where 
violated, complainants would have the right to appeal to international bodies and 
procedures once federal avenues were exhausted.  Meanwhile, an expanded multi-
narrative would be available and domestic jurisprudence on the rights growing, 
better equipping federal courts to narrate future admission policies. 
If nothing else, intentional importation could offer federal narratives of equality 
needed legitimacy and resonance.  This may be most true within the United States 
where “polls indicate strong American support for international human rights”34—
including economic, social and cultural rights35—but significant communities of 
rightsholders continue to feel disenfranchised and excluded despite constitutional 
guarantees.  As this thesis has emphasized, those with the most at stake—even the 
‘canary in the coalmine’ in terms of rights realization generally—include Native 
Hawaiian and other indigenous learners.  The thesis has repeatedly described these 
rightsholders as the most vulnerable of the vulnerable whose historical and ongoing 
experience in education show a disturbing pattern of vulnerability to majoritarian 
bias, discrimination and disparities which have changed relatively little over 
centuries—except where indigenous education rights have been realized.  While the 
‘hard case’ might be avoidable in theory, the failure of federal law to account for 
measurable, predictable and consistent forces which a priori disadvantage members 
of minority groups on the basis of their ancestry question the legitimacy and moral 
force of such law—especially where such law is meant to effect constitutional 
guarantees including equal protection. 
                                                          
33 See VCLT, above n 29, which states basic principles of international customary law.  Article 12 
recognizes that the signing of a treaty indicates “consent to be bound by a treaty”.  Under art 26, the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda applies—that is “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties 
to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”  Under art 27, “[a] party may not invoke the 
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”  The general rule of 
interpretation recognized in the Vienna Convention is found in art 31(1) which states: “A treaty shall 
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” The United States signed the 
convention on 26 June 1987 but has not ratified it. 
34 Sam McFarland and Melissa Mathews “Do Americans Care About Human Rights?” (2005) 4 
Journal of Human Rights 305. At least where it does not conflict with national interests or entail a 
significant commitment of resources.   
35 See, for instance, Shareen Hertel, Lyle Skruggs and C Patrick Heidkamp “Human Rights and 
Public Opinion” (2009) 3 Political Science Quarterly 443, regarding public opinion regarding the 
right to a minimum standard of living. 
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Federal legislation and jurisprudence must derive greater legitimacy from the 
human rights multi-narrative’s capacity to legally account for the guarantee/reality 
gap in terms of these most vulnerable of rightsholders and phenomena including 
organic multiplication and denial, indirect, institutionalized and systemic 
discrimination, as well as the good of identity-specific rights.  As Yamamoto and 
Obrey have described, human rights legitimacy is a vital aspect of reconciling the 
“deep harm” which is still experienced by Native Hawaiians and other minorities 
as the result of historical injustices perpetrated by the United States.  Vitally, human 
rights legitimacy seemingly corresponds with democratic legitimacy, just as a 
commitment to human rights affirms an earnest commitment to civil rights.36 
This federal human right to education would seemingly exhibit earnest 
reconciliation, historical awareness, buffer-and-access features, a morally imbued 
right to education, positive measures and minority rights to education.  However, it 
would still lack proportional remedial self-determination and specifically 
indigenous self-determination in education.  Importation of the substantial 
everyone/no-one and complex someone human right to education is consistent with 
an expanded multi-narrative and many of the seven markers but still largely 
confined to liberal projects.  As such, it cannot fully account for the unique 
historico-legal context of the admission policy nor the complex guarantee/reality 
gap which it addresses.    
 
8.6 BEST: INTENTIONAL INCORPORATION OF AN INDIGENOUS HUMAN RIGHT 
TO EDUCATION 
To be most consistent with the multi-narrative and its markers, the United States 
needs to intentionally import UNDRIP and Article 14 into federal law. 
                                                          
36 Eric K Yamamoto and Ashley Kaiao Obrey “Reframing Redress: A ‘Social Healing Through 
Justice’ Approach to United States-Native Hawaiian and Japan-Ainu Reconciliation Initiatives” 
(2009) 16(1) Asian Am LJ 5, at 40-42.  Yamamoto and Obrey argue: “To reclaim legitimacy, an 
established democracy like the United States needs to demonstrate fealty to internationally respected 
precepts of democratic governance.  In particular, the United States must heal the continuing wounds 
of injustice inflicted on its own people.”: at 42. 
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8.6.1 INTENTIONALLY INCORPORATE UNDRIP INTO FEDERAL LEGISLATION  
Any importation should be expressed in the language of rights, assign UNDRIP at 
least a fundamental, supra-legislative value similar to Plyler’s but exceed 
traditional liberal projects in recognizing a more historical self-determination.   
Given the lengthy drafting saga of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples 2007 (UNDRIP), the CANZUS vote and the ‘aspirational’ response of the 
United States when it finally announced its support,37 this recommendation is not 
made lightly.  Nevertheless, only an expanded equality multi-narrative, justifying 
a more historical indigenous learner, will have the philosophical and legal capacity 
to account for the unique historico-legal context of the policy and its capacity to 
overcome guarantee/reality gaps specific to the Native Hawaiian learner.  Such 
expansion requires an earnest response from the United States, even intentional 
incorporation into federal legislation. 
Mancari and a long line of time-honored, consistent federal jurisprudence and 
legislation going back to at least the Marshall Trilogy have recognised the rights of 
Native American peoples to limited, particularly remedial self-determination.  
Residual political status and rights to self-determination have justified indigenous-
specific legislation and policy.  The foundation of the expanded indigenous learner 
already narrative exists. 
However, UNDRIP promises to build on Mancari.  As a human right consistent 
with the rights of peoples, the expanded self-determination is supra-domestic, being 
only subject to certain limits under Article 46 which might be justified in a 
democratic society.38  This self-determination cannot necessarily be abrogated or 
legislated away by Congress nor ignored or “disfigured”39 by activist federal courts 
and would come with international jurisprudence to aid interpretation.  UNDRIP’s 
legitimacy derives from the organic relationship between proportional remedial 
                                                          
37 See discussion in Chapter Six at 6.4. 
 
38 UNDRIP, above n 2, Article 46. 
39 Language of Eric K Yamamoto and Catherine Corpus Betts “Disfiguring Civil Rights to Deny 
Indigenous Hawaiian Self-Determination: The Story of Rice v. Cayetano” in Rachel E Moran and 
Devon Wayne Carbado (eds) Race Law Stories, Foundation Press (New York, Thomson Reuters/ 
Foundation Press, 2008) 541.  
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self-determination and the realization of all other human rights but also from the 
pre-existing, continuous nature of the rights recognized in UNDRIP, especially as 
it expresses the rights of peoples.  Consistent with Hawaiʻi state law, these rights 
would actually originate in the Native Hawaiian people rather than being externally 
imposed thus also countering the harm of overthrow, annexation and other 
historical injustices and buffering against ongoing majoritarian bias and 
discrimination.   
Given its buffer-and-access and organic features, as in New Zealand, intentional 
importation of UNDRIP is likely to blur the lines between constitutional rights and 
human rights but also between indigenous rights, human rights and constitutional 
rights.  As described, this is not only because of importation but because the lines 
between various expressions of the same right to education are seemingly 
superficial where equality narratives are more earnest.  Ultimately, both 
everyone/no-one constitutional rights and complex someone rights seemingly 
depend on the realization of specifically indigenous rights, and specifically 
indigenous rights depend on expanded self-determination. 
As a peremptory norm of international law akin to equality and non-
discrimination, 40  self-determination possesses normative force and represents 
comity with international law.  Given its recognition in sister settler domestic 
jurisdictions including New Zealand and non-discrimination, the right already 
translates at a domestic level.  UNDRIP represents lessons learned from a global 
and local indigenous moʻolelo.  Ultimately, it could offer tremendous moral force 
as it addresses the plight of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged of rightsholders 
rather than wilfully ignoring us.  Again, given the deep harm experienced by Native 
Hawaiians and other indigenous peoples, self-determination possesses the greatest 
narrative capacity for a proportionate response to those harms.41   
 
                                                          
40 See discussion in Chapter Six at 6.5.2. 
41 Yamamoto and Obrey, above n 33, at 38. 
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8.6.2 MODEL IMPORTATION AFTER ACT 195 AND THE AKAKA BILL 
Lawmakers should use Hawaiʻi’s importation of Act 195 and the latest version of 
the Akaka Bill as prototypes for federal importation of UNDRIP’s right to self-
determination. 
Importation is not without precedent in American law.  As described in Chapter 
Three, Act 195 has already imported Article 3 of UNDRIP into Hawaiʻi state law 
and the latest version of the Akaka Bill was set to import the basic wording of 
Article 3 and 4—that is, internal and external, remedial and historical self-
determination—into federal law.   
While the Akaka Bill borrowed some language from Articles 3 and 4, Act 195 
quoted Article 3’s ICCPR-like right to self-determination.  The Act draws on 
UNDRIP’s language and other international law when it speaks in terms of rights 
and frequently stresses identity as “indigenous”, “aboriginal”, “native” and 
“maoli”—which has a similar meaning in Hawaiian—as well as “people” and 
“population”.42  In fact, section 1 notes the United States’ accountability in terms 
of their treaty obligations under international law, including treaties recognizing the 
decolonization rights of the Native Hawaiian people.43  Ironically, Article 3, the 
most debated and resisted of UNDRIP’s provisions44—the provision which caused 
the most consternation amongst the CANZUS group 45 —has already been 
incorporated into American law and equated with various pieces of federal 
legislation identity-specific to Native Hawaiians.   
Such importation is consistent with the joint Departments of Interior and Justice 
report, Mauka to Makai: The River of Justice Must Flow Freely 46  which 
recommended that self-determination for the Native Hawaiian people be a top 
federal priority.  Often citing Act 195, a 2014 Department of the Interior Advance 
                                                          
42 “Indigenous”, “native”, “aboriginal” or “maoli” are used at least 24 times with similar frequency 
for “people” or “population”. 
43 Including article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations; and United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 66(I) regarding Transmission of information under Article 73 e of the Charter,  
A/RES/66(1) (1946): see discussion in 6.6.1. 
44 See discussion in Chapter Six at 1.4. 
45 See discussion in Chapter Six at 6.6.1. 
46 Department of the Interior From Mauka to Makai the River of Justice Must Flow Freely: Report 
on the Reconciliation Process between the Federal Government and Native Hawaiians (Washington 
DC, Department of the Interior and Department of Justice, 2000). 
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Notice of Procedural Rulemaking (ANPRM)47 accepted that the “government-to-
government relationship” between the federal government and the Native Hawaiian 
people should be re-established but would seemingly bypass the legislative ordeal 
of the Akaka Bill via administrative procedure like that used to federally recognize 
Native American tribes.  The ANPRM has been described by respected indigenous 
legal scholars James Anaya and Robert Williams as “open-ended” as far as the 
shape that self-determination will take should such an administrative rule 
eventuate.48  In fact, the ANPRM sought feedback from Native Hawaiians on how 
much the federal government should be involved in the reorganization process and 
whether Native Hawaiians should determine that process autonomously.49  In a 
hopefully earnest overture, the ANPRM sought the input of specifically indigenous, 
politically defined rightsholders regarding a possible expansion of the narratives. 
However, while Act 195 is consistent with the intentional importation of UNDRIP 
and certainly a landmark in Native Hawaiian history, it cannot, on a narrative level, 
substitute the greater importation of UNDRIP.  As discussed in Chapter Six, 
UNDRIP’s mostly economic, social and cultural rights not only animate and define 
Article 3 self-determination but constitute a minimum list of human rights standards 
regarding indigenous peoples and individuals50 which should not, it would seem, 
be abbreviated given organic multiplication and indivisibility—especially as they 
form a legal backdrop to the Article 14 right to education.  Moreover, UNDRIP in 
its entirety could be vital in framing any reorganization process which would clarify 
the political nature of the admission policy in future.  The proviso in the ANPRM 
seems to be that the process be “consistent with Federal law”.51  Currently, that 
would, at best, mean a Mancari narrative not entirely consistent with the unique 
historico-legal context of the admission policy or the dangers of congressional 
whim and judicial activism.   
                                                          
47  Department of the Interior “Procedures for Reestablishing a Government-to-Government 
Relationship With the Native Hawaiian Community” Advance Notice of Procedural Rulemaking, 
43 CFR Part 50 (16 June 2014) [ANPRM]. 
48  James Anaya and Robert Williams “International Recognition” (Part of panel discussion at 
“Kāmau a Ea 5: Keeping the Breath of Life”, Hawaiian Governance Symposium, Honolulu, 
November 2014).   
49 At 4.  These are two of “five threshold questions”. 
50 See Chapter Six at 6.3.2. 
51 ANPRM, at 4. 
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Once imported into a standalone piece of legislation, perhaps not unlike the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 or its Human Rights Act 1993, all federal 
legislation relating to Native Hawaiians should be consistent with the United States’ 
good faith obligations under UNDRIP.  The legislation could impose certain 
safeguards to address potential internal oppression but these limits should be 
consistent with UNDRIP’s own limits52 in order to avoid the pitfalls of current 
narratives.  Legislation which is inconsistent with UNDRIP would be revisited.  
Legislation such as the Akaka Bill which remained focused on federal recognition 
might have to be revisited in terms of proportionality and given the vulnerability of 
tribes with federal recognition to arbitrary congressional whim and judicial 
activism.53 
Where federal legislation or judicial decisions are not consistent with UNDRIP’s 
rights, Native Hawaiians would then have recourse to international law once all 
domestic avenues are exhausted. 54   As previously argued in terms of good 
recommendations, where such rights are equated with Brown-like equal protection, 
more immediate recourse may be available through federal courts.  Where 
substantial everyone/no-one and complex human rights to education are 
intentionally imported, many UNDRIP rights including special measures including 
affirmative action could be immediately legal and justiciable including in terms of 
the ICCPR’s Article 26 right to non-discrimination given its long legal reach. 
 
8.6.3 INTENTIONALLY INCORPORATE ARTICLE 14 INTO FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
Lawmakers should intentionally draft legislation which specifically gives effect to 
Article 14 of UNDRIP.  Legislation regarding Native Hawaiians and other 
                                                          
52 For instance, Article 46’s territorial and democratic limits. 
53 As discussed in Chapter 3, the author is well-aware of the marathon-like struggle which passage 
of the Akaka Bill has already been and does not make this recommendation lightly. 
54 UNDRIP does not have a complaints mechanism yet but this possibility is currently being pursued 
by the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues: see Dalee Sambo Dorough and Megan Davis Study 
on an Optional Protocol to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
focusing on a Voluntary Mechanism E/C.19/2014/7 (2014).   
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indigenous peoples which is inconsistent with Article 14’s multi-narrative of 
equality should be reviewed.   
Although UNDRIP as a whole promises an expansion of narratives, Article 14’s 
right to education itself should be intentionally incorporated into federal law. 
Education is rightly attributed an almost incomparable value in federal 
jurisprudence such as Plyler and Brown as well as in the human rights universe.  
The specifically indigenous right to education would be supra-domestic, remain 
inalienable, universal and could not be refuted or taken away by domestic law 
because it was inherently attached to the human being.55  Its legitimacy would 
derive from its organic and legal indivisibility from fundamental civil and political 
rights, and its justiciability and emphasized legality otherwise.  As a culmination of 
the evolution of the international right to education, it would also be consistent with 
Brown-like substantial equality and non-discrimination and a Plyler-like 
fundamental right to education as well as the remedial purpose and political basis 
of the Mancari preference.  As in New Zealand, intentional importation could result 
in an overlap between human, constitutional and indigenous rights displaying 
further organic indivisibility, justiciability, and emphasized legality. 
The importation of Article 14 might also clarify liberal concerns regarding 
UNDRIP’s Article 3 right to self-determination.  At the nexus of education and self-
determination, Article 14 is buffer and access, organic multiplier and the epitome 
of remediation, specifically meant to remedy rights denials in education.  Again, 
Article 14 and other specific rights define and illustrate what this expanded self-
determination might look like in real-time.  Rather than secession and 
Balkanization—the perceived horrors of a decolonization context—UNDRIP rights 
mostly reference ESCRs, the stuff of human survival and basic thriving, not civil 
war. 56   
Regarding survival and thriving, Article 14 constitutes a minimum list of human 
rights standards for the indigenous learner in education.  Certainly, other UNDRIP 
rights give context to those standards—including self-determination, special 
                                                          
55 Chapter Five at 1.2. 
56 See Chapter Six at 6.3.2. 
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measures, language and transmission of knowledge rights—but Article 14 
enshrines education and the admission policy itself.  Given all these features, 
Article 14 would carry significant moral force in and of itself.  Its intentional 
importation would have several implications in terms of education legislation 
including present and future incarnations of the NCLB, ECAA and the NHEA. 
The importation of Article 14 and associated rights would import a multi-narrative 
toolbox of rights options including universal guarantees, special measures, 
permanent minority rights and autonomous indigenous educational systems and 
institutions.  Consistent with Brown’s positive duties, an earnest importation of 
Article 14 would require that the United States take “effective measures to ensure 
that” 57  education rights are protected.  Federal education legislation would 
generally need to be consistent with all these rights options in seemingly identity-
specific terms, given the buffer-and-access function of specificity.  Article 14 would 
then provide a supra-legislative standard by which to interpret a host of federal 
legislation dealing with Native Hawaiians in education and to buffer such 
provisions against adamant everyone/no-one narratives.   
Even prior to incorporation, federal legislation should be reviewed for consistency 
with Article 14 in the name of good faith treaty obligations.  As the right is 
surprisingly consistent with federal precedents—particularly where measured in 
terms of substantial equality and non-discrimination—such an exercise could result 
in a certain legitimation of federal legislation.  The host of legislation listed by 
various courts which are specific to Native Hawaiians in education, including the 
Stafford-Hawkins Act would already be fairly consistent with the effective 
measures required by Article 14, as will the NHEA.  Indigenous education rights 
expressed through, for example, the Native American Languages Act would also 
seem to have greater moral force vis a vis everyone/no-one legislation, including 
the ESSA.  Such legislation would best be interpreted as a historically specific 
response to the Native Hawaiian moʻolelo, likened to the application of a 
deliberately everyone/no-one narrative to segregation in post-Brown jurisprudence 
and Civil Rights legislation.    
                                                          
57 As discussed in Chapter Six at 6.3.2, “effective measures” are stipulated throughout UNDRIP. 
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8.6.4 ENACT STANDALONE FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
The NHEA and the rest of Title VII should be separated from the ESSA and included 
in a standalone piece of federal legislation which gives effect to Article 14 and 
related UNDRIP rights. 
Beyond mere incorporation, amendment or interpretive aid, earnest incorporation 
may still require the drafting of a standalone piece of legislation which would 
replace Title VII of the ESSA.   As discussed, the ESSA’s capacity to account for 
the admission policy in terms of an earnest liberalism is undermined by the 
predominance of a homogenous everyone/no-one narrative expressed in terms of 
standardization.  At the very least, the NHEA is literally and philosophically 
submerged in this singular narrative.  Philosophically, it is also not rights based but 
governance and funding focused.  Given the supra-domestic nature of self-
determination and the supra-legislative, Plyler-like equal protection which also 
underwrites the expanded multi-narrative, the ESSA already feels like a poor fit for 
the NHEA and must be for Article 14.   
In terms of coverage, this federal statement of an indigenous right to education 
would apply to Native Americans, Alaska Natives as well as Native Hawaiians58 
not unlike Title VII.   Like the ESSA and NHEA it could retain provisions specific 
to federal Indian law and the relationship between respective groups and the federal 
government, and also for governance and funding.  However, group-specific 
provisions would need to be consistent with Article 14, while governance would 
need to reflect Articles 3 and 4 of UNDRIP and preserve indigenous peoples’ right 
to collective rational revision in terms of determining processes affecting them, as 
recognized in Article 18 and as emphasized in the ANPRM.  Funding would 
similarly need to be expressed in UNDRIP terms of both the rights of indigenous 
Americans to, and state obligations of, effective special measures. 
The legislation would need to repeat Article 14’s multi-narrative in terms of 
everyone (“all”), no-one (“without discrimination”) and the complex someone 
                                                          
58 However, it would also seemingly apply to the indigenous peoples of Guam and other territories 
as there is little distinction in UNDRIP between territorial or decolonization status and federal status.  
Indigenous peoples like the Chamorro people of Guam have suffered similar human rights abuses 
as the result of United States occupation and annexation: see Aguon, above n 29. 
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(“particularly children”).  Its learner would be specifically guaranteed previously 
promised universal individual rights to a public education but also the option to 
attend a parallel, indigenously established and controlled educational institution 
such as Kamehameha Schools—as well as rights to an education in their own 
culture and language as a minority.59   
In name and substance, however, these federal rights—including its everyone/no-
one provisions—would be, consistent with buffer-and-access and historical self-
determination projects specific to the indigenous learner.  The legislation would 
need to recognize the rights-holder as both the indigenous learner and their 
community.  Preference for the indigenous learner in admissions would need to be 
explicit consistent with Article 14(1)’s control right, Article 18’s decision-making 
right and Article 33’s right to determine membership.60  All children would possess 
a Plyler-like universal right to education and other buffer-and-access rights—one 
which was also specifically attributed to the indigenous child.  However, the right 
to attend a school like the Kamehameha Schools—and for that school to be 
established and controlled by indigenous communities like Native Hawaiians—
would be owned by the indigenous learner.   
The inclusion of related UNDRIP rights could recognize the good of indigenous 
cultural membership.  Again, Article 14 is preceded by rights: to 
“revitalize...cultural traditions and customs”61; to “teach...spiritual and religious 
traditions, customs and ceremonies”62; and “to revitalize, use, develop and transmit 
to future generations their histories, language, oral traditions, philosophies, writing 
systems and literatures...”63—rights essential to indigenous education.  Like the 
public good of educating all learners in Native Hawaiian history and culture 
envisioned by the Hawaiʻi State Constitution,64 federal legislation would benefit 
from the inclusion of the Article 15(1) “right to the dignity and diversity of 
indigenous cultures, traditions, histories and aspirations which shall be 
                                                          
59 See minority education rights discussed in Chapter Five at 5.2.3. 
60 Which would be consistent with Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez 436 US 49 (1978). 
61 Article 11(1).   
62 Article 12(1). 
63 Article 13(1). 
64 Hawaiʻi Constitution, art X. 
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appropriately reflected in education”. 65   With Article 14, these rights could 
represent a legislative list of identity-specific primary goods for indigenous learners 
in America—or as Article 43 states, they would “constitute the minimum standards 
for the survival, dignity and well-being of” the indigenous child.66   
In terms of deep harm, however, these rights would seemingly address indigenous-
specific human wrongs in education, even the disadvantage of cultural membership.  
In their specificity, the legislation would clearly and directly respond to specific 
injustices historically and currently suffered by Native Hawaiian and other 
indigenous learners.67  However, rather than merely performing a buffer-and-access 
function in terms of present disparities, this federal indigenous right to education 
could be narrated as a remedy to ongoing harm which continues to have a profound 
effect on current rights outcomes.   
 
8.7 CONCLUSION 
Given the once-and-future nature of UNDRIP rights, this right would have the 
liberal narrative capacity to account for the causal chain of historical self-
determination. This right could seemingly account for the prior sovereignty of a 
nation which never relinquished it, the ongoing harm resulting from continued 
denial of self-determination, and the living continuum of Native Hawaiian rights 
which is a legal fact—or the unique historico-legal context of the admission policy.  
Its buffer-and-access features would nevertheless appreciate the Schools’ proven 
track record in overcoming the guarantee/reality gap in real-time. 
In contrast to the modified Weber-Johnson test, these rights would seemingly ask 
the ‘right questions’.  Rather than viewing present manifest imbalance in 
historically abstract terms, these rights admit the reality of in-built majoritarian bias 
and discrimination against Native Hawaiians causally linked to the above history 
and an overwhelming species of discrimination, even multi-generational trauma, 
                                                          
65 UNDRIP, art 15(1).  My emphasis.  Article 15(2) clearly refers to previous instruments on the 
purpose of education in its aim of “combat[ting] prejudice and eliminate[ing] discrimination 
and...promot[ing] tolerance”. 
66 UNDRIP, art 43. 
67 See discussion in Chapter 2 at 2.4.4 and in Chapter 3 at 3.2.2. 
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chronic stress, higher allostatic load, cumulative, cyclical and otherwise complex 
factors drawn insidiously to Native Hawaiian identity.  In fact, best 
recommendations acknowledge the deep harm of overthrow, annexation, 
assimilation and discrimination and recognize historical self-determination and 
buffer-and-access mechanisms as a proportionate remedy to that harm. 
Similarly, the question would not be whether the policy ‘trammeled’ the rights of 
others or whether it did ‘unnecessarily’ but the extent of the right itself.  The 
question would not be whether the right was consistent with liberal projects alone—
with earnestly reconciling the guarantee/gap for individuals—but whether it was 
consistent with the residual self-determination rights of a sovereign people which 
never ceded that sovereignty.  It would be a political, human rights or constitutional 
question—not an exception to the rule. 
Certainly, the goal would not be parity but long-term outcomes, organic 
multiplication rather than denial.  The rights in question would not be temporary 
exceptions but timeless, once-and-future rights, a supra-domestic affirmation of a 
historical continuum of Native Hawaiian rights. 
Ironically, one of the most significant implications of Article 14(1) is that the 
identity of those preferred in admissions to the Kamehameha Schools is less 
important than the identity of those making that decision and the basis of the right 
to make that decision.  Beyond individual considerations, remedial self-
determination recognizes that collective rational revision translates into individual 
rational revision.  As Kymlicka realizes, the toolbox of rights options is just that—
a toolbox out of which Native Hawaiians may utilize multiple narratives of equality 
in order to reconcile the disadvantages of cultural membership—including in-built 
majoritarian bias and discrimination and other effects of deep harm.  It is the 
quintessential expression of a richer rational revision context. 
In fact, this toolbox best resembles the multi-narrative of Hawaiʻi state law and the 
claims of Native Hawaiians themselves.  It also most closely affords with the 
intuitions of lawmakers, courts and the earnest liberal generally that the admission 
policy is really a measure of equality justified by the reconciliation of formalized 
everyone/no-one constitutional guarantees with gross real-time disparities 
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unrelentingly attracted to indigenous identity.  Moreover, Article 14 and UNDRIP 
have an increased narrative capacity to account for the disadvantage and good of 
cultural membership, the moʻolelo, both global and local, and the liberal 
appropriateness of an admission policy which appears to be effecting substantial 
equality on a daily basis. 
The author is under no illusion that better and best recommendations would 
seemingly require what amounts to a major paradigm shift in both legal and political 
attitudes, that decades of US exceptionalism would have to be discarded and that a 
‘Third Reconstruction’,68 even a human rights revolution akin to the Civil Rights 
gains of the 1960s, may have to take place.   However, that very possibility indicates 
a tremendous opportunity, even the hope of another Brown moment. 
The reality is that, regardless of whether human rights are intentionally incorporated 
into United States federal law, Native Hawaiians retain human rights as human 
beings and specifically indigenous human rights as an indigenous people under 
international law.  Incorporation or lack thereof, whether intentional or not, cannot 
change this legal fact or the fact that Native Hawaiians are utilizing human rights 
frameworks and fora to advance legal claims.69  However, incorporation would 
create a greater consistency between domestic and international narratives 
enhancing the moral force of all.  Rejecting aspirational distinctions and displaying 
a good faith earnestness towards a right which the United States has approved by 
signature anyway must also lend greater legitimacy to the United States as a human 
rights defender generally.   
                                                          
68 Again, borrowing language of Yamamoto and Betts, above n 33.  
69 James Anaya in Anaya and Williams, above n 57. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
EARNESTNESS  
9 CHAPTER NINE: EARNESTNESS 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
Awful as race prejudice, lawlessness and ignorance are, we can fight time if we 
frankly face them and dare name them and tell the truth; but if we continually dodge 
and cloud the issue, and say the half truth because the whole stings and shames; if 
we do this, we invite catastrophe.  Let us then in all charity but unflinching firmness 
set our faces against all statesmanship that looks in such directions.1 
At its outset, the thesis asked how a school which was established to help a group 
of children consistently identified with disparities in education achieve equality—
and which has actually done so—could be sued for discrimination because it prefers 
those children in admissions.   
In search of answers, this thesis has critically analyzed the narratives of equality 
evident in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Doe v Kamehameha 
Schools, arguing that the dissent, majority and concurrence opinions suggest three 
conflicting narratives of equality—what have been called the adamant everyone/no-
one, weak someone and limited indigenous learner narratives.  It has demonstrated 
how these narratives reflect an identity-specific, racialized history of slavery and 
segregation but fail to account entirely for either the unique historico-legal history 
of the Native Hawaiian people or the huge gap between formal constitutional 
guarantees of equality and everyday realities of complex discrimination and 
disparities almost unrelentingly attracted to Native Hawaiian identity.  It has 
recommended an expansion of these narratives within federal law consistent with 
liberal theory, international law and the legal experience of a sister settler 
jurisdiction—Aotearoa New Zealand—but, more importantly, with substantial 
equality, non-discrimination and rights of self-determination which may have the 
greatest capacity for reconciling the guarantee/reality gap.  Finally, specific good, 
                                                          
1 African American journalist, educator and civil rights activist WEB Du Bois, quoted in David 
Levering Lewis W. E. B. Du Bois, 1868-1919: Biography of a Race (New York, Owl Books, 1993) 
at 434. 
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better and best recommendations have included philosophical consistency with the 
expanded multi-narrative, the intentional importation of the human right to 
education and the intentional incorporation of Article 14 of the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2007 into federal law.   
As stated at the outset of the thesis, however, these recommendations could only 
ever be a first step—though necessary.  Several issues remain uncertain. 
 
9.2 REMAINING CHALLENGES 
First, it is impossible to determine how federal judges and lawmakers might respond 
to the recommendations, no matter how consistent with substantial equality.  The 
thesis has suggested possible paths, including those which might take very little 
adjustment in terms of present federal narratives.  It has indicated the possible 
interface between present narratives and the expanded multi-narrative in terms of 
all other recommendations.   However, as the Kamehameha case demonstrates, 
interpretation can differ widely and be dramatically inconsistent given current 
trends of judicial activism and congressional whim creating arbitrary narratives 
which produce significant wrestles and vastly different outcomes.  Additionally, 
one would have to be naïve to believe that the intellectual shift from prioritization 
of the singular narrative to a human rights- and indigenous rights-informed multi-
narrative of equality will be easy for judges, lawmakers or the public at large.  This 
would seemingly require a major paradigm shift, a kind of constitutional revolution 
of the magnitude of Reconstruction and Civil Rights. 
This is not, however, the first time the nation has stood on the brink of such a 
moment, nor the first time it has been faced with the opportunity to adopt new 
equality narratives.  As Chapter Two describes, while Reconstruction-era 
constitutional amendments were revolutionary in outlawing segregation and 
recognizing the rights of African-Americans as citizens, Brown v Board of 
Education required that those formal guarantees be substantially interpreted, laying 
the foundation for another narrative shift which ushered in the Civil Rights era.   As 
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Yamamoto and Betts have aptly described, 2  those landmark constitutional 
moments ended with two broken civil rights promises, the most recent accounting 
for the demise of affirmative action and rise of reverse discrimination suits.  This 
one need not follow suit. 
As argued, the human right to education and Article 14 itself come loaded with 
significant moral force and liberal legitimacy which could bolster the moral force 
and liberal legitimacy of constitutional rights.  For millions of its citizens who are 
practically excluded from the promise of equality according to group identity—
including African-Americans and Native Americans—importation would at least 
demonstrate a certain amount of earnestness.  At best, it would provide narratives 
capable of addressing the historico-legal peculiarities of the rights of other groups 
and most importantly their own guarantee/reality gaps. 
The irony is that, as difficult as it might be to convince American lawmakers and 
courts to embrace a multi-narrative of equality, the philosophical and legal changes 
required would only be the first step.  While an expansion of narratives must 
facilitate meaningful discussion and dialogue on indigenous education rights, 
implementation remains a separate but grave issue.  International law’s increasingly 
identity-specific rights to education and explicit state parties’ obligations in regard 
to ESCRs and education—indeed the drafting of article 14 itself—all indicate a 
drive for implementation.  The evolution of the right to education illustrates the 
importance placed on legal frameworks, processes and structures which enhance 
and ensure substantive realization of these rights, especially because they are 
organically indivisible from and crucial to the realization of most or all other human 
rights and freedoms.  This is the proverbial ‘million-dollar question’ in international 
law.   
Similarly, New Zealand currently draws less criticism for failing to import 
international human rights than for failing to implement its ratified and imported 
treaty obligations.3  In contrast, the United States draws considerable criticism for 
                                                          
2 Eric K Yamamoto and Catherine Corpus Betts “Disfiguring Civil Rights to Deny Indigenous 
Hawaiian Self-Determination: The Story of Rice v. Cayetano” in Rachel E Moran and Devon Wayne 
Carbado (eds) Race Law Stories, Foundation Press (New York, Thomson Reuters/ Foundation Press, 
2008) 541.   
3 See, for instance, Judy McGregor, Sylvia Bell and Margaret Wilson Fault Lines: Human Rights in 
New Zealand (New Zealand Law Foundation Research Paper, April 2015). 
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both.  While the United States’ characteristic exceptionalism creates significant 
obstacles to even preliminary discussions of human rights, New Zealand has started 
implementation dialogues.   If the standard is substantive equality and non-
discrimination, however, the very next inquiry after importation must be to explore 
what other frameworks, structures and processes will be needed to realize the right 
to education. 
The question of enforcement entails such an assessment.  Once it ratified the 
relevant treaties and imported the human right to education into federal law the 
United States might still violate them at will as it has others, both domestically and 
internationally.  In fact, it has a track record of doing so, particularly where 
indigenous peoples are concerned.   
However, the thesis has shown that, where liberal projects are earnest, someone, 
indigenous and human narratives become intertwined with constitutional 
everyone/no-one narratives.  Thus, the most fundamental and sacred guarantees of 
the Constitution will be at stake should the United States fail to keep its word in 
terms of human or specifically indigenous human rights.  Such failure might be per 
the status quo but would certainly appear to be less legitimate, less right and raise 
a greater level of alert in our liberal sensibilities regardless of rightsholder identity.   
Similarly, the expansion of narratives would create “discursive space”4 but also 
accountability in terms of supra-domesticity, organic indivisibility and emphasized 
legality where education rights continue to be denied to Native Hawaiians and other 
indigenous peoples.  Again, importation and incorporation would create a domestic 
toolbox of rights options and legal remedies to which indigenous peoples and other 
vulnerable rightsholders can appeal. 
Given these uncertainties, implementation and enforcement will require a 
comprehensive review of present legislation for consistency with the imported, 
incorporated human rights but, perhaps, also the establishment of specialized 
judicial or quasi-judicial bodies fitted to determine human rights and specifically 
indigenous human rights questions.  In terms of a federal body with special 
expertise in terms of indigenous education rights, New Zealand’s Waitangi Tribunal 
                                                          
4 James Anaya and Robert Williams “International Recognition” (Panel discussion at “Kāmau a Ea 
5: Keeping the Breath of Life”, Hawaiian Governance Symposium, Honolulu, November 2014). 
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offers one possible model.  The federal version might source its authority in the 
incorporated UNDRIP legislation or UNDRIP itself just as the Waitangi Tribunal 
is sourced in the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 which gives effect to the Treaty of 
Waitangi.  This body could hear complaints relating to ‘prejudice’ against Native 
Hawaiians and other indigenous individuals and groups both in terms of historic 
injustices, present discrimination and predictable future prejudice.  It might be 
supported by a commission that receives complaints not unlike the current Equal 
Employment Opportunities Commission established during the Civil Rights era to 
enforce civil rights.  The Human Rights Commission and Human Rights Review 
Tribunal in New Zealand provide additional models of recommendatory and 
judicial fora with special expertise in addressing human rights and specifically 
indigenous human rights. 
Finally, international recognition of Native Hawaiians as a people possessing an 
expanded right to self-determination does not depend on the reorganization of a 
Native Hawaiian governing entity.  Nor should federal recognition pursuant to any 
incorporated UNDRIP rights.  However, a Native Hawaiian governance entity 
would provide an easily recognizable face for the exercise of self-determination 
especially as it administers its own educational systems and schools.  Conversely, 
the degree to which UNDRIP and Article 14 will affect the shape of that governing 
entity and the reorganization process also remains to be determined. 
 
9.3 LESSONS LEARNED 
The impact of such changes on long-term real-time outcomes for Native Hawaiian 
learners and other vulnerable indigenous rightsholders also remain unquantifiable 
at this stage.  However, philosophical consistency, intentional human rights 
importation and UNDRIP incorporation—especially article 14—would expand 
federal narratives of equality giving them a greater capacity to account for both the 
unique historico-legal context of the policy and the complex socio-economic 
disparities it was designed to address.  As argued throughout the thesis, such 
narrative capacity could significantly effect positive outcomes for a group of 
children historically associated with significant disparities in education as it buffers 
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against in-built discrimination, provides access to a richer rational revision and 
remedies ongoing harm. 
In contrast to the modified Weber-Johnson test, the imported and incorporated 
multi-narrative of equality would seemingly ask the ‘right questions’.  Rather than 
viewing present manifest imbalance in a single moment of time, multiple rights 
admit the reality of in-built majoritarian bias and discrimination against Native 
Hawaiians causally linked to a particular history and an overwhelming species of 
discrimination, even multi-generational trauma, chronic stress, higher allostatic 
load, cumulative, cyclical and otherwise complex factors drawn insidiously to 
Native Hawaiian identity.  Similarly, the question is no longer just whether the 
policy would trammel the rights of others unnecessarily or otherwise but whether 
the policy might be protecting the rights of others—whether it might be consistent 
with substantial equality.  In fact, the admission policy is no longer the exception 
to the rule but a right in and of itself.  The next question is not whether this right is 
consistent with liberal projects alone—with earnestly reconciling the guarantee/gap 
for individuals—but whether it is consistent with the residual, specifically 
indigenous self-determination rights of a once-and-future sovereign people which 
never ceded that sovereignty.  Subsequently, the Kamehameha Schools are more 
accurately portrayed as no ordinary school but an Article 14 system, an innocuous 
expression of both internal and external self-determination.   
Where recommendations are implemented, the admission policy will form a nexus 
of rights which more appropriately engenders political questions, human rights and 
constitutional questions rather than questions of justiciability, legality or 
enforceability.  Consistent with international law, the goal is no longer elusive 
parity with the majority but long-term de facto outcomes, measurable indicators, 
organic multiplication rather than denial.  The rights in question are not temporary 
but timeless, once-and-future rights.  They are a supra-domestic affirmation of a 
historical continuum of Native Hawaiian rights—which also happen to be the best 
chance that the earnest liberal has of reconciling the everyone/no-one constitutional 
guarantees with the reality of complex discrimination and disparities drawn to 
Native Hawaiian identity.  Despite implementation and enforcement issues, this 
multi-narrative toolbox of options represents the best possibility for resolving the 
wrestle and the gaps. 
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9.4 HOPE 
Of course, this thesis has from the outset assumed that anyone speaking in the name 
of equality or claiming it to champion their cause is talking about the project of the 
earnest liberal—that is, the reconciliation of real-time, indigenous identity-specific 
discrimination and disparities which inherently violate liberal projects and 
formalized, everyone/no-one guarantees.  The thesis has assumed that no earnest 
liberal will be comfortable with professed equality narratives which cannot 
reconcile the guarantee/reality gap and even inherently favor certain groups of 
individuals while disadvantaging others on the basis of identity.  Moreover, the 
thesis has assumed that no earnest liberal will approve of deep harm or the historic 
and ongoing denial of education rights to the most vulnerable of our society’s 
members, even a group of children who are overcoming unchosen odds heavily 
‘stacked against’ them. 
Given ‘lessons learned’ at home and abroad, in theory and law, it seems impossible 
to be anything but an earnest liberal.  As the evolution of the right to education 
illustrates, an adamant insistence on homogenous and anonymous rights 
fundamentally ignores lessons learned not just from slavery but from the Holocaust 
and World War II and the experience of minority groups the world over.  Adamant 
narratives particularly ignore the catastrophic global indigenous moʻolelo of 
colonization, assimilationist law and policy, and frank statistics which tell their own 
story.  These historic and present realities undermine all promises of liberal equality 
and all equality narratives by their very existence, effectively predicting future 
rights denial and discrimination—just as they retell an unresolved past marred by 
injustice.  The logarithmic nature of this species of global and once-and-future harm 
must particularly discomfort the earnest liberal. 
Accordingly, the earnest liberal will see the necessity of dropping veils of ignorance 
and disregarding the false premise of an original position or level playing field, of 
abandoning cosmopolitan arguments which actually mask old-fashioned 
discrimination and callous utilitarian calculations—when necessary to ensure 
equality.   Instead, the earnest liberal will insist on an equality requiring equal 
outcomes and not merely equal treatment.  Such equality will be historically aware, 
even remedial—not abstract—and recognize cultural membership and indigenous 
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identity where doing so may buffer the indigenous individual against indirect, 
systemic and cumulative discrimination and, conversely, provide access to a richer 
rational revision context.  The earnest liberal will recognize complex someone, 
strong standalone rights to education and specifically indigenous rights to establish 
and control autonomous educational systems and institutions as consistent with 
equality and non-discrimination but also historically continuous indigenous rights 
which exceed traditional liberal projects.  The earnest liberal will recognize his own 
rational revision aims in the toolbox of rights options which result from this 
expanded multi-narrative.   
Ultimately, in the tears of my mother and the aunties the earnest liberal will weep 
too.  Then, rather than cry ‘discrimination’, they will see themselves and feel their 
own offense in the real-time plight of the Native Hawaiian learner, in the wrestle, 
the intuitions and the gaps.  The ongoing, enduring and pervasive harm of historic 
injustice will sting not just their pride but their humanity.  They will come to equate 
the admission policy’s substantial effect on real-time outcomes with the validity of 
their philosophy and its potential for reconciliation of the guarantee/reality gap with 
proof of their religion.  In the historico-legal context of the admission policy they 
will see a liberal good, the very tenets of their faith; in collective self-determination, 
they will recognize the individual rational revision they hold dear.  In difference, 
they will understand sameness.  In identity, we will all see hope.    
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